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Abstract
This thesis examines the notion of the enabling approach within the context of 
housing provision in Jos, Nigeria. The research analyses how the notion of 
enabling has been deployed and why it has failed to provide solutions to formal 
housing problems in Nigeria and other developing economies. This study takes 
the form of a three-step analysis; it follows the sequence of the policy 
implementations. Firstly, it examined the notion of enabling in respect to the 
debt crisis that occurred during the 1980s and the measures taken (SAPs) by 
the IMF to aid Nigeria's recovery. This aspect was scrutinised and findings 
agreed with previous research in showing that the conditionality imposed by the 
IMF further crippled the economy of Nigeria thereby interfering with social 
services systems. This study also concurs with previous studies in confirming 
that the implementation of SAPs in countries affected by debt crisis, rather than 
bringing about recovery, was instead the beginning of a transition to neo­
liberalism, which obstructed attempts to provide formal housing.
Secondly, the notion of enabling was scrutinised in respect to the rise of 
neoliberalism and the reforms implemented in Nigeria as a consequence. 
Primary and secondary source material was employed to examine the 
underlying premises of neoliberalism. The findings show that the neoliberal 
policy reforms prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank for Nigeria did not 
deliver their promise - economic growth and national development. For the 
Nigerian housing sub-sector, the neoliberal reform programme left fewer results 
than it had promised for the subsidised mortgage system.
Thirdly, the notion of enabling was examined in relation to the transfer of 
administrative techniques from the World Bank, the UNDP and the UN­
HABITAT, to Nigeria. The assumptions of this policy transfer were empirically 
examined in respect to the provision of new housing and the improvement of 
slum conditions in Jos. The study reveals that the strategy emanating was 
unsuitable for addressing the issues affecting the provision of new housing. It 
was, however, suitable for the administration of slum improvement projects. But 
this had the consequence of side-lining the existing bureaucratic system in Jos 
and of limiting the participation of domestic financial institutions in Nigeria.
For Nigeria, the novelty of this research lies in the approach adopted to 
investigate the overall effect of the socioeconomic and political development 
process on housing policy outcomes in Jos. Through this, the complexities 
surrounding housing provision were uncovered and the variables influencing 
housing provision in Jos were identified. A distinction was drawn between the 
variables: those that result from enduring legacies of national development 
process and those that originate from the local setting in Jos.
Overall therefore, this study demonstrates that the implementation of public 
policy founded on foreign ideas that are coercively imposed leads to 
unsustainable policy strategies. This was confirmed in respect to housing policy 
and practice in Jos: ambiguities in the city's housing provision strategy created 
difficulty for implementers, uncertainties and risk for local private investors and 
mistrust on the part of beneficiaries.
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CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Nigeria is one of many developing countries that has undertaken neoliberal 
reforms to counter the effect of debt crisis. The reforms in Nigeria were 
prescribed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, on 
the assumption that economic liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation 
would enhance the role of the private sector and equally promote growth and 
development. The current housing policy statement in Nigeria and the notion of 
enabling originated from this line of thinking: it was assumed that neoliberal 
reforms would lead to growth and stability in the financial system, and that 
government would introduce and enforce appropriate legislation to compel 
private finance institutions to contribute in the financing of subsidised mortgage 
housing. This has not occurred; on the contrary, the neoliberal reform 
programme in Nigeria has brought fewer results than the reform promised the 
economy and the subsidised housing system.
The neoliberal agenda was born out of the debt crisis that ravaged developing 
countries, including Nigeria, throughout the 1980s. The solution prescribed by 
the IMF and the World Bank for all the countries that were affected by the debt 
crisis was the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). SAP was founded on 
four key objectives: one is liberalisation - the promotion of the free movement of 
capital and the opening of national markets to international competition. The 
second is the privatisation of public services and companies. The third is the 
deregulation of labour relations and the cutting of public spending. The last is 
the improvement of competitiveness. To achieve these objectives, the IMF and 
World Bank decided to impose the same measures (conditionality) on all 
countries that were in need of loans to cushion the scourge of the debt crises: 
first, the borrowing countries were made to pursue government deficit through 
the reduction of public spending on social services including health care, 
education, pensions, and housing among others. The second was an upward
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review of interest rates. The third was the liberalisation of foreign exchange 
rules and trade. The fourth was the scaling down of public enterprises through 
privatisation. The last was the deregulation of the national economy (Stiglitz, 
2002 and Jauch, 2012).
In theory, SAP and its conditionality were meant to help countries return to 
economic stability after the debt crisis. In practice, however, the opposite was 
the case (Jauch, 2012) and dozens of developing countries that have followed 
the IMF and the World Bank policy prescriptions found themselves worse off 
than they were before (Stiglitz, 2002). The IMF and World Bank have been 
widely criticised for prescribing such policies. Furthermore, the manner in which 
Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) were implemented has been indicted on 
the grounds that they were not democratically decided upon by the debtor 
countries but imposed by the IMF and the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2002; Locker, 
2000). Such policy transfer is coercive rather than voluntary (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 1996). This often undermines the sovereignty of the nation that is 
compelled to accept a foreign proposal because it does not have the freedom to 
choose between alternatives or the opportunity to make an informed decision 
(Evans, 2009). Most often, the consequence is a policy failure (Dolowitz and 
Marsh, 2000 p. 5); and this is the most important critique that has been 
advanced in regard to the IMF/World Bank SAPs and the neoliberal agenda 
(Evans, 2009; Stilitz, 2002; Dolowitz and March, 1996).
The enabling approach was born out of the crippling effect of SAP conditionality. 
Ideologically, the idea of enabling is flawed because its theoretical footing - 
neoliberalism - is faulty. It is faulty in the sense that it interfered with national 
economic development and social services systems in developing countries 
over the last three decades (Stiglitz, 2002). In addition, the neoliberal agenda 
has generated an anti-neoliberal policies movement (Green and Griffith, 2002 p. 
50-51). As result of this political reaction, the World Bank and Aid agencies 
have begun to refine the policies they push in developing countries. More 
recently, a notion of enabling which is based on decentralisation, participation 
and empowerment has been deployed in the developing countries; this has 
been undertaken to ensure that public services are run in an accountable,
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transparent and efficient manner (UN-HABITAT, 2004; Keivani and Werna, 
2001; Cohen and Peterson, 1997).
This thesis examines the notion of the enabling approach within the context of 
housing provision. Since its introduction in Nigeria in February 1991, the 
enabling approach for housing has been unsatisfactory in addressing the supply 
of formal housing nationally. This study examines why this housing approach is 
not yielding the desired results. First of all, a critique of globalisation and 
neoliberal policy transfer is presented. Next, the thesis undertakes an analytical 
assessment of the theoretical drivers of the 'enabling' housing approach in the 
Nigerian context. Focus then turns to the city of Jos in north-central Nigeria 
where local institutional arrangements are explored through case studies.
The field study was conducted in Jos, a city situated on the Jos Plateau, which 
serves as the administrative capital and commercial centre of Plateau State, 
one of the thirty-six states of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The population of 
Jos was estimated at 736,016 in 2006 (The National Population Commission of 
Nigeria, 2006). The field study location is made up of two Local Government 
Areas/Councils (Jos North and South LGAs/LGCs) with a land area of 801km2 
(Government of Plateau State, 2008). These two LGAs/LGCs are jointly 
referred to as 'the City of Jos' for the purpose of this study and are among the 
17 LGAs/LGCs that make up Plateau State (Government of Plateau State, 
2008). A map of Nigeria showing the location of Jos is available on Appendix I 
in page 302.
Historically, the city on which this study centres is relatively new when 
compared with other cities in the north and south of the country, some of which 
are over 1000 years old (Dung-Gwom, 2008). Jos was originally established in 
1905 as a tin mining and transportation camp and its early history was closely 
linked to the prosperity of the tin mining industry (Falola, 2013; Missen, 2002). 
The city of Jos is 4000 feet above sea level and lies close to the geographical 
centre of Nigeria. It is about 288km away from Abuja, the nation's capital; it is 
linked by road, rail and air to the rest of the country. It has an equitable climate 
averaging 22°C (75°F) daily. Average humidity is 60 percent and the average 
annual rainfall is 1400 mm (56"). The land form of Jos is characterised by
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impressive ridges and isolated rocky hills separated by extensive plains. It has 
an average height of 1,200m. (4,000 ft) above sea level, and reaching its 
highest peak in the Shere Hills where it stands at 1,766m (5,829 ft) (Missen, 
2002).
The city of Jos was chosen for the fieldwork for a variety of reasons: firstly, the 
field study location is the most rapidly urbanising part of Plateau State and this 
urbanisation creates demand for urban housing and facilities which local 
institutions are not able to provide in commensurate terms; secondly, there has 
been an increase in slum housing conditions which mostly affect the low-income 
urban residents of Jos; thirdly, the housing problems are an indicator of policy 
failure which needs investigation; and lastly, the researcher is familiar with the 
field work site which makes it easier to accomplish the field study within the time 
frame available.
In Nigeria the idea of 'enabling' was introduced in an effort to shift away from a 
state-led and bureaucratic management approach to a market-friendly 
environment where public and private solutions would complement each other. 
In regard to the administering of housing provision, the practice of the enabling 
approach in Nigeria constitutes a search for institutional pluralism. One of the 
key assumptions therefore, is that an administrative design framework that 
allows for the decentralisation of decision making and the shifting of 
organisational roles from central to local state could bring about the participation 
of and a partnership between government agencies and private sector 
institutions (Cohen and Person, 1997). But this assumption will hold only if 
government promotes market freedom to attract the participation of private 
institutions (Pugh, 1994, a&b, Helmsing, 2002, Awortwi and Helmsing, 2007). 
Another assumption on which the enabling approach rests is that the 
embedding of decision making and organisational roles in the local 
administrative system will promote good governance (accountability, 
transparency, effectiveness and efficiency) in the provision of housing. If these 
assumptions hold, then an effective housing supply will be achieved in the 
context of institutional pluralism, whereby public institutions will serve as 
brokers that network with an array of central, non-central, private sector
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institutions, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and community based 
organisations (CBOs) to perform the role of financing, to supply new housing 
and to bring about the improvement of slum housing (UN-HABITAT, 2004; 
Keivani and Werna, 2001; Cohen and Peterson, 1997).
Since 1991, enabling strategies have been deployed in an attempt to address 
various housing supply constraints including access to finance, provision of 
capital subsidies, production of new housing and providing the opportunity for 
slum dwellers to break away from slum conditions. In regards to low interest 
finance, Nigerian housing policy tries to broker a partnership between local 
institutional investors (Deposit Money Banks, insurance companies and Primary 
Mortgage Institutions - PMIs), households, foreign investors, and government to 
invest in the supply of subsidised housing through the Federal Mortgage Bank 
of Nigeria (FMBN). The credit scheme administered by the FMBN is meant to 
benefit only people (employed in public, private and informal institutions) who 
subscribe to a scheme known as the National Housing Fund (NHF). The NHF 
scheme is an arrangement whereby people who are gainfully employed and in 
receipt of a regular monthly income are required to save 2.5 percent of their 
basic monthly income in the FMBN as a precondition for access to a loan. In 
this sense, the subscribers become key actors and partners in the supply of 
finance and housing which benefits them (FGN-NHP, 2006a; Federal 
Government of Nigeria - FGN, 2011; FGN-NHF Act, 1992). Some official FMBN 
records published in local print media in October 2012 indicate that there were 
3,647,275 subscribers to the NHF scheme (Ogunwusi, 2011). Further 
consideration of the housing finance arrangement comes in chapter five.
In supplying new housing, the enabling approach aspires to create partnerships 
between the mortgage institution (FMBN), small and medium scale estate 
developers (housing corporations, private developers, cooperative societies), 
government subsidy providing agencies, and land owners (communities, kinship 
groups and individuals) to supply accessible and affordable mortgage housing 
to the NHF subscribers. In regard to the improving of slum housing conditions, 
the policy tries to create a partnership between government agencies, 
communities affected by slum conditions which should be mobilised through
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CBOs, NGOs, Cooperatives, and or thrift and credit associations, and formal 
institutional financial investors (local and international). For these purposes, 
public institutions are expected to broker a relationship between institutional and 
individual actors to supply new housing and at the same time improve slum 
conditions at local levels (FGN-NHP, 2006a; FGN-Housing Sector Reforms, 
2006b). Further clarification and consideration of these partnerships comes in 
chapter five.
So far, research has examined the performance of the NHF scheme and found 
that cumulative collections of subscriptions to the FMBN have maintained a 
steady increase but it takes a year and half for PMIs to successfully process 
and approve a loan request (Adedokun et al, 2011). Adedokun et al also 
speculate that there is a lack of awareness about the NHF scheme among 
workers across Nigeria. The FMBN is required to have affiliation with PMIs for 
the purpose of processing loans for the NHF subscribers, but the PMIs are not 
evenly spread across the country, with more than 50 percent of them operating 
in Lagos, Nigeria’s former capital and its largest city, which lies in the south­
west of the country (FGN-FMBN, 2011; Adedokun et al, 2011). Ibem (2010) 
undertook a case study of government partnership with private developers for 
new housing projects in certain locations in southern Nigeria and found that 
local government agencies were not involved. Other studies (Ayendu and 
Oluwatobi, 2011; Ikejiofor, 1999) have documented the reluctance of public 
sector agencies to fulfil their enabling roles.
Ogu and Ogbuozobe (2001) concluded that the process of disbursing NHF 
loans needs to be reviewed to incorporate a mechanism for resolving land 
acquisition problems. Inconsistency in governmental decisions to provide land 
and services subsidies to developers is also a documented problem 
(Ajanlekoko 2001). Other issues identified by research include a failure to 
streamline procedures for the issuance of property title and for the updating of 
property records (Ikejioke 1998 & 1997 Aluko & Amidu, 2006; Garba 1997). 
Except for Ibem (2010), who undertook a case study of partnership for new 
projects in certain locations, the remaining studies are reviews which do not 
take account of certain variables that affect the expected outcomes in a 
particular location. This study addresses this gap in the literature by examining
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the application of the enabling strategy within housing provision in a local 
context, that of Jos.
It is agreed (Adedokun et al, 2011; Dung-Gwom, 2001, 2007a, 2008, & 2009; 
Wapwera, Parsa and Egbu, 2011 and Wapwera et al., 2011) that the present 
housing system does not adequately address housing supply constraints; it 
rather reproduces past failures at both national and local level, as can be seen 
in Jos. Prior to a consideration of the evidence supporting such an assertion, an 
explanation of Nigeria's housing problems is necessary so as to bring into focus 
the national and local dimensions of the housing problems found in Jos.
1.2 NIGERIA'S HOUSING PROBLEM
Access to housing for the majority of Nigerians is attainable by self-build/help as 
opposed to buying a house on the formal market. Thus, informal sector 
solutions predominate over formal ones. Attempts by government to provide 
formal housing are not impressive. Consequently, a prevailing deficit of between 
1 2 - 1 7  million formal housing units has been estimated (Pepple, 2012a; FGN- 
Housing Sector Reforms, 2006). This overwhelming shortage is growing 
regardless of which policies, strategies, and actions the government has 
pursued since independence. A UN projection indicates a need to provide
500,000 units per annum for the next 40 years (UN-HABITAT, 2008) in order to 
overcome the shortage of adequate housing.
Owing to the limited supply of formal housing, rents in urban areas have 
become expensive. Evidence indicates that 85 percent of the urban population 
who rent properties spend over 40 percent of their income on rent (EFIinA and 
FinMark Trust, 2010). The shortage of adequate housing is manifested in poor 
housing conditions, an aspect that will be elaborated upon in chapter four. 
Poverty is also a hindrance to accessing good housing in Nigeria. Specifically, 
poverty that arises from unemployment is an issue of concern. The 
unemployment rate in 2010 was 17.7 percent among males, 24.9 percent 
among females and 21.1 for the population as a whole (FGN-NBS, 2010). 
Studies have documented low wages (Ibem, 2010 and Onyika, 2007) and wage 
disparities (Aminu, 2008 and Fajana 2007) as constraining factors to accessing 
adequate housing. In 2010, 55 percent of Nigerians lived below the national
poverty line (World Bank, 2012). Indeed, the Nigerian economy is in a difficult 
state as can be seen in recent macroeconomic data: Gross Domestic Product - 
GDP growth rate of 6.7 percent in 2011; GDP per capita of US$1,452 in 2011; 
Human Development Index -HDI (Global Ranking) of 0.459 (156) in 2011; the 
proportion of the population living on less than US$2 per day stood at 84.5 
percent in 2010 (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2012 p.109); 
and the Inflation rate was 12 percent in December, 2012 (FGN-NBS, 2013 p. 4).
The housing system in operation prior to 1991 was unsatisfactory in terms of 
overcoming the housing shortage. Accordingly, in 1991 the government 
introduced a housing system based on the enabling approach. However, by end 
of 2011, the enabling housing system that had instituted nearly two decades 
earlier, had provided only 70,412 housing units (FGN-FMBN, 2011). 
Furthermore, access to credit on the open market remains a challenge due to 
high interest rates (Gbadegesin & Aluko 2010; Dung-Gwom & Mallo 2009). With 
the exception of the FMBN, which charges a six percent interest rate on 
mortgage loans to individuals and 10 percent on Estate Development Loans to 
developers, in 2011 the average lending rate in the mortgage industry stood at 
16 percent (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa p. 109) and in April 
2012 the inflation rate was 12.9 (FGN-CBN, 2012). Indeed, recent statistics 
reveal how bad the situation has become: mortgages as a percentage of GDP 
were put at 0.39 percent in 2011; only 29.7 percent of the entire population had 
access to formal financial institutions in 2011; and Nigeria was ranked at 133 
(out of 183) in 2012 in regard to the 'Ease of Doing Business' of all kinds 
(Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2012 p. 109).
By September 2009, housing projects funded through the FMBN arrangement 
were completed at 25 different locations, including in Jos. However, some 
developers could not sell houses to the target groups (the NHF subscribers) 
because they had incurred additional expenses in financing the provision of 
residential infrastructure and they needed the government's permission to 
approve an upward revision of housing unit cost to cover actual production 
costs in order to make profit on their venture. For instance, the unit cost of 
houses produced by some developers had to be revised from N3.9m
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(US$25,161) to N4.48m (US$ 28,903) to cover additional costs incurred. This 
scenario was common in cities where anticipated government capital subsidies 
were not provided.
The foreclosure laws in Nigeria are weak; it takes an average of 7-10 years to 
adjudicate on foreclosure through the existing judicial system (Ogunsola, 2012). 
This is one reason why the formal housing sector, which constitutes about 15 
percent of the housing market, is insufficient to meet demand. Securing 
reasonably priced land under the present land tenure system is a constraint to 
individuals and developers (Dada 2010, Owei & Ede 2008 and Amidu 2006). 
This problem restricts opportunity for low and moderate income families to 
access adequate housing. The World Bank (2009) reported that 80 percent of 
Nigerians live in informal housing, in structures of varying degrees of 
permanence on land over which they have no ownership rights. Most of the land 
in Nigeria, an estimated 65 to 70 percent, is still held under customary title and 
unless a piece of land has statutory title (that is, a certificate of occupancy 
issued under the Land Use - LUA - Act 1978), it can never serve as collateral 
for credit in Nigeria (EFInA and FinMark Trust, 2010). Evidently, the enabling 
approach seems to have been devised and imported with little or no regard to 
the legal systems in operation in developing countries.
The LUA 1978 (Part IV section 21) restricts customary land holders from 
alienating any part of their property by assignment, mortgage, transfer of 
possession or subleasing without the consent of the Governor or the approval of 
local government authorities in the case of rural areas. The process of seeking 
consent and obtaining statutory title often takes too long to finalise. The World 
Bank in its 2011 Doing Business report ranked Nigeria 133 out of 183 
economies as regards the ease with which property can be registered; this 
involves 8 procedures, has 34 day duration, and costs 22.2 percent of the 
property value (The World Bank Doing Business Report, 2012).
In summary, Nigeria is experiencing economic and administrative problems 
which are constraining national development. In regard to urban development, 
there are problems of rising urbanisation, an expansion of slum housing 
conditions, increases in the demand for new housing against an insufficient
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supply and an inadequate urban infrastructure, among others. Answers to these 
problems are thought to lie in liberalism, decentralisation, participation and 
partnerships; the theoretical assumptions underlying these ideas appear to offer 
a solution. Over the last two decades, the policy makers have assumed that 
economic liberalisation could achieve growth, stability, and the efficient and 
effective management of development in all sectors of the economy. If this 
assumption held, then the enabling strategies of decentralisation, participation 
and partnerships should address housing supply issues and urban development 
in the national context. Unfortunately these aspirations have not been fully 
realised as substantiated in the preceding paragraphs.
Having explained the nationwide institutional problems in Nigeria, the 
succeeding section will focus on the local dimension of housing supply 
constraints with reference to Jos.
1.2.1 Housing Supply Constraints in Jos
The housing supply constraints in Jos are mostly connected to the nationwide 
institutional problems discussed above. However, this section is focused on 
local and contextual housing supply issues which the housing policy was 
designed to address through the enabling housing strategies of liberalism, 
decentralisation, participation and partnership. The constraints can be 
summarised in four categories, which will then be further elaborated: access to 
subsidised interest finance; a shortage of new housing that is affordable to low- 
income groups; access to land for housing development; and the expansion of 
slum housing conditions.
1) Access to low interest finance for housing development 
Low-income housing in Nigeria is provided mostly by small and medium sized 
companies; for any company to participate in such activity, the housing policy 
requires that it should affiliate to the FMBN, from where it can access a loan to 
finance the project. This policy provision is, however, affected by the uneven 
spread of house-building companies in Nigeria. Available data indicate that 
only 12 out of 27 states benefitted from the houses provided by private 
developers between 2005 and 2008. Over this period, only 30 units were 
provided in Jos by a private company. This happened in Jos because there was
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only one developer who was affiliated to the FMBN and the state government 
housing corporation was not functional. Since 2009, the number of private 
developers who are affiliated to the FMBN has been on the increase and at the 
time of this study four were in Jos to provide low-income housing (FGN-Housing 
Sector Reforms, 2006 pp. 23-25; Government of Plateau State, 2005 p. 72-73). 
There is no doubt that inability to access finance from the subsidised sector or 
on the open market is responsible for the limited participation of small and 
medium scale estate development companies whose businesses could improve 
the supply of low income housing.
In like manner, there is an uneven spread of the PMIs that serve as channels 
for the supply of loans from the FMBN to subscribers of the NHF. Between 
2005 and 2008, 3915 loan-seekers were granted mortgages but the 
beneficiaries resided in only 16 out of the 37 states. Over this period, only 19 
applicants were given a mortgage loan in Jos through the state government PMI 
and the private PMIs were not available to supply housing credit. Furthermore, 
evidence (FGN-Housing Sector Reforms, 2006 pp. 23-24) also suggests that 
people who resided in states that had a high number of PMIs secured a higher 
number of mortgages than those residing in states that had fewer PMIs, or even 
none. Due to the absence of PMIs in Jos, prospective loan seekers were unable 
to access mortgage credit from the FMBN. Similarly, access to housing credit 
on the open market is a challenge to residents who desire to use such an 
alternative. That the formal credit system is reaching a minute number of 
households has been confirmed by recent study (Wapwera, Parsa and Egbu, 
2011) which sampled 300 households in selected areas of the Jos metropolis. 
The study found that 75 percent of households have utilised informal credit 
sources over the last decade while only 25 percent have utilised formal sources. 
All this evidence confirms that the government's policy proposals are not 
providing desired results.
2) Shortage of new housing that is affordable to low income groups
There is an acute supply shortage of formal housing in Jos. This problem has 
arisen for a number of reasons: firstly, previous efforts through the state-led 
approach did not produce a huge stock of public housing in Jos and other cities.
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In 2006 there were 559,561 unprivatised units of public housing rented across 
the 37 states of Nigeria, and of this number 77,411 were found in Lagos, the 
former capital of Nigeria, 28,062 in Abuja, the present capital, and 6,089 in Jos 
(FGN-National Population Commission, 2010 p. 151 & 173). On the basis of this 
data, it can be inferred that the combined efforts of the federal, state and local 
government provided only 6,089 units in Jos.
Secondly, there is a problem of unfair allocation of housing by the federal 
government agencies. A review of previous studies suggests that much of 
Nigeria's public housing stock was provided by the federal government 
agencies. However, the housing projects were often allocated by the federal 
government to the various cities through a political or administrative process 
that resulted in unfair allocation (Ikejiofor, 1999 pp. 179-183; Awotona, 1987 pp. 
92-93, 1990 p. 19; Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992 pp. 47-49). For instance, in 
the 1980s and 1990s, about 12,000 to 15,000 residential plots were produced; 
these fell into three categories (1296 m2 size plots for the low-density residential 
areas, 648 m2 for the medium-density and 360 m2 for the high-density areas) 
and were sold to the public via the site-and-services schemes in some selected 
locations. The scheme was implemented in certain cities such as Bauchi, 
Bendel, Borno, Niger, Ogun, Oyo, Cross River, Lagos, Kano, Imo, Kwara, Ondo, 
Rivers and Enugu states (UN-HABITAT, 2001a p. 90). Others are: Anambra, 
the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Abuja (Ademiluyi, 2010 p. 157). 
Unfortunately, the city of Jos was not among those which benefitted from the 
site-and-services scheme. Recent corroborating evidence reveals that the 
Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development implemented 150 
site-and-services residential plots per site in the FCT and six other states 
(Lagos, Adamawa, Kano, Niger, Enugu and Rivers) (Pepple, 2012b p. 38). 
Apparently, Jos and other cities did not benefit from the scheme.
To further substantiate, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), which has been 
responsible for the provision of public housing over the last three decades, 
made a cumulative success of 35,609 units in 2010. However, though projects 
were executed across 50 sites only 22 out of 37 states got an allocation: 
unfortunately, Jos was not among those receiving cities (FGN-Federal Housing 
Authority, 201 Oe). Recently, the FHA has also signed a partnership agreement
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with some states for the provision of 6,000 housing units in eight states namely: 
Kaduna, Gombe, Benue, Anambra, Cross-River, Osun, Bayelsa and Lagos 
(Pepple, 2012b p.7). Though the requirements for the partnerships have not 
been established, the state government in Jos along with 27 others are not 
involved. In like manner, the recent housing supply progress of the Federal 
Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development resulted in a Public-Private 
Partnership (PPP) that actualised 17,267 housing units in 10 States, namely: 
Adamawa, Cross-River, Delta, Edo, Enugu, Katsina, Kogi, Lagos, Nassarawa 
and Ogun (Pepple, 2012b p.8). The requisites for the PPP could not be 
ascertained, but apparently the arrangement did not benefit the residents of Jos.
Thirdly, the state government authorities have long admitted that private sector 
participation in housing development in Jos has been low owing to the absence 
of sound policies and incentives to invest in housing development. This is a 
factor discouraging private investment in housing provision in the city of Jos 
(Government of Plateau State, 2005 p. 72). To corroborate this, the World Bank, 
in its 'Doing Business' report for 2010, ranked Jos, the capital city of Plateau 
State, as 20th out of 37 states as regards the enforcing of contracts; 13th out of 
37 in the area of registering property; 24th out of 37 in dealing with construction 
permits and 4th out of 37 in regard to starting a business. Plateau State was 
placed in 15th position out of 37 states in the overall sub-national ranking (The 
World Bank Doing Business Report, 2012). These positionings need to be 
addressed by the local authorities in Jos if the business environment is to be 
made attractive for small and medium scale house building companies so that 
they actively participate in increasing the supply of housing. However, this has 
to be matched with a supply of low interest finance from the FMBN and 
development subsidies from local authorities in Jos.
Fourthly, from the inception of the enabling housing approach in 1991 to 
December 2011, fewer than 500 housing units were funded through the 
subsidised credit system in Jos (FGN-FMBN, 2011f). The population in Jos is 
increasing, and has grown from 510,300 in 1991 (Geohive, 2012) to 736,016 in 
2006 (FGN-NPC, 2006). This is creating more demand for housing, yet the 
formal housing supply is not keeping pace with this demand. The arrangement
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proposed for organising the provision of housing within the enabling housing 
policy framework is further explained on page 122. Essentially, the national 
housing policy (FGN-NHP, 2006 p.23-26) requires local authorities (policy 
makers, state government agencies and local government councils) to improve 
the supply of new housing through partnership arrangements between 
government agencies, private developers, and FMBN and NHF subscribers. It 
also requires local authorities to put in place arrangements that will help slum 
dwellers to move out of such conditions. In Jos these aspirations remain largely 
unfulfilled.
3) Growth of Slum Settlements
The housing situation in Jos is not just a matter of supply shortage but also of a 
growing stock of substandard housing. The high level of inadequate housing is 
considered to be a serious indictment of housing policy. Indeed, it is an 
indication of policy failure (Spicker, 2004; Balchin and Rhoden, 2002). Due to 
the shortage of formal housing many people in Jos rely on informal mechanisms 
which are mostly connected to self-help and self-build approaches.
The informal housing system is dominant but much of its stock is substandard. 
As of 2006, 53 percent of 148, 897 households were using well water sources 
for domestic use in Jos. This source of water is mostly associated with informal 
housing. Safe water sources in Jos are available from pipes carrying water 
inside dwellings (17 percent); pipes carrying water outside dwellings (11 percent) 
and boreholes (2 percent) which together constitute 30 percent of total water 
sources. Other sources of supply are of lower quality than well water and are 
less safe for domestic use. The types of toilet facilities are similarly of concern 
in Jos. In 2006, 81,454 households (representing 53 percent of 148,897) were 
using pit toilet facilities while 27 percent (41,767) of households had a water 
closet. As of 2006, about 13 percent (20,108) of households were still 
defecating around the open fields (FGN-National Housing Census, 2006).
In Jos, the problem of informal housing is compounded by lack of road, 
drainage, water and electricity infrastructure. This is because it is uneconomical 
to provide such infrastructure on an individual basis or through informal
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arrangements. The problem of infrastructure provision is aggravated by 
naturally occurring features which limit opportunities to provide through informal 
mechanisms. The city is characterised by undulating land forms with rock 
outcrops that have occurred, forming a continuous range of hills around the city. 
In the absence of formal housing solutions, people who are financially 
constrained are building houses in areas where they can afford to buy land, that 
is, mostly on rocky terrain (figure 1). This problem is leading to a growth of slum 
housing (figure 1) around the city. By the provisions of Nigeria's national 
housing policy, the three levels of government have a joint responsibility to 
provide infrastructure for housing as part of government support of the housing 
supply. However, this has become a difficult task due to increases in 
urbanisation that seem to outstrip the capacity of local authorities to provide 
adequate services (UN-HABITAT, 2009).
Slum settlement 
around open mining 
pond in Jos 
(Wapwera et al, 
2011 p. 1077)
Photo 2
Houses built on 
rocks in Jos 
(Shenley, 2011)
Photo 3
Atypical slum 
settlement in Jos 
(Field study, 2011)
Photo 1
Sprawling housing in 
rocky areas of Jos 
(Field Study, 2011)
Figure 1: Slum housing situation in Jos
The practice of relying on the informal approach of self-build as the dominant 
mode of housing provision has led to the formation of slums in Jos. It is 
documented in official records that only about 25 percent of the landed 
properties within the urban areas of Jos are covered by statutory title: 75 
percent are not. The authorities also document that over 50 percent of 
residential properties built since 2005 do not comply to local planning 
regulations (Government of Plateau State, 2005 pp. 124-127). Inner city and 
peripheral slums have been on the rise. As of 2004, a total of 25 slum areas 
have been recommended for renewal (Dung-Gwom, 2007). In the slum areas in
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Jos less than 50 percent of roads were found to be tarred, less than one 
percent had street light coverage, the remaining areas had an insufficient water 
supply and a sporadic electricity supply. The state government acknowledged 
that the effect of these infrastructural deficiencies in the face of ever increasing 
population is responsible for the development of slums (Government of Plateau 
State, 2005 p.25).
4) Land Supply
The problem of land supply in Jos is partly caused by natural constraints (such 
as rocky terrain) which limits the supply of land that can be effectively used for 
housing within the current technological and economic limits of small and 
medium scale estate development companies and self-builders. Land supply is 
also affected by issues such as the politics of control between kinship groups 
and government; a distorted land market and failure to formalise informal land 
(Umezulike, 2011; Otubu, 2007); poor planning; ineffective development control 
(Dung-Gwom, 2007a); and delays in private developers obtaining planning 
permission (Dung-Gwom, 2001). Similarly, around Jos, there are numerous 
mining ponds and lakes resulting from the mining activities which began some 
hundred years ago. In 1990, it was estimated that 316 square kilometres of land 
have been damaged around the city, and that this now requires reclamation 
(Alexander, 1990 p. 44).
Unregulated tin mining is still continuing (Mallo, 2012) and civil society 
organisations (Environmental Right Action, Friends of the Earth Nigeria, League 
of Human Rights and Community Based NGO Forum) have observed that most 
of the flat lands around Jos are affected by tin mining. The affected areas have 
become waste land, with stagnant ponds where mosquitoes breed, threatening 
the health of the local population; some areas are hazardous due to the 
presence of radioactive materials (Wapwera, et a\, 2011, NGO News Africa, 
2009; Raufu, 1999). The reclamation of open mine ponds in Jos has been 
rather slow. Where attempts have been made, domestic waste has been used 
to refill ponds (Mallo, 2012 p. 32) and this has not been undertaken in an 
organised and pragmatic manner. In farming communities, some mining ponds 
that contain water are used for dry season irrigation agriculture (Dung-Gwom,
16
2007b, while others have become death traps for those people unlucky enough 
to fall in and become trapped (Adiuku-Brown, 1999).
In the urban areas of Jos, un-reclaimed mining ponds create a shortage of land 
for housing development (Wapwera, et al, 2011) and with increasing 
urbanisation coupled with challenges in accessing reasonably priced land, the 
poor, low and some medium income people are pushed to build houses around 
open mining ponds (figure 1). The housing policy (FGN-NHP, 2006 and 
provisions of LUA 1978 [Part I section 2(1) and Part II section 5(1) & 6(1)] has 
placed the responsibility for providing land for housing on state government and 
LGCs in Jos. These policy provisions have evidentially not solved the problems 
of access to land for low income housing supply in Jos.
1.3 PURPOSE OF STUDY
The enabling approach for housing holds promises that are appropriate for 
tackling constraints to housing provision in Jos and other locations. The 
approach is reactive in that it offers opportunities for the supply of low-income 
housing to meet present and future demand. The approach is also reactive in 
the sense that it offers corrective solutions to existing slum conditions whereby 
affected residents could move out of slum housing. These progressive 
proposals remain largely unfulfilled in Jos and other locations across Nigeria. 
The purpose of this research is to examine the underlying characteristic of the 
enabling approach in the context of housing provision. The study is undertaken 
with a view to uncovering the variables that influence housing provision on the 
basis of the enabling approach.
1.4 AIM, OBJECTIVE AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The aim of this thesis is to examine the notion of the enabling approach within 
the context of housing provision in Nigeria. The objective is to analyse how the 
notion of enabling has been deployed and why it has failed to provide solutions 
to housing problems in the city of Jos. The aim and objective are addressed by 
means of four research questions, which are derived from the research 
questions map illustrated in figure 2.
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1 How does the globalisation of liberalism impact on economic and socio­
political development in Nigeria?
2 In what ways do neoliberal reforms enable the provision of subsidised 
housing in Nigeria?
3 To what extent does the local state provide subsidies and support for 
housing provision in Jos?
4 Does the local state organise this 'enabling' provision of new housing and 
the improvement of slum conditions in Jos?
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Post 1991 housing 
policy/system: The 
enabling approach
Pre 1991 housing policy/system 
State-led provision and 
bureaucratic management
Research question one Research question two
Neo-liberalism
Expected outcome:
Efficient and effective housing financing 
production and allocation
Liberalisation; deregulation; privatisation 
of public enterprises; implementation of 
public sector reforms; recapitalisation of 
finance institutions; undertaking of legal 
and regulatory reforms; promoting of 
good governance; promoting the growth 
of private finance and house-building 
companies
Partnership of multiple actors (Federal 
Government, private investors and the 
NHF subscribers) in the supply of 
subsidised housing finance through the 
FMBN
s Research questions three and
Decentralisation of 
administrative roles for the 
provision of housing from the 
federal to state and local 
Government Agencies and the 
private sector organisations
Expected outcomes:
Partnership of multiple actors (bureaucratic 
agencies, housing corporations, the FMBN, the 
UDBN, private developers, land owners, CBOs, 
NGOs, local and international financial investors) 
in the provision of housingParticipation through 
information dissemination, 
consultations, involvement 
and collaborations
Accountable and transparent arrangement for 
housing provision
Improved supply of land and infrastructure 
subsidies, and local support for development of 
low-income housing
Provision of physical and social infrastructure for 
slum households and communities
Improved well-being and empowerment o f the people:
Equitable access to low-income mortgage housing by the NHF 
subscribers; opportunity for households affected by slums housing 
conditions to break-away
Figure 2: Research Questions Map
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1.5 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS
This thesis is made up of ten chapters. Chapter one provides the general 
background to and the rationale for the study. It gives a context to the research 
and brings into focus the housing problems in Nigeria and Jos. The chapter 
both gives a brief description of the research case-study site and provides the 
research questions.
Chapter two examines the impact of globalisation on the economic, political and 
cultural transformation of developing countries. The connection between 
globalisation, neoliberalism and the notion of enabling is analysed with a view to 
uncovering the discontents of globalisation. The chapter also examines the 
impact of coercive policy transfer, with a focus on the SAPs and the Washington 
Consensus.
Chapter three examines ideas and administrative techniques that have been 
transferred to the developing countries by the international agencies, and how 
those transfers could help in administering the provision of housing. 
Furthermore, a debate on the state versus market approach to housing 
provision is examined with a view to explaining the place of housing in both the 
welfare and the market context along with the expected role of government in a 
given housing system.
Chapter four examines the impact of political and socio-economic development, 
on housing policy outcomes in Nigeria. This chapter covers a number of themes: 
development planning and housing provision; oil discovery and housing policy 
outcomes; the impact of military rule and changes of government; institutional 
issues; rapid urbanisation and the growth and scale of shanty towns; land 
tenure systems and housing provision; ethno-religious conflicts; and wider 
influences within and beyond Jos.
Chapter five examines the neoliberal reforms and the assumptions of the 
national housing policy in Nigeria. The methodology and field study is contained 
in chapter six. The chapter provides an explanation of the design of the case 
studies that were used within the field study.
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Chapter seven discusses the field data in analysing case study one. Chapter 
eight addresses the second case study. Chapter nine discusses the field data 
used in analysing case studies three and four. The final chapter synthesises the 
findings extracted from the analyses chapters. The chapter reflects on housing 
provision and theoretical propositions. It draws conclusions, presents the 
limitations of the study, and its implication for policy and contribution to 
knowledge.
1.6 SUMMARY
This chapter provides the general background to and the rationale for the study. 
It gives some background information on the enabling approach for housing 
provision; it explains nationwide institutional problems in Nigeria; and it brings to 
the fore local housing problems in Jos. The purpose of the study is explained, 
the research questions presented, and the structure of the thesis is provided. 
Having provided a general background to the study, it is now necessary to 
examine the notion of enabling in the context of globalisation and neoliberal 
policy transfer. This is covered in the following chapter.
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CHAPTER TWO
GLOBALISATION, NEO-LIBERALISM AND THE ENABLING
APPROACH
2.1 INTRODUCTION
The notion of enabling is vital to understanding the changing role of government, 
from provider to enabler of social services including housing. For Nigeria and 
most developing countries, this transition can be explained in the context of 
debt crisis, the SAPs and the need for private sector participation (World Bank, 
1993a). Enabling can also be explained with reference to the role of multilateral 
agencies (such as the IMF, the World Bank and UN agencies), Corporations 
and the process of globalisation in relation to policy transfer from the developed 
world to developing world (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000 p. 5; 1996 p. 344, 348). In 
other words, enabling can be interpreted in the context of securing a framework 
for action by people, the private sector and markets (UN-HABITAT, 2004). All 
these interpretations are inseparable from the contemporary neoliberalism 
which arose from the Washington Consensus during the 1980s and 1990s 
(Stiglitz, 2002, 2011). This chapter, therefore, examines the impact of 
globalisation on the economic, political and cultural transformation of developing 
countries. A context of this nature will provide an insight into the globalisation of 
the neoliberal agenda within a global context, and to bring into focus discontent 
with, hostility towards, and rejection of neoliberalism and policy transfer.
2.2 GLOBALISATION AND ITS IMPACT
Globalisation, a phenomenon that has been going on now for centuries (Green 
and Griffith, 2002), appears to lack a consensus definition in academic literature; 
however, it is severally interpreted as a force that brings about change' (Held, 
2004; Stiglitz, 2002; Juhasz, 2002; Horvat, 2003) or a 'process of change' 
(Lechner, 2001; Khor, 1996). Held, one of the leading authors on the subject of 
globalisation argues that globalisation:
...describes a growing global interconnectedness; it represents a significant shift in 
the spatial form of social relations so that the interaction between apparently local
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and global process become increasingly important; it involves the organisation and 
exercise of power at a global scale; it applies to a whole range of social relations - 
cultural, economic and political - that affects all aspects of social life; and it may 
have benefits for society as well as risks (Held, 2004 p. 15).
As Held demonstrates, globalising forces and processes are extremely diverse. 
To make the discussion manageable, this chapter targets attention on the 
economic, political, and social dimensions of globalisation. In the economic 
sense, globalisation has resulted in a massive economic transformation through 
trade liberalisation, deregulation, and the expansion of the global market place. 
The cognitive component of this massive change is the spread of neoliberal 
economic principles and expanded trade. This is the position adopted by 
economic liberals who have successfully used this argument to advocate that 
public policy should continue to reinforce the deregulation of trade, investment 
and capital movement (Held, 2002). Furthermore, globalisation is characterised 
by an increased mobility of money and goods. The result is that corporations 
are freer than ever to move capital, financial instruments and institutions, and to 
invest wherever they choose (Leo, 2007). Trade liberalisation has brought 
benefits to developed and developing countries alike. The interdependency 
created by trade liberalisation allowed for the growth of trade in the developed 
countries. For instance, between 1973 and 1995, the percentage of 
merchandise trade (trade in agriculture, mining and manufactured goods) to 
GDP rose from 29.0 to 36.6 percent in France, 35.2 to 38.7 percent in Germany,
80.1 to 83.4 percent in Netherlands, 39.3 to 42.6 percent in the UK, and 10.5 to
19.0 percent in USA (Held, 2000 p. 96, 97). In spite of this economic 
transformation, several writers including Stiglitz (2002, 2011), Juhasz (2002), 
Horvat (2003), Weisbrot (2002, 2003) and Fasenfest (2012), maintain that in a 
global sense, the developed countries have accumulated disproportionate 
benefit from trade liberalisation at the expense of the developing world countries. 
This aspect will be revisited in subsequent discussion, in a detailed examination 
of the impact of neoliberal policy transfer on developing countries.
In a political sense, globalisation has led to the emergence of a specific 
infrastructure for global governance. There has been a "remarkable 
institutionalisation of intergovernmental and transnational networks of political 
interaction" (Held, 2000 p. 123). One clear instance of this was the founding of 
the UN. There has also been a growth of "new centres of authority above, below
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and alongside the state" such as the WTO, the European Union (EU) and the 
African Union (AU) among others. Furthermore, globalisation has generated the 
idea of global polity and, alongside, the development of infrastructure for a 
transnational civil society. Lastly, the creation of a "system of global governance 
and transnational civil society is associated with new forms of multinational, 
transnational and global politics" (Held, 2000 p. 142). In a more positive sense, 
the growth of global civil society can be beneficial to developing countries. This 
is confirmed by Stiglitz (2002) who reports that the global synergy of well- 
orchestrated public pressure forced the international community to write off the 
debts of some of the poorest countries. The World Council of Churches, the 
Catholic Agency for Overseas Development (CAFODj, Christian Aid, and the 
Jubilee Movement International for Economic and Social Justice are good 
examples of civil societies involved in the struggle for debt cancellation for the 
poorer countries. As a result of the synergy created by these civil societies, the 
World Bank, the IMF, the Paris Club and the G7 countries were made to write 
off the debts of some of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) (World 
Council of Churches, 1999; Green and Griffith, 2002, Jubilee Plus, 2001). As of 
2005, debt waivers had been secured for 24 HIPCs including Nigeria 
(Onyekachi, 2006; Jubilee Plus, 2001). It is also maintained that globalisation 
has impacted positively on developing countries in that they have absorbed 
western democratic principles and are now using it to elect their leaders (Teleng, 
2011).
The benefits of globalisation have not come without cost. Leo (2007) documents 
that globalisation has made national governments less able to control the 
activities of mobile businesses than in the past, and that corporations and 
international finance institutions have assumed a better position and more 
leverage from which to dictate to national governments. The corporations and 
the international finance institutions are able to achieve this by "relocating their 
activities to - and buying the currencies of - states whose policies they approve 
and abandoning, or threatening to abandon, the rest" (Leo, 2007). Leo concurs 
with Khor (1996) in arguing that globalisation threatens the economic 
sovereignty of developing countries in the sense that they have lost the power 
to determine and shape the economic policies that are most conducive to their
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development. In like manner, Haass and Robert (1998) expressed the 
discontent of globalisation and neoliberal policies advanced by the U.S. They 
argue that the political and economic demands of the modern world have 
outgrown the neoliberal agenda. Haass and Robert frown at the role that the 
U.S has played in reducing barriers to the movement of goods and capital 
across national boundaries. To Haass and Robert, the removal of barriers has 
resulted in a more intrusive and intense economic interaction, including the 
growth of world capital markets that led to the demise of fixed exchange rates. 
Subsequent discussions will show the effect that this produced on the 
developing countries.
In regard to the transformation of cultures, the positive globalists feel that 
globalisation has done more good than harm to cultures around the world. 
Cultural transformation is a crucial component of globalisation because it is 
through culture that common understandings are developed - so culture is 
central to the connections between places and nations (Held, 2000 p. 48). 
Globalisation has had a great impact on world cultures because: firstly, "there is 
a huge and fast-growing culture [that] flows between countries"; secondly, the 
"ownership of televisions and radios has increased enormously worldwide, 
albeit with huge regional and national disparities"; thirdly, "national broadcasting 
systems are experiencing declining audience shares"; and fourth and finally, 
"cable and satellite ownership rates are increasing and in some countries are 
very high" (Held, 2000 p. 54). The invention of the internet has played a great 
role in the transformation of world cultures (DiMaggio et a!., 2001). Specifically, 
DiMaggio et al (2001 p. 325) observe that since 1980 "changes in consumer 
demand have combined with new media technologies to segment markets and 
differentiate cultural goods, enabling individuals and groups to individualise their 
media habits". Held (2000) indicates that globalisers tend to focus on structures, 
and they argue that the growth of global culture will lead to the demise of 
national culture. This, to them, will do more good than harm. The United Nations 
Educational, Social and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) is often cited by the 
positive globalists as a positive agent of cultural globalisation (Held, 2000). 
Indeed, the activity of UNESCO is helping to preserve cultural sites and to make 
people aware of them. Today, the World Heritage List of UNESCO includes
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981 properties. These include 759 cultural, 193 natural and 29 mixed properties 
in 160 States Parties (UNESCO, 2013).
The positive globalists support global culture but it has been responded to with 
several criticisms by the pessimistic globalists. The pessimistic globalists argue 
that the globalisation of culture is not just a matter of levelling or increasing of 
uniformity, but that it is also a process involving the reproduction and extension 
of inequalities between nations. The extension of global inequalities can be 
analysed from the perspective of cultural imperialism, which is one important 
way of understanding the globalisation of culture (Held, 2000). The structural 
analysis of culture can be underpinned by two core notions (Held, 2000 p. 65). 
One notion is that the dominant cultures of the West and the United States of 
America are swamping the minority cultures through the processes of 
homogenisation and the reduction of diversity. The second notion is that 
homogenisation and the reduction of diversity is a strategy deployed to meet the 
economic interest of the United States of America and other Western nations. 
The anxiety of the pessimists is shared by many writers including Stiglitz (2002), 
Fasenfest (2012), Dolowitz and Marsh (2000), Davies (2006), Jessops (2001), 
Daly (2001), Green and Matthew (2002) among others. These authors set out 
arguments which confirm that the transfer of policy (economic and political 
culture) by the U.S. and Western nations through the IMF and the World Bank 
has done more harm than good to the developing countries. This will be 
expatiated in subsequent discussions.
2.3 NEOLIBERALISM AND THE IMPACT OF COERCIEVE POLICY 
TRANSFER
The spread of the neoliberal ideology to developing countries during the 1980s 
and 1990s was easier to achieve because the role of the IMF and the World 
Bank was redefined to operate in tandem with the new economic and political 
order (Green and Griffith, 2002). The IMF and the World Bank were both 
created at the end of the Second World War as a fall out of the 1944 UN 
Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. Each 
of the two agencies was created to fulfil a specific mandate. The first mandate 
was to finance the rebuilding of Europe after its destruction in the Second World 
War: this mandate was given to the World Bank whose proper name is the
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International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The second 
mandate went to the IMF: its responsibility was to ensure the attainment of 
global economic stability, as the signatories of the Bretton Woods agreement 
were haunted by the spectre of the Great Depression (Stiglitz, 2002). To cite 
Stiglitz (2002 p. 12): "In its original conception, then, the IMF was based on a 
recognition that markets often did not work well..." Moreover the "IMF was 
founded on the belief that there was a need for collective action at the global 
level for economic stability".
As it turned out, the IMF and the World Bank were made to move drastically 
away from their founding ideology and operating principles in becoming the 
promoters of neoliberalism (Stiglitz, 2002; Green and Griffith, 2002). For the 
purpose of actualising the neoliberal agenda, series of bilateral, regional and 
global international trade and investment agreements were made, in the form of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This became the 
precursor of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) (Teeple, 1995; Green and 
Griffith, 2002). Teeple (1995 p. 95) observes that the WTO together with the 
World Bank and the IMF applied pressure on the governments of developing 
countries and those in transition to "legislate neoliberal policies intended to free 
capital from social forms in which it is under or open to political control and 
thereby turn those forms into corporate private property".
With the IMF and the World Bank serving as the agents of globalisation, the U.S. 
in collaboration with other powerful state-players was able to officially endorse 
and spread the new economic order. The endorsement of this new economic 
order was carried out by prescribing a core set of neoliberal strategies which 
writers (Stiglitz, 2002; Green and Griffith, 2002, Williamson, 2002a and Birdsall, 
De la Torre, Valencia Caicedo, 2010) termed the Washington Consensus'. 
Stiglitz (2002 p. 16) states that "the Washington consensus' was a consensus 
between the IMF, the World Bank, and the U.S. Treasury about the 'right' 
policies for developing countries. ...the ideas incorporated in the consensus 
were developed in response to the problems in Latin America, where 
governments had let budget get out of control while loose monetary policies had 
led to rampant inflation". This had several implications.
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Firstly, governments were advised to maintain fiscal discipline. This was well 
intended as the consensus was made when the developing countries, for 
example, the Latin America countries had run large budget deficits that led to 
balance of payment crises and high inflation that hit mainly the poor population 
(Williamson, 2002b). Secondly, the 'Washington Consensus' demands 
governments to reorder public expenditure priorities and to adopt a tax system 
(reform tax) that would combine a broad tax base with moderate marginal rates 
(Williamson, 2002b). Writers (Stiglitz, 2002; Matinez and Garcia, 1996) took 
issue with the idea of reordering public expenditure as it entails the cutting down 
of public expenditure for social services and the reduction of the safety net for 
the poor. Thirdly, the 'Washington Consensus' advises governments to allow a 
competitive exchange rate and, to liberalise interest rates, trade and Inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (Williamson, 2002a). Matinez and Garcia (1996) see 
these as a calculated attempt to cajole governments in developing countries to 
promote the rule of the market and to 'free' private enterprise no matter how 
much social damage this causes. Fourthly and finally, governments were 
advised to privatise public corporations, to deregulate economic activities to 
promote property rights for the benefit of the informal sector. As a result, the 
reforms succeeded only in subjugating the concept of 'public good' and also 
marginalising the 'community' spirit that hitherto existed for the benefit of the 
poor (Stiglitz, 2002). Further, there has been a replacement of collective 
ownership with individual responsibility; and this came with a negative 
consequence for access to quality education, health care, adequate housing 
and safe drinking water in the developing countries (Weisbrot, 2002, 2009).
Having examined the origin and ideology of the contemporary neoliberal 
agenda, the succeeding sections will further expatiate on discontent with 
neoliberalism drawing on evidence from countries around the world. The 
experience of Nigeria will be brought to focus in the course of the discussions.
2.3.1 Debt Crises and the IMF's Structural Adjustment Policies
Over the 1980s and '90s, the IMF prescribed a policy under the SAPs for the 
developing countries that were ravaged by debt crises. In theory, SAPs were 
meant to assist countries to return to economy recovery. In practice the 
opposite happened (Jauch, 2012). Stiglitz (2002) and Chossudovsky (1998)
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provide convincing accounts which show that SAPs contributed in great 
measure to destabilising national currencies and ruining the economies of 
developing countries. SAPs have been widely criticised on the grounds that 
they were not democratically decided upon by the people of the debtor 
countries but imposed by the IMF and the World Bank (Stiglitz, 2002; Locker, 
2000). Policy transfer in this manner is coercive rather than voluntary (Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 1996). Furthermore, coercive policy transfer is found to undermine 
the sovereignty of nations that are forced to accept a foreign proposal; very 
often the receiving country is not given the freedom of choice between 
alternatives or the opportunity to make an informed decision (Evans, 2009). The 
result is often a policy failure (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000 p. 5) and this is the 
most important critique that has been advanced in regard to the IMF/World 
Bank SAPs (Evans, 2009; Stilitz, 2002; Dolowitz and March, 1996).
Prior to examining the damage done by SAPs in developing countries, a brief 
account of the debt crisis which precipitated the prescription of SAPs will be 
presented. Locker (2002) indicates that during the 1960s and 1970s, the IMF 
and the World Bank switched their focus from the financing of redevelopment 
projects in Europe to the issuing of loans for economic development in 
undeveloped countries. As a result, developing countries started to obtain long­
term loans from the IMF and the World Bank to finance development projects 
such as roads, power plants, schools, dams, bridges, ports and other forms of 
infrastructure. The developing countries had additional opportunities for 
borrowing money from the commercial banks of the developed countries that 
experienced windfall at the end of the oil crisis of 1973-74 (Ferraro and Malissa, 
1994). The available money was realised mostly from the oil producing 
countries, and the banks were eager to put this windfall capital to productive 
use. The assumption then was that a sovereign debt was a worthwhile risk and 
this thinking was predicated on the belief that countries would not default. For 
the developing countries, it was a great opportunity to obtain loans for the 
development of their economies.
Throughout the 1970s, several countries became indebted, including Zaire, 
Sierra Leon, Sudan, Togo, Sao Tome and Principe, Liberia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Mauritania, Philippines, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Chile (Cohn, 2013 pp. 358, 362),
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Algeria, Nigeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Syria, Venezuela (World 
Bank, 1992 pp. 258-259, 264-265 cited in Ferraro and Malissa, 1994), 
Mozambique and Zimbabwe (Locker, 2000). There is a consensus among 
researchers (for example, Stiglitz, 2002, Ferraro and Malissa, 1994 and 
Easterly, 2002, 2003) that most of these countries had to borrow in order to 
overcome the scourge of poverty and as such, they could not have avoided 
borrowing - this was the cold harsh reality as Ferraro and Malissa observe. 
Again, the borrowing countries thought that loans were a good means of easing 
the trauma of the oil price increase and the high inflation that was experienced 
at the time. Those countries that had oil resources as their main export, such as 
Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nigeria, and Venezuela, aspired to capitalise on 
their much improve financial status. Moreover, oil prices had risen dramatically 
and they thought that this would last for an extended period of time - an 
assumption that would hold only for a short period according Ferraro and 
Malissa (1994).
The surprise came in 1982, when Mexico became incapable of servicing its 
public sector debt obligations to the international lenders. The external debt of 
Mexico then stood at about $78 billion, and out of which $32 billion was owed to 
foreign commercial banks (Cohn, 2013 p. 343). Cohn observes that Mexico's 
inability to service its foreign debt produced a big shock wave to the lenders, 
such that they moved quickly to decrease their loan exposure to the developing 
countries. This measure was, however, too late. Yet, an earlier warning sign 
had been ignored from Zaire, Argentina, Peru, Sierra Leon, Sudan and Togo; 
these countries were already involved in debt rescheduling negotiations from 
1976 to 1980. It is amazing how such a warning was ignored in spite of a huge 
loan sum ($500 billion) that was already granted to the developing countries 
between 1972 and 1981 (Cohn, 2013). Foreign debt was indeed a serious 
concern at the time, as records confirm: In 1970, the fifteen most indebted 
nations (Algeria, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Ecuador, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Peru, Poland, Syria and Venezuela) had 
an external public debt of $17,923 billion, which then was equivalent to 9.8 
percent of their Gross National Product (GNP). Seventeen years later, these 
same nations had accumulated an external debt of $402,171 (an equivalent of
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47.5 percent of their GNP). Further, the interest paid on loans owed by the 
fifteen countries rose from $2,789 billion in 1970 to $36,251 billion in 1987 
(World Bank, 1992 pp. 258-259, 264-265 cited in Ferraro and Malissa, 1994).
In subsequent years, the sub-Saharan African countries became increasingly 
indebted to multilateral agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank the 
International Development Association and the African Development Bank. The 
aggregate debt of the 45 sub-Sahara African countries that had borrowed 
escalated from US$6.1 billion in 1970 to US$138.4 billion in 1998. This 
amounted to a 630 percent increase in constant (1980) US Dollar terms 
(Greene, 1989 p. 839, 841). By 1989, Nigeria had the eleventh largest external 
debt among the less developed countries (and it became the highest debtor in 
sub-Saharan Africa). Over this period, Nigeria's debt had increased from US$9 
billion in 1980 to US$33 billion in 1989 (Metz, 1992 p. 198). In like manner, the 
aggregate ratio of external debt of the 45 sub-Saharan countries to exports of 
goods and services increased to 366.7 percent in 1988 from 67.5 percent in 
1970 (Greene, 1989 p. 840). The rising debts created servicing problems and in 
spite of this, the external debt of sub-Saharan Africa attracted less attention 
than that of middle-income countries in part because it was regarded as of 
minimal threat to the international banking system (Greene, 1989). This was the 
feeling of the international lenders even though hardship was increasing and 
poverty levels rising at an alarming rate (Stiglitz, 2002).
In 1983, the World Bank announced that by the end of 1982 25 developing 
countries had officially requested that their external debts be restructured (Cohn, 
2013). Cohn documents four important factors that led to these debt levels: 
firstly, some unexpected changes in the global economy occurred. For instance, 
the first external shocks occurred in the early 1970s, when grain and oil prices 
sharply increased. There was also a sharp rise in oil prices from US$3.0 to 
US$14.0 (Okurounmu, 1993 cited in Obansa, 2005) in 1973, after the Arab - 
Israeli war; the Arab members of the Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) decided to reduce their oil exports to the West because the 
US supported Israel during the war (Cohn, 2013 p. 343; Obansa, 2005). The 
global economic event that most affected Nigeria occurred between 1977 and
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1978 when demand for Nigeria's low-sulphur crude decreased as oil became 
available from the North Sea, Alaska and Mexico. Following this, demand for 
Nigerian crude became sluggish from 1978 until 1990 (Metz, 1992 p. 198).
Secondly, the behaviour of the lenders contributed to debt accumulation by the 
developing countries, and subsequently to the debt crises. For example, foreign 
private banks were charging extremely low interest rates because of inflationary 
conditions and also in an attempt to outsmart competitive lenders. The lenders 
who did this failed to signal to the borrowing countries when to stop borrowing. 
As this was going on, in the early 1980s, interest rates rose sharply, thereby 
heightening the severity of paying back debts by the borrowing countries. The 
IMF itself did not helped matters as it decided to introduce a new lending 
scheme for the oil exporting countries in 1974. This lending scheme caused the 
foreign private lenders to upgrade their lending activities (Cohn, 2013 p. 344) 
and as a consequence, Nigeria became further indebted (Metz, 1992).
Thirdly, the behaviour of the borrowers contributed to the debt crises. Many 
liberal theorists (as cited in Cohn, 2013) argue that the developing countries 
chose to borrow from the private banks in the 1970s so as to avoid the 
conditionality requirement of the IMF loans. Whereas the IMF does impose 
policy conditions on their loans to sovereign governments, the private foreign 
lenders do not have the legal authority to do this. Thus, private funds were more 
accessible compared to those from the IMF (Cohn 2013 p. 345). Lastly, 
historical materialists argue that the 1980s debt crises originated not only from 
the three factors indicated above, but also from the long-term structural nature 
of capitalism. They argue that the north was determined to keep the south 
dependent on the north through a 'debt trap'. Further, some writers have drawn 
linkages between the debts crises in the developing countries and the legacy of 
colonialism (Cohn, 2013 p. 347). The debt crises and the huge debt overhang in 
developing countries further substantiate the negative side of globalisation. In 
Stiglitz's (2002) view, the debt accumulated by the underdeveloped countries 
and excruciating poverty that came as a consequence is the greatest pain that 
globalisation has brought to the modern world.
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It was in an attempt to bail out the countries affected by the debt crises that the 
IMF and the World Bank designed their SAPs - a programme that is now well 
known to have aggravated debt crises and poverty levels in the developing 
countries (Stiglitz, 2002). To bail out a country that is ravaged by debt and 
poverty, the IMF and the World Bank will only extend loans if the country agrees 
to accept SAPs. In theory, SAPs were meant to achieve structural changes 
which were intended to provide long-term solutions to some of the problems 
facing developing countries. Thus, the IMF and the World Bank justified SAPs 
on the grounds that they were helping developing countries to achieve 
economic stability and sustained growth. To its proponents, SAPs were a 
forward-looking, long-term solution to underdevelopment in developing 
countries (Oringer, and Welch, 1998).
The loans provided by the IMF and the World Bank under the SAPs were given 
to the debtor countries on number of conditions. The general conditionality of 
SAPs requires countries to devalue their currencies against the dollar; lift import 
and export restrictions; balance their budgets and not overspend; and to 
remove price controls and state subsidies (Locker, 2000; The Whirled Bank 
Group, 2003). The devaluation of currency in the borrowing country makes 
their goods cheaper for foreigners to buy and in theory it makes foreign imports 
more expensive. In principle it should make the country wary of buying 
expensive foreign equipment. In practice, however, the IMF and the World Bank 
actually disrupts this by rewarding the country with a large foreign currency loan 
that encourages it to purchase imports (Whirled Bank Group, 2003).
Ogbimi (1998) studied the implementation of SAPs in Nigeria and found that 
currency devaluation was endless. Ogbimi observes that prior to the 
implementation of Nigeria's SAPs in 1986, one US Dollar exchanged for 77 
kobo (one Nigerian naira = 100 kobo). By July 1987, the Nigerian naira had 
depreciated 66 percent to exchange for US$0.64 (N1.64 = US$1) (Metz, 1992). 
The Dollar further gained strength to exchange for 4.016 naira at the end of 
1987, 5.35 naira in 1988, 9.93 naira in 1991 and 22 naira in 1993 (Ogbimi, 
1998). As the devaluation of Nigeria's currency against the US Dollar became 
endless (see appendix II p.303), the gap between the demand and supply of the 
US Dollar also widened (Ogbimi, 1998). Over time, the depreciation of the
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Nigerian naira went into a sort of freefall and by 2012, one US$ was exchanging 
for N157.65 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2012b). The currency devaluation was terrible 
in some African countries. In Ghana for instance, one cedi was exchanging for 
US$2.5 at the beginning of their SAPs. By 1998,'the exchange rate of Ghanaian 
cedi to US$ depreciated to extent that some goods in Ghanaian stores were 
marked in the US$ instead of the local currency. The situation was similar in 
Tanzania and Zambia (Ogbimi, 1998).
SAPs conditionality requires borrowing countries to focus on the production and 
export of primary commodities such as cocoa and coffee to earn foreign 
exchange. However, primary commodities are always affected by price 
fluctuation in the international market. Instances exist where prices of cash 
crops became depressed shortly after countries have invested in these so- 
called 'cash crops' (Whirled Bank Group, 2003). This appears to be one of the 
most flawed pieces of advice ever given to the borrowing countries under the 
SAPs. Most countries that followed this advice completely turned their focus to 
the production of cash crops for export and abandoned the production of food 
crops for local consumption. Holt-Gimenez (2009) reveals that the SAPs 
imposed by the IMF and World Bank on developing countries led to the 
dismantling of agricultural marketing boards, the elimination of price guarantees, 
the closing of the entire research and extension system, the breaking down of 
tariffs, and the deregulation of agricultural markets. While these went on, most 
of the developing countries were flooded with subsidised grain from the US and 
Europe, which was sold at prices far below the cost of producing similar crops in 
the developing countries. This alone destroyed the national agricultural markets 
in developing countries and also tied the developing countries' food security to 
global markets that are dominated by the rich developed countries.
In sub-Saharan Africa, The World Bank and the IMF, through its SAPs put 
pressure on the African countries to abandon small crop farming that supports 
the food needs of the poor rural households. This policy strategy succeeded in 
making rural dwellers abandon subsistence farming. It also pushed people to 
the urban centres in the hope that they would find employment opportunity in 
manufacturing industry. Further, the policy was advised by the World Bank and
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the IMF on the assumption that African industrial agriculture would produce 
export crops (coffee, cocoa, cotton etc) to pay off their foreign debt, and that 
Africans would use revenues from industry to import their food. Another 
assumption was that this development strategy would result in increased family 
incomes and economic security, thus leading to lower production growth rates 
(Holt-Gimenez, 2009). Holt-Gimenez reports that this strategy failed miserably, 
expressing the discontent of this development strategy in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the following terms: one, "the urban population increased, swelling from 18 
percent to 33 percent of the population"; two, "the poor and unemployed 
workers swelled the cities—with two-thirds of them living in slums"; three, "the 
manufacturing and industrial sector did not take off in African countries" and the 
growth of the GDP coming from industry did not appreciate significantly (30 
percent in 1961 and 32 percent in 2000). Five, the expansion of plantations for 
agro-exports led to a reduction in food production. As a consequence, poverty 
increased in the countryside. For instance, while the rest of the developing 
world lowered the amount of export earnings they spent on food imports from 
42 to 24 percent; African countries increased the share they spent on food 
imports from 42 to 54 percent. Lastly, the industrial transition did not slow 
population growth because it actually increased poverty and insecurity in both 
rural and urban areas. Thus, the rise in population is not the cause of hunger, 
but the result of poverty—brought on by the programmed destruction of African 
food systems.
In other respects, SAPs conditionality demanded that the borrowing countries 
introduce fiscal austerity measures (Locker, 2000). One practical austerity 
measure is the ensuring of a balanced national budget, which can be realised 
by raising taxes (Whirled Bank Group, 2003). Prior to SAPs, Nigeria adopted 
this approach and, in addition, it reduced public sector wages in order to save 
money to pay off its debt (Metz, 1992). The IMF and the World Bank frowns 
upon this approach, but advises rather the reduction of public spending on 
education, health and social care, and the removal of subsidies designed to 
control prices of the basics (Whirled Bank Group, 2003). All borrowing countries 
were required to follow this approach and evidence confirmed that it most hurt 
the poorest households in Africa, because they depend heavily on public
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services and subsidies (Stiglitz, 2002; The Whirled Bank Group, 2003). WHO 
corroborated this evidence in 2004 by confirming that SAPs had led to a 
reduction in spending on health in the developing countries throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. This, in turn, had detrimental effects on the rates of certain 
infections such as HIV/AIDs, tuberculosis and sexually transmitted diseases 
(STDs) in sub-Saharan Africa (WHO, 2004 cites Sivaraman, 1988). WHO also 
confirmed that reduced spending on vector-borne disease control programmes 
in Africa during the periods of SAPs led to the failure to appropriately control 
diseases such as malaria. In addition, there was a resurgence of some parasitic 
infections such as African trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness disease) during 
the period of SAPs (WHO, 2004 cites Sanders and Chopra, 2002)
The preceding account confirms beyond doubt that the IMF solution succeeded 
in impoverishing the developing countries. However, as Chossudovsky a (1998 
p. 293) documents, this social reality has been distorted:
Increasing levels of global poverty resulting from economic restructuring are 
casually denied by G7 governments and international institutions (including the 
World Bank and the IMF); social realities are concealed, official statistics are 
manipulated, and economic concepts are turned upside down. In turn, public 
opinion is bombarded in the media with glowing images of global growth and 
prosperity.
The UNDP was equally involved in this campaign of calumny by documenting 
outrageous figures of Human Development Index, which blatantly misrepresent 
the true country-level situation and the seriousness of poverty created by SAPs 
(Chossudovsky, 1998 pp. 302, 303).
2.3.2 Austerity Measures and Violent Reactions
There is doubt that the IMF and the World Bank SAPs imposed on developing 
countries caused deterioration in the standards of living, a reduction in access 
to public services, devastation of the environment, and a rise in unemployment 
levels. For these reasons, there have been dozens of instances of agitations 
and resistance in countries affected. In Nigeria, decreased spending on social 
welfare led to recurrent domestic unrest and some examples are illustrative: the 
Muslim-Christian riots in Kaduna State in March 1987, urban rioting in April 
1988 in response to reduced gasoline subsidies, student-led violence in 
opposition to government economic policies in May and June 1989, and a 
second coup attempt against the military government in April 1990 (Whirled
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Bank Group, 2003; Metz, 1992 p. 201). Between May and June 1989, several 
people were killed and hundreds arrested in riots and strikes against SAPs in 
three major Nigerian cities - Lagos, Benin and Port Harcourt. In 1990, university 
students and workers staged a nationwide protest against the government's 
plans to accept $150 million University restructuring loan from the World Bank. 
Yet another protest was witnessed by Nigerian university students in reaction to 
the scourge of SAPs, which they accused of being responsible for the 
deterioration of campus facilities and education programmes as well as the 
doubling of transport prices (The Whirled Bank Group, 2003).
The Whirled Bank Group (2003) documents several other instances of 
resistance action against the SAPs. In December 1993, a coalition of parties 
opposed to the neoliberal reform measure was able to win a majority in 
parliamentary elections conducted in Russia. In another instance, the 
devaluation of currency and price hikes led to street violence, involving about
15,000 people in Khartoum, Sudan. In July and August 1990, the Society of 
Muslims protested in Trinidad and took their president and some members of 
cabinet hostage. This was a direct response to the IMF imposed economic 
austerity measures. Elsewhere, for example in Uganda, the IMF imposed 
conditionality led to a cut in stationaries supply and travel allowances for 
university students. In response, students of the Makerere University protested 
in December 1990, which led to the death of two persons. In like manner, 
protests took against SAPs in Venezuela in 1989, Zaire, 1985, and Zambia, 
1987.
Recent study (Weisbrot et al., 2009 p. 4) has further confirmed the discontent 
with and hostility towards policy transfer effected by the IMF. Weisbrot et al., 
studied the IMF agreements (Stand-By Arrangements - SBA, Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Facilities - PRGF, and Exogenous Shocks Facilities - ESF) with 41 
countries selected from sub-Sahara Africa, Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and Eastern Europe and came to the following conclusions: that 31 
of the 41 agreements were found to contain pro-cyclical macroeconomic 
policies. These are either pro-cyclical fiscal or monetary policies -  or in 15 
cases, both -  that, in the face of a significant slowdown in growth or in a
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recession, would be expected to exacerbate the downturn. The study also found 
that the IMF subsequently relaxed the original conditions; sometimes (as in 
Hungary, Latvia, Republic of Congo, and Haiti) this appeared to be in response 
to social unrest or other pressures on the borrowing government. Further, the 
study reveals that in many cases the IMF's pro-cyclical policies were based on 
over-optimistic assumptions about economic growth. For instance, of the 26 
countries that have had at least one review, 11 IMF reports had to lower 
previous forecasts of real GDP growth by at least 3 percentage points, and 
three of those had to correct forecasts that were at least 7 percentage points 
overestimated.
In recent years, violent reactions to debt crises and austerity measures have 
become more prevalent in the European countries. For instance, the G8 
summits have generated widespread debate, protests and demonstrations. At 
one of the G8 meetings that took place in July 2001 at Genoa, Italy, violence 
erupted between street protesters and police officers, leading to the death of a 
young Italian and many were injured (Stiglitz, 2002; Green and Griffith, 2002 pp. 
49-50). The financial crises that ravaged European countries (such as Portugal, 
Ireland, Greece, Spain and Belgium) and the austerity measures taken by the 
affected countries in partnership with the EU, the IMF and the European Central 
Bank, generated reactionary protests across the Europe (Lane, 2012; Sandoval 
eta!., 2011).
In November 2010, students across the United Kingdom protested over the 
government's decision to cut education subsidies. Between September and 
October, there were strikes in France over pension reform, and in May a 
nationwide protest against austerity took place in Greece. In April 2009, there 
was a protest in London against the G-20 submit (Duthel, 2010). In February, 
2012, the New York Times reported a riot against the Greek Parliament's 
decision to pass an austerity plan. This austerity plan includes, inter alia, a 22 
percent cut in the benchmark minimum wage and the layoff of 150,000 
government workers by 2015. The protest against this austerity plan was 
massive and in Athens alone more than 80,000 people turned out to show their 
anger (Kitsantonis and Donaldio, 2012). Again in 2012, thousands of 
demonstrators turned out in the European cities of Valencia, Barcelona, Madrid,
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Paris, Athens, Lisbon and Brussels, in February, to protest against austerity 
(BBC News Europe, 2012).
The preceding examples confirm beyond reasonable doubt that the IMF and the 
World Bank policy transfer made the developed and developing countries worse 
off than they were before the intervention. This indeed, affirms the discontent of 
globalisation and the neoliberal policy agenda. Under the next sub-heading a 
further examination of aspects of privatisation and liberalisation will be carried 
out, so as bring to focus the experience of developing countries.
2.3.3 Privatisation, Deregulation and the Unrealised Promises of Reforms 
In theory, privatisation and deregulation are vital processes for overturning 
government repression. The proponents of privatisation and deregulation hold 
the view that government represses economic growth partly through the 
ownership of enterprises and partly by the introduction of regulations, laws and 
other nonmarket restrictions, which do not allow businesses to operate at their 
full potential (Haslag and Koo, 1999 p. 3 cites Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1995). 
The Washington Consensus and the SAPs were founded on the assumption 
that government was repressing economic growth in underdeveloped countries, 
and that there was a serious need to overturn this. Based on this line of thinking, 
the IMF and the World Bank decided that privatisation and deregulation were to 
be the key terms of conditionality for borrowing money by those countries that 
required a bail-out from their debts (Briggs and Yaboah, 2001). For most 
developing countries that were already heavily indebted, there was an urgent 
need for state owned enterprises to be privatised so as improve failing public 
enterprises, cut down on public expenditure and save money to pay off debts or 
even qualify for more debt. In this regard, the move to privatise in most of the 
indebted countries, including Nigeria, stemmed more from pragmatism than 
ideology (Zagha and Nankani, 2005).
The advice by the IMF and the World Bank in respect of privatisation and 
deregulation was appropriate because the indebted countries were in desperate 
need of help. As appropriate as it was though, the advice on the process of 
implementation has been widely criticised. In regard to the pace of privatisation 
reforms, the IMF and the World Bank advised the already indebted countries to
39
privatise quickly (Zagha and Nankani, 2005). This advice was flawed in the 
sense that countries were expected to privatise as fast as possible without 
thought being given to how this could be achieved. Most of the countries that 
followed this advice came out worse off than they were prior to the privatisation. 
Russia, for example, speedily undertook its privatisation programme in the 
absence of institutional infrastructure, and this promoted corruption and 
produced no positive economic effect (Stiglitz, 2002 p. 157).
In most transition countries of Eastern Europe the volume of privatisation was 
massive and the process was difficult to manage. Besides, countries were 
expected to privatise very quickly. However, the experience of privatising 
quickly, as advised by the IMF, did not lead to impressive results, as the 
conventional techniques for privatisation proved inadequate for the task at hand 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Albania, Estonia, 
Georgia, Mongolia and Russia, introduced a concept of privatisation by 
vouchers. The voucher concept involved the government printing and 
distributing vouchers (free or, for a token sum), perhaps unequally to favour 
certain groups. The vouchers are then used in lieu of cash or as supplements, 
to bid for firms being auctioned to the highest bidders. The government would 
then exchange its equity in a state firm for vouchers that are cashed in (Zagha 
and Nankani, 2005). Zagha and Nankani found that in most countries that 
adopted such a technique the outcome of privatising state enterprises by 
vouchers was not impressive. The benefits were not as widely distributed as the 
technique intended. Most of the recipients of the vouchers decided to sell them 
for a small value, often to the firms' incumbent managers. In general the 
privatisation process created value but the controlling owners received more, 
and other owners received just a little. Zagha and Nankani further observe that 
most of the Eastern Europe countries did not privatise their banks as they did 
manufacturing and commercial firms. This was not part of an overall plan but 
rather because buyers were not forthcoming. Potential buyers were less 
interested in buying the banks because of the huge nonperforming loans that 
existed in those banks.
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The SAPs induced privatisation of state owned enterprises became prevalent 
among the African countries during the 1980s and 1990s. By 2001, 37 countries 
had undertaken privatisation resulting in 2270 transactions. The sum of 
US$9,111.9 was realised from the transactions and the total share of state 
owned enterprises divested across the 37 countries was about 40 percent 
(Nellis, 2005 p. 8). Nellis examined the outcomes of the privatisation 
programmes in African countries and found that it was greatly affected by the 
institutional setting in which the divesture occurred. Stiglitz (2002) concurs with 
Nellis in confirming that timing (and sequencing) is everything when it comes to 
privatisation. Unfortunately, this principle was evidently (Nellis, 2005, Stiglitz, 
2002) neglected in the SAP imposed deregulation programme. Stiglitz (2002) 
observes that countries were advised to undertake reforms quickly to curb the 
quality flaws and the financial losses that were being recorded by the state 
owner enterprises. In response, most of the countries kick-start their reform 
programme in haste and the institutional foundation on which good privatisation 
must be based was neglected or insufficiently emphasised. As a consequence, 
the reform programmes failed to achieve their purposes due to the absence of 
legal and economic institutions that could support and guide market operations.
The experience of privatisation in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Togo clearly 
corroborates the findings of Nellis (2005) and Stiglitz (2002). In Cote d'lvore, the 
telephone company was privatised before a regulatory or competitive 
framework was put in place (Stiglitz, 2002). In the case of Nigeria, the 
privatisation was formally introduced in 1988 by the enactment of the 
Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree (now an Act). This Act led to the 
creation of the Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation 
(TCPC) which was given the mandate to privatise and commercialise public 
enterprises (Nwoye, 2007). Between 1988 and 1993, the Committee was 
involved with the privatisation of 110 public enterprises, of which about 70 were 
to be fully divested (Drum, 1993). By 1993, the Committee had succeeded in 
privatising 88 enterprises. However, its activities were marked by a lack of 
transparency and the Labour Union in Nigeria continually resisted the 
privatisation process as workers were losing job in their numbers. Further, the 
resistance from the Labour Union was intensified for the reason that a good 
number of the larger enterprises that were privatised got bought out by foreign
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interests. Even the Committee that was overseeing the process of privatisation 
in Nigeria realised that there was a need for a better institutional framework for 
this purpose. The recommendation of the Committee to the federal government 
was that a Bureau for Public Enterprises (BPE) and the National Council on 
Privatisation should be created. These institutions were created in 1993. 
However, this was belated as much of the privatisation had gone through in a 
process that was adjudged to lack transparency (Nwoye, 2007).
Togo's privatisation programme was one of the earliest in the sub-Saharan 
Africa, starting in 1982. However, inadequate institutional framework impacted 
negatively on the reforms implemented. The Ministry for Industry and State 
Enterprises was given the mandate of privatising 74 public enterprises but the 
process was slowed down as a result of social and political changes. Shortly 
after the privatisation exercise began, it soon became apparent that the 
institutional framework was inadequate: the country had neither a stock 
exchange nor well-developed capital markets, and there was relative little 
independent accounting expertise in the country. As a result of these 
constraints most of the transactions that took place were carried out by private 
placement and much of the divested enterprises went to foreign investors as 
opposed to the Togolese (Drum, 1993). In like manner, the principal 
beneficiaries of the privatisation reforms in Uganda were foreign investors, who 
acquired 75 percent of the total divestiture proceeds, while the local population 
gained an only 16-percent share (Bhattacharya et al., 2002).
Zagha and Nankani (2005) document that the number of enterprises affected in 
the privatisation programmes that were implemented in many countries was 
massive and difficult to manage. Poland, for instance had 8,400 state-owned 
enterprises with subsidiaries, and it was hard to keep track of changing 
numbers and sizes. Mexico had to privatise 150 state owned enterprises in six 
years. This was just too much when compared to the experience of United 
Kingdom, which had to privatise only 20 firms over a period of 10 years (Zagha 
and Nankin, 2005). In Hungary, for example, 10,000 retails shops and 
restaurants were auctioned out, and approximately 500 enterprises were 
divested (SAPRIN, 2002). Between 1991 and 2001, Ghana had privatised 181
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enterprises, 189 enterprises were privatised in Kenya, 474 in Mozambique, 
1999 in Tanzania, 102 in Uganda, 252 in Zambia, 82 in Cote d'Ivoire and 57 in 
Angola (Nellis, 2005 p. 8). Nellis found that the volume of transactions involved 
in the privatisation programmes of these countries was just too difficult to 
manage. The consequences were an increased incidence of corruption, 
manipulation of transaction to the benefit of the rich, the agile and politically 
well-connected persons, and the divesture added greatly to unemployment.
Stiglitz (2002 p.57) confirms with evidence that SAP induced privatisation 
destroyed jobs rather than create new ones. In Nigeria, many workers were laid 
off (in some instances with minimal or a complete absence of severance 
benefits) from NITEL, Nigerian Airways, and Nigerian Railways. As a 
consequence, in Nigeria, urban violence, increased crime, and social and 
political unrest became the order of day. Similarly, high numbers of job losses 
were recorded in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, East 
Germany, Russia and Vietnam (Martin, 1997 p. 13, 14). The practice is quite 
different in the developed countries where the pain of layoffs is acknowledged 
and somehow ameliorated by the safety net of redundancy payment and 
unemployment benefit. This is not the case in developing countries where 
unemployed workers do not become a public charge - since there are seldom 
unemployment insurance schemes (Stiglitz, 2002). Zagha and Nankani (2005) 
observe that privatisation was implemented in most countries without due 
consideration given to the distinction between regulated industries and 
competitive ones. This was a common problem in most countries that 
undertook SAP imposed deregulation (Stiglitz, 2002).
Some countries, such Botswana, Malaysia, Korea and China, decided not to 
follow the IMF advice. Rather, they employed different approaches and, as a 
result, they become success stories. Botswana's success came through the 
ability to maintain political consensus, based on a wider sense of national unity 
(Stiglitz, 2002). Political consensus, according to Stiglitz, is necessary for any 
workable social contract between the government and the people. The evident 
political consensus is seen in Botswana's ability to manage a stable democracy 
since independence in 1966. Further, the country has been able to
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independently enter into collaboration with outside advisers, from a variety of 
public institutions and private agencies, including the Ford Foundation. 
Collaborating with such advisers as opposed to that of the IMF helped the 
government and the people Botswana in a number of ways: firstly, unlike the 
IMF, which largely deals with the finance ministry and the central bank, the 
advisers were open and candid in explaining policy proposals as they worked 
with the government of Botswana. The public regarded this to be a transparent 
process and thereby offered their support for the government's programme and 
policies. Secondly, the foreign advisers discussed the entire proposals with 
some senior officers in Botswana's government and also conducted open 
seminars, as well as one-to-one meetings. Thirdly, the senior officers in 
Botswana's government took great care in selecting the advisers. Lastly, 
Botswana's economy is diversified with two important sectors: cattle and 
diamonds (Stiglitz, 2002 pp. 37-38).
In the case of Malaysia's, the government was reluctant to join the IMF 
programmes for two reasons: one, because the government officials in Malaysia 
were not happy to allow outsiders to dictate policies for them; and two, the 
government did not have confidence in the IMF. Even when the IMF made 
attempts to advise the Malaysian authorities, the government did not take the 
advice at face value but carefully decided on what was more appropriate for 
their situation. This principle has helped the Malaysian government over time, 
and today the country stands in a far better position than those countries that 
followed the IMF advice. Even during the Asian crises, Malaysia emerged 
stronger than other countries such as Thailand, who followed the IMF pattern 
(Stiglitz, 2002 p. 125). The experience of Korea is similar to that of Malaysia. 
This was evident during the Asian crises, when the Korean government decided 
not to follow the IMF's standard prescriptions, such as the advice to close down 
banks and deregulate interests (Stiglitz, 2002 p. 127). China is one country that 
has adamantly followed an independent course. This has afforded it the 
opportunity to achieve its short-run and long-run growth. By following an 
independent course, China has successfully created a lot of opportunities for 
public investment with high returns (Stiglitz, 2002 p 125 - 126).
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The evidence examined in the preceding discussion confirms again that the 
neoliberal policy reforms (in respect to privatisation and deregulation) 
implemented in most developing countries did not deliver their promises. 
Further, the discussions covered raise a serious need for a rethink on the 
transfer of policies that are tied to specific conditionality as it is the case with the 
IMF and the World Bank. It is also important that countries are allowed the 
opportunity to adopt policies and reform programmes that are most suitable and 
appropriate for them.
2.3.4 Liberalisation and its Controversy
The IMF and World Bank neoliberal agenda is hinged partly on liberalisation. 
Liberalisation is premised on the idea of openness (Bhattacharya et a l 2002; 
Banuri, 1991; Zagha and Nankin, 2005), which describes the state of an 
economy and the degree of its integration with the global economic forces 
(Banuri, 1991). Economic openness can be attained through financial 
interactions and trade relations across international borders. Another way to 
think of liberalisation is in terms of the extent of a given country's outward 
orientation. Outward orientation itself is a description of the strategies adopted 
by government - regarding imports, devaluation, changes in trade restriction 
and bias of trade policy - to create economic openness (Banuri, 1991 p. 10). It 
is argued that with greater openness, small economies can accumulate higher 
share of trade in their gross national product than can large economies that 
restrict trade. Liberalisers assume that trade liberalisation leads to poverty 
reduction and, equally, that it enhances the welfare of consumers as they find 
opportunities to choose from a wider range of quality goods made available 
from cheaper imports (Bhattacharya et al., 2002).
The World Bank and the IMF have hinged their policies and advice on these 
assumptions (Stiglitz, 2002). However, evidence indicates that these theoretical 
assumptions are not always correct in practice and that, indeed, the contrary 
may be the case. For example, Banuri (1991) examined the liberalisation 
experience and found that it caused a reversal of the GDP in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, 
Urugua and Paraguay) and the Philippines. For these countries, Banuri notes 
that neither economic openness nor outward orientation brought improved
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economic performance over the 1980s. The experiences of these countries 
indicate that changes in policy orientation did not lead necessarily to changes in 
openness. The findings equally suggest that the degree of openness was 
different in different countries, and the attempts by the IMF to impose a 
universal solution by force were costly and ineffective. Banuri's study also 
pointed to the strong association between economic liberalisation and political 
authoritarianism, which created much difficulty in the implementation of IMF's 
prescription in the study countries.
The supposed relationship between the IMF's prescribed policies and the 
expected outcomes is not verified in most counties that undertook trade and 
financial liberalisation reforms. It has been confirmed (Stiglitz, 2002) that "trade 
liberalisation in developing countries succeeded only in moving resources from 
low-productivity sectors (uses) to zero (none) productivity. This destroyed jobs 
as inefficient industries close down under pressure from international 
competition". The steel industry in Nigeria is a classic example. Before the 
liberalisation programme began in Nigeria, the government was operating three 
inland rolling mills (Jos, Kaduna, and Oshogo), two steel companies (Detal and 
Ajaokuta), two steel materials exploration agencies (Kogi and Kaduna), one 
metallurgical training institute (Onitsha), and one metallurgical development 
centre (Jos) (ISSSAN, n.d.). With the exception of the metallurgical 
development centre, the rest of these enterprises were privatised following the 
IMF and the World Bank's advice; that it was more advantageous for Nigeria to 
export its raw materials to the industrialised countries, and buy finished steel 
from them than to develop the indigenous steel industry (Yusuf, 2006; 
Mohammed, 2003). The Government of Nigeria obliged to this advice without 
taking into account: the value for money that would be lost as a result of the 
depreciation in the value of domestic currency against international ones; 
additionally, the deregulation process exposed the infant steel industry to 
unfavourable competition (Yusuf, 2006); finally, the job losses that were bound 
to occur from the privatisation programme were not taken into account. 
Accordingly, the workers became the scapegoats as 3017 of them were 
disengaged from two steel companies as of 2005 (ISSSAN, n.d.). The record of 
those that were retrenched from the inland rolling mills, the exploration agencies
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and the training institute could not be ascertained. However, ISSSAN 
documents that over 8600 workers of the steel companies were owed about a 
year's salaries as of 2005.
Another example is the textile industry. Prior to Nigeria's liberalisation in 1987, 
the textile industry was estimated to be the third largest in Africa, after Egypt 
and South Africa, with about 180 textile mills employing more than 350,000 
workers in major textile towns such as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Kano, Kaduna, 
Asaba, Funtua, Gusau among others. The Nigerian textile industry was 
generating an annual revenue estimate of US$9 billion, which was capable of 
directly or indirectly supporting 17.2 million people. The textile industry started 
crumbling after Nigeria introduced a liberalisation programme and the key 
reasons include: lack of sufficient electrical power, dwindling domestic cotton 
production, cheaper textile imports as well as higher energy prices, which lead 
to increased financing costs (Kure, 2012). The number of textile mills fell over 
the neoliberal era, shrinking from 180 mills in 1986 (Kure, 2012) to 124 mills in 
1994 and right down to 70 mills in 2002. As of 2012, the number of textile mills 
has further sunk to 30 (The Engineering News, 2012). The collapse of textile 
industry in Nigeria was accompanied by the bitter experience of job losses 
which affected thousands of people whose severance benefits were not paid 
(Eroke, 2013).
There is no doubt that Nigeria's trade liberalisation succeeded in exposing the 
infant industries to unfavourable competition conditions. This experience was 
similar in other African countries such as Kenya, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe. 
Research by Zagha and Nankani (2005) shows that in these countries most of 
the small firms responded to import competition pressure by contracting rather 
than upgrading aggressively. In like manner, Argentina lost much of its 
automobile industry to unfavourable competition and the situation was similar 
for the cereal industry in Brazil (Zagha and Nankani, 2005). Zagha and Nankani 
also found a negative relationship between trade liberalisation and rising 
inequality in Colombia, Mexico, Morocco and Poland. Furthermore, in most of 
the sub-Saharan Africa countries (such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, 
Zimbabwe), the liberalisation of the labour markets led to the elimination of cost
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of living adjustment clauses in collective agreement and to the phasing out of 
minimum wage legislation.
Bhattacharya et al. (2002 pp. 57, 58) examined trade liberalisation policies and 
their impact on the manufacturing sectors in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Ghana, 
Zimbabwe, Hungary, Mexico and the Philippines, and made some strident 
conclusions: one, that because the IMF pushed trade liberalisation to 
developing countries indiscriminately, this led imports to surpass exports 
thereby destroying the conditions necessary for the growth of domestic firms 
(similar experience is confirm in the Nigerian textile industry); two, that trade 
liberalisation caused the countries studied to lose many local manufacturing 
firms, particularly those innovative, small and medium size firms that generate a 
great deal of employment; three, the decline of the domestic manufacturing 
permitted the economies of the countries studied to be flooded with cheap 
imports which further diminished local production; four, exchange-rate 
depreciation did not contribute much to export competitiveness of domestic 
industries for which it is intended. Rather, it increased the price of imported 
inputs and raised production costs thereby hurting the manufacturing firms 
producing for the domestic market; lastly, export growth in the countries studied 
became concentrated in a few activities that do not create links to the local 
economy.
Some countries such as China, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and 
South Korea have succeeded with 'illiberal' economies, while most of the sub- 
Saharan Africa countries, as well as those of Latin America (such as Chile and 
Argentina) have suffered despite undertaking liberalisation to the highest levels 
(Banuri, 1991). Industries in Southeast Asian countries (including China) are 
often given some incentives to ensure that selling on international markets is as 
attractive as domestic sales. Creating such incentives requires that a country 
establishes a regime that offsets the anti-export bias. This in turn requires an 
effectively functioning bureaucracy to implement the offsetting regulation 
(Zagha and Nankani, 2005). Unfortunately, the IMF and the World Bank appear 
to be economical with this advice; they have evidently not prescribed this 
proactive measure to countries that have been made to undertake trade 
liberalisation.
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In the era of SAPs, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury prescribed full capital 
account liberalisation on the grounds that it would help the developing countries 
to grow faster. Sadly, the opposite was the case in most of the countries that 
followed this advice. For instance, the East Asian countries did not require 
additional capital, given their high savings rates, yet capital account 
liberalisation was pushed on them by the IMF. This turned out to be the single 
most important factor that led to the financial crisis in Asia in the 1990s (Stiglitz, 
2002 p. 99). Prior to the financial crisis there was a huge inflow of foreign 
investment. This reversed with the crisis as investors decided to withdraw their 
funds and invest elsewhere. This sudden change in investor sentiment 
worsened the crisis and created a recession (Stiglitz, 2002). Thailand is one of 
the country worst hit by investor sentiment and the reversal of fund; the reversal 
amounted to 7.9 percent of Thailand's GDP in 1997, 12.3 percent of GDP in 
1998 and 7.0 percent in the first half of 1999. The financial crises in Asia 
generated so much criticism to the extent that even the IMF agrees that it 
actually pushed the liberalisation agenda too far (Stiglitz, 2002 pp. 99, 100 and 
59).
Bhattacharya et al. (2002 pp. 67-69) undertook a study on the effect of financial 
sector liberalisation on production of small scale enterprises in Bangladesh, 
Ecuador, El Salvador and Zimbabwe and found that: one, liberalisation did not 
improve the level of economic efficiency within the financial sector of the 
respective countries; two, that corruption and bribery became prevalent under 
liberalisation in all four countries; three, that financial sector liberalisation, in 
practice, promoted short-term speculation and investment in non-productive 
activities, as well as borrowing for the purpose of consumption; four, that the 
reforms carried out in the four countries facilitated the search for quick profits 
which also helped to channel resources away from productive sectors. Stiglitz 
(2002) also confirms this in most developing countries that undertook 
liberalisation reforms. Five, that instead of promoting macroeconomic stability, 
the liberalisation of interest rates and capital account allowed capital to become 
increasing volatile, flowing easily off-shore, and this contributed to economic 
crises and increased the vulnerability of the countries to external shocks (Stiglitz, 
2002 confirms this also); six, and lastly, the study found that liberalisation
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reforms permitted assets to become increasing concentrated in few private 
hands.
Recent experiences around the world, particularly lessons from the financial 
crisis of 2008, have further called to question the idea of a deregulated 
economy and the free market. While it is true, of course, that no economy in the 
world has ever operated a pure free market, free capitalism had emerged a 
clear winner prior to the global financial crisis 2007-2009 (Schuman, 2012). The 
success of free capitalism was overturned with the crisis. In the aftermath of the 
financial crisis, some writers identify unregulated markets as the cause, while 
others blamed states’ inabilities to design institutions or implement policies 
capable of neutralising the negative impact of the crisis on output, employment, 
and social welfare. In this sense, it was a failure of both the market and the 
state (Foxley, 2010). Three important lessons came out of the crisis. Firstly, the 
crisis proves that deregulatory legislation which leads to an increased role for 
markets can generate financial risk and economic downturn (Jickling, 2009; 
Jaffee, Quighly and Noll, 2007). Secondly, inadequate supervision and 
regulation can lead to imbalances of capital inflow and loose monetary policies 
(IMF, 2010). Lastly, policy makers have come to realise that state and market 
roles are complementary, rather than substitutable (Schuman, 2012; Jickling, 
2009). These lessons point to the need for an appropriate legal and regulatory 
framework in developing economies. In seeking economic growth, development 
and competitiveness through liberalisation, it is essential that varying degrees of 
state regulation and intervention should be maintained. If an appropriate mix of 
state and market roles is achieved, institutions will efficiently allocate resources 
such that people's social welfare is protected.
3 .4 SUMMARY
The discussions covered in this chapter confirm beyond doubt that globalisation 
has brought both gains and losses to the nations of the world. In the West, the 
gains globalisation has brought surpass the losses. Contrariwise, the 
experience of globalisation in the developing nations is that it has effected 
political, economic and cultural damage. First, globalisation opened the door for
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the accumulation of sovereign debts by the developing countries from the 
developed sovereign nations (G7), the multi-international agencies, and 
corporations. The debt overhang on the developing countries has created a 
dependency relationship whereby the developing countries have become 
subservient to the developed ones. The dependency relationship is an open 
channel whereby the foreign earnings of developing countries syphoned back to 
the developed nations in the form of debt repayment. This is constraining 
economic growth, development and the improvement of living conditions in 
developing countries.
The debt reduction solution that was prescribed through the IMF's SAPs did not 
address the problem but rather worsened it. In theory, the IMF SAPs were 
intended to help the recovery of those economies that had been ravaged by the 
debt crises. Unfortunately, most countries that followed IMF prescriptions 
underwent economic, political and social degeneration. The consequences for 
sub-Saharan Africa countries, including Nigeria, was a further destabilisation of 
national economies leading to reversed growth, poverty, hunger, riots and many 
more detestable social realities.
The trade and financial liberalisation that was imposed on the developing 
countries delivered far less than the theory of openness promised. It is evident 
from the discussion above that most of the countries that undertook 
liberalisation became worse-off than they were prior to their reforms. 
Liberalisation did not really improve macroeconomic stability nor did it trickle 
down to improve the well-being of the people in countries that undertook the 
reform. This is a serious indictment of the imposition of policies on developing 
countries by the international agencies.
In conclusion, the idea of 'enabling' created a paradox. At first sight, it could be 
seen to be an interference with many aspects of social, political and economic 
development. It is, accordingly, clear that those countries that observed the IMF 
and the World Bank economic reform programme had their social services 
system crippled. And for most developing countries, including Nigeria, the 
neoliberal reforms that have been precipitated by the IMF and the World Bank
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have rather constrained the growth of national economies than enabled them. 
Further light will be shed on the experience of Nigeria in chapters four and five. 
The next chapter will further examine the notion of enabling, in connection with 
the transfer of administrative techniques from the international agencies (World 
Bank, UNDP, UNHABITAT) to the developing countries, and their application in 
the organisation of formal housing provision.
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CHAPTER THREE
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSUMPTIONS FOR ORGANISING HOUSING
PROVISION
3.1 INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapter shows that globalisation and neoliberal policy transfer 
has rather disabled the economies of developing countries than enabled them. 
The direction that neoliberalism assumes over the last three decades has 
generated a movement of anti-neoliberal policies. Over the last three decades, 
the struggle against the neoliberal agenda has witnessed spectacular growth in 
intensity, scope, and visibility as a public issue (Green and Griffith, 2002 p. 50- 
51). As result of this political reaction, the World Bank and Aid Agencies began 
to refine the policies they push to developing countries, and in recent times, 
they began to transfer administrative techniques (such as decentralisation, 
participation and empowerment) within the purview of the enabling approach. 
These concepts will be examined to understand how they can be helpful to the 
reforms of housing systems in developing countries. Further, as there are 
opposing views as to whether housing should be treated as a market 
commodity or a welfare item, it is important also to review the market versus 
state debates in housing provision. This will further shed light on how the 
production and allocation of housing could be achieved in a neoliberal context. 
All these will be covered in this chapter.
3.2 IDEAS AROUND THE ENABLING APPROACH FOR HOUSING
Over the past four decades, the global housing situation of poor households 
and the rising urban concerns have received attention in UN conventions (such 
as the 1976 Vancouver Conference on Human Settlements, the UN General 
Assembly of 1988 and UN Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat II) held 
at Istanbul in 1996). In these conferences, the idea of the enabling approach 
for housing was born and a number of decisions were made in connection to 
human settlements.
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The first was that housing is a complex phenomenon and its delivery requires 
the inter-dependency of components. The proposers of the enabling strategy 
developed the concept based on the assumption that housing involves much 
more than houses: it is a complex arrangement that is comprised of several 
components and conduits such as institutions, laws, regulations, consumers 
and providers (UN-HABITAT, 2010). The concept of enablement therefore, 
seeks to achieve whole-sector housing development so that all of the peoples' 
needs will be satisfied (Pugh, 1994b & 2001). A UN agency (UN-HABITAT, 
2010 pp. 13, 14) has demonstrated in figure three, that enablement is premised 
on the notion that 'housing' is understood as a holistic and multi-dimensional 
concept. Based on this understanding, the provision of adequate and affordable 
housing should hinge fundamentally on the structure and functioning of the 
entire housing sector and its components. Hence, five key inter-dependent 
components that interact in any housing market were identified in the UN­
HABITAT report: land; infrastructure; finance; labour; and the building materials. 
These components are organised and shaped by four groups of external forces 
that comprise the legal, regulatory and institutional frameworks within which 
they operate. The four forces are: policies; strategies; instruments; and actions 
(See details in figure three).
Strategic Institutional Frameworks
Building Materials
Policies
Labour Finance
Infrastructure
Instrumen Legal & Regulatory Frameworks Actions
Figure 3: A multidimensional view of housing sector (source: UN-HABITAT, 2010)
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The second idea about 'enabling' is that decentralisation of roles and 
responsibilities can effectively address the complexities of housing delivery. 
Proponents of the enabling approach advocate the decentralisation of roles and 
responsibilities between tiers of government, non-governmental organisation, 
community-based organisation and the formal private sector (UN-HABITAT, 
2004 p. 14; World Bank, 1996c pp. 4, 88)
The third idea that is associated with the idea of enabling is participatory 
development of the housing sector and housing provision. The UNDP argues 
that enabling places people at the centre of human development. If this were 
the case, then agents and beneficiaries (people) of the development process 
would guide the direction of development, and people would be fully involved in 
propelling economic growth and social progress. This implies that people's 
participation is essential in housing provision. According to the UNDP, 
participatory development starts with self-reliance, which means people being 
able to take care of themselves. However, to promote peoples' economic, 
political and social self-reliance is not to argue against state intervention in 
human development. On the contrary, carefully designed government policies 
and programmes should promote greater participation of all people in the 
development process (UNDP, 2006 p. 2; 1990 p. 64).
According to the UN-HABITAT (2004 p. 14), participatory development is when 
there is active involvement of all the key actors in the housing process. This is 
fundamental to the effective design and implementation of the enabling shelter 
strategies. Governments are, therefore, encouraged to promote widespread 
consultation and the full and equal participation of the poor, women, and other 
disadvantaged groups; governments are also encouraged to empower them to 
participate effectively. And governments, as part of their housing facilitator role, 
should form and promote partnerships with, and between, the various actors in 
the shelter process. The World Bank (1996c) holds the view that participation 
implies that people acquire a greater voice in local affairs and an expanded role 
in decision making processes. It is therefore, inseparable from empowerment. 
However, the justification for participatory strategies must lie in their contribution 
to the specific objectives of housing and infrastructure service delivery. The
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avenues for individuals and households to participate in the development of the 
housing sector and provision of housing are community-based organisations, 
civil society groups and non-governmental organisations. The role of these 
organisations in housing provision came to the fore during the Habitat II 
conference in Istanbul. Since then, successive publications of the United 
Nations and its agencies (UNDP and UNCHS) and the World Bank have 
emphasised the role of these actors in housing provision, the delivery of 
infrastructure services, urban management and planning (UNDP, 2006 pp. 16, 
36; UNCHS, 1996 p. 28; 2001 b pp. 1, 2).
The idea of enabling comes with the promotion of private initiatives in housing 
provision, infrastructure delivery and management. At the Habitat II conference, 
participants came to the consensus that the role of formal private enterprises is 
crucial to the provision of affordable housing. Participants at Habitat II 
recognised that the private sector can and should play an important role in the 
housing and development process. Therefore, governments were encouraged 
to create a framework for the functioning of housing markets (UNCHS, 1996). 
Three major policy areas are generally recognised as essential to private sector 
development in the developing world: 1) the creation of an environment for 
private sector development, including new legislation and regulations supportive 
of private sector growth; 2) privatisation, especially of productive functions more 
efficiently performed by the private sector and the strengthening of micro, small, 
and medium-sized enterprises through such mechanisms as small-scale credit 
schemes, volunteer executive programmes and venture capital; 3) and the 
improvement of public sector management and private sector management 
training. What is required is a smaller but more effective public sector capable 
of creating an enabling development framework and guiding private investments 
into priority areas for housing and infrastructure development. The role of the 
public sector should be confined primarily to building the economic 
infrastructure and to providing social services. Successful development will 
depend on the right strategy mix, on the right policy package that combines 
private and public sector strategies in the interest of people-oriented 
development (UNDP, 1990 pp. 64, 65).
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In summary, if enabling shelter strategies are to contribute to the goal of 
adequate shelter for all, there are certain principles to which they must adhere: 
1) housing strategies must be politically endorsed and supported by 
government at all levels, with governments facilitating the process; 2) it must be 
participatory, involving all the actors involved in shelter development and 
improvement - public organisations, the private sector (both formal and 
informal), NGOs, and most importantly, the people themselves; 3) it must be 
needs-driven; this requires the recognition and appreciation of the realities on 
the ground, and the consideration of the priorities and preferences of the people 
themselves; 4) it must be people-centred whereby local communities actively 
participate in the shelter development and improvement process; 5) it must be 
focused on the housing needs of the poor and other vulnerable, marginalised 
and disadvantaged groups; 6) it must be result-oriented; this requires the 
identification of goals, objectives and targets, and the design of an action plan 
to achieve them; 7) it should be comprehensive; this requires the taking into 
account of the multi-dimensional nature of housing needs and the recognition of 
the depth and complexity of some of the changes needed; 8) it must be based 
on partnership between governments and other actors in the housing process; 9) 
it should be a sustainable arrangement (UN-HABITAT, 2004 p. 47). The 
evidence for these principles in Nigeria is examined in chapter nine (see page 
239).
The ideas enabling are reflected in the housing policy of Nigeria. The housing 
finance arrangement that came with the policy is based on people's 
participation in the NHF scheme and the participation of private local and 
international investors with government. Within the framework of enabling the 
federal government tried to devolve decision-making power by encouraging 
state and local government authorities to design strategies and programmes 
within the framework of the national policy. The policy decision evolved the 
apportioning of roles and responsibilities for housing and infrastructure provision 
between federal, state and local government authorities. The decision also 
encouraged government authorities to partner with NGOs, CBOs and the formal 
private sector to address housing and infrastructure delivery. This way, 
participatory development could be realised and people's housing needs solved.
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These ideas became popular in Nigeria after the Habitat II declarations were 
made. And the international agencies such as the UNDP, UN-HABITAT and the 
World Bank have influenced Nigerian government in this direction.
3.3 OPERATIONALISING THE ENABLING APPROACH FOR HOUSING
The idea of enabling is an attractive one, but its dilemma arises from how it 
could be effectively achieved. The concept appears to be loose and open to 
different kinds of interpretation and response. Evidence from case studies 
(UNDP, 2001 pp. 35-36, 44-45; Kanothi, 2009 pp. 9-26; Helmsing, 2002 pp. 
317-340; UN-HABITAT, 2004 pp. 9-10) confirms that there is no concrete 
procedure for the implementation of the enabling strategy. And one important 
reason for this is the substantial variations that exist in housing problems 
between countries, as well as political, social and economic situations. Though 
few authors pay attention to the concrete implementation procedure for the 
enabling strategy, Helmsing (2002, p. 321), after considering previous studies, 
identified three forms of implementation.
One form of implementation relates to market enablement. Helmsing (2002), 
citing Burgess et al (1974; 1997) reports that market enabling lays at the heart 
of most neoliberal policy frameworks. Pugh (1994b, p. 357) concurs with this 
position, that the idea of enabling has its derivations in the political economy of 
liberalism. In the direction of liberalism, enablement is meant to facilitate and 
promote the private business sector (formal and informal) and entrepreneurs in 
order to provide market solutions for the production, distribution and exchange 
of urban goods and services (Helmsing, 2002). Nigeria and most of the 
developing countries that introduced policies which are based on the idea of 
enabling underwent market restructuring, mostly through liberalisation, 
deregulation and privatisation programme. Some examples include Malaysia 
(Njie, 2006), India (Sanyal and Mukhija, 2000), Nigeria, Korea, Thailand, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Uganda, and Senegal 
(Zagha and Nankin, 2005; Pill and Pradhan, 1995), Argentina, Brazil, Sri Lanka, 
Venezuela, Pakistan, Kenya, Egypt (Kim and Kenny, 2006; Pill and Pradhan, 
1995), among others. This indicates that the policies pushed forward by 
international agencies, mainly the World Bank and the UN agencies (in this
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case the UNDP, UNCHS and UN-HABITAT), played a significant role in shaping 
the housing markets in developing countries.
It is important to state that neoliberal policies in Nigeria and most developing 
countries were introduced through SAP. The SAP conditionality essentially 
forced developing countries to open their markets to foreign products. This 
came with some negative consequences such as the destruction of local 
industries and the creation of dependency upon commodities which have low 
prices as they are heavily subsidised by economically dominant nations (Hart- 
Landsberg, 2006; Makwana, 2006). Nigeria and other countries in Sub-Sahara 
Africa introduced financial liberalisation between 1987 and 1992 (Pill and 
Pradhan, 1995). This however did not address the issue of access to mortgage 
in the open market. To illustrate, the rate of access to formal and informal 
financial services as a percentage of national population of Nigeria (151 million) 
in 2009 (see Table One) indicates that: 21 percent of Nigerians had access to 
banks; two percent had access to other formal institutions; 24 percent had 
access to informal financial sources and 53 percent were excluded from all 
sources. The opportunity for access is generally poor in Nigeria compared to 
other developing countries. For instance, South Africa's population was 48.7 
million in 2009 and 60 percent was accessible to banking services. The 
proportion of those that had access to other formal sources was four percent, 
those who had access to informal source were 10 percent and the percentage 
of those excluded was 26. Similarly, the opportunity for access to financial 
services is higher in Botswana and Namibia compared to Nigeria. However, 
Rwanda, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique are worse off compared 
to Nigeria. For these countries, access to mortgage housing by low income 
households is affected by restrictive eligibility criteria, high costs and 
conservative terms (Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa, 2010 p. 1).
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Table 1: Access to financial services in some selected African Countries
Selected countries and Country Rate of access and exclusion from formal and
year data was obtained Population informal financial services as percentage of country
in millions population
Banks Formal (others) Informal Excluded
South Africa 2009 48.7 60 04 10 26
Botswana 2008 2.0 41 18 08 33
Rwanda 2008 10.0 14 07 26 52
Namibia 2007 2.0 45 02 02 52
Malawi 2008 14.8 19 07 19 55
Tanzania 2009 42 12 04 27 56
Zambia 2009 12.6 14 19 14 63
Mozambique 2009 22.0 12 01 10 78
Nigeria 2009 151.0 21 02 24 53
(Centre for Affordable Housing in Africa, 2010 p. 13)
Furthermore, financial liberalisation resulted in the removal of barriers to 
currency speculation from abroad. The result of this is a rapid inflow and outflow 
of currencies which is now responsible for acute financial and economic crisis in 
many developing countries (Makwana, 2006). I have earlier referred to the 
experience of SAP in Nigerian. It is apparent that the SAP induced liberalisation 
came with terrible experience for the developing countries. Makwana (2006) 
documented the experiences of Latin America countries over the 1990s. For 
instance, Venezuela, Cuba, Argentina and Bolivia were left with no choice but to 
follow the neoliberal model of privatisation and deregulation due to their 
financial problems and pressure from the IMF in the 1980s/90s. These countries 
have since rejected foreign corporate control and the advice of the IMF and 
World Bank. Instead they have reintroduced public enterprises and also 
prioritised the provision of healthcare, education and public housing.
No doubt, the post neoliberal era has been marked by slower growth, greater 
trade imbalances, and deteriorating social conditions developing countries 
(Hart-Landsberg, 2006 citing UNCTAD, 1999). This appears to be similar in all 
developing countries. For instance, in Latin America the average growth rate 
was lower by 3 percent per annum in the 1990s than in the 1970s, while trade 
deficits as a proportion of GDP was much the same. In sub-Saharan Africa 
growth fell, but deficits rose. The Asian countries were lucky enough as most of 
them managed to grow faster in the 1980 decade, while reducing their 
payments deficits. This did not last long as they ran into deficits without 
achieving faster growth in 1990s (Hart-Landsberg, 2006). Makwana (2006)
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agrees with Hart-Landsberg that neoliberalism has not been able to address 
growing levels of global inequality. Makwana specifically documents that "over 
the last 25 years, the income inequalities have increased dramatically, both 
within and between countries. Between 1980 and 1998, the income of richest 
10% as share of poorest 10% became 19% more unequal; and the income of 
richest 1% as share of poorest 1% became 77% more unequal (again, not 
including China)"
The second form of implementation relates to political enablement. This 
requires a transformation in the structure and functions of central and local 
government, the relations between them, and their relations with the market and 
the community (Helmsing, 2002). Political enablement devolves decision­
making power, administrative and managerial functions through decentralisation, 
democratisation, institutional reforms, widespread use of NGOs, CBOs and the 
formal private sector. Helmsing (2002) and Pugh (1994a; 1994b) are in 
harmony with political enablement. Pugh (1994b, p. 166) further state that 
political enablement is meant to create a platform for partnership arrangements 
which join together policy makers, firms and market entrepreneurs, NGO, CBOs, 
and households. Thus, the partnerships are meant to join together 'top-down' 
with 'bottom-up' approaches, and to achieve effectiveness by enabling each 
participating institution to pursue its comparative advantage.
The UN-HABITAT concurs with Helmsing and Pugh in its recommendations for 
policy makers (2004, pp. 13, 14). The argument of the UN-HABITAT is that "the 
institutional arrangements underpinning housing development and improvement 
are integral to the success of enabling shelter strategies". Thus, "creation of 
appropriate institutional frameworks will likely require reform in three key areas - 
decentralisation, participation and partnerships. Governments have a 
paramount role to play in the formulation and implementation of enabling shelter 
strategies through creating appropriate institutional, legal and regulatory 
environments".
The third form of implementation relates to community enablement. Burgess et 
al (1994, p. 57), as cited in Helmsing (2002, p. 322), defined community 
enablement as "a strategy adopted by central and local government to co-
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ordinate and facilitate the efforts of community and neighbourhood-based 
organisations to initiate, plan and implement their own projects according to the 
principles of self-determination, self-organisation and self-management". The 
UN-HABITAT (2004, p. 24) also recommended that "community groups should 
be facilitated to fully contribute to shelter development and improvement 
through the establishment of enabling legislative, institutional and financial 
frameworks, along with the private sector and NGOs". However, "NGO and 
CBO roles should not be seen as a replacement for local government’s 
essential role in shelter strategies".
Though three forms - market, political, and community - of implementation of 
enabling policy can be identified, they do not, however, provide a concrete 
procedure for its implementation. Helmsing (2002) observes that countries vary 
widely in the relative importance they give to these forms of implementation. In 
addition to these forms of implementation, the UN-HABITAT (2004, p. 4) 
proposed an institutional framework for housing development and improvement 
(see figure 4). The proposed institutional framework depicts the complex and 
multidimensional nature of housing, which requires multiple policies, strategies, 
components and actors in its provision. This framework is meant to guide the 
design and implementation of an enabling housing strategy.
POLICIES
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Infrastructure Financer  Housing 1 
developm ent
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Materials
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Figure 4 A Conceptual view of housing development and improvement process based on 
enablement strategy (Source: UNHABITAT, 2004 p. 4)
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The UN-HABITAT has recommended some "dos" and don'ts" in the practice of 
enabling housing provision (see Appendix III p.304). These recommendations 
may serve as a valuable guide to policy makers in the design and 
implementation of enabling strategy. However, they do not provide a concrete 
implementation procedure. In spite of the recommendations made by 
international agencies and academic researchers, the procedures for the 
implementation of the enabling strategy remain a bit vague and open to different 
kinds of understanding and responses. This is a key concern about the 
enabling concept.
3.4 FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS FOR THE ENABLING STRATEGY
3.4.1 Decentralisation
Over the last two decades, decentralisation has become an essential condition 
for dispensing aid and loans by agencies such as the International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) (UNDP, 2007; World 
Bank 1994 & 1998), Sub-continental Development Banks (Asian Development 
Bank, 2011; Awortwi and Helmsing, 2007 p. 13 citing African Development 
Bank, 2005 p. 265, 266), UN Agencies (WHO, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNICEF, 
FAO, IFAD, UNFPA, UNESCO among others), the DFID and the USAID (UNDP, 
2007) and the European Union -EU (EU-Republic of Nigeria, 2009). In order to 
attract funding, most developing and transition countries have adopted a 
decentralised structure in their development planning and delivery of public 
services such as healthcare, education, social infrastructure and welfare 
benefits, among others. Some typical examples are Uganda (Okidi and Guloba, 
2006), Ghana, Philippians, Uganda, Zambia (Partners for Health Reforms Plus, 
2002), Indonesia, Cambodia, Mali, Ghana and Nigeria (Smoke, 2003), Ghana 
(Alan and Koranteng, 2011), Hungary, Brazil and Ghana (World Bank, 1994), 
Russia, China and India (Bardhan, 2002), Uganda, Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, 
Cote d’Ivoire, Kenya and Tanzania (Robinson, 2007), among others.
As decentralisation is not a theory, variable practices are observed among 
countries that adopted it in the governance of public services (UNDP and 
Government of Germany, 1999). However, the commonly observed goal with 
decentralisation is to achieve a diverse array of governance and public sector 
management reform objectives (see for instance, Wunsch, 1998; Cohen and
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Peterson, 1997; Blair, 2001; Bardhan, 2002; Helmsing, 2002; Smoke, 2003; 
Robinson 2007; Awortwi and Helmsing, 2007; Mazzaferro and Zanardi, 2008 
among others). In Nigeria, a federal system of governance has been in 
operation right from independence in 1960. This is to say that constitutional 
federalism, which allows for sharing of administrative power and public service 
delivery roles, is not a new idea in Nigeria. What is new in Nigeria is the UNDP- 
supported decentralisation approach (which is linked to local governance, 
partnership and participation in the provision of public services). This idea has 
been introduced in the governance of healthcare services and education. It is 
also being tried in the provision of new housing and the slum improvement 
scheme through the current housing policy with which this study is concerned 
with (UNDP, 2007).
The most elaborate approach of all forms of decentralisation, which the UNDP 
is pushing forward, came out of a research conducted by Cohen and Peterson 
in 1997 (UNDP and Government of Germany, 1999 pp. 3-8; Cohen and 
Peterson, 1997 p. 29). Cohen and Peterson developed a model for the practice 
of decentralisation. The model is termed 'Administrative Design Framework. 
The "Administrative Design Framework" is a model of institutional pluralism 
based on decentralisation through deconcentration, devolution and delegation. 
It emerged from an exercise carried out by Cohen and Peterson for the United 
Nations in 1995-96. The Framework is a strategy proposition for addressing a 
number of critical governmental needs in developing countries. Foremost 
among these are increased transparent and accountable, effective and efficient 
production and delivery of public goods and services (Cohen and Peterson, 
1997 p.1, 2; Blair, 2001 p. 199). These are serious institutional problems in Jos 
and Nigeria as a whole, which is why the study will test the hypothesis of the 
"Administrative Design Framework".
The Administrative Design Framework examines administrative design in terms 
of the concentration or deconcentration of roles by institutions that implement 
public sector tasks. The central principle underlying this Framework is that 
providing allocative tasks through a pluralist, rather than a monopolist, 
administrative design promotes accountability, which in most developing 
countries is the most important issue affecting delivery of goods and services.
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Breaking the “monopoly of central design” and expanding the options of 
administrative design is one of the major challenges facing administrators and 
development assistance agencies using decentralised strategies to promote 
accountability in delivery of public goods and services.
Cohen and Peterson employ a diagram, presented in figure Five to explain the 
theoretical propositions of their Framework. They argue that Administrative 
Design Framework presents three objectives of administrative design: 
accountability of performance; efficiency of management; and effectiveness in 
mobilising and using resources in the context of the enabling strategy. They 
define accountability as holding public servants responsible for their outcomes, 
efficiency as the positive relationship of resource inputs to outputs, and 
effectiveness as a measure of the appropriateness of outputs. They further 
argue that, in developing countries, these problems arise from two scenarios. 
The first scenario arises from institutional monopoly or centralisation in delivery 
of goods and services. This will occur where roles are concentrated at the 
spatial centre in an organisation or institutions. The second scenario arises from 
distributed institutional monopoly. In this scenario, there is administrative 
decentralisation to local-level governmental institutions and organisations, but 
roles are often distributed spatially and concentrated in one organisation or 
institution. Either of these two scenarios could result in a lack of accountable, 
inefficient and ineffective delivery of housing.
The Administrative Design Framework assumes that accountability is the 
foremost objective and that efficient management and effective resource 
mobilisation stem from accountability. Furthermore, the Framework assumes 
that accountability is maximised by having two or more public sector institutions 
and/or private sector firms and organisations share in the performance of the 
roles needed to promote administrative design changes or carry out a particular 
administratively decentralised public sector task. The Administrative Design 
Framework is designed to overcome institutional monopoly and distributed 
institutional monopoly with Institutional Pluralism, or administrative 
decentralisation through deconcentration, devolution and delegation. The three 
forms of decentralisation, when applied together are capable of overcoming
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institutional monopoly and at the same time promoting a pluralist delivery of 
social services (Cohen and Peterson, 1997 pp. 2, 21). Empirical studies found 
that this approach show considerable promise for the implementation of public 
projects in Bolivia (Blair, 2001). Specifically, Cohen and Peterson argue that 
the pluralist delivery of roles through the strategies of the distributed institutional 
monopoly's devolutionary form or through institutional pluralism promotes 
accountability and good management (Cohen and Peterson, 1997 pp. 2, 21).
ANALYTICAL (ROLE)
Centralisation
(Monopoly)
Decentralisation
(Pluralism)
Figure 5 Analytical and Structural Design Dimensions of Administrative System (Source: Cohen &
Peterson, 1997)
The Administrative Design Framework is concerned with promoting accountable, 
efficient and effective policy innovation, leadership, planning, financing, 
management, and task administration in the provision of public service. To 
achieve this, there are four different sequences of spatial (structural) and 
analytical (role) centralisation and decentralisation that can be illustrated with 
reference to figure Five.
The first sequence is from quadrant I to quadrant III. This should lead to 
centralised roles and structures, to spatially decentralised structures. Here, 
there is deconcentration or devolution of functions and responsibility from 
central government to local level agencies, resulting in a distributed institutional
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monopoly. Pluralism is not achieved in this case because the roles are 
centralised at both central and local-level agencies. The second sequence is 
from quadrant I to quadrant II. This should lead to centralised roles and 
structures, to decentralised roles and centralised structures. Pluralism is not 
achieved because the centre only deconcentrated the roles spatially at the 
centre, excluding the local levels. The third sequence is from quadrant III to 
Quadrant IV. This should lead to centralised roles and decentralised structures, 
to delegated roles and structures. Pluralism is achieved here because the roles 
are deconcentrated or devolved from centre to local level agency with further 
spatial delegation taken place at the local level. This promotes accountable, 
efficient and effective leadership in the planning, financing, management and 
task administration of housing delivery. The fourth sequence is from quadrant I 
to quadrant IV. This should lead to centralised roles and structures, to 
delegated roles and structures. Pluralism is achieved because the roles are 
deconcentrated or devolved to the local level from the centre and the centre 
also delegated roles to other local-level institutions. This promotes accountable, 
efficient and effective delivery of housing.
As preceding discussion would confirm, a decisive factor in the design and 
implementation of the enabling housing approach is decentralisation. However, 
decentralisation has in most cases political implications, for it often seeks to 
change power structures and can encounter explicit or hidden resistance from 
those political and bureaucratic forces who fear the loss of their power through 
decentralisation (Swiss Agency for Development and Corporation, 2001). If the 
centralising of housing provision roles in a few agencies permitted privileged 
corrupt bureaucrats and politicians to pursue personal gains in Nigeria (as 
confirmed by Ikejiofor, 1999, and Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992), then it 
would be reasonable to predict that decentralisation of housing delivery roles 
from government to government or private organisations would lead to efforts of 
re-centralisation on the part of bureaucrats who are afraid of losing control over 
the implementation stage.
3.4.2 Empowerment
The empowerment of people at the local and community level is one of the 
goals of the enabling strategy. Empowerment in this sense is targeted at
67
expanding the "assets and capabilities of poor people to participate in, negotiate 
with, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives". Such 
empowerment should give people access to "voice and information, greater 
social inclusion and participation, greater accountability, and organisation 
strength". The practice of the enabling strategy should ultimately result in a 
Local and Community Driven Development (LCCD). The rationale behind LCDD 
is to "harness social capital (the networks of relationships among people) 
through empowerment and to increase social capital through scaling up" 
(Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt and Spector, 2010 p.4). The LCDD approach is 
advocated on the basis that many developing countries have "mixed record of 
state effectiveness, market imperfections, and persistent structural inequities 
that undermine the effectiveness of social policy"(Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt 
and Spector, 2010 p. v). These problems accounts for the poor delivery of 
services to poor urban and rural people in the developing world. They are also 
responsible for the concentration of poverty in rural areas and urban slums 
(World Bank 2004f, 2008d cited in Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt and Spector, 
2010 p. 1). To overcome these problems, the World Bank feels that "social 
policy needs to move beyond conventional social service approaches toward 
development’s goals of equitable opportunity and social justice" (Binswanger- 
Mkhize, de Regt and Spector, 2010 p. v).
The LCDD approach is applied on a number of assumptions. Firstly, it is 
assumed that "it has the explicit objective of reversing power relations in a 
manner that creates agency and voice for poor, allowing them to have control 
over development assistance". Secondly, it is assumed that LCDD approach 
could make "the allocation of development funds more responsive to their
i
needs, improve the targeting of poverty programmes, make government more 
responsive, improve the delivery of public goods and services, and strengthen 
the capabilities of the citizenry to undertake self-initiated development activities". 
Thirdly, there is an assumption that if there is a clearly defined decentralised 
framework that devolves real power and resources to local governments and 
communities, then local development could be planned and managed by local 
citizens, their communities, and their local governments (Binswanger-Mkhize, 
de Regt and Spector, 2010 p. 1). Lastly, there is an assumption that LCDD
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approach will result in an efficient and sustainable management of shared 
facilities by communities that benefit from such projects. This assumption will 
hold on three conditions: one, the residents of benefitting community should 
fully participation in the project initiation, part-financing, and managing the 
implementation process. Two, the beneficiary communities should be 
encouraged to take ownership of the projects after it is executed. They should 
also be encouraged to take responsibility for operation and maintenance. Three, 
the assumption is predicated on the need to enhance capacity of the beneficiary 
community (Binswanger-Mkhize, de Regt and Spector, 2010 pp. 2).
There are few countries in Africa that have attained a phase of decentralisation 
that lead to empowerment. Examples are Botswana and South Africa. Other 
countries, including Ethiopia, Ghana, Tanzania, and Uganda are seen to 
consolidate on their decentralisation but Nigeria and other Sub-Sahara African 
countries are categorised among the incipient, where decentralisation is 
territorially limited, fiscally constrained by insufficient transfers from central 
government. In Nigeria, decentralisation is also functionally constrained 
because responsibility for delivering public services such as health care, 
education, water provision, and road maintenance are retained by the central 
government and its deconcentrated structure (Serrano-Berthet et a\, 2010 p. 
124). In theory, the enabling approach should effectuate changes in Nigeria. 
This study will empirically examine the extent at which such changes are 
occurring in the practice of housing provision in Jos.
3.4.2 Participation
Closely related to decentralisation and empowerment is the idea of participation. 
Wilson (1996) argues that decentralisation, participation and empowerment are 
intertwined. Decentralisation that allows for the participation of people in 
development process should enhance individual empowerment. Participation 
brings about partnership and this in turn should result in the empowerment of 
the people. To this effect, Wilson (1996 p. 627) asserts that "as individual 
empowerment dismantles the sense of personal isolation, the act of 
participation creates a feeling of belonging and interconnectedness, which in 
turn produces commitment and cooperation" This assertion is affirmed by
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Brodie et al (2009 p.17) who demonstrates that participation has a wide 
spectrum and the process through which it occurs should lead to information 
dissemination (provide the public with balanced and objective information to 
assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or 
solutions), consultations (to obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives 
and/or decisions), involvement (work directly with the public throughout the 
process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently 
understood and considered), collaboration (to partner with the public in each 
aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the 
identification of the preferred solution); and empowerment (to place final 
decision-making in the hands of the public) (Brodie etal, 2009 p.17).
3.5 HOUSING: A WELFARE ITEM OR MARKET GOOD?
The notion of enabling (liberalisation, decentralisation and participation) is in 
favour of changing the role of government, from provider to enabler of social 
services including housing. This raises a question of how the change in 
government's role would achieve the social objective of housing the poor and 
low-income households in a liberal market context. Housing is one of the four 
pillars of the welfare state. Others are social security, health services and 
education. However, housing differs from the three other pillars of the welfare 
state in being characterised by high capital intensity, which makes it prone to 
cuts in spending (Lowe, 2011; Kemeny, 2001). Housing is an economic good as 
well a product of social, cultural and political structures and agencies (Lowe, 
2004). Lowe argues that the thinking about housing as a cultural/historical 
formation as well as an economic good and commodity, makes it a difficult item 
in the welfare context. As a pillar of the welfare state, housing is often neglected. 
This partly arises from housing being socially and culturally embedded (Lowe, 
2004), and partly due to housing characteristics, particularly those that are 
found mostly in the private sector (unlike other welfare services) (Lowe, 2011).
Clarke and Gingsburg (1975) argue that housing is a necessary and large 
component of the reproduction of labour power, and yet, houses are too 
expensive to be bought outright by members of the working class. In this sense, 
housing differs from the other welfare pillars in being rarely considered as a 
universal form of public provision. Even where housing is directly provided by
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government, only a minority of the population often have access to it. This is the 
case even though the government covers a much higher proportion of the costs 
than is the case with other welfare pillars (Lowe, 2011; Kemeny, 2001; Clarke 
and Gingsburg, 1975). This is still the situation in Nigeria, where only minority 
of the population have access to limited housing provided by federal, state or 
local government authorities (Awotona, 1987 & 1990). Worse still, houses and 
housing support schemes that are meant for low-income groups are often 
hijacked by privileged high-income groups (Ikejiofor, 1999; Onigbokun, Agbola 
and Labeodan, 1989; Lewis, 1977). And yet, adequate shelter and services are 
a basic human right, which places an obligation on governments to ensure their 
attainment by all people. Government is expected to remove all impediments 
hindering attainment of these goals (United Nations - Vancouver Declarations, 
1976 p. 7). The subsequent discussion examines the theoretical narratives that 
explain the assumptions on which housing policies are designed, the expected 
role of government in any given housing system and the opportunities for 
equitable access to adequate housing for all.
3.6 NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS
The enabling approach for housing has its origin in the political philosophy of 
liberalism (Pugh, 1994a). Liberalism has economic connotations based upon 
the principles of market dynamism and efficiency, orthodoxy in macroeconomic 
management, and certain prescriptions in the politics of institutional conditions 
and property rights (Pugh, 1994a; Misses, 1985 pp. 10, 19-38). In line with this, 
the classical liberals have often argued that in some way liberty and property 
are intimately related and a market order based on private property is 
synonymous with freedom (Gaus and Courtland, 2011). These assumptions 
have influenced economic theories that seek to promote efficient production and 
allocation of goods and services through market freedom. Market freedom is 
achieved by removing restrictions through liberalisation and deregulation 
(Arestis, 2005). Liberalisation has been a key activity around achieving markets 
that are friendly to the private sector and are also efficient. A typical economic 
approach that is aligned with these thoughts is neoclassical economics.
Neoclassical economics is a term that is used to describe economic approaches 
which are focused on the determination of prices, outputs, and income
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distribution in markets through demand and supply. This perspective is 
characterised by several assumptions common to many schools of economic 
thought. There is no complete agreement on what is meant by neoclassical 
economics, and the result is a wide range of neoclassical approaches to various 
problem areas and domains - ranging from neoclassical theories of labour to 
neoclassical theories of demographic change (Ferguson, 1969). Although 
certain branches of neoclassical theory may have different approaches, 
Weintraub (2002) suggests that neoclassical economics rests on the three 
assumptions of rationality, utility maximisation and independent action on the 
basis of full and relevant information. The argument for neoclassical economics 
centres on these three assumptions. They assert that free exchange promotes 
division and specialisation of labour allowing the individual to concentrate on 
producing the goods that they are most suited to create; that the state should 
confine itself to doing what only the state can do, such as maintaining law and 
order, policing of contracts, production of infrastructure, and other services 
which could never be in the interest of any individual to provide. And because 
individuals are rational maximisers of their self-interest, if the state obeys these 
rules, then the unseen hand of the market will promote everyone's welfare 
(Lund, 2011 p. 4).
If this argument is related to housing, then its consumption would not be far 
from a commodity traded in markets where individuals seek satisfaction of their 
wants by paying rents or prices for purchase. Ball (1986) had earlier established 
three strands of neoclassical economics which concerned housing studies. The 
first relates to the question of distributional equity, the second attempts to 
provide predictors of changes in house prices and/or the number of houses built. 
The last relates to the examination of specific housing policies. Studies in 
distributional equity are more to do with influences upon demand, with the point 
of reference taken from the impact of state policies on an individual's housing 
and its cost (Ball, 1986). The question that follows then is how should the 
impact be measured? Ball has given a number of ways that neoclassical 
economists have tried, but all showed that the objectives are not easy to 
achieve. Possibly, the ideal economic criterion would be the attainment of equal 
costs for a given quantity of housing within and between tenures. This would 
allow everyone to face the same 'price' when deciding how much housing to
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consume and its location. Tenure then becomes a neutral backdrop to 
consumption decisions, affecting only the profile of repayments. If this were the 
case, Ball suggests that the objectives of housing policy would then be to 
achieve this equality and, in addition, to subsidise explicitly merited cases.
Unfortunately, studies (McMaster & Watkins, 1999 and Pugh, 2007) including 
Ball's, have argued that the concept of equal cost is difficult to define in an 
economic theory based on subjective preferences, especially when the profiles 
of cost are distributed over time as inevitably they are in housing. Furthermore, 
people's tastes vary, including their choices over present and future 
consumption. Different housing tenures produce distinct profiles of cost over 
time for consumers, and neoclassical economics has no means of establishing 
whether two profiles are equal in some respects. Due to the absence of a single 
and generally agreed measure, highly contentious ones have been used to 
achieve 'fairness' of some sort. For example, attempts have been made to apply 
tax reliefs in order to keep cost burdens at par for varying tenure holders, 
subsidies have been applied to households in some cases, while, in others, 
’free market rents' have been compared with the personal incidence of housing 
costs in different tenures (Ball, 1986). Whichever criterion is taken, it may not 
give a good base on which to erect a policy of wider scope.
Pugh (2007) suggests that neoclassical economists tend to be most 
comfortable using their theoretical framework to explore principles of efficiency, 
incentive and maximisation of utility or minimisation of costs. They are pulled 
into housing as a public policy, which raises dilemmas. Pugh feels that these 
dilemmas arise because their theoretical roots are in 'methodological 
individualism', but any useful theory of public policy must reconcile itself to 
notions of establishing binding social choices. Housing may be accepted as an 
exceptional case in order to break with methodological individualism. If it is, it 
will simply mean being summated with the likes of education, health, social 
security and many more 'exceptional subjects'. If, on the other hand, social 
choice is accepted, neoclassical economists may be constrained to argue for 
housing as a 'merit good'. As such, individual choices can be overruled by 
professional or political expertise because, inherently, the individual is regarded
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as having a distorted or irrational preference. This scenario would not give a 
useful basis on which to erect a good housing policy.
Neoclassical economists attempt to model housing-market behaviour on 
assumption of stable demand and supply schedules (Ball, 1986). They try to do 
this on their central tenets, which McMaster & Watkins (1999) say include 
equilibrium, individual utility maximisation and the absence of severe 
information problems. Mirowski 1989 and Samuels 1995 cited in McMaster & 
Watkins (1999) argue that "the important points are that equilibrium is optimal 
when markets are perfectly competitive and that all markets are assumed to 
possess a natural tendency to equilibrium". The modelling of market behaviour 
has had considerable relevance for the owner-occupied housing market, as it 
implies, for example, that "house price inflation can only be caused by 
something external to that market". Therefore, the potential need for any 
fundamental changes in housing provision is rejected before the start of the 
analysis (Ball, 1986).
There has been a series of criticisms of the neoclassical approach to modelling 
market behaviour. McMaster & Watkins (1999) present some of the criticism: 
that optimisation is not feasible; information is costly to obtain; and even when 
individuals possess information, they may not retain the requisite cognitive 
ability to employ it optimally. Neoclassical consumption theory has been 
criticised with reference to housing wealth. According to Hannsgen (2007), 
Elizabeth S Anderson, with other philosophers, has argued that "certain goods 
are intrinsically different from others and should therefore be produced, 
distributed, and consumed in different ways". This argument stands in contrast 
to economic theories of rationality, which reduce all goods to utility and make no 
distinction between market and non-market goods. Hannsgen applies such 
analysis, however, not denying that houses are goods, but asserting that they 
are different in kind from other market goods. In addition, Hannsgen developed 
the following points that support housing being treated differently from the way 
that neoclassical consumption theory suggests.
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Firstly, Hannsgen suggests that the norms, institutions, and behaviours 
surrounding the production, maintenance and exchange of homes should not be 
seen as neoclassical consumption theory prescribes. Secondly, house 
ownership produces some social implications. For example, a house-owner with 
family cannot sell his or her house without having an effect on the family's social 
existence. This is because a house-owner and his or her family members 
socialise with their neighbours go to the same schools, share valuable 
information and often lookout for one another. Thirdly, house-ownership is a 
symbol of status and pride. In addition, the owner of a house has a sense of 
control, which is a social advantage. For these reasons, Hannsgen draws the 
conclusion that neoclassical theory has misplaced the role of one of the largest 
purchases most families will make in their entire lives. Further, Hannsgen 
argues that a correct understanding of the nature of the goods provided by 
houses has an important implication for policy. Kauko (2006) conducted a study 
on the perceptions of housing consumers and reached a conclusion which is 
indicative of the need to establish a research agenda that aims at investigating 
socially inflected housing preferences. This conclusion also needs to be taken 
into consideration when modelling market behaviour.
According to Ball (1986), there is a concern which needs to be given adequate 
interest in housing studies. This concern has to do with housing being "too often 
seen solely as an item of personal consumption that must be bought or rented 
on the open market or be allocated through some sort of state-orchestrated 
institutional framework" (Ball, 1986 p.147). This perspective has led to 
consumption and exchange being regarded as the central focus of housing 
research. Ball argues that the effect of social relations surrounding the provision 
of housing as a whole should be considered and examined. Housing tenures 
and the institutions associated with them are treated in a particular way within 
both distributional studies and neoclassical economics in general. Ball is also 
concerned that neoclassical economic theory is concerned with resource 
allocation and, by assumption, no tenure form, state policy or institution alters 
the fundamental behavioural characteristics underlying demand or the 
technically determined conditions of supply.
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Marxism and institutionalism are at variance with the argument of neoclassical 
economics. Therefore, the succeeding discussion will undertake a brief review 
of Institutionalist and Neo-Marxist thoughts about housing.
3.7 NEO-MARXISM AND HOUSING
Marxists maintains that the relationship between individuals and social 
institutions is determined by the mode of production used in a particular society 
(Lund, 2011). Marxists view society in terms of a conflict between the two 
economic classes, where the capitalist class exploits the industrial working 
class. Marxists' analysis of welfare concentrates principally on its relationship to 
the exercise of power. The state can be seen either as an instrument of the 
ruling capitalist class or as a complex set of systems which reflect the 
contradictions of the society it is part of (Spicker, 2010).
Marxism is not a single doctrine; it has come to stand for a wide range of 
opinions within an analytical framework that is critical of capitalism (Spicker, 
2010). Neo-Marxism is an alternative paradigm that gained particular 
prominence from the mid-1970s and featured prominently in the work of 
Ginsburg, Gough and Offe (Clapham, Kemp & Smith, 1990). Clapham et al 
describe the views of the trio as congruent. They both put forward an argument 
that capitalist economies are driven by class inequalities, and that the state is 
required to protect and sanction 'a set of institutions and social relationships to 
dominate the capitalist class. Gallan (1984), while criticising neoclassical 
economics, argues that market prices are inadequate mechanisms for resource 
allocation in some instances and that government intervention is justified either 
for the elimination or reduction of monopolies or for the rectification of the 
neglect of social rationality by the private enterprise system. The preceding 
arguments therefore, point to the need for welfare and social policies which 
include housing provision.
If the arguments of the Marxists are applied to housing, Lund (2011) states that 
they will generate a number of propositions: firstly, the real exploitation of the 
worker takes place at the point of production when building workers are paid 
less for their labour than the exchange value of the houses they create. 
Secondly, there are fractions of housing capital with different short-term
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interests but the same long-term interest is in ensuring the continuation of the 
capitalist system. Thirdly, capitalism needs a contented, efficient labour force 
and a 'reserve army of labour' that can be injected into the economy when 
required and ejected when superfluous. Fourthly, housing has an exchange 
value to capitalists (its efficiency in generating profits), but it also has a use 
value in meeting the housing need of the working class. Therefore, in a market 
capitalist economy, housing will be affected by its investment value as well as 
its utility in meeting needs. These propositions point to the fact that capitalism is 
highly exploitative. And when we think of the economic, social and political 
context within which housing is produced and allocated, it benefits the capitalist 
class to the detriment of the workers.
Clarke and Ginsburg (1975) argue that in capitalist societies housing is a 
commodity, and so shares the characteristics of the commodity under 
capitalism analysed by Marx. However, for political and theoretical reasons, 
housing is an important commodity in a capitalist society. If housing is analysed 
as a commodity, it raises three important concerns according to Clarke and 
Ginsburg. Firstly, the price of housing includes some elements of rent and 
hence the discussion of housing as a commodity ought to involve a theory of 
rent. Secondly, the cost of housing is huge, which makes it too expensive to be 
bought outright by members of the working class. Even with mechanisms such 
as private and public renting, and purchase on the basis of loan finance, it still 
doesn't take the form of an outright sale. In either case, the cost of finance 
constitutes a large proportion of the costs of realisation, and so analysis of 
housing ought to involve an adequate theory of interest. Finally, the state has 
had to intervene directly or indirectly in housing provision. Directly or indirectly, 
the state now plays a major role in the regulation of production and circulation of 
housing. Hence an understanding of housing presupposes an adequate 
understanding of the state and of state intervention.
Politically, housing is important because it does not only bring the worker into 
contact with the supplier of the commodity in a single transaction. Instead 
people seeking to acquire houses are placed in a long contractual relationship 
with property owners, financiers or the state itself. In this way, prospective home 
owners who are workers would usually encounter capital as consumers instead
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of workers. The huge cost involved in the transaction of housing places 
prospective home owners in long contractual relationships with property owners, 
fanciers or the state. All these issues point to the fact that the housing struggle 
has historically been a very important source of conflict under capitalism (Clarke 
and Ginsburg, 1975).
Ball (1986) and Kemeny (1992) concur with Clarke and Ginsburg. Their position 
is that developments within societies are determined by conflicts whose 
contents are fundamentally influenced by the dynamics of the dominant mode of 
production. Individual situations, needs and the extent of their satisfaction all 
depend on the general social dynamics. Ball uses this argument to examine 
housing consumption in capitalist societies, for which he expresses the role of 
state expenditure as being central. He argues that State subsidies for housing 
consumption may simply help to keep wages down or help to provide a potential 
pool of workers in a particular locality. Some researchers, however, hold a 
contrary view to this. For example, Clapham, Kemp and Smith (1990) see 
subsidies as assistance with housing costs from the state or state intervention 
in the cost of consuming housing. They further argue that such assistance is 
necessary because housing costs are such a large component of household 
costs and have an influence on the level of wage demands within the economy. 
Looking further at subsidies, Gibb and Munro (1991), hold that a subsidy can, 
rather, be thought of as a State finance reduction in the cost of housing. 
Supporting this view Pugh (2004 p. 49), writing on subsidies in developing 
countries, states that it is a way of addressing housing equality or inequality.
Neo-Marxists also view housing within the domain of their political economy of 
the welfare state. Pugh (2007) suggest that they see housing as highly 
politicised, but refuse to agree with middle-ground theories of the welfare state 
which hold that governments can successfully reform economic institutions to 
achieve more equality and compatibilities among state- and market-economic 
roles. Pugh (2007) examines Gough (1979) and understands neo-Marxist 
political economy as follows. Firstly, the neo-Marxist sees the state as serving 
the functional needs of capitalist development. The state ensures continuity of 
capitalism and, in so doing it is incapable of prevailing over the conflicts 
between social policy and the interest of capitalists. Examples of internal conflict
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in a welfare state would include occasional opposition to the welfare state from 
moderate politicians and from business interests. The state concedes housing 
and other social policies to society perhaps because it is a way of dealing with 
working-class political struggles and containing some opposition to capitalist 
inequality. Secondly, Pugh reveals that social policy has an instrumental 
purpose in reproducing labour power. This implies that social policies add a 
'social' wage to ordinary wages, and both wage forms ensure workers' fitness to 
work. Lastly, the Marxist views the state as serving two main functions: the first 
is to improve conditions for the accumulation of capital; the second function is to 
legitimise the capitalist system by introducing measures which lead people to 
accept the system as it stands.
3.8 INSTITUTIONALISM AND HOUSING
Institutionalism is one of the traditions that reflect a grounded and 
comprehensive body of thought that lies at the core of radical political 
economies (Nell, 2005 p 814 and Stretton, 1999 p 852). Gallen (1984) suggests 
that institutionalism insists on the importance of studying empirically the 
connections between economic institutions and other aspects of culture. The 
institutionalists have a much different perspective on the nature of economic 
system from neoclassical economists. The theoretical structure of 
institutionalism was developed in America between 1890 and 1920 (Gallen, 
1984). This strand of institutionalism is now referred to as the "old" institutional 
economics, or OIE. In recent years, a new strand of institutionalism has 
emerged from neoclassical, Austrian and game-theoretical sources, which is 
referred to as "new" institutional economics, or NIE (Rutherford, 1996).
Institutionalism has been particularly influential in the analysis of social change 
(Lowe, 2011). In contrast to neoclassical economists, the institutionalists are 
evolutionists and reject the idea of a static economic order. They regard 
economics not as the study of the "natural" regularity of market patterns, 
processes and behaviours which permitted supply and demand to achieve 
equilibrium, but, rather, as the study of economic structures, or systems, and 
their evolution through history (Gallen, 1984). Acceding to Gallen's position, 
Pugh (2007) submits that institutionalists perceive a continuously advancing 
society with well-designed institutional arrangements offering temporary and
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tentative solutions. As transformations take place in the society, it becomes 
necessary to revise institutional arrangements. This position seems reasonable 
because there can never be a lasting solution to societal problems including 
housing. However, temporary solutions may exist to tackle the problems of the 
day. Institutional arrangements (including those responsible for the 
administration of housing) must, therefore, be subject to continual evaluation 
and institutional reform should be carried out when deemed necessary.
Institutional economists are easily reconciled to politics and they believe that 
valuation is socio-political and that public policies are necessarily expressed 
through institutional arrangements (Pugh, 2007). Institutions express the way 
democratic choices in society as whole can revise market freedom, re-allocate 
resources and use the state to restructure society. Basically, the institutionalist 
recognises that various devices can be used to bring cohesion, including 
housing markets and the state's social, political and economic roles. When fair 
and democratic institutional arrangements are lacking, people's choices would 
be unsatisfactorily met or would be limited either by extreme market inequalities 
or by authoritarianism. In housing, extreme market inequalities could result in 
the deprivation, exclusion and marginalisation of people in substandard housing 
and slum conditions. This situation is visible in Jos as was noted earlier in 
chapter one.
3.9 SUMMARY
The preceding discussions suggest that the enabling strategy for housing is 
indeed a neoliberal policy and its success is dependent on the extent to which 
liberal principles are implemented. With regard to implementing the liberal 
principles, the role of government authorities in the developing countries 
including Nigeria is to deliberately undertake reforms. Unfortunately, the 
process through which the liberal reforms were undertaken brought discontent 
to the developing countries. The experience of Nigeria will further be examined 
with specific focus to the housing sub-sector. This will be done with a view to 
explaining how financial liberalisation impacted on the supply of subsidised 
housing.
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The debates presented above indicate that when housing, being a form of 
welfare service, is provided in a market context, it can result in conflict between 
welfare intentions and business's profit-making objectives. To bridge such 
conflict, production subsidies are often suggested to keep house prices at 
reasonable levels and consumption subsidies advocated to help the low-income 
households to afford the cost of a house. The practice of housing provision on 
the basis of the enabling strategy is likely to face conflicts in two ways: firstly, in 
the provision of housing finance, the government aspires to partner with private 
local and foreign investors to supply finance through the FMBN. There may be a 
conflict of interest in pursuit of this aspiration because the FMBN is a regulated 
system and this could drive away private investors whose interest is to make 
profit from any investment. Therefore, it is a sensible speculation to say that 
private local (Deposit Money Banks and insurance companies) and foreign 
investors may be reluctant to partner with the FMBN on this course. 
Subsequent discussions will examine how this potential conflict is being 
managed in the market place.
Secondly, in the provision of housing, the government allows private developers 
to access loans from the FMBN to build houses for the NHF subscribers. The 
loan is provided at regulated interest rates and, in addition, the government 
plans to provide capital subsidies, such as land and primary infrastructure, in 
order to reduce the cost burden on developers. For this reason the government 
has imposed a ceiling cost of N5million on houses provided for low-income 
groups with a FMBN loan. This may result in a conflict between the 
government's pursuit of social welfare for the people (by regulating interest 
rates and cost of houses) and business interests. If the government is unable to 
provide capital subsidies and also prevail over private interest in achieving 
these welfare objectives, private-public partnership may fail or the government 
may even try to abdicate its responsibility to business interests which could 
result in the exploitation of prospective home owners (NHF subscribers) in Jos.
There are emerging themes from the discussions covered in this chapter. The 
first theme is decentralisation, which lies at the heart of the enabling housing 
framework. In the context enabling, the decentralisation of roles (such as in 
policy innovation, leadership, planning, financing and management) is
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necessary and this can result from different kinds of reorganisation. One form of 
reorganisation leads to the second theoretical theme, which is bureaucracy. In 
relation to this theme, decentralisation seeks to breakdown excessive 
bureaucracy in administering housing delivery through deconcentration, 
delegation and devolution of roles. These decentralisation forms involve 
transferring political power, decision making authority, responsibility and fiscal 
resources and revenue generating power from central government to lower 
levels of government or field offices of central government.
There is a kind of reorganisation that is related to the relaxation of state 
regulation, which is the third theoretical theme of this study. Here, 
decentralisation seeks to allow housing delivery functions that are primarily or 
exclusively the responsibility of government to be carried out by businesses, 
community groups, cooperatives, private voluntary associations and other non­
governmental organisations. This form of decentralisation increases 
participatory housing provision. This covers the fourth theoretical theme, which 
is participation. Participatory development is one of the key ideas associated 
with the enabling approach for housing. This is possible with the increased 
participation of private business, community groups, cooperatives, voluntary 
associations and non-governmental organisations in housing delivery. The 
rationale behind the participatory approach is for the creation of partnership and 
empowerment of the people.
All forms of decentralisation are aimed at achieving the fifth and sixth theoretical 
themes, which are efficiency and effectiveness. Advocates of enabling housing 
strategy are of the view that improvement in the efficiency of resource utilisation 
can be achieved by incorporating local preferences into the determination of 
housing needs and expenditures. Furthermore, that increased efficiency can be 
achieved in housing delivery when there is closer link between resource 
allocation and utilisation. It is also believed that there can be increased 
effectiveness in housing delivery through the adaptation of arrangements to 
local conditions and the targeting of local housing needs. All forms of 
decentralisation and participatory development are aimed at the seventh, eighth 
and ninth themes, accountability, transparency and legitimacy, which are
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thought to be achieved by embedding housing delivery arrangements in local 
administrative systems. The theoretical themes identified relate to the 
institutional and organisational arrangements of housing provision, market 
phenomena and individual actions. Therefore, answers to the research 
questions will be sought from these elements in Jos.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PO LITICA L AND SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND HOUSING  
POLICY OUTCOMES IN  N IGERIA
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter examines the impact of Nigeria's political and socioeconomic 
development on housing policy outcomes. The purpose is to explain the 
reasons for the past failures in formal housing supply attempts and to identify 
the legacy issues that have endured to influence the current system. In 
achieving this, a chronology of the post-independence development plans and 
an account of key developments in Nigeria's housing sub-sector are presented. 
Next, the discovery of oil and its impact on housing policy outcomes is 
discussed. Thirdly, a brief examination of the impact of military rule and the 
frequent changes of governments on public policy is explained. This is followed 
by a review of institutional issues that influence housing provision efforts. Fifthly, 
an account of the impact of policy dilemmas on Nigeria's rapid urbanisation 
process and the growth of 'shanty' towns are highlighted. Following this is an 
explanation on the Nigerian land tenure system and its impact on housing 
provision, an explanation on the effect of civil unrest and religious conflicts on 
housing supply. Finally, the wider political influences within and beyond the city 
of Jos, which affect the overall development process including housing 
provision are outlined.
4.2 DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND HOUSING PROVISION
The Nigerian formal housing system emerged with the post-independence 
process of development planning of the country. The chronology of National 
Development Plans (NDPs), significant events and developments that occurred 
in the housing sector is illustrated in figure Six. In the early period of Nigeria's 
independence, the federal government's emphasis was placed on five-yearly 
NDPs as the instruments for economic and social development. The funding of
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social services including public housing before 1991 was accommodated in the 
budgets of NDPs.
In the first NDP (1962-1968) (Federal Government Nigeria, 1962), an estimated 
capital expenditure of H2.2 billion was budgeted for, with sectoral allocation of
72.3 percent for the economic sector, 16.5 percent for the social sector, 10.7 
percent for administration, and 0.5 percent for financial obligations. A further 
breakdown on expenditure items for each sector is contained in Table Two. As 
it can be observed, housing provision was not accorded priority and, therefore, 
it was totally absent from expenditure items in the first NDP. Nevertheless, there 
was a projection of 24,000 housing units to be provided by housing corporations 
across Nigeria. How this projection was to be financed remained unclear as no 
financial plans were made. At the close of the first Plan in 1968 housing 
corporations had produced about 500 housing units (Olayiwola, Adeleye and 
Ogunshakin, 2005). Olayiwola, Adeleye and Ogunshakin (2005 p. 3) attribute 
this failure to civil war, which disrupted the Plan in 1967, lasting till 1970. Other 
studies (Ademiluyi, 2010; Kabir and Bustani, 2009 and UN-HABITAT, 2001a) 
hold a contrary view and maintain that housing was totally neglected from the 
planned expenditure schedule so that it could not have been possible to provide 
without a financial plan.
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Table 2: Planned expenditure in first National Development Plan 1962-68
Sectors Planned Expenditure 
in Per cent
Sub-totals
Economic Primary production 5.0 72.3
Trade and Industry 10.7
Electricity 23.8
Transport 25.1
Communication 7.3
Water 0.4
Social Education 7.1 16.5
Health 2.5
Town and Country Planning 5.6
Social Welfare 0.7
Information 0.6
Administration Judiciary 0.1 10.7
General 10.6
Financial obligations 0.5 0.5
Total 100
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria (1962 p. 3)
The second NDP (1970-74) involved a capital expenditure of N3billion (Lewis, 
1977; Ekundare, 1971); the priority items of expenditure are presented on Table 
Three. Housing was not on the expenditure schedule, but an 'after thought' 
allocation of $42,634 million was made with a high projection of 54,000 housing 
units (Awotona, 1990 p 3). By this time more States had been created in Nigeria, 
requiring houses to be provided in 11 State capitals plus the Federal Capital 
Territory. Ten thousand units were allocated to Lagos, which was then Federal 
Capital Territory, and 4000 units in each of the then 11 state capitals (Olayiwola, 
Adeleye and Ogunshakin, 2005).
Table 3: Planned expenditure for second National Development Plan 1970-74
Sectors Planned Expenditure in Per cent
Transport 23.7
Education 13.5
Agriculture (Forestry and Fishing 12.9
Defence and Security 9.4
Industry 8.4
Health 5.2
Fuel and power 4.4
Communication 4.2
Others 18.3
Total 100
Source: Ekundare (1971 p. 151)
The pattern of expenditure suggests that housing provision was concentrated in 
the Federal Capital Territory. Apart from the money expended on reconstructing 
houses destroyed by war which were mostly in the eastern region states, other 
states did not receive the federal government's attention during the second
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NDP housing programme. At this time some form of decentralisation was 
introduced to allow state governments to participate in the funding and provision 
of public housing in their respective localities (Awotona, 1990). Even with 
decentralisation, housing provision suffered neglect compared to other social 
services. For instance, the expenditure pattern in the 11 states that existed 
during the second NDP confirms the extent to which housing suffered neglect 
compared to other welfare services. The aggregate expenditure of 11 states on 
health care services was N87.362 million, the expenditure on education was 
N 179.542 million and town and country planning, including housing provision, 
received an expenditure of N27.576 million (Awotona, 1990 p. 19). The way 
housing was treated in the first and second NDPs leaves one with the question 
of why housing was so neglected.
The third NDP (1975-80) was the most ambitious of all Plans. While the first 
Plan involved a capital expenditure of U2.2 billion and the second Plan an 
expenditure of N3.0 billion, the third Plan proposed a capital expenditure of *430 
billion. Again, the third Plan proposed a growth rate of nine percent per annum 
against four percent and 6.6 percent of the first and second Plans (Metz 1992; 
Lewis, 1977). There is a consensus view in academic research (Kabir and 
Bustani 2009; Ikejiofor, 1999; Awotona, 1990; Lewis, 1977; Babawale, 1999) 
that housing received some attention in terms of expenditure allocation, 
projection and housing allocation plans. The UN-HABITAT (2001a p. 49) 
observed that the third NDP period (1975-1980) experienced the most 
comprehensive and active intervention by government in housing provision. 
During this period, the federal government decided to participate directly in the 
provision of housing. The third Plan proposed to construct 66,000 housing units 
(Ikejiofor, 1999) at an estimated cost of N1.83 billion (Olayiwola, Adeleye and 
Ogunshakin, 2005).
More States were created during the period of the third Plan, from 12 to 19 
including the Federal Capital Territory (Smith, 1981). This means more houses 
were needed, particularly in the State capitals of newly created States to 
accommodate the work force. In the third Plan, 46,000 units were allocated to 
Lagos, the capital city, 12,000 were allocated to Kaduna State and 8,000
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allocated to 17 States (Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992). There is no 
explanation for this pattern of housing allocation in academic literature or 
government documents. From 1973 to 1979, when the third Plan was almost 
closing, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) provided about 10,000 housing 
units in Lagos and 24,000 in other State capitals. The success achieved in the 
third Plan was approximately 23.3 percent before its close in 1980 (Ogunsola, 
2011; FGN-NHP, 2006; Ikejiofor, 1999; Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992).
The fourth (1981-1985) coincided with a return to civil rule in 1979 and there 
were a lot of political promises, including housing for public sector workers and 
urban residents. A total of N2.686 billion (then US$3 billion) was earmarked for 
the implementation of the various projects during the fourth NDP. As it can be 
seen in Table Four, the planned expenditure for housing represented about 5.6 
percent of total expenditure in all sectors (UN-HABITAT, 2001a). The federal 
government made a projection of 440,000 dwelling units to be constructed over 
the period of the fourth Plan and 115,000 of these were earmarked for the low 
and middle income groups (Awotona, 1990). In the first year of the fourth Plan, 
a total of 40,000 units (of which 90 percent were to be one-bedroom units, 10 
percent three-bedroom) were to be constructed throughout the country. In this 
way, 2000 units were to be built in each State including the new Federal Capital 
Territory, which had moved to Abuja (UN-HABITAT, 2001a). Financial plans 
were made, the combined state governments’ allocation was N1,095 billion, 
while that of the federal government was N1, 592 billion. This came to a total of 
N2, 686 billion (Awotona, 1990). See (Appendix IV) the typical example of 
houses provided with NDP funding by federal and state government in Jos.
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Table 4 Planning expenditure in fourth National Development Plan 1981 - 85
Sectors Planned Expenditure in Per cent
Agriculture 37.0
Industry 16.0
Development Planning 10.0
Education 9.0
Employment 9.0
Transport and communication 7.0
Human settlements 6.0
Natural resources 3.0
Health 2.0
Science and technology 1.0
Source: UNDP (1982 p. 3)
The fifth NDP started in 1988. By late 1989 the military administration had 
abandoned the concept of a fixed five-year plan. Instead, a three-year NRP was 
introduced for 1990-92 in the context of more comprehensive fifteen- to twenty- 
year plans. A rolling plan, considered more suitable for an economy facing 
uncertainty and rapid change, is revised at the end of each year, at which point, 
estimates, targets, and projects are added for an additional year. Thus, 
planners would revise the 1990-92 three-year NRP at the end of 1991, issuing a 
new plan for 1991-93. In this period, Nigeria was struggling with an economic 
down-turn and the attention of the government at this time was focused on 
pushing forward liberalisation programme (Mongabay, 2010).
The idea of funding housing through NDPs was, at first sight, a good one, but it 
still did not give housing the same priority as other social services such as 
health care and education. In some instances such as the first NDP, there were 
projections without financial plans (Olayiwola, Adeleye and Ogunshakin, 2005). 
In the second NDP, housing was not initially an item of expenditure but an 'after 
thought' (Awotona, 1990). Housing received priority in the third and fourth NDPs 
but limited supply success was achieved (Ogunsola, 2011 and Ikejiofor, 1999). 
There was a tendency to neglect funding for housing in the first and second 
NDPs; the third and fourth NDPs gave priority to the funding of housing but 
some variables, which will subsequently be discussed, influenced the rate of 
supply of housing.
The sequence of national development planning was interrupted at certain 
periods, particularly between the first and second plans, when a break of two 
years occurred, and between the third and fourth, when a break of one year
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was experienced. There was another two-year break between the fourth and 
fifth plans and even after five years of the NDP gave way to three years of the 
NRP, it also became inconsistent. These inconsistencies would have affected 
the national development process and the delivery of social services including 
housing.
In the late 1970s, public employers were made to provide housing for their 
employees. This idea was introduced following the promulgation of the 
Employee's Housing Scheme (Special Provision) Act of 1979 (FGN-Employees 
Housing Scheme, 1979). Though there are no records of the expenditure and 
the quantity of houses provided by public employers, there are stocks of such 
houses at different locations in Jos (Appendix V-VII pp. 306-308). Beside this, 
there were two arrangements for making housing loans before 1991. These 
included the FMBN's loan and the staff housing loan respectively. The FMBN's 
loan scheme came into operation following the declaration of Indigenisation Act 
of 1973. This Act permitted the federal government to acquire full ownership of 
the Nigerian Building Society (NBS). The NBS was established in 1956 by the 
colonial government to provide credit for housing and to also encourage people 
to save, particularly for housing investment. With the legal provision of Decree 7 
of January 1977 the NBS was transformed into the FMBN. The transformation 
of the NBS into the FMBN was aimed at implementing a subsidised housing 
credit policy in Nigeria (Sanusi, 2003). By the mid-1980s, the FMBN was the 
only housing credit institution in Nigeria and its activities fell short of 
expectations in the provision of housing finance. For instance, during the first 
eight years of operation (1977 - 1985), the FMBN only granted loans totalling 
N442.6 million to 8874 applicants. During this period (1977 to 1991), the bank's 
operations were centred on the granting of social loans, which accounted for 
about 90 percent of its loan portfolio (UN-HABITAT, 2001a).
The second arrangement was the Staff Housing Loan (SHL) scheme which 
came into operation following a policy introduced in 1974 (Federal Government 
Staff Housing Board Act No. 6 ,1974). This Act created the Federal Government 
Staff Housing Board to administer the SHL for federal public officers and for 
other matters connected to it (FGN-NHP, 2006). It was a way of promoting 
home ownership by offering housing loans at very low and subsidised interest
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rates (usually 3 percent per annum). Any loan granted is usually amortised 
according to the number of years an applicant has served and expectations in 
terms of benefits and entitlement. This policy has not been repelled but has 
become unpopular among public employers in Nigeria (UN-HABITAT, 2001a).
4.3 OIL DISCOVERY AND HOUSING POLICY OUTCOMES
Nigeria's journey from independence to contemporary times has experienced 
periods of economic prosperity: this occurred after the discovery of oil in the late 
1960s and the revenue accumulated from its exports during the 1970s (Metz, 
1992). Available evidences suggest that the period of economic prosperity was 
poorly managed and the effect of the down-turn was severe, constraining 
national development and the provision of social services (Ikpeze, Soludo and 
Elekwe, 2004). Nigeria's early economic prosperity arose from the production 
and exportation of cash-crops. For example, the contribution of agriculture to 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 1959 was 65.7 percent. During this period, 
crops such as cocoa beans and products, palm kernel and rubber were 
cultivated and exported in commercial quantities. Later on in the 1960s, crude 
oil was discovered in commercial quantities and by 1971, the country was 
depending on oil exports compared to agriculture products (see appendix VIII, 
and IX on pages 309 and 310) (Metz, 1992).
In the 1970s decades, Nigeria enjoyed revenue from the oil-price boom, which 
began as a result of the high price of crude oil in the international market (Metz, 
1992 p. 217). The government benefited from the influx of oil revenue to fund 
projects. While the boom afforded government much needed revenue, it also 
created structural problems in the economy (Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwe, 2004). 
During this period there was an increased dependence on oil and an 
abandonment of agriculture. This was confirmed by Metz (1992 p. 174), that the 
contribution of agriculture to GDP in 1976 had reduced to 30.9 percent from
65.7 percent in 1959. The economic prosperity of 1970s was reflected in public 
expenditure for social services including housing. For example, in the second 
NDP (1970-1974), the budget allocated to housing was N2.634 million 
(Awotona, 1990) and in the third NDP (1975-1980), a N1.83 billion budget 
(Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992). These amounts of money were reasonable 
at those times, particularly as the exchange rate of domestic currency to U.S
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Dollar was almost at par and inflation rates were fluctuating from single to 
double digits (See appendix II on page 303).
A minor recession was experienced in 1977-79 leading to declining oil revenues. 
This created disequilibrium in the balance of payments, growing unemployment 
and increasing rate of inflation. By 1978, the country begun to borrow from the 
IMF and the World Bank, which confirmed that the existing macroeconomic 
policies did not stimulate sufficient economic growth and development. The 
private sector remained weak and the economic policies were encouraging 
consumption rather than production. And because the economy could not 
produce what it needed to consume, the country had to depend on imports. At 
that time, the military government introduced some austerity measures, which 
were short-lived because they failed to address structural problems. The GDP, 
which had grown to 10.5 percent in 1976 declined by 5.7 per cent in 1978 and 
grew by only 5.9 percent in 1979. Consequently, the economy entered a 
recessionary phase, requiring further stabilisation measures to reverse the 
gloomy situation (Ekpo and Umoh, 2000). In spite of the recession revenues 
rebounded until mid-1981 when the fourth NDP started (Metz 1992).
Public housing provision received priority in the fourth NDP (1981-1985), but, 
however, this was amidst an economic recession that arose from the collapse of 
oil price at the international market (Metz, 1992). The first phase of the public 
housing project took off across the country, but, shortly, a recession set in to put 
strains on the government programme. Soon after the second phase of the 
programme commenced, comprising of 20,000 units of two bedroom houses for 
the low-income groups, the recession became more severe. This phase of the 
programme failed to take off evenly in most states: while some were at 
completion others were just starting and some were abandoned. The 
government made efforts to carry on with the scheme in succeeding years, but 
the shelter policy was halted by economic down-turn and the austerity measure 
introduced (Babawale, 1994; UN-HABITAT, 2001a; Metz 1992).
Ikepeze, Soludo and llekwe (2004) suggest that 1982 signified the end of an era, 
with the further collapse of oil prices on the international market. This led to a 
fundamental reform agenda and the most dramatic feature of this era was the
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adoption of SAP in 1986. As a consequence, the fifth NDP was postponed until 
1988 because the government's emphasis was completely turned to 
implementation of SAP. With a further collapse in the oil price, revenue 
dwindled. At some point, over 44 percent of export earnings were being used to 
service the foreign debt accumulated by predecessor governments (Metz, 1992).
In 1985, the federal government declared a national economic emergency 
programme, which lasted for 15 months. Under the emergency programme, the 
government de-emph'asised the funding of large-scale projects and introduced 
salary and wage reductions for the armed forces and public sector employees. 
Job losses were recorded and imports were restricted by introducing 30 percent 
surcharges on imports. The government began to introduce deregulation so as 
to encourage foreign investment and there were also cuts in all forms of 
subsidies. All these efforts could not achieve the target of rescheduling the 
foreign debt without the World/IMF loan as a further drop in world oil prices 
compounded the situation (Mosley, 1992). It became necessary for the World 
Bank to step in by providing a loan over three years to support the SAP. The 
government accepted the conditions of the loan, which included the devaluation 
of the domestic currency in 1986 and introduction of market liberalisation 
policies (Metz, 1992).
The period from 1986 to 1993 is often referred to as the SAP era in Nigeria. 
During this period, inflation soared, the exchange rate depreciated continually 
(see appendix II on page 303) and Nigeria became import-dependent (see 
appendix X on page 311). The SAP experience was associated with a decrease 
in spending on social programs. According to Metz (1992 p. 157), "the lower 
spending of the 1980s was partly the result of the SAP which came into effect 
from 1986 to 1990". Another experience of Nigeria's SAP was the increase in 
external debt leading to a huge debt over-hang. For instance Metz (1992 p. 222) 
observed that "among less developed countries (LDCs), Nigeria had the 
eleventh largest external public debt in 1989 (and the largest among sub- 
Saharan countries). Its debt had increased from US$9 billion in 1980 to US$33 
billion by 1989. The country faced persistent difficulties servicing its debts; in 
the 1980s, debts rescheduling was almost continuous". The SAP era witnessed 
an economic reform package designed to liberalise the economy with emphasis
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on the financial system. The reforms brought about the removal of various 
administrative controls and the progressive move towards a liberalised and 
deregulated economy (Central Bank of Nigeria - CBN, 1995).
In order to liberalise the economy, it became necessary to privatise some 
government-owned enterprises so as to allow the private sector to become the 
'engine' of growth. The privatisation began with business enterprises such as 
banks, cement manufacturing companies, oil and chemical companies, railway, 
Nigerian airways, telecommunication, agricultural boards (Alabi, Onimisi & 
Christian, 2010; Adejumobi 1999) and later extended to social services like 
health, water supply, power generation, education, housing, pensions etc 
(Ramanadham, 1991 cited in Adejumobi, 1999). Metz (1992 p. 222) observed 
that under SAP, unemployment soared, food prices increased significantly and 
numerous user fees for education and health services were imposed as part of 
the liberalisation process. Housing delivery was affected because government 
felt it was spending a significant amount on the construction and maintenance 
of public housing (Ikejiofor, 1999. The idea of an enabling strategy for housing 
provision was a product of the liberalisation exercise. The economic conditions 
changed the direction of government's policy on housing as well as the 
approach to housing provision.
4.4 MILITARY RULE AND CHANGES OF GOVERNMENTS
Nigeria has a difficult history of politics, governance and policy inconsistencies. 
The country was granted independence on October 1, 1960 after a democratic 
government came into power through the general election conducted in 
December of 1959 (Metz, 1992). In January of 1966, the military overthrew the 
democratic government to form a new government and by July of the same year, 
there was a counter coup which ushered in a new military government that 
lasted till 1975 (Metz, 1992). In July of 1975 there was a coup which brought 
into power a new military government that lasted till February of 1976 when an 
attempted coup led to assassination of the administrator and was succeeded by 
another military officer (Falola, 2013).
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The military government conducted elections and returned the country to 
democratic rule in October 1979 but the democracy only lasted for a short 
period of about four years and was overthrown by military again on December 
31, 1983 (Falola, 2013). By August 1985, another coup took place bringing into 
power a new military government and in December of the same year a counter 
coup failed. There was a failed coup attempt in April 1992 and this allowed the 
1985 military regime to stay in power until June 1993 (Metz, 1992; Falola, 2013). 
An attempt by military to return the country to democratic rule in June 1993 
failed after the election was annulled but power transferred to the leader of the 
transition committee to conduct fresh elections. While this process was going on, 
the transition government was toppled by military in August 1993. This military 
government stayed in office till June 1998 when the sitting administrator died in 
power and was replaced by the next most senior military officer at the time. The 
newly appointed officer conducted election successfully and the country 
returned to democratic rule in May 1999. From 1999 up till the time of this study, 
changes in government were successful through democratic process (Falola, 
2013).
The frequent changes of government mostly through military coups affected the 
consistency of public policies and programmes. For example, from 1966 to 
1979, Nigeria had experienced five military coups leading to four successive 
regimes. The first three NDPs were executed within four different military 
regimes and this possibly affected their consistency and outcomes. Furthermore, 
the military administrators that ruled from 1983 to 1998 appear to have had 
contrasting ideological stances. By 1982, Nigeria had begun to experience 
declining revenue due to the collapse of crude oil prices in the international 
market. This economic challenge prompted the government to seek the World 
Bank and IMF intervention. The process started when the military staged a 
successful coup, took over power in 1983 and were opposed to the World Bank 
and IMF SAP. The military government halted the World Bank and IMF SAP 
process because of its inclination towards socialist ideology, which favoured a 
welfare system (Metz, 1992 p. 220, 221). In 1985, another military government 
came to power after staging a successful coup and its ideological stance was 
consistent with the market system. This government reinitiated the World
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Bank/IMF SAP and liberalisation process which had been halted by its 
predecessor (Metz, 1992 pp. 221 - 224). This very government introduced the 
housing policy which derived its principles from liberalism and the notion of 
enabling (Madaki and Ogunrayewa, 1999) and also suspended the funding of 
public housing projects (Ikejiofor, 1999). In August 1993, a military government 
that was opposed to market friendly policies came into power and turned 
national economic policies towards the direction of welfare. Public housing 
projects were again reinitiated (Ikejiofor, 1999) but the projects failed woefully. 
The neoliberal reforms were again restarted after Nigeria returned to democracy 
in 1999. These contrasting ideological stances affected public policy and the 
overall development of Nigeria.
4.5 INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES AND HOUSING POLICY OUTCOMES
The Nigerian housing sector has experienced an accretion of institutions right 
from the 1960s till present times. This was an attempt to address the issue of 
institutional incapacity in the formal housing sector. For example, during the 
span of the first NDP, regional housing corporations were established in the 
three regions that existed in Nigeria at that time. These corporations came to 
meet the Lagos Executive Development Board, which had existed from the 
colonial era at the administrative seat of Nigeria in Lagos (FGN-NHP, 2006; 
Ademiluyi, 2010). In 1973 the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) was set up to 
take responsibility for the construction of public houses while Federal Ministry of 
Works coordinates the housing provision.
During the span of the third NDP, the federal government created the Federal 
Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Environment in 1975. This 
ministry was created to reduce bureaucratic issues being experienced when the 
Ministry of Works was overloaded with the role of administering urban 
development, housing provision and infrastructure provision (Ogunshakin and 
Olayiwola, 1992). The need for a research organisation led to the establishing 
of the Nigerian Building and Road Research Institute in 1975. This agency was 
expected to collaborate with the Federal Ministry of Works, the newly created 
Federal Ministry of Housing, Urban Development and Environment, and federal 
and regional housing corporations through research and development that
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would improve the quality of built spaces (houses, roads, bridges etc). The 
FMBN was created by upgrading the NBS in 1977 (Awotona, 1990).
Similar developments occurred during the period at state government levels, 
particularly for newly created states. In Jos for instance, the Plateau Investment 
Company (PIC) Limited, the precursor to the Plateau Investment and Property 
Development (PIPC) Limited, was incorporated in June 1977 (Government of 
Plateau State, 2010). Before this time, some restructuring and the creation of 
new agencies had been going on from February 1976, after Plateau State 
became a separate State from Benue-Plateau State, which had existed from 
1967. Twenty years later, precisely on October 1, 1996, Plateau State was 
affected by yet another State creation exercise, when a new State was carved 
out of it. This resulted in yet another restructuring process (Government of 
Plateau State, 2008b).
The creation of relevant agencies in the housing sector is still occurring even in 
the contemporary period as it will be seen in further discussions. The continual 
creation of relevant institutions for the national and local housing sectors 
indicates that the development process right from 1960 till the contemporary 
period has been associated with administrative challenges, particularly where 
administrative capacity was lacking for optimal delivery of service.
Nigeria's administrative development process has been associated with a 
central bureaucratic management approach that creates negative effects on the 
public procurement process. This was confirmed by Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwe, 
(2004) who document that the period of economic prosperity (late 1960s and 
1970s) induced and nurtured a state command-planning policy regime. This 
neo-Keynesian-type management of the economy was visible in national 
development planning where the federal government embarked on ownership 
and control of businesses in most economic sectors, like the petroleum and 
mining industries, banking, insurance, clearing and forwarding, among others. 
With the promulgation of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree in 1972, 
the government became directly involved in virtually all aspects of the economy, 
especially as foreign exchange was thought to be no longer a constraint to 
development. Consequently, the era created an over-centralised system of 
economic activities and social services delivery, which resulted in a lack of
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accountability and transparency, inefficiency and ineffective governance and 
delivery of public services. Personal accumulation of wealth was intensified, 
corruption, theft, real estate speculation, outright looting of government treasury 
and other fraudulent practices prevailed (Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwe, 2004).
In review studies, Olayiwola, Adeleye and Ogunshakin (2005) and Ogunsola 
(2011) identified some factors that account for the failures of public housing 
projects to include the mismanagement of public funds, a lack of probity, 
accountability, inefficient and ineffective administrative machinery, the mass 
importation of foreign technology, material, personnel and inflation. Corrupt and 
sharp practices were glaring in the process of implementing housing schemes. 
Instances existed where contracts were issued and re-issued to non-existent 
contractors and "ghost contracts" were awarded, signed, approved and paid-off 
with large sums of money. Furthermore, actual contract sums were inflated in 
return for kickbacks, leading to the overrunning of actual project costs (Ikejiofor, 
1999 p.180). Ikejiofor adduced that much of these problems resulted from over­
centralisation because the federal government authorities at the centre 
organised and decided projects. The federal authorities instructed different 
individual and groups of contractors to execute the programme at state and 
local government levels. At the State level, the implementation process was 
centralised and monopolised by state agencies. These gave 'excessive' 
authority and responsibility to very few individuals such as state governors and 
their representatives to decide who constructed what and how. The mass 
organisations, unions and local authorities were virtually excluded from these 
exercises (Ogunshakin and Olayiwola, 1992 p. 48-50).
The centralisation which characterised military rule from 1966 to 1979 
(Ademolekun, 1991 and Smith, 1981) and 1985 to 1999 (Ademolekun, 1991; 
Khemani, 2001) has not been reversed by the return to civilian government. 
Khemani, (2001), Akindele, Olaopa and Obiyan (2002), and Omotoso (2010), 
among others, have demonstrated that the state governments are heavily 
dependent on central funding and their revenues from federal allocations are 
increasingly tied to specific, federally approved purposes. The federal 
government continues to control the revenue allocation formula. And even the
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civilian federal government seems as determined as the military to adopt 
uniform policies for the whole nation. Coutsoukis (2005) argues that it would be 
a mistake to think that LGCs were sufficiently autonomous to be an effective tier 
of government. As a consequence, the LGCs in Nigeria are lacking the financial 
capacity to adequately discharge their functions (CLGF, 2012).
Closely related to the problem caused by over-centralisation is the issue of an>
inadequate public procurement system. From the late 50s till the 90s, the public 
procurement of works and goods was based on the Treasury Circulars of 1958, 
which provided only guidelines on public expenditure management. The 
guidelines of these circulars on public procurement practice were inadequate 
and created room for malpractices and a high level of corruption in contract 
management. The Treasury Circulars of 1958 permitted the three spheres of 
government and their institutions to procure works and goods through 
Departmental Tenders Boards at state and local government levels and the 
Federal Tenders Board at federal level. This process gave considerable power 
to public officers such as Permanent Secretaries, Ministers and Commissioners 
in government Ministries, Departments and Parastatals to procure works and 
goods without adhering to due process (Onyema, 2011).
Due process implies that governmental activities and businesses can be carried 
out openly, economically and transparently without favouritism and corruptible 
tendencies (Oguonu, 2005 citing Ezekwesili, 2004). This was lacking throughout 
the period when government was directly implementing public housing schemes 
and the studies of Ikpeze, Soludo and Elekwe (2004), Ikejiofor (1999), and 
Ogunshakin and Olayiwola (1992) substantiate the claim. In 2000 the Federal 
Government of Nigeria commissioned the World Bank along with some private 
sector specialists to study the financial systems and general procurement- 
related activities in the country. The findings confirmed a lack of a modern law 
on public procurement and permanent oversight for monitoring of purchasing 
entities. The finance (Control and Management) Act of 1958, together with 
financial regulations which set basic rules for managing public expenditure had 
gaps and deficiencies such as the absence of permanent arrangements for 
control and surveillance. This created opportunities for bribery and corruption. 
The study also found that due to inflation and lack of regular adjustments on the
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thresholds of the approving limits of the Tender Boards, their authority was 
constantly being eroded, resulting in abuses, prominent among which was the 
splitting of contracts (World Bank, 2000 pp. 7-10;  Oguonu, 2005).
Furthermore, there was a proliferation of Tender Boards which were perceived 
by the private sector as sources of delays and non-transparency. The Tender 
Boards appeared to have limited mandates, with powers to decide contracts de 
facto resting with permanent secretaries, ministers, governors and 
commissioners. These high level politicians were found to be operationally 
involved in public procurement processes. Also, public procurement systems 
and procedures were cumbersome and major causes of delay in clearing goods, 
and hence a source of corruption. It is also observed that procurement was 
often carried out by public officers that substantially lacked the relevant training 
to handle such a process. Overall, there was a lack of genuine competition and 
transparency in the public procurement system and the applicable rules were 
usually tilted in favour of predetermined contractors. The processes for 
procuring goods, works and services by public institutions were not harmonised 
and projects were not selected on priority bases. This created gaps between the 
budget and the actual releases, under-funding in some instances, delays, and 
absence of competition among providers, the escalation of prices and the 
abandonment of the projects in some instances (World Bank, 2000 pp. 11-16; 
Oguono, 2005).
4.6 RAPID URBANISATION AND THE GROWTH OF SHANTIES
Rapid urbanisation is now a global concern and Davis (2004 pp. 5, 6) in his 
paper - Planet of Slums - captured the problem: one, the earth has urbanised 
even faster than originally predicted by Thomas Malthus in 1972. For instance, 
there were 86 cities in the world in 1950 with a population over one million. 
Today, there are 400, and by 2015, there will be at least 550; two, cities are 
growing phenomenally and have now absorbed nearly two-thirds of the global 
population. And, indeed, the urban population (3.2 billion) as of 2006 was 
already larger than the total population of the world in 1960; three, the global 
country side was estimated at 3.2 billion in 2006. This has been shrinking and it 
is anticipated that this will continue in such a manner that cities would account 
for about 10 billion of the world's population in 2050; finally, by 2050, it is
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anticipated that 95 per cent of the world's population will reside in the urban 
areas of the developing countries.
Accordingly, the developing countries will face a crisis of urbanisation. Indeed, 
the crisis is already manifesting in the sub-Sahara African region where 
countries are faced with the shortage of good housing, urban infrastructure 
deficiency, urban poverty (Habitat International Coalition - HIC, 2006 p.13; 2009 
p. 14), growing urban populations, prevalence of informal housing practices and 
poor housing conditions (International Housing Coalition, 2009 p. 11). Failure to 
deal with these issues is leading to the continued growth of slums and poorly 
serviced informal settlements on the urban periphery. The urban population is 
rising (see Table Five) among the sub-Sahara African countries; already, 
between 75 and 99 percent of urban residents in many African cities live in 
squalid slums of ramshackle housing (IHC, 2006 p.13; 2007 p. 11). In many of 
Africa’s cities and towns, less than 10 percent of the population lives in formal 
sector housing. A few examples are illustrative here: in Lusaka, Zambia, 74 
percent of urban dwellers reside in slums; in Kartun Sudan, 85.7 percent; in 
Tanzania, 92.1 percent; in Madagascar as a whole 92.9 percent (IHC, 2007 p 
12), and 85 percent in Kambala, Uganda (IHC, 2009 p. 11). In Addis Ababa, 
about 70 percent of the city requires upgrading (Wubneh, 2013). As much as 70 
percent of the urban housing stock in sub-Saharan Africa is of poor quality and 
not in compliance with local regulations (Habitat for Humanity, 2012 citing 
Kissick, et al, 2006).
The urbanisation experience in Africa is creating hardship for urban residents as 
it appears not to have a positive relationship with the economic growth. This is 
contrary to the experience of urbanisation in today's developed world over the 
nineteenth century. Evidences (Diniejko, 2012; Davis, 2004 & 2006; Baker, 
2001) suggest that the nineteenth century experiences of urbanisation in 
today's developed nations (such as Britain and USA) were linked to the 
industrial revolution. Essentially, the industrialisation process was seen to bring 
about urbanisation and rising urban population, and slumming was inextricably 
linked to these. On the contrary, the experience in developing countries is that 
of a rising urbanisation and slumming without much industrialisation occurring 
(Davis, 2004).
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Table 5: Population, urbanisation and poverty in sub-Saharan Africa
Countries Population in
millions
(2010)
Urban population  
as % o f total 
(2009)
Population less 
than US$2 per 
day (2009)
Population  
below  
national 
poverty line
Angola 18.9 57.6 70.2 68.0 (2008)
Benin 9.2 41.6 75.3 2 9 .0 (1999 )
Botswana 1.9 60.4 49.4 30.3 (2003)
Ethiopia 84.9 17.2 77.6 44.2 (2000)
Ghana 24.3 50.7 53.6 28.5 (2006)
Kenya 40.8 21.9 39.9 45.9 (2006)
Namibia 2.2 37.4 62.2 Not available
Nigeria 158.3 49.1 83.9 6 5 .6 (1996 )
South Africa 50.4 61.2 42.9 45.0 (2000)
Tanzania 45.0 25.9 96.6 3 5 .7 (2001 )
Source: FinMark Trust Year Book (2011)
In a global perspective, the number of people that are affected by slum 
conditions has been on the rise, from 777 million in 2000 to almost 830 million 
in 2010 (United Nations, 2013). At the sub-continental level, the sub-Sahara 
Africa was said to have approximately 200 million slum dwellers. During this 
period, there were 11.8 million slums dwellers in the North Africa region. In Asia, 
the statistics revealed a figure of 190.7 million for Southern Asia, 189.6 million 
for Eastern Asia, 88.9 million for South-Eastern Asia and 35 million for the 
Western Asia regions. In Latin America and the Caribbean, there were 110.7 
million slum dwellers and in the region of Oceania, there six million (UN-Habitat,
2010). These figures are quite disturbing and are corroborative of the assertion 
that the world is a planet of slums (Davis, 2004 & 2006).
In sub-Saharan Africa, slums are a consequence of unrealistic regulatory 
frameworks, ill-conceived policies, inadequate urban planning, and weak 
institutional capacity (World Bank, 2008). Other factors include: rapid rural-to- 
urban migration, increasing urban poverty and inequality, insecure tenure, and 
globalisation (UN-Habitat, 2007). The slums are also found to arise from failed 
policies, bad governance, corruption, inappropriate regulation, dysfunctional 
land markets, unresponsive financial systems, and a fundamental lack of 
political will (Chang, 2009 citing Cities Alliance, 2000). And to a high degree, 
there is a correlation between urbanisation and slum formation in most 
developing countries (Akinbamijo, 2012; Ooi and Phua, 2007). Contrary to 
these acclaimed reasons, neoliberalism, especially the IMF’s SAP has been
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squarely indicted as Davis (2006 p.11) argues: "the primary direction of both 
national and international interventions during the last twenty years has actually 
increased urban poverty and slums, increased exclusion and inequality, and 
weakened urban elites in their efforts to use cities as engines of growth"
Writing about the rising urbanisation in developing countries, Venard (1995) had 
speculated that in 2020, Africa will have mega-cities with 5 million inhabitants or 
more. This rapid growth in urban population would lead to rapid growth both in 
the size and number of urban places. Recent developments in Nigeria are 
making right, Venard's forecast, and based on a census that was conducted in 
2006, five (Lagos, Kano, Port-Harcourt, Oyo, Kaduna and Katsina) of cities in 
Nigeria recorded a population above 5million and 20 recorded a population of 3 
to 5 million inhabitants (FRN-NPC, 2010). The rising urbanisation in Nigerian 
cities coupled with a shortage of good housing is worsening the housing 
conditions of urban poor. In Table 6, for instance, the percentage of households 
using unsafe water from Well and Vendor (Tanker/TruckA/an) increased from 
27.83 and 1.35 percent in 2003 to 33.30 and 4.10 percent in 2007. However, 
the percentage of those that get supply of water from streams and ponds was 
reducing over the period. In like manner, the data presented in Table 6 suggest 
that the percentage of households using pit latrine increased from 45.20 percent 
in 2003 to 59.30 percent in 2007.
The current urbanisation rate of Nigeria is 5.5 percent per annum and the urban 
population was put at 50 percent in 2012 (Pepple, 2012a).The UN-HABITAT 
(2008) reports that Nigeria's inability to plan and manage rapid urbanisation has 
resulted in uncontrollable growth in all major cities and towns. This is leading to 
a decay of inner cities and the growth of shanty towns, especially in the peri­
urban areas. The burden of these problems is borne by the poor people and the 
low income groups who lack the financial capacity to access adequate housing. 
A recent projection indicates that more than 60 percent of Nigerians will live in 
urban centres by 2025, and a sizeable proportion (mostly low-income earners 
and the poor) of these are likely to live in slums if action is not taken (FGN - 
MDG Report, 2010).
The slum situation in Nigeria is already frightening for the reason that the 
proportion of people affected by slum conditions is such a significant element in
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sub-Sahara Africa. In 2012, the estimated population of 47 sub-Sahara African 
countries was 910.4million (World Bank, 2013) and of this, 167million were 
Nigerians (FRN-National Population Commission, 2013). Of the 167million 
people in Nigeria, 61.1 percent were said to reside in slums (Pepple, 2012a). 
Mathematically, 61.1 percent of 167million is equal to 102.203million and from 
this, it can be inferred that Nigeria alone has over half of the 200million slum 
dwellers in sub-Sahara Africa. This situation calls for appropriate policy and 
response by the authorities in Nigeria.
4.6.3 Informal Housing, Shanties and Government's Response in Nigeria 
Housing for most people in Nigeria most of the time is acquired through self­
build/help as opposed to buying on a formal market. This indicates that much of 
the Nigeria's housing stock is provided through informal solutions that are 
synonymous to the increase of substandard housing stock. The provision of 
housing through informal means is not a problem in itself, but problems arise 
when houses are built with substandard materials, without adequate facilities, 
and out of the local planning and development regulations. The situation in 
Nigeria is illustrated in Table Six and Seven.
Table 6: Distribution of households by source of water supply in Nigeria
Source o f w ater Year/Percentage Change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pipe born water 15.78 14.50 16.20 15.35 10.40
Borehole water 22.04 17.60 24.00 20.80 26.80
Well 27.83 36.00 25.10 30.55 33.30
Streams/Ponds 33.00 31.50 33.50 32.50 24.50
Tanker/Truck/Van 1.35 0.40 1.20 0.80 4.10
Others - - - - 0.90
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: FGN-Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2008)
There is increasing concern in regards to the sanitation conditions of 
households in Nigeria. As of 2007, only 17.70 percent of households had a 
water closet facility, 59.30 percent were using a Pit latrine and the rest were 
either using a Pail or defecating in the open fields (See further details in Table 
Seven).
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Table 7: Distribution of households by type of toilet facility in Nigeria
Type o f Toilet Year/Percentage Change
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Pit 45.20 53.30 34.10 45.20 59.30
Pail 1.10 0.40 1.80 1.10 0.20
Water Closet 16.90 9.30 24.50 16.90 17.70
Others 36.80 34.00 39.60 36.80 22.80
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: FGN-Nigerian Bureau of Statistics (2008)
Nigeria is currently faced with a challenge of overcoming a backlog of 17 million 
housing units (Pepple, 2012). This figure is a mere guess by the authorities but 
it may not be far from the actual. The condition of slums in some selected cities 
of Nigeria (see Figure Seven) shows the real situation that is confronting slums 
dwellers in Abuja, Jos, Port-Harcourt and Lagos. The slum situation remains a 
big concern in most cities, and more worrisome is the action of government 
authorities in different cities, which is evidently aggravating the difficulty of slum 
dwellers. The key issues arising from the action or inaction of government 
authorities include:
1) The ignoring of slum conditions to develop on a larger scale: The 
appropriate approach for the prevention of slums is the employment of proactive 
measures. To be proactive is to "manage the process of urban expansion so 
that cities can organise, orient, and initiate their response to the multitude of 
challenges and opportunities posed by their urban future" (World Bank, 2008 pp. 
29-30). The Nigerian authorities are reluctant to adopt this approach and the 
consequence is the growth of shanties and shacks. In Abuja for instance, the 
residents of slums are usually allowed to acquire land from the native people 
who are waiting for resettlement by government, and this allows them to illegally 
squad on land that belongs to the federal government. As of 2004, there were 
27 squatter settlements in different parts of the city and their combined 
development covered a land area of 2412 hectares (SERAC, 2006 pp.28-29).
The situation in Jos is different to that of Abuja in the sense that the residents of 
slums often acquire their land legally from the native owners. However, the 
purchasers would usually not formalise the transaction at the land registry. In
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addition, the purchasers often undertake development on the land without 
obtaining development permits from the local planning and development control 
agencies. As of 2004, a total of 25 slums areas were recommended for renewal 
(Dung-Gwom, 2007) and the government in Jos responded by updating the 
master plan for the city and also designed a strategic plan for its implementation 
(Government of Plateau State, 2008a; 2009). However, the full scale 
implementation of the strategic plan was yet to commence as of 2012 but the 
government was focused on the expansion of inner city roads and opening of 
new ones: nine contracts for such projects were awarded in 2008 (Government 
of Plateau State, 2008b p. 43) and 10 other projects were awarded in 2013 
(Alao, 2013).
The neglectful attitude of governmental authorities to slums in Jos is similar to 
that of Port Harcourt. Whereas as in Jos, the slums residents are marginalised 
around open mining ponds and rocky areas, those in Port Harcourt reside in 
marshy waterfronts. In 2009, the government in Port Harcourt declared that 
waterfront areas were porous, full of criminal activities, and causing threat to 
security within the state. The government decided to clear all the waterfront 
shanties and nine settlements were recommended for demolition (Nnanna, 
Onah & Onoyume (2009). In Lagos, most of the slums are situated around the 
waterfronts and marshy areas, and some houses are even constructed on top 
of water such as the Makoko settlement (figure 10). In 2006, the State 
Government in collaboration with the World Bank identified nine of Lagos’ 
largest slums for upgrading (IRIN, 2006).
The slums settlements in Nigerian cities have one issue in common: the 
residents are often deprived and excluded from access to public infrastructure, 
facilities and services. To illustrate this with example of getting access to safe 
drinking water in Mokoko slum of Lagos for instance, there are several 
communal water points. But people may have to paddle their canoe 3km to get 
there. They then pay about N10 (US$0.06) for a 10 litre bucket (Guardian News 
and Media Limited, 2011). In like manner, access to safe drinking water is 
unstable in most of the slums settlements of Abuja. The slum resident mainly 
relies upon ‘mairuwa’ (water vendor) who sell water that is fetched from the
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commercial boreholes or from distant rivers and streams. In some areas of 
Abuja, 50 litres water-can will cost N50 (US$0.31) (Uzondu, 2013). Walker 
(2013) found that a large family in Abuja may need around 200litres (about 10 
water-cans) every day, and that adds up to about US$486 every year. This 
often put pressure on poor and low-income households that live on an average 
of US$2 a day. In Jos, the West Africa Wash Journalists Network (2012) cites 
a case of Tudun Wada and Hwolshe slum areas to explain that residents 
urinate and defecate in a stream at one end of the town, and fetch the water 
from the same stream at the other end to use in their houses. This evidence 
clearly shows that government authorities are ignoring slum conditions to 
develop on larger scales.
2) Eviction of slum residents: In 2006, Nigeria was ranked third among the 
worse violators of housing rights by the Geneva-based CORHE (CORHE, 2009). 
From 2000 to 2011, more than two million people have been forcibly evicted 
from their homes in different parts of Nigeria. And most of those affected were 
already marginalised in slums and many had lived their lives without access to 
clean water, sanitation, adequate health care or education (Amnesty 
International, 2011). There are two key issues of concern about force eviction 
in Nigeria: firstly, the residents are often not given adequate notice of eviction or 
even evicted without prior notice. For example, about 19,000 people were 
forcibly evicted from their homes in August 2009 at the Njemanze waterfront in 
Port Flarcourt. These evictions were carried out without adequate notice 
(Amnesty International, 2011). Further, the Amnesty International (2011) 
announced via a press release published on its website that: "in April 2005, 
houses, churches, and medical clinics were demolished in the community of 
Makoko, Lagos. About 3,000 people lost their homes". In Abuja, the federal 
authority usually notifies the indigene residents of its plan to displace and 
resettle them. This is so because the Federal Capital Territory was relocated 
from Lagos to Abuja and the government promised to resettle the native 
residents of the area. This is not the case with non-indigene residents who 
squad on land that belong to the federal government. For this category of 
people, the government usually evict them on short notice (SERAC, 2006).
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The second issue that often arises from forced eviction is the inadequate 
compensation to the affected households or the provision of alternative 
accommodation. In Abuja, the indigene residents are usually resettled to an 
alternative settlement but the non-indigene residents are not. For instance, 
SERAC (2006 p.10) documents that: "between July and September 2000, 
demolitions were carried without adequate compensation or resettlement; an 
estimated 50,000 residents were displaced from their homes without alternative 
accommodation". The government in Lagos has made attempts to compensate 
displaced slum residents. However, the compensations were delayed; the case 
of those evicted from Makoko is an example (Sessou, 2013). More so, the 
affected people were not compensated adequately and studies (Agbola and 
Jinadu, 1997) show that most of those resettled to alternative accommodation 
were worse housed than they were before the eviction.
3) The demolition of slum houses: Instead of improvement, the authorities 
in Nigeria would prefer to demolish slum houses and in the process, they inflict 
untold hardship on the affected residents. The authorities in Abuja appear to be 
notorious for this practice. This assertion is substantiated in CORHE's report 
(2009 pp. 40-41), which indicates that demolitions have occurred in 34 
settlements from 2003 to 2007. The justification that the authorities gave was 
that there was a need to restore the master plan of the Federal Capital Territory. 
Interestingly, the state government authorities in Lagos, Kano, Ibadan (SERAC, 
2006 p. 10), Jos (Dung-Gwom, 2007a) and Port Harcourt (Amnesty 
International, 2011) have justified their actions or planned action on the need for 
urban renewal and the restoration of the master plan. These reasons could as 
well be interpreted to mean a failure on the part of the relevant authorities to 
properly manage urban growth, prevent the occurrence of slums or to upgrade 
those settlements that have already turned into shanties with minimal 
interferences to the livelihood of the residents.
4) The use of violent means to evict the residents of slums: There is a 
practice of employing violent means to evict residents of slums. This process 
often results in the loss of lives and causes injuries to people and damages to 
properties. A typical scenario is documented in Durumi I, II, III, Kado and some
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parts of Garki in Abuja (SERAC, 2006 p.38). In this case, seven people who 
were trying to resist the demolition of their houses were killed including a 
pregnant woman and others were injured (SERAC, 2006).
Writing about the experience in Port Harcourt, the Amnesty International (2011) 
observed that: in one settlement, the demolitions were accompanied by the use 
of force by Nigerian security forces. Twelve protesters were shot and injured in 
Bundu waterfront in October 2009. The Amnesty International (2011) 
documents that six people were killed. There are more than 40 waterfront 
settlements in Port Harcourt and they make up some of the city's most densely 
populated areas. Amnesty International (2011) has raised concerns that if the 
State Government authorities in Port Harcourt "continue with the planned 
demolitions of all the remaining waterfront settlements without first 
implementing adequate human rights safeguards, more than 200,000 people 
will be at risk of losing their homes and livelihoods". In like manner, the Amnesty 
International (2011) documents that: protesters were beaten and injured by law 
enforcement officials during the demolition of Makoko slum in Lagos. Oseni 
(2013) corroborates this evidence and adds that about 100,000 people lost their 
houses as a result of the demolition. All this evidence calls for a policy that 
would prevent the use of violent means to evict the residents of slums.
4.7 LAND TENURE SYSTEM AND HOUSING PROVISION
Nigeria has operated a dual land tenure system (Customary and English) right 
from the colonial era. The operation of dual tenure systems implied that 
individuals, family, or community could acquire, own, possess or transfer land 
according to customary or English law. In southern parts of Nigeria, the 
operation of dual tenures presented conflicts. In principle, English tenures were 
ones of individual ownership, whereas under customary law land is owned by a 
community or family, particularly when it is described as a "family property". 
However, both tenures allowed transfer of a piece of land from one to another. 
As regards conversion from customary to English tenure, the view was that an 
appropriate conveyance executed by the persons whose consent is needed 
under customary law could effectively create an English title. However, this was 
not always the case because instances existed where English interest was 
denied even when the historical root of title lay in customary law (Park 1965 p.
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18). Park argued that these factors, together with the difficulties of obtaining all 
the consent required by customary law for a transfer of land, inevitably led to 
uncertainty and unnecessary expense in land transaction.
McDowell (1970 p. 155) reports that the underlying assumption of running the 
dual tenure system in anticipation of a new one emerging through local 
legislation did not become a reality. Therefore, the received English law and the 
retained customary law were both operational in the colonial era and even 
beyond. Most of the legislation that was made in connection with land achieved 
much success in northern regions compared to the southern regions. The 
success achieved in the north is attributed to the political and religious powers 
that the northern monarch had over their subjects. Furthermore, the far north of 
Nigeria, which was predominantly practising Islamic religion, already had a legal 
(sharia) system in line with the religion.
In most of the northern regions, the monarchs (Emirs) were highly respected; 
this allowed them to possess sufficient power to administer their territories by 
enforcing the Islamic legal system in all spheres of life including land matters 
(International Crisis Group - Africa Report, 2010 pp. i, 3-4). For instance, they 
welcomed the idea when the Land and Native Rights Ordinance of 1910 
declared all lands in Northern regions to be under the control and disposition of 
the Governor, for the use and common benefit of the natives. This Ordinance 
later served as the basis for the Land Tenure Law of 1962 which was 
introduced in northern states, two years after Nigeria achieved independence. 
Whilst these developments occurred in the north, there had hitherto been little 
legislative interference in land tenure in the southern regions. Forms of land 
tenure were allowed to persist or develop as they would in southern regions 
(Francis, 1984).
Some accounts (Naanen, 2006; Francis, 1984) indicate that, during the early 
part of the colonial period, an attempt to impose a law of Northern Nigeria's type 
in southern region was resisted. This led to a women's riot in south-east Nigeria 
in 1928 to stop the imposition of an indirect land tax on the people by colonial 
government. Drawing on previous discussion, the social and economic 
organisation of Nigerian societies was centred on the communal ownership of
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land by kinship groups. The notions of treating land as common heritage, held 
between past, present and future generations caused women in the south­
eastern region to resist tax levies on the dead (Naanen, 2006). It was obvious 
that the belief systems between the southern tribes and those of the northern 
regions were not the same, which is why the imposition of land tax system was 
successful in the north. In fact, evidence (Yakubu, 1985 cited in Mamman, 2012) 
has revealed that land tax (or al-kharaj), which was usually paid for land 
occupied by an individual, existed in pre-colonial Islamic north. This made it 
easier for the colonial authorities to introduce a land tax in the north. And, with 
the help of Emirs, who were highly respected, the colonial administrators found 
it easy to indirectly impose and collect a land tax (Naanen, 2006 pp. 70-71).
There is sufficient evidence to show that significant variations existed in the land 
tenure systems and that these discrepancies were affecting government's effort 
of acquiring land for public use. The difficulty of acquiring land from kinship 
groups for public projects by the government in different parts of Nigeria is well 
documented in academic literature. This challenge was found to undermine the 
success of public projects that were provided within the funding from NDPs. 
Mamman (2012) documents that the Federal Government highlighted the 
problem in the third NDP as follows: "that in spite of existing legislation 
empowering Governments to acquire land compulsorily for public purposes, it 
has become difficult to do so at reasonable cost in some of Nigeria's urban 
centres". Consequently, several projects (housing and urban infrastructure) in 
the Second Development Plan (1970- 1974) failed to take off because of the 
difficulty of acquiring land in major urban centres. In the same manner, private 
projects must have run into similar obstacles. Agbosu (1988) records that even 
where land was readily available, the financial implications of compensating 
dispossess owners were often prohibitive. Consequently, compensation claimed 
and paid by governments in the event of compulsory acquisition were generally 
much higher than the true opportunity cost of land. Onibokun, Agbola and 
Labeodan (1989) also suggest that land acquisition for site-and-services 
schemes was a critical delaying factor in most cases. Because the government 
was increasingly faced with the difficulty of land acquisition in urban regions, the 
Federal Government promulgated the Land Use Act (LUA) in 1978 to address 
these concerns (Umezulike, 2011).
113
4.7.1 The Land Use Act of 1978 and its Flaws
The LUA of 1978 is the subsisting land tenure system in Nigeria. It was 
promulgated by the military government on 27th March 1978 following the 
recommendation of a Land Use Panel inaugurated on the 20th May, with the 
following terms of reference: to study the various land tenure, land use and 
conservation practices in the country and recommend steps to be taken to 
streamline them; to analyse the implication of a uniform land policy for the 
country, as well as to examine the feasibility of a uniform land policy for the 
entire country and propose guidelines for its implementation; and to examine 
steps necessary for controlling future land use and also opening and developing 
new lands for the need of the government and Nigeria's growing population in 
rural and urban areas (Mamman, 2012; FGN-LUA 1978; Oshio, 1990). Studies 
(Mamman, 2012; Oshio, 1990 and Francis, 1984, 1986) indicate that the Land 
Use Panel submitted a main report (with a minority one) to the government after 
completing its work. The recommendations of the main report were against 
nationalisation and the introduction of a uniform tenure system for the entire 
country while the minority report advocated land nationalisation and the 
unification of the land tenure system in the country. The military government 
chose the minority recommendation and went ahead to promulgate the Land 
Use Decree (now Act).
The preamble of the Land Use Act of 1978 goes as follows:
"An Act to Vest all Land comprised in the territory of each State (except land 
vested in the Federal Government or its agencies) solely in the Governor of the 
State, who would hold such Land in trust for the people and would henceforth 
be responsible for allocation of land in all urban areas to individual residents in 
the State and to organisations for residential, agriculture, commercial and other 
purposes while similar powers with respect to non-urban areas are conferred on 
Local Governments" (FGN-Land Use Act, 1978).
The Land Use Act provided that "right of occupancy" replaced previous forms of 
title and became the basis upon which land could be held. The rights of 
occupancy operate in two kinds: statutory and customary. Statutory rights are 
granted only by the Governor or a representative of the Governor in respect of 
land, whether or not in an urban area. Customary rights are granted by the 
Local Government Council authorities in respect of land not in urban areas 
[Land Use Act, 1978 - Part II, Section 5 (1) and (2)]. Part IV (21) and (22) 
requires holders of customary or statutory titles to seek for the Governor's
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consent or in other cases (applicable only to customary title holders), approval 
of the Local Government Council authority before alienating (in full or part) 
landed property by assignment, mortgage, transfer of possession, sublease or 
otherwise.
The introduction of a uniform tenure system replaced all forms of customary 
land holdings with statutory right of occupancy. This has generated concern. 
Francis (1984) put up a series of arguments against the Land Use Act. Firstly, 
"that the intentions behind the Land Use Act seem to have been neither unitary 
nor coherent, and its real potentials as an instrument of expropriation are 
shrouded in rhetoric of equality and justice". Secondly, that the "distinction 
between legislative intention and effect is an impact of the disjunction between 
the national and the local; between the State pretensions and community 
impermeability; or, in their normative aspects, between law and custom" 
(Francis, 1984 p. 5)
Lastly, Francis (Ibid. p. 6) observed that "the ideological construction of the 
Land Use Act is at variance with potential consequences in a manner which 
exactly parallels the central ambiguities in the Decree drafting. There is 
divergence of interest between the bureaucratic powers established to 
administer the Decree and mass rural dwellers who are its potential victims", 
Francis concluded. Otubu (2007) argues that "the Land Use Act is nothing but a 
nationalisation instrument which took away the right of ownership and 
management from the citizens and vested it on the state. It has turned property 
owners into tenants over land and also impoverished citizens as it sought to 
remove the economic and wealth creation attributes of land". Furthermore, the 
power bestowed on Governors by the Act was enormous to the extent that it 
overshadowed and made nonsense of the power vested in Local Government 
Authorities to administer rural land. With the increase in urbanisation that is 
currently happening in Jos where rural areas are fast integrating into the urban 
setting, the Local Government Authorities are losing their constitutional powers 
on land to the State Governor.
These problems were well acknowledged by designers of the housing policy 
that thrives on the enabling strategy (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 28-29). For instance, 
the housing policy designers noted that the Land Use Act was intended to
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facilitate the availability of urban and rural land for development, but this has not 
been achieved due to a number of constraints. Firstly, the government 
appreciated that the inclusion of the Act in the Federal Constitution of Nigeria 
made it inflexible and difficult to effect even minor amendments. Therefore, the 
government proposed to remove the Land Use Act from the Nigerian 
Constitution and for it to be treated as a separate law. Secondly, the 
government acknowledged that the vesting of all land (except Federal 
Government lands) in State Governors seriously hampered acquisition and the 
transfer of land. This has led to cumbersome and costly procedures for 
obtaining C of O, and the seeking of consent to transfer interest on property 
from one person to another.
Thirdly, the restriction in section 34 (8) imposed on private developers to 
acquire only half a hectare of land in urban areas was a fundamental flaw. 
Lastly, the government recognised that it had always delayed paying 
compensation for land acquired from people across Nigeria. And the 
compensation paid was not often adequate to motivate dispossessed land 
owners to part with their property easily (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 28-29). This was 
the position of land tenure system on which the policy that thrives on the 
enabling strategy was erected. In principle, land was perceived to be held by 
government in accordance with the provision of Land Use Act, but in a practical 
sense its ownership, possession and control was with the communities, kinship 
groups and individuals.
4.8 THE IMPACT OF CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS UNRESTS
Nigeria has experienced civil unrest of varying dimensions and resulting from 
different reasons from 1960 to the contemporary period. The most devastating 
of all since the 1960 independence was the civil war, which occurred between 
1967 and 1970. The immediate cause of this was an attempt by the eastern 
region to break off from the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Metz, 1992 p. 59). The 
civil war began about one year earlier, before the end of first NDP, and it is a 
possible reason why the second NDP could not begin until after the war ended 
in 1970. The civil war caused a substantial loss of lives, and public 
infrastructure and houses were destroyed, mostly in the eastern region. The 
second NDP started in the aftermath of civil war and the major goals set by the
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federal government were concerned with post-war infrastructure, housing 
reconstruction and restoring productive capacity. For instance, the replacement 
cost of physical assets damaged and destroyed by the civil war, mostly in 
States located at eastern region of Nigeria (the secessionist region), was 
estimated at N600 million (then about US$900 million) (Lewis, 1977).
The second NDP budgeted N2.634million for housing with a projection of 
54,000. Though there are no accurate quantitative records on houses built at 
the close of this Plan, consensus exists in academic research that a substantial 
amount was used for reconstruction of damaged houses (Olayiwola, Adeleye 
and Ogunshakin, 2005; UN-HABITAT, 2001a p 49; and Awotona, 1990 p. 18,
19). From the total budget for housing, an amount of N0.60million went for 
reconstruction of houses destroyed during civil war; N0.80 was used to expand 
the financial resources of the NBS; N 1 .40 was expended on provision of staff 
quarters at the Federal Capital Territory in Lagos; and 140.16 was expended on 
provision of transit housing for public officials at the Federal Capital Territory in 
Lagos (Awotona, 1990). These data suggest that, apart from the money 
expended on reconstruction work in eastern region states, any other 
expenditure on new housing only benefitted Lagos. The States in the northern 
region and mid-west region were neglected in this period.
There were other forms of civil unrest that arose from bloody military coups, 
such as those of 1966,1976,1990 and the failed transition to democratic rule of 
1993. The uprisings that occurred in these periods led to the loss of lives and 
properties and the disruption of the national development process (Falola, 2013; 
Metz, 1992). Furthermore, the cutting of expenditure for social services that 
occurred during SAPs led to different forms of uprising as explained in chapter 
two. The destructions (of lives and properties) that resulted from these uprisings 
were not adequately quantified and documented in academic research, but it is 
clear that the journey has been uneasy for ordinary Nigerians.
4.8.1 Ethno-Religious Conflicts and Wider Influences within and beyond Jos
The preceding discussions confirmed that the overall development process of 
Jos is influenced by multiple factors. Some of the factors (such as the impact of 
oil industry, military coups, the revenue allocation system, the national policy
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dilemmas, the changes in government, and political issues) which have already 
been discussed are beyond the control of government authorities in Jos. Other 
wider influences within and beyond the city of Jos are related to violent conflicts. 
During the last two decades, the ethno-religious conflicts in Jos have become 
more pressing than any other issue. The chronology of contemporary violence 
in Jos includes that of 1994 (International Crisis Group, 2012 p. 9), the 2001 
and 2004 episodes (International Crisis Group, 2012 p. 10; Higazi, 2011 p. 18), 
2008 events (International Crisis Group, 2010 p. 12; Higazi, 2011 p. 18), and 
persistent violence since 2010 (International Crisis Group, 2010 p. 13; Higazi, 
2011 p. 18). The drivers of these civil unrests include the interplay of identity, 
politics and the economy, segregation and polarisation along ethnic and 
religious lines, and remote causes that are connected to ownership and control 
of land between indigenes and settlers or indigenes and citizens (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, p 16-20; Higazi, 2011 p. 12-24).
In the last three years, the nature of violence in Jos and other regions took a 
different dimension with the involvement of an Islamic group known as Boko 
Haram. This Boko Haram group is a galaxy of loosely connected armed cells 
under a leadership with alleged links to the Middle East Al-Qaida group (Fagotto, 
2014). In Jos alone, at least 4,000 people have been killed as result of Boko 
Haram attacks. The activities of this group are beyond the capacity of the 
authorities in Jos to manage. It has become a national concern as the group 
has undertaken strikes against army barracks, police stations, prisons, schools 
and the United Nation building in Abuja, the Federal Capital Territory (Fagotto, 
2014). While analysing the situation in Jos, Fagotto notes that: "years of 
religious violence and Boko Haram attacks have turned Jos into an African 
Belfast, where Christians and Muslims live rigorously segregated, with minimum 
interaction: They have set up separate street markets, and what were once 
mixed public school, have now become de-facto segregated institutions".
There is a consensus in the literature that ethno-religious conflicts that occurred 
over time in Jos affected the growth of the local economy and constrained the 
urban development process (Dung-Gwom and Rikko, 2009; Kwaja, 2011, 
Higazi, 2011; International Crisis Group, 2012 and Aliyu, 2012 et al). These 
studies also maintain that residential properties, places of worship and public
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facilities have often been targeted during conflicts, but they do not provide 
accurate quantitative estimates. Dung-Gwom and Rikko (2009) and Aliyu et al 
(2012) in their studies document that the destruction of un-quantifiable housing 
stock in Jos aggravated supply shortage. Aliyu et al (2012) also show that civil 
unrests have resulted in massive residential mobility and relocation around the 
city. This corroborates with the findings of Dung-Gwom and Rikko (2009), who 
conclude that, as a consequence of civil unrest, excessive demand for land and 
housing was created in areas where there was limited or no supply. 
Furthermore, they observe that houses were available and unoccupied in 
locations where demand was relatively lower, compared to supply. These 
findings suggest that civil unrest was having a negative effect on the 
development of the local housing market and the supply of low income housing 
in Jos. The persistent etho-religious conflicts are now beyond the capacity of 
local authorities to manage. Evidently, this has become an investment risk and 
a discouraging factor for housing investment by private house builders and 
financiers.
4.9 SUMMARY
It is clear from the preceding discussions that the political and socio-economic 
processes have impacted negatively on the overall progress of Nigeria. 
Specifically, national development and housing programmes have been 
constrained by the political and socio-economic processes. The key factors that 
accounted for this failure include: one, the impact of military rule and changes of 
governments. The frequent changes in government, which in many instances 
occurred through military coups, resulted in changes in the economic and 
political-ideological stance of the government. This factor influenced the 
continuity of national development planning, policy consistency, public spending 
patterns on social service and the priority accorded to the provision of public 
housing. Since the return to democratic rule in 1999, there have been relatively 
smooth transitions from one democratic government to another and political and 
economic ideology has been consistent in favour of complementing state roles 
with market solutions. However, it is too early to predict the continuity of 
government programmes and the continuity of policies.
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Two, the institutional framework for the implementation of national plans and 
policies was poor. For instance, a central bureaucratic management style which 
concentrated roles in few agencies was adopted. This allowed few agencies 
and individuals to monopolise the implementation of public housing projects. As 
a consequence, the arrangement became corrupt, ineffective and inefficient. 
Central bureaucratic management is a persistent variable particularly in 
connection to fiscal centralisation. This factor is capable of undermining the 
capacity of local authorities to effectively fulfil their roles in the delivery housing 
services at the local level.
Over the years, relevant institutions have been created or restructured by 
federal and state government authorities to build capacity in the housing sector. 
This process cannot occur at once. In Jos, state creation and the process of 
development have continually presented a need to create or restructure 
institutions. It is possible that the outcomes of the housing programmes were 
influenced by a lack of institutional capacity at federal and local levels. 
Improvement of institutional capacity is still required and remains an on-going 
process at both federal and local levels in Jos.
Furthermore, the weak institutional framework is evident by the inadequate 
procurement regulations, which permitted sharp practices and corruption during 
the procurement of public housing projects. Procurement reforms are still on­
going and it is too early to think that the period of an inadequate procurement 
system is over. The eighth influential variable is the land ownership tussle 
between government and kinship groups. This factor is still lingering and 
capable of influencing the success of housing provision in Jos and other 
locations across Nigeria.
The ninth issue is civil and religious unrests, which have impacted negatively on 
the development process of Nigeria. This factor is persistent in different 
geographical areas of Nigeria. In Jos, ethno-religious conflicts have become a 
reoccurring event and this is a serious issue that is constraining the 
development of the city. It is also a potential risk for housing investment. 
Furthermore, when violent uprising occurs in Jos, houses, places of worship 
and public facilities are often targeted. This has reduced the residential housing
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stock and created unbalanced demand and supply of housing in different 
locations.
Tenth, some of the development plans implemented in Nigeria were over 
ambitious. For instance, the economic prosperity in the 1970s permitted the 
government to propose huge amount of money for the NDPs. This led to 
corruption, mismanagement and high degree of wastage. Sadly, the out 
outcomes of the NDPs that command those huge budgets were poor. Lastly, 
the economic prosperity that arose from crude oil discovery and export was 
poorly managed. Since the discovery of crude oil in late 60s, Nigeria has 
become heavily dependent on crude oil and the much accrued public revenue is 
not well accounted for by public officials. This has created structural imbalances 
in the economy which have lingered till present times in Nigeria.
Lastly, the issue of rapid urbanisation and growth of shanties across Nigeria is 
an evident of poor planning and policy failure at national and regional levels. 
Urbanisation and slumming in Nigeria deserves an effective policy that will help 
to improve the living conditions of slum dwellers, and to prevent more people 
from getting entrapped in the slums conditions. The approach where 
government authorities are seen to criminalise slum residents, evict and 
demolish their houses without compensation or resettlement need to be 
changed. Instead of demolition, the approach to slum clearance should that of 
improvement and adaptation.
The search for a solution in the idea of enabling the provision of housing is 
incomplete without addressing the variables that have endured over time to 
continually influence the outcomes of housing policy in a negative way. Having 
analysed the legacy of housing provision in Nigeria, it is now necessary to 
explain the changes that were proposed by the government in the 1991 housing 
policy, and the reforms that have been implemented to bring some improvement 
to the housing system.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUBSIDISING HOUSING IN NIGERIA'S NEOLIBERAL CONTEXT
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Nigeria has followed in the line of developing countries that had to undertake 
neoliberal reforms (liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation), on the 
assumption that they would help restore economic stability and also enhance 
the role of the private sector in development. The current housing policy 
statement in Nigeria originated from this line of thinking: it was assumed that 
financial liberalisation would lead to growth and stability in the financial system, 
and that government would apply appropriate legislation to compel private 
finance institutions to contribute in the financing of subsidised mortgage housing. 
In subsequent years, the International Development Agencies have advised 
Nigeria to undertake administrative (decentralisation, participation and 
partnership) reforms, on the assumption of promoting pluralism, efficiency and 
transparency in the management of public services including the provision of 
housing provision. The Nigerian housing policy and the notion of enabling are 
founded on the above assumptions. The objectives and strategies of the 
housing policy are appended (Appendix X p. 311). The purpose of this chapter 
is to examine the reforms that have been implemented in line with the 
underlying premise of enabling, and how they can be benefit the provision of 
formal housing in Nigeria.
5.2 NEOLIBERAL REFORMS AND HOUSING POLICY ASSUMPTIONS
This section discusses the neoliberal reforms implemented in Nigeria. Tables 
showing precise details of these reforms can be found in appendix XI and XII 
(page 313 and 314). Following the acceptance of the IMF's SAP in 1986, the 
authorities in Nigeria began to undertake reforms. In 1988, the privatisation and 
commercialisation decree was enacted. This legislation led to the creation of the 
Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC). Between 
1998 and 1993, the TCPC was involved with the first round of Nigeria's
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privatisation, and about 70 public enterprises were fully divested (Drum, 1999). 
In 1989, the PMIs Act was enacted to create a legal framework for the setting 
up of PMIs by government and the private sector. As PMIs and private 
institutions were being created, it became necessary to provide regulatory 
framework. This led to the enactment of the Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions Act of 1991. This legislation was made without an enforcement 
agency and so, remain inactive (Nwoye, 2007). Also, a new National Housing 
Policy was launched in 1991, calling for government to become an enabler, 
promoter and facilitator of housing as opposed to provider (World Bank, 1993a).
In 1992 the Nation Housing Fund Act was promulgated (see Appendix XI on 
page 313) and the contributory housing finance (NHF scheme) arrangement 
was kick-started. In 1993, the FMBN Act was enacted to empower the FMBN to 
start administering the NHF scheme. In the same year, the UDBN Act was 
promulgated and the UDBN was incorporated for the purpose of financing urban 
infrastructure. By 1994, banks were beginning to fail, fraudulent activities were 
increasing and money laundry was now a common crime among corrupt 
government officials. Three legislation were passed between 1994 and 1995 to 
address these problems but to no avail. A further deterioration in the Nigerian 
financial system necessitated the creation of two corruption prevention agencies 
in 2000 and 2004. Further, it became evident in 1999 that the institutional 
framework for the privatisation programme was deficient. This necessitated 
enactment of the Public Enterprise (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act in 
1999. This legislation led to the creation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises 
(BPE) to take responsibility of implementing Nigeria's policy on privatisation and 
commercialisation (FGN- Privatisation Programme, 2006).
In 2002, the federal government withdraw from retail mortgage operation and 
liquidated the PMI (the FMFL) which it had set-up in 1999. However, the state 
governments maintained ownership of PMIs including that in Jos (Mobogunje,
2011). Over this period the poor performance of the FMBN in supplying 
mortgage finance had necessitated some reforms: a new Board was constituted; 
incompetent staffs were retrenched; new and competent staffs were employed; 
and an arrangement was put in place for the private developers to access loans 
to build houses for the benefit of the NHF subscribers (Mabogunje, 2011 p. 584).
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Between 2003 and 2004, the Central Bank had to introduce new measures to 
sanitise Nigeria's financial system: a new guideline for PMIs was announced; 
and the recapitalisation and stabilisation of financial institutions was started 
(CBN, 2003, 2012). By 2005, another round of privatisation began. This time 
around cement companies, bricks and clay companies, steel rolling mills, the 
FMBN, public deposit money banks and insurance companies were affected 
(FGN-Privatisation Programme, 2006). The UDBN was also privatised (Yari, 
2010 p. 20). Between 2007 and 2011 public procurement reforms were 
implemented (see Appendices XI and XII pp.313, 314).
As a way of shifting the government role from provider to enabler, the federal 
government introduced a policy on the monetisation of worker's fringe benefits 
and the privatisation of government housing in 2003. Following this policy, all 
public houses across the country were sold through public auction at the end of 
the first year of the monetisation programme (Aluko, 2003). Unlike other forms 
of privatisation, this policy sought to transfer the responsibility for public assets 
not to private companies but directly to individual members of the public. 
Sprigings and Smith (2012) observed that public housing transfer in this manner 
has unintended consequences. One of the less explicit consequences is the 
transfer of long term management and maintenance costs of public sector stock 
away from the government to individual households. This was the primary 
objective for introducing the policy of public housing transfer in Nigeria. The 
unintended effect of this policy has already been established by Sprigings and 
Smith (2012). Their study revealed that the initial privatisation of public housing 
in the UK leads to subsequent commodification and re-commodification. They 
observed that public housing stock transfer which came from the 'Right to Buy' 
policy gradually expanded the Private Rented Sector. This has resulted in 
unintended consequences for Local Housing Allowances (Sprigings and Smith,
2012). The response of governmental agencies to this policy in Jos will be 
examined in subsequent discussions.
It clear that the decades of 1991 to 2011 have experienced regulatory and 
institutional reforms with much of it occurring after Nigeria returned to 
democratic rule in 1999. The events that were meant to change the
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government's approach of housing provision appear to have occurred rather 
slowly and haphazardly. The sequence of events shows a lack of consideration 
to the interdependency of legislation and action. Some progress and 
inconsistencies are observed from the reforms outlined in Appendices XI and 
XII pp.313, 314. First, the federal government has set-up institutions that are 
supported by statutes. Secondly, there has been a progressive but very slow 
and uncoordinated development in institutionalising relevant policy decisions. 
Additionally, some of the decisions are yet to be supported with appropriate 
legislation such as for the proposed taxation and capital subsidies for housing 
production. Furthermore, some statutes were created without commencement 
dates. This failure could create a negative impact on the supply of housing 
finance and provision of subsidies.
Thirdly, the deregulation and privatisation reform was implemented without an 
appropriate institutional framework. For instance, the privatisation exercise 
began in 1998 when the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) was not yet 
created. The consequence was the increase in financial crimes including 
advanced fee fraud and money laundry by corrupt government officials. 
Furthermore, a lot of private finance institutions came into operation as a result 
of deregulation programme. However, the legal and regulatory framework was 
deficient. Also, instances exist where legislation was made for the purpose of 
checkmating financial malpractices but an enforcement agency was not created.
Fourthly, property rights reform has not received the adequate attention of the 
government. This failure has implications for the housing finance system. The 
absence of clearly stated foreclosure laws is causing mortgage providers to 
adopt arbitrary measures to safe-guard their investment, to the detriment of 
borrowers. The World Bank (2009b) confirms this and reports that despite the 
unfavourable environment there is a reasonably efficient and rapidly growing 
mortgage market in Nigeria. The World Bank further observed that: "loans are 
provided by the retail deposit banks on short term basis. The maturity mismatch 
is largely mitigated by use of adjustable rate mortgages where loans rates are 
typically being tied to banks' prime lending rates". For instance, the average 
lending rates in the mortgage industry was 19.5 percent in 2011 (CBN 
Economic Report, 2011 p. 18). This is due to the absence of adequate
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underwriting mechanism for examining the financial history of the borrower, 
particularly in respect of his/her record in repaying other loans (World Bank, 
2009b). Furthermore, it is the security of the property that allows a lower rate of 
interest to be charged as opposed to that for an unsecured loan. The World 
Bank reported that the arrangements in Nigeria are not straightforward. It is 
observed that arrears are very low on the mortgage lending that has taken 
place (World Bank, 2009b).
Fifthly, until now there is no attempt to carryout land reforms despite the 
problems created by the present land tenure system. As noted in chapters one, 
the poor performance of Nigeria as a whole in registering property is attributed 
to flaws contained in the Land Use Act (LUA) of 1978. There are two courses of 
actions that need to be undertaken as regards the LUA issue. First, relevant 
sections need to be amended. Presently, the LUA is incorporated into the 
national constitution. It needs to be expunged from the constitution so as to 
effect the required amendment as well as to fast track future amendment when 
necessary, without going through the rigours of constitutional review (MBAN, 
2009). As the LUA of 1978 has nationalised Nigeria's land tenure system so its 
amendment can only be made at a national context by federal legislatures. It 
was previously noted in chapters one and three that LUA of 1978 has become 
an obstacle to making land available for housing; it has been blamed for the 
prolonged bureaucratic process of obtaining C of O, the document that confers 
ownership of the land to the individual from the government. The Act has not 
guaranteed security of title and the cost remains prohibitive while access to 
registered land is difficult and cumbersome (EFInA and FinMark Trust, 2010, p. 
37). In 2009 the MBAN presented a memo to the national assembly, requesting 
for amendment of the LUA. This has been followed with lobbying by FMBN but 
to no avail.
The neoliberal reforms that have been implemented raises hope particularly for 
the anticipated partnership between Deposit Money Banks and insurance 
companies with the FMBN to provide housing finance. It is observed that the 
federal government has adopted an approach which allows key institutions such 
as the FMBN, UDBN, housing corporations and some PMIs to remain in the 
ownership of government. For instance, the FMBN and UDBN were converted
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into GSEs. Technically, these institutions have moved from the federal 
government's ownership to the ownership of federal government agencies and 
local states. They have moved simply from government to government and 
remain as bureaucracies which cannot operate without the government's 
influence. The problem therefore is unsolved.
The expectation that government should shift its role from provider to enabler 
does not mean a complete withdrawal from the shelter process or the 
abdicating of responsibility. But what has happened in the case of FMBN is 
inconsistent with enabling ideas of deregulating and debureaucratising of public 
institutions to promote performance. Similarly, the ownership structure of federal 
and state government housing corporations and PMIs owned by local states is 
yet to be altered. They remain fully owned by the government and so part of 
bureaucracies. In this case, the issues of bureaucratic restraints, 
mismanagement, corruption, over-dependence on state funding, service 
arrogance and many others have not been addressed.
Not much has been done about secondary market development even though an 
efficient secondary mortgage process is lacking. This is putting enormous 
burden on the FMBN and PMIs to carry the mortgage loans to maturity. It has 
been observed that: "outstanding mortgage loans remain on the books of 
mortgage providers no matter the tenure and this limits the ability of the FMBN 
and PMIs to originate more loans" (EFInA and FinMark Trust, 2010, p. 38). The 
Federal Government of Nigeria aspires to link primary and secondary mortgage 
markets to capital markets. The absence of securitisation law is impeding this 
aspiration. At the time of this study the sale of securitised mortgage debts by 
the FMBN and PMIs cannot be effectively achieved within the present housing 
finance model.
7.4.1 The Impact of Financial Reforms
The reforms implemented in the Nigerian financial system led to the merger and 
acquisition of banks, leading to a reduction in their number from 89 in 2004 to 
21 as of August 2012 (CBN, 2012). In terms of growth, records suggest that the 
reforms have produced a positive impact on banks. Figure Eight presents the 
capitalisation rates of Deposit Money Banks from 2002- 2011. Over this period 
there was a steady growth in the capitalisation rate of banks. This coincided
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with the period over which the government intensified the economic 
liberalisation programme (see tables 8 and 9). During this period, the banks 
experienced their highest capitalisation rate in 2006/07 with a total amount of 
146.432 billion (US$40.2million) being recorded in 2007. This occurred a year 
and half after recapitalisation and consolidation programme took effect. The 
CBN recorded that the capitalisation rate realised in 2006/07 was a direct result 
of the consolidation programme (CBN, 2007).
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Series 1 0.233 0.354 0.662 1.212 2.142 6.432 3.715 2.238 2.71 1.839
Years and Capitalisation amounts
Figure 8 Capitalisation of Deposit Money Banks from 2002-11
Recapitalisation produced a range of effects on the insurance companies. For 
instance, in 2006, there were 103 insurance companies in Nigeria which later 
decreased to 49 in March 2007 and by August 2012 there were only 45 
registered insurance companies operating in Nigeria (FGN-NAICOM, 2012). 
The reduction in the number of insurance companies arose from closure and 
mergers that occurred to meet the prescribed capitalisation requirement 
introduced by the CBN in 2004. The recapitalisation significantly increased the 
minimum capital requirements for insurance firms, up from around US$1 million 
to US$16 million (equivalent of N2 billion) for life insurance companies and to 
N3 billion (US$24 million) for non-life insurers (World Bank, 2009b p. 83). As 
can be seen in figure Nine, insurance companies recorded their highest 
capitalisation rate in the period of 2006/07 with, an amount of N419 million 
(US$2.6) being recorded in 2007. The effect of this development on the supply 
of subsidised housing finance will be examined in subsequent chapters.
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2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Series 1 7.9 15.5 25.1 34.4 52.4 419 313.9 201.5 140147.9
Years and Capitalisation amounts
Figure 9 Capitalisation of Insurance Companies from 2002-11
The recapitalisation programme also changed the face of Nigerian PMIs in 
some respects. Prior to recapitalisation, there were 119 PMIs in 2005, of which 
115 were described by CBN as 'terminally distressed'. Ninety seven of these 
were closed down and new ones began to emerge holding the prescribed 
capital of N100 billion ($850,000) (World Bank, 2009 p. 131). Existing PMIs 
were made to recapitalise, some were acquired by the Deposit Money Banks 
and emerging ones had to possess the prescribed capital before they could be 
licensed (CBN, 2003 & 2007). At the time of field study, the government owned 
PMI in Jos was not functional because it failed to recapitalise to the required 
amount of N100million thus its license to operate was revoked by the CBN 
(Government of Plateau State, 2008).
The data presented in figure 10 suggests that PMIs experienced growth in their 
capitalisation rate around the same period as Deposit Money Banks and 
insurance companies. The highest capitalisation rates of PMIs were recorded in 
2008 with an amount of N54.202 million (US$0.34million) being recorded. 
Before this period, there was a steady growth from 2007 which suggests that 
post consolidation had made a positive impact on mortgage institutions.
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2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Series 1 45.25 54.202 24.85 23.154 20.881
Years and Capitalisation amounts
Figure 10 Capitalisation of mortgage institutions from 2007-11
The capital base of the FMBN was raised from N100 million to £45billion 
(US$30.864million) in 2005 but there is no data to illustrate its capital 
appreciation over time. Evidence suggests that the recapitalisation of finance 
institutions produced an appreciable effect on the credit supply. First, there was 
a continual appreciation in loan and advances disbursed by Deposit Money 
Banks right from 2002 (as illustrated in figure 11). The loans and advances 
disbursed reached a high of N8.45billion (US$52,812 million) in 2009. This 
suggests that the consolidation and recapitalisation programme produced a 
positive impact on the provision of credit by Deposit Money Banks.
20042002 2003 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Series 1 0.85 1.04 1.29 1.86 2.34 4.49 7.6 1.45 6.62 6.49
Years and amounts of loan and advances disbursed
Figure 11 Loans and advances of Deposit Money Banks from 2002-11
In terms of the sectoral credit allocation (Table Eight) by Deposit Money Banks, 
the credit allocation to real estate sector reached its highest percentage in 2010 
and this was three years after Deposit Money Banks experienced their highest
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capitalisation rates. This further confirms that the recapitalisation and 
consolidation activities produced a positive effect on supply of credit to the 
housing sector.
Table 8 Sectoral credit allocation by deposit money banks from 2006-11
Annual credit share allocation per cent
Sectors 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Agriculture 2.2 3.2 1.4 1.4 1.7 3.5
Solid Minerals 10.1 10.7 11.3 12.7 15.3 17.7
Exports 1.2 1.4 1.0 0.5 0.6 0.6
Manufacturing 16.9 10.4 12.5 10.6 12.8 14.4
Real Estate 5.9 6.2 6.2 8.3 8.7 6.2
Public Utilities 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9
Transport & Communication 7.6 6.8 7.2 8.3 10.7 17.3
Finance and Insurance 4.6 9.4 9.5 13.1 11.3 4.1
Government 4.5 3.7 1.9 3.7 4.9 6.8
Imports & Domestic trade 22.5 14.5 16.4 12.8 11.7 10.3
 nclassified 23.7 32.9 31.8 27.9 21.8 18.1
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Central Bank of Nigeria, 2006 - 2011 Annual Reports
In figure 12, it can be observed that the funds available for mortgage investment 
by PMIs rose to N188.5billion (US$1,178) in 2007. Most of these funds would 
have come from the loans and advances of Deposit Money Banks, premiums of 
insurance companies and loans made available by the FMBN. The CBN 
recorded that investible funds available to PMIs in 2006 comprised of deposit 
liabilities, long term loans/NHF and paid up capital (CBN, 2006). The rise of 
investible funds of PMIs between 2007/07 is also attributed to the growth in 
balance sheets of PMIs that were acquired by Deposit Money Banks (a fall out 
of consolidation and recapitalisation programme), leading to capital injection.
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Series 1 94.34 188.5 154.2 154.2 124.2 126.6
Years and amount available investment
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Figure 12 Funds available for investment by PMIs, 2006-11
The cumulative loans disbursed by five development finance institutions, of 
which FMBN and UDBN made proportionate contributions to, appreciated year 
after year. As shown in Table Nine, loans disbursed by development finance 
institutions reached &129.8billion (US$811,250) in 2011. From 2007-2011, the 
FMBN continued to make an appreciable contribution to the loans disbursed by 
development finance institutions. Starting from 2008-2011, the FMBN made the 
highest contributions to the cumulative loans disbursed by development finance 
institutions. This suggests that over this period, the amount of mortgage credit 
supplied from FMBN was significant.
Table 9 Loan disbursement by Development Finance institutions from 2006-11
Year Cumulative Percentage share contributed to total loan disbursed by each
loan development finance institutions____________________________
disbursed in 
billion Naira
(FMBN) (UDBN) Bank of
Agriculture
(BOA)
Bank of 
Industry 
(BO!)
Nigeria 
Export & 
Import 
Bank
Total 
per cent
2006 169.7b 5.8 75.6 10.2 3.8
(NEXIM)
4.7 100
2007 57.5b 27.0 - 35.0 24.0 14.0 100
2008 78.0b 41.3 - 29.1 12.9 16.7 100
2009 90.8b 43.0 0.2 25.9 14.7 16.2 100
2010 111.8b 49.6 0.2 20.2 23.2 6.8 100
2011 129.8b 42.7 0.1 17.4 29.1 10.2 100
Source: CBN, 2006 - 2011 Annual Reports
The developments in Nigeria's financial system suggest that some benefits may 
arise in the future. The discussions so far reveal some benefits that give hope 
and flaws that require attention of the government (see Table 10).
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Table 10: Summary of Findings
Benefits_______________________________
1 The reforms implemented so far to support 
housing provision on the basis of the enabling 
strategy are progressive.
2 The privatisation of financial institutions and 
their subsequent recapitalisation has improved 
their performance.
3 The introduction of an EDL is a noteworthy 
achievement. This essentially allows private 
house-building companies, cooperatives and 
Housing Corporations to access loan from the 
FMBN to build houses for sale to NHF 
subscribers.
The formation of the REDAN is an 
achievement. Over 102 housing building 
companies who are members of REDAN are in 
affiliation with the FMBN for the purpose of 
building low-income housing for NHF 
participants.
The enactment of public procurement law, the 
creation of the Public Procurement Bureau and 
two anti-graft agencies are notable 
achievements. These will promote economy, 
efficiency, fairness, reliability, transparency, 
accountability and ethical standards in the 
procurement of works including housing 
provision. Financial abuses of various forms 
and degrees will also be regulated.
The introduction of regulatory guidelines for 
PMIs, Development Finance Institutions, 
Deposit Money Banks and Insurance 
Companies will curb financial abuse and build 
confidence for the people.
Flaws______________________________ ’
1 The events however occurred rather slowly, 
haphazardly and uncoordinated.
The sequence of events shows a lack of 
consideration to the interdependency of 
legislation and action.
Some inconsistency is observed on the part of 
the government to make necessary legislation. 
For example, property rights reform has not 
received the adequate attention of the 
government and there is no attempt to carryout 
land reforms despite the problems created by 
the present land tenure system.
Some of the policy decisions are yet to be 
supported with appropriate legislation such as 
the proposed taxation and capital subsidies for 
housing production. Also, foreclosure and 
securitisation laws are still missing.
Some statutes were created without 
commencement dates. A typical example is the 
income tax law
Federal and state government housing 
corporations and PMIs owned by local states 
are yet to be privatised.
Source: Author's assessment (2013)
5.3 HOUSING POLICY ASSUMTIONS
5.3.1 The NHF Scheme and the Subsidised Mortgage Proposal 
Housing finance in the context of the enabling strategy is based on participation 
and partnerships, and the role of the FMBN is crucial to its realisation. The 
anticipated participatory financing arrangement is illustrated in figure 13. As it 
will be seen in the course of the discussion, the FMBN was expected to 
mobilise finance from NHF subscription, commercial banks (which are termed 
Deposit Money Banks) and registered insurance companies, contributions by 
federal government and private capital from foreign investors to create a pool of 
finance which is referred to as the National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF)
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(Federal Government of Nigeria - NHP, 2006b p. 22). The NHTF is a subsidised 
finance sector which operates as a subset of the national housing finance 
market (World Bank, 2009 p. 121). This arrangement is of special interest in this 
study because it provides low interest mortgage credit and has the potential for 
expanding opportunity for access to low-income housing in different locations.
Based on figure 13, the policy designers anticipated that five key actors would 
participate in financing housing through the FMBN. Firstly, workers in Nigeria 
were expected to participate in the NHF scheme, from which a house loan could 
be made accessible to them. The FMBN was mandated to mobilise 
subscriptions from the workers (people employed in public, private and informal 
organisations) based on 2.5 percent of their basic monthly salary. Section 4 (a) 
of National Housing Fund Act 3, 1992 and Part II (e) of the FMBN Act 82, 1993 
both empowered the bank to this effect. The FMBN was expected to enforce 
NHF collections from workers and this role is facilitated by the outreach 
structure of the bank, which is made up of eight regional offices and 36 state 
and district offices, including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) whose 
functions are to register participants and collect subscriptions (FGN-FMBN, 
2011).
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Institutional Investors
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insurance companies
Public Finance:
Annual Statutory 
Allocation from Federal 
government
Households:
(NHF 
subscribers)
Foreign
investors
National 
Housing Trust 
Fund (NHTF) at 
FMBN
Money supply to house builders
Housing Corporations and Private 
Estate Developers
FMBN Mortgage housing 
beneficiaries
NHF subscribers (households)
Figure 13: Framework for the financing of mortgage housing for the benefit of NHF subscribers
Secondly, the policy provided that the federal government should support the 
FMBN through an annual budgetary allocation (FGN-NHP, 2006). This provision 
was supported by an NHF Statute. Section 6 (I) and (II) of the NHF Act 3, 1992 
provided that the federal government should make an adequate financial 
contribution to the fund for the purpose of the granting of long term loans and 
advances for housing development in Nigeria. In this regard, the State remained 
an important actor in financing housing. Though state financing was frequently 
criticised on the grounds of economic efficiency and ineffectual targeting, it 
remained a long term source of housing finance in most countries (Clarke and 
Ginsburge, 1975). In Nigeria, the FMBN is technically owned by the State. The 
present ownership structure of the bank is comprised of the Federal 
Government of Nigeria which, has 50 percent share capital in the bank, the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) which, has 30 percent and the Nigerian Social 
Insurance Trust Fund which, has 20 percent (FGN-CBN, 2011).
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Thirdly, the policy designers expected local investors to partner with the FMBN 
in financing housing in Nigeria. The policy required Deposit Money Banks to 
invest some proportion of their loans and advances in the FMBN. The NHF 
Statute supported this policy provision. Section 5 (1) of the NHF Act 3, 1992 
provided that every Deposit Money Banks should invest in the fund 10 percent 
of its annual loan and advances at an interest rate of one percent above the 
interest payable on current accounts by banks. Section 11 (1) and (2) 
empowered the CBN to collect the money and pay it to the FMBN within two 
months of making the collection. It was intended, under these provisions, that 
the Deposit Money Banks would invest their deposits to finance housing at 
subsidised interest rates through the FMBN and also at open market interest 
rates on their own.
Fourthly, the housing policy expected insurance companies operating in Nigeria 
to invest some of their investible premiums in the FMBN. This was supported in 
Section 5 (2) and (3) of the NHF Act of 1992, which stated that every registered 
insurance company would invest a minimum of 20 percent of its non-life funds 
and 40 percent of its life fund in real property development, of which not less 
than 50 percent should be invested in the FMBN at an interest rate not 
exceeding 4 percent. Section 11 (1) and (2) empowered the CBN to collect the 
money and pay it to the FMBN within two months of making the collection. It 
was intended that, if this proposal proved successful, Nigerian insurance 
companies would supply subsidised housing finance through their investment at 
the FMBN and also originate mortgages through other ways.
The present housing finance system in Nigeria is based on mortgages and this 
was introduced to substitute for budgetary provisions that were usually allocated 
for public housing schemes before the introduction of the enabling strategy 
(FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 30-40). It is noteworthy that the enabling strategy and 
participatory housing finance were meant to lead to the development of a formal 
subsidised mortgage market. Theoretically, the mortgage market is a term that 
describes a vast array of institutions and individuals that are involved in 
mortgage finance in one way or another (McDonald and Thornton, 2008). In 
mortgage transactions, the primary market serves to bring borrowers to obtain
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loans from mortgage originators whereas the secondary market is where 
mortgage loans are bought and sold, and relationships at this level exist 
between originators, and investor (McDonald and Thornton, 2008; Cummings & 
DiPasquale 1997). As it will be seen in the subsequent discussion, mortgage 
transaction in Nigeria is currently facilitated by interaction of actors which fall 
under the classification of primary or secondary mortgage operators.
In Nigeria, the sources of finance (illustrated in figure 14) from which PMIs and 
banks originate their mortgages are comprised of NHF savings, deposits and 
insurance premiums. Based on figure seven, it is from primary sources that 
PMIs and banks are expected to originate mortgages. Because mortgage 
tenure could be long, the role of the secondary market becomes essential to 
mitigate risks associated with a mortgage created from short-term deposits 
(Okpala, Mutizwa-Mangiza & Moisseev, 2006; Cummings & DiPasquale, 1997).
Nigeria's housing finance model is designed to operate such that both mortgage 
backed securities and bonds can be traded and, through this process, long term 
finance can be generated (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 39-40). The FMBN is the 
conduit through which mortgages can be sold at the capital market. Other key 
players in the second tier market are the PFCs and PFAs, the CBN, and the 
insurance companies. Also in this market is the UDBN. Under the present 
housing finance model (figure 14) the FMBN serves to pool loans into 
mortgage-backed securities and bonds for onward trading in the capital market. 
If mortgages are securitised, issuing houses, stock brokers and portfolio 
managers can sell them to potential investors such as PFAs and PFCs, the 
CBN, the insurance companies, the UDBN and other investors. Alternatively, 
mortgage originators can sell directly to these investors.
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Figure 14 Nigerian Housing Finance Model (adapted from CBN, 2010)
Over the preceding discussion it is noted that the enabling housing strategy 
aspired for a participatory financing arrangement which would, in turn, lead to a 
mortgage system. The federal government planned to facilitate access to 
housing through the supply of subsidised credit from the FMBN. If the 
government's ambitions had been successful it would have meant that 
mortgages would have been financed at subsidised interest rates through the 
FMBN and at open market interest rates through the activities of commercial 
banks and insurance companies.
The FMBN has conditions for credit making and recovery. The conditions are 
applicable to individuals, PMIs, cooperatives and estate developers who are 
interested in accessing loans from the bank. The housing finance policy is 
designed to provide loans to Nigerians in all sectors of the economy including 
those at the low and medium income levels who cannot afford housing loans at 
open market interest rates, for example, civil servants, traders, artisans, and 
commercial vehicle drivers among others. The first condition for any prospective 
loan seeker is to subscribe to the NHF scheme, which can be done in two ways. 
For people employed in the formal public and private sectors, they can do this 
by registering with a duly accredited PM I who will be responsible for collecting 
2.5 percent of basic monthly salary from their employers to pay it to the FMBN.
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For individuals that are employed in the informal sector, they can subscribe to 
the NHF scheme through cooperative societies which are accredited by the 
FMBN. Such cooperatives play a similar role to that of PMI (FGN-FMBN, 2011).
The FMBN loan scheme is for the exclusive benefit of NHF subscribers to 
acquire houses. And there is no restriction as to where a subscriber can own a 
house; it could be located anywhere as long as it is within Nigeria. This is where 
the role of the PMIs, estate developers and cooperative societies comes in, to 
be an interface in the transaction and make houses available in different 
localities. With the role of these agencies, there are two ways for subscribers to 
acquire houses. One way is for the subscribers to place demands for houses 
with the PMI that the subscribers are registered with, and, also for the 
subscribers to pay 2.5 percent of their salaries for onward payment to the 
FMBN. In this case, the PMI will scout for a house from the real estate market to 
create a mortgage on it. The house should satisfy some criteria and, first, the 
land on which the house is constructed must have an acceptable title document 
which has to be a C of O (FGN-FMBN, 2011).
Secondly, the cost of the house should not exceed N5million (US$31,250) if the 
prospective purchaser is within the low and middle income groups. And the 
purchaser should be capable of paying a mortgage equity contribution. The 
ability of a prospective purchaser to make an upfront payment of equity is often 
considered as sufficient to satisfy the mortgage affordability test. The equity 
contribution on an W5million mortgage is 10 percent down payment, for 
NIOmillion it is 20 percent and for N15million it is 30 percent. If a purchaser is 
able to pay equity, the FMBN will pay off the balance to enable the purchaser to 
take possession of the house and immediately begin to repay the loan. The loan 
tenure is between 25 to 30 years; an example of a loan repayment plan used by 
the FMBN is available at appendix (XIII). During the mortgage tenure, the 
mortgage holder is required to repay the mortgage on a monthly basis through 
the PMI that originated the mortgage. The mortgage holder will also continue to 
pay a 2.5 percent monthly subscription until after a mortgage is completely 
repaid, then a refund of the subscription will be made with two percent interest 
(FGN-National Housing Policy, 2006 pp.34-37; FGN-FMBN, 2011).
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The alternative to the above procedure is for the FMBN to grant an estate 
development loan to developers and cooperative societies to build houses on 
which mortgages are created. In the case of estate developers, which could 
either be private companies or housing corporations, they need to first of all be 
in affiliation with the FMBN. To achieve this, the estate development company 
needs to be a registered member of the Real Estate Developers Association of 
Nigeria (REDAN). This is an umbrella body that regulates the activities of estate 
developers. Before approaching the bank for any loan, developers must have 
obtained a firm commitment from interested house buyers from among the NHF 
subscribers. For this purpose, developers are required to collaborate with any 
FMBN affiliated PMI to introduce an intended project to the NHF subscribers. 
The PMI will eventually play a similar role as explained above. In addition, 
developers would acquire a land for the housing project, produce a layout and 
obtain appropriate title documents for each plot. Furthermore, the proposed 
housing units to be produced should be of varying sizes and prices, not 
exceeding N5million. After these requirements are fulfilled, developers can then 
make an application for a loan through the collaborating PMI (FGN-National 
Housing Policy, 2006 pp.34-37; FGN-FMBN, 2011).
Where a cooperative society is involved, the requirements are similar to those 
applicable to estate development companies with just few differences. In the 
case of a cooperative society, the loan being sought from the FMBN should 
benefit the members of the society. The members of the cooperative society 
should also already be subscribed to the NHF scheme. And, instead of the PMI, 
the cooperative should be responsible for paying the monthly subscriptions of 
its members to the FMBN. For the purpose of processing a loan application, a 
cooperative is required to collaborate with any PMI that is affiliated to the FMBN. 
The cooperative society also needs to hire the services of building professionals 
to serve as in-house project consultants who will give advice and also ensure 
that houses are built to the required standard. And as soon as houses are built 
and buyers take possession, loan repayment would normally commence. Again, 
this would be paid through the cooperative society to the FMBN (FGN-National 
Housing Policy, 2006 pp.34-37; FGN-FMBN, 2011).
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The FMBN usually disburses an estate development loan in three instalments in 
order to complete houses' substructure, the super-structure and the finishing. 
To the developer, the loan attracts 10 percent interest and is repayable in 24 
months. To NHF subscribers, the loan is granted by the FMBN at an interest 
rate of four percent per annum to PMIs for on-lending to subscribers at an 
interest rate of six percent. From the preceding discussion, it is clear that 
housing finance through the FMBN is a regulated arrangement. The regulation 
of interest rates is meant to serve both as a production subsidy to developers as 
well as a consumption subsidy to NHF subscribers. The government assumes 
that if the interest rate on an FMBN loan is regulated, it will enhance access to 
housing by NHF subscribers. The thinking of government is that if interest rates 
are regulated the cost of low-income housing per unit should not exceed 
N5million. Another basis for imposing a ceiling price of N5million per housing 
unit is in anticipation that capital subsidies will be provided by state and local 
government authorities at different locations where houses are being provided 
by developers. This will be explained further in the next section, which 
examines housing subsidy proposals.
5.3.2 Housing Development Subsidy Proposal
There are provisions in Nigeria's housing policy which take cognisance of the 
role of subsidy in stimulating the production of affordable housing. The subsidy 
proposals will be explained in the course of this discussion. Generally, subsidies 
are ways that governments intervene in housing markets with an array of 
policies intended to stimulate housing production or consumption by various 
groups. On the production side, subsidies aim to increase the volume of new 
housing production and renovation so as to reduce the housing expense level. 
On the consumption side, subsidies provide support that focuses directly on the 
households, with the aim of improving their situation in the housing market 
(Huovinen, Laine and Toivonen, 2005). In Nigeria, some subsidies aim at 
facilitating consumption while others are tailored at stimulating housing 
production.
On the basis of facilitating access to affordable housing, the Federal 
Government of Nigeria allows the FMBN to grant mortgage loans at subsidised 
interest rates. As explained earlier, the bank often grants mortgage loan at an
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interest rate of six percent to NHF subscribers. The PMIs usually borrow from 
the FMBN on behalf of NHF subscribers at four percent. Because of the risks 
involved, PMIs are allowed a spread of two percent on top so that the effective 
interest rate for borrowers becomes six percent. Out of the two percent, the 
PMIs make provision for any risks they are carrying and they equally pay 
insurance premium of about 0.5 percent to Nigerian Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (NDIC) (Kolawole, 2013 p. 28). Interest on loans remains fixed 
throughout the life of the mortgage at 6 percent per annum and subscribers are 
entitled to a loan of up to 90 percent of the cost of a house (FGN-NHF Act, 1992 
Section 4; FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 46; FGN-FMBN, 2011). This subsidy form is 
similar to the practice of granting interest subsidies in Nordic countries, the case 
of Finland for example (Huovinen, Laine and Toivonen, 2005 p. 10).
In Nigeria, interest subsidies on the loans provided by the FMBN are meant to 
have a combined effect on the consumption and the production of housing. The 
consumption side has been explained, and the subsequent discussion will show 
how it is linked to production. In addition to interest subsidies, the federal 
government proposes to amend some clauses in the Nigerian Personal Income 
Tax Law in order to create tax based subsidies. This should operate in like 
manner to the housing allowances that obtain in Germany, the Netherlands and 
the USA (Oxley and Haffner, 2010 p. 14) and Nordic countries (Huovinen, Laine 
and Toivonen, 2005 p.10). The proposed amendment is intended to increase 
relief for all taxable person(s) and also allow exemptions on deductions such as 
Pensions, the NHF, Life Assurance, the National Health Insurance Scheme and 
Gratuity. If these amendments were made it would mean that the workers that 
have such deduction from their pay slips would then receive a tax-free lump 
sum on retirement. Generally, the exempted tax components should facilitate 
access to housing, but this would be more beneficial to the subscribers of NHF 
scheme.
In order to stimulate housing production, the federal government proposes 
some forms of subsidy to facilitate the production of affordable housing. One of 
the proposal is an interest subsidy applicable to an estate development loan 
(EDL) granted to estate developers (Private Developers, Housing Corporations
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and Cooperatives) by the FMBN to build houses within affordable target prices 
for sale to NHF subscribers. This would attract 10 percent interest and be 
repayable in 24 months (FGN-FMBN, 2011).
The national housing policy also requires federal, state and local government to 
subsidise the cost of land acquisition. In this regard, government authorities are 
expected to acquire land from Natives (individuals and kinship groups), produce 
the layout, and improve the land by providing roads, electricity, a water supply 
and drainage before selling to developers and individuals at the subsidised rate 
for new housing projects (FGN-NHP, pp. 19-21; 23-26). These are capital 
subsidies, similar to the type that was practised in the K up to the late 70s 
(King and Oxley, 2000 p. 51). This form of subsidy is meant to cut down the 
cost of producing new houses. Also, there are proposals in the national housing 
policy for taxation subsidies, which include granting capital allowances for 
residential buildings and exempting mortgage loans from tax. The policy also 
proposes to allow a five-year tax waiver on any investment in housing which is 
meant to benefit low income groups (FGN-NHP, p.25).
5.4 DECENTRALISATION, PARTICIPATION AND HOUSING SUPPLY
In the context of the enabling strategy, roles and responsibilities are 
apportioned to the three tiers of governments. The federal government is 
expected to perform three roles within the context of the enabling strategy. 
Firstly, it is responsible for national policy formulation, coordination and creation 
of the legislative framework for the national housing market. Whereas policy 
formulation is a joint responsibility between the National Planning Commission, 
the National Economic Council and the Federal Ministry of Land, Housing and 
Urban Development, private experts, who are usually drawn from professional 
bodies (such as Real Estate Developers Association, Mortgage Bankers 
Association, Institute of Estate Surveyors and Valuers, Instituted of Builders etc) 
and federal legislatures (whose oversight functions relates to housing and urban 
development), the coordination is an exclusive role of the Ministry. At the 
federal level, the legislators are expected to make laws which could result in an 
enabled operational environment for states and local government to perform 
their expected roles. The federal law makers are expected to provide a legal
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and regulatory framework for the national housing market (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 
19-22).
Secondly, the federal government is an implementer of housing policy through 
the operation of the Federal Housing Authority (FHA), which is a housing 
corporation, and Development Finance Institutions (the FMBN and the BN). 
Lastly, it is a regulator. It does this by supervising federal agencies (such as 
FMBN, UDBN and FHA) and the regulation of estate development companies 
by the Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing and Urban Development. Another 
aspect is the supervision of finance institutions (Deposit Money Banks, FMBN, 
UDBN, PMIs, PFAs, PFCs, and insurance companies), which is performed by 
the CBN (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 19 - 22; FGN-National Technical Working Group 
on Housing, 2009; CBN, 2011).
At the state government level, authorities are expected to formulate housing 
and urban development strategies, and to implement and also regulate housing 
activities. In the context of the enabling strategy, state government authorities 
are required to stimulate development of the local housing market so that 
private businesses can participate in the supply of low-income housing. For this 
purpose, the state government authorities are expected to formulate their own 
sub-policies and programmes within the overall framework of the national policy 
(FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 23-24). In Jos, the agencies responsible for this role 
include the State Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the Ministry for 
Lands, Survey and Town Planning, the State legislators, and the Directorate of 
Research and Planning. At this level, the Ministry for Housing and Urban 
Development is responsible for policy coordination (Government of Plateau 
State, 2005, 2008a).
The housing implementation role of state government authorities involves 
utilising State Housing Corporations to execute, develop and manage housing 
provision on a commercial basis. They are equally expected to carry out the 
redevelopment and upgrading of blighted residential areas, to facilitate the 
development of the site-and-services scheme and the provision of subsidies. In 
Jos, the state government operates a PMI. The policy expects this PMI to
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collaborate with the FMBN in the collection of the NHF subscriptions from 
workers at State level. In summary, the agencies responsible for housing 
provision in Jos are the Plateau Investment and Property Development 
Company - PIPC (State government Housing Corporation), First Capital 
Savings and Loans (State Government PMI), the Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development, and the Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning. In the 
area of regulation, the agencies concerned are the Town Planning Directorate 
and the Metropolitan Development Board (Government of Plateau State, 2005, 
2008a).
The Local Government Councils are expected to develop programmes in line 
with the overall framework of the national housing policy. The programmes of 
the Councils should address the provision of site-and-services schemes, to 
create and maintain the land registry, to upgrade slum areas and to formalise 
informal settlements in collaboration with federal and state government 
agencies together with CSOs (NGOs and CBOs). Councils are also expected to: 
provide land for new developments with services; to maintain infrastructure and 
be responsible for environmental sanitation; assist in the formation of Housing 
Cooperatives, Thrift and Credit Societies, PMIs and Building Societies; and 
enter into partnership with other government agencies and private sector 
companies in the delivery of housing either in the rural areas and or the towns 
and urban areas (FGN-NHP, 2006 p.24).
The policy statement that introduced the enabling housing approach had a 
number of implications which were not explicitly stated. Firstly, the policy 
statement gave additional responsibilities to the Local Government authorities. 
In order for the LGCs to effectively fulfil the responsibilities it was necessary to 
review the previous constitutional roles of the three tiers of governments so as 
to bridge any disconnection between the constitutional roles and the anticipated 
housing provision roles. For instance, the national housing policy statement 
requires LGCs to fulfil the roles which have been outlined above. However, the 
Councils were initially lacking the constitutional power to fulfil the responsibilities. 
This is because the decision to provide housing is an item on the Concurrent 
Legislative List of 1999 Federal Constitution. This provision allows only federal
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and state government authorities to take decisions on matters contained in the 
Concurrent List. A revision of the constitution would have been essential so that 
the LGCs will not always have to seek the authorisation of the state government 
before implementing any new housing programme in their locality.
Secondly, matters relating to the provision of physical infrastructure and social 
services are contained on the Concurrent List of the subsisting Federal 
Constitution: where only federal and state authorities can concurrently decide 
on such matters as construction of road, water supply facilities, health care 
provision, education, and housing provision among others. The LGCs are not 
constitutionally empowered to perform such roles and a recent study conducted 
by the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (2012) substantiates this.
Thirdly, the policy statement transferred some responsibility for housing and 
urban development from the federal government authority to the local States. 
This was not supported with fiscal decentralisation to ensure that the local 
States have sufficient funds to fulfil their responsibilities. The subsisting sharing 
formula splits the federal revenue account as follows, 52.68 percent goes to 
Federal Government; 26.72 percent goes to 36 State Governments; and 20.60 
percent goes to 774 Local Government Councils (Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum, 2012 p. 150). Recent evidences (Commonwealth Local 
Government Forum, 2012) suggest that the LGCs are increasingly experiencing 
financial constraints in fulfilling their roles on the basis of the subsisting revenue 
allocation formula. This problem is further worsen by the lack of autonomy 
(financial, political and administrative) for the LGCs to impose local taxation, 
generate revenue within its assigned sources, allocate its financial and material 
resources, determine and authorise its annual budget without external 
interference of the state and federal authorities (Okafor, 2010 pp.125-128).
Fourthly, the Exclusive List contained in part I of the Second Schedule in the 
subsisting federal constitution gives the federal government exclusive reserve 
over decisions relating to the borrowing of money within and outside Nigeria for 
the purpose of the Federation or of any State. By this provision, state and local 
government authorities can borrow money only if the federal government gives 
approval. Similarly, the state government is empowered to decide on the 
sharing of public revenue between the State and Local Government Councils
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and among Local Government Councils in the State. This level of subordination 
is likely to affect the ability of the local States to borrow or go into partnership for 
the purpose of financing housing or infrastructure projects.
Fifthly, the Concurrent List empowers both the federal government and state 
government to decide on such matters as the imposition of any tax or duty: 
capital gains, income or profits, documents or transactions by way of stamp 
duties. Based on this provision, federal and state government authorities are 
constitutionally in position to fulfil the subsidy proposal which relates to allowing 
tax exemption for house builders who build houses for sale to low-income 
groups. On the basis of the subsisting constitution, LGCs appear to lack the 
power to fulfil this policy proposal.
Finally, the preceding discussions clearly show that the administrative drivers of 
the enabling strategy of housing provision are decentralisation, participation and 
partnership. These drivers are emphasised in the national housing policy 
statement. Though the three tiers of government have specific roles and 
responsibilities apportioned to each, they are required to collaborate between 
themselves and with private agencies such as estate development companies, 
PMIs, and CSOs (NGOs, and CBOs) to achieve participatory development. The 
anticipated collaboration between the three spheres of government should be 
directed at addressing the subsidised credit supply, subsidy provision, new 
housing supply and the improvement of slum. Figure 15 illustrates the nature of 
partnership required based on the national housing policy statement the 
anticipated outcomes. Most importantly, putting the enabling strategy to work at 
local level requires the federal and state government authorities to help LGC 
authorities to build political, institutional and administrative capacity for 
discharging its duties. The state and local government authorities are expected 
to provide an avenue for communities to participate at the local level (FGN-NHP, 
2006 p. 24).
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5.6 SUMMARY
This chapter sets the research context clear. It explains the changes that have 
occurred in the system of housing provision in search for solutions to the 
problems discussed in chapters one and four. The adoption of the enabling 
strategy in the 1991 housing policy was an ambitious effort to move away from 
a state monopoly to a pluralist approach that promotes participatory financing, 
production and allocation of housing. The discussions show how the national 
housing policy introduced the participatory concept in the financing of housing 
through the FMBN (see page 135). This should involve the participation of 
private institutional actors (Deposit Money Banks, insurance companies and 
foreign investors), households (NHF contributors) and government. This 
proposal was made at a time when government dominated the banking and 
insurance businesses. It was made on the assumption that the liberalisation 
process would roll back the government's dominance from the financial market 
and this in turn would allow the private sector to take ownership of public 
institutions. It was also assumed that the government would be committed to 
making essential reforms that could strengthen the financial capacity of the 
private institutions so they can leverage some of their resources to fund 
subsidised housing through the FMBN. The role of the FMBN here is to broker 
partnership between these investors to provide housing finance. Subsequent 
discussions will reveal the extent to which these assumptions have held.
The housing policy introduced the idea of decentralising the administrative roles 
in policy innovation, planning and organisation of new housing provision and 
improvement of slum housing conditions. These roles were to be distributed 
between the federal, state and local government authorities. In this sense, the 
administration of housing production and distribution is decentralised between 
public institutions in different spheres of government. The expectation of this 
enabling strategy was that public institutions would broker a partnership 
between housing corporations, private estate developers and cooperatives with 
the FMBN to deliver housing in the local level. Similarly, public institutions were 
to broker a partnership between CSOs (CBOs and NGOs), local (formal and 
informal) and international financial investors to improve slum conditions at the 
local level. The thinking of policy designers is that the decentralisation of roles
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would lead to participatory development. This in turn should address poor 
performance, inefficiencies, ineffectiveness, lack of accountability and 
unresponsiveness in Nigeria's housing delivery system. Subsequent 
discussions will examine the extent to which these operational assumptions are 
fulfilled in Jos.
It is observed that the land tenure system does not seem to correspondent with 
the enabling strategy of decentralisation. In principle, the land tenure system is 
unified by the provisions of the Land Use Act, while the organisation of housing 
provision is decentralised in the context of the enabling strategy. This means 
that there is a decentralised approach of housing provision against a centralised 
land tenure system that does not give sufficient power to local authorities to 
help developers acquire land for housing provision. The present tenure system 
over-centralises the statutory power of land allocation, acquisition and transfer 
in the hands of governors and their representatives. This is a fundamental flaw 
in housing provision. Furthermore, in accordance with the provision of the Land 
Use Act, the government appears to have control over the land but, in practical 
sense, the land belongs to individuals and kinship groups whose control can 
undermine housing delivery at the local level. The idea that requires State and 
LGC authorities to provide land as a development subsidy is a key assumption 
for examination in the subsequent discussion.
Finally, the extant constitution of Nigeria empowers federal and state 
government authorities to concurrently decide on such matters as construction 
of roads, water supply facilities, health care provision, education, and housing 
provision, among others. This power is not extended to LGC authorities and so 
housing provision is not in the domain of LGCs. The local government 
authorities can act on matters such as housing provision only when the federal 
or state government authorities give their approval. This level of subordination is 
legitimised in the Nigerian constitution and it is capable of undermining the 
anticipated housing provision role of LGCs. Similarly, the present revenue 
allocation formula from the Federation Account does not correspond with the 
enabling strategy of decentralisation. Whilst local authorities are expected to do 
more in the context of enablement and decentralisation, much of the revenue is 
held at the centre. This could undermine the efforts of local States in housing
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provision. Subsequent discussions will examine the extent to which LGCs in Jos 
are involved and are fulfilling their anticipated roles in Jos.
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CHAPTER SIX
METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND FIELD STUDY
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter includes the discussions of methodology, methods and field study. 
The chapter is structured into six sections. The first section explains the 
philosophical concepts that underpin the research approach. This is followed by 
discussions of the methodology and the methods employed for the study. The 
third section provides a discussion of the data collection and the next section 
explains the design of the case studies and the field study activities. This is 
followed by an explanation of the analyses of case studies. The sixth section 
explains the ethical considerations, after which a brief summary of the chapter 
is presented.
6.2 THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS AND RESEARCH APPROACH
6.2.1 Ontology
Ontology deals with questions concerning what entities exist or can be said to 
exist and how such entities can be grouped, related or subdivided according to 
their similarities and differences. Ontological claims are claims and assumptions 
that are made about the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what 
it looks like, what units it is made up of and how these units interact with each 
other. Ontological assumptions are concerned with what we believe constitutes 
social reality (Grix 2004).
Ontological positions are often divided between those based on foundationalism 
and those based on anti-foundationalism. Central to a foundationalist ontology 
is the view that reality is thought to exist independently of our knowledge of it 
(Grix 2004). Based on this position, it can be assumed that the problems 
affecting the enabling approach of housing provision in Jos exist independently 
of what actors believe is the reality of it. This implies that problems are 
problems not because people feel or perceive that they are. On the other hand,
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anti-foundationalists do not believe that the world exists independently of our 
knowledge of it, but that 'reality' is socially and discursively 'constructed' by 
human actors (Grix 2004). Based on this position, the 'reality' of issues 
surrounding the enabling provision of housing and access to housing lies within 
the thoughts, perceptions and feelings of key actors involved. This implies that 
problems are problems only because people perceive them as problems.
The ontological claim for this research is that there are considerable influences 
on the outcome of the enabling system of housing provision in Jos. It is 
assumed that the reality of this problem partly lies within the experiences and 
perceptions of the key actors involved and is partly independent of their 
experiences and perceptions. A compromise position on how to go about 
investigating this reality will be reached after a consideration of the 
epistemological views on how to approach these phenomena.
6.2.2 Epistemology
Gray (2009) and Crotty (1998) state that a relationship exists between a 
philosophical stance adopted by a researcher, the methodology and methods 
used, and the researcher's view of the epistemology. Epistemology deals with 
the nature of knowledge, its possibility, scope and general basis. It is concerned 
with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge 
are possible and how we can ensure that the knowledge is both adequate and 
legitimate (Crotty, 1998). Grix (2004) makes it clear that epistemology is 
concerned with the questions of, what exists and how we know what we know 
to exist. Relating this to the research, the questions are: what are the key 
variables influencing the enabling provision of housing in Jos and how can we 
know what those variables are?
There are, of course, quite a range of epistemologies. Those that routinely 
appear in the lexicon of social science methodologists and philosophers are 
objectivism (or objectivist epistemology) and subjectivism (or subjectivist 
epistemology) (Gray, 2009; Crotty, 1998). Objectivism is the view that things 
exist as meaningful entities independently of consciousness and experience, 
that they have truth and meaning residing in them as objects ('objective' truth 
and meaning, therefore), and that careful (scientific) research can attain that
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objective truth and meaning (Gray, 2009). This is related to the foundationalist 
ontology discussed above. To proceed on the basis of this assumption, the 
research would go about discovering the objective truth of the claim made 
above, employing a 'scientific' method. A theoretical perspective closely linked 
to objectivism is positivism (or the positivist perspective). The argument of 
positivism is that the social world exists externally to people, and that its 
properties can be measured directly through observation. In essence, positivism 
argues that reality consists of what is available to the senses - that is, what can 
be seen, smelt, touched etc. Inquiry should be based upon scientific 
observation (as opposed to philosophical speculation), and therefore on 
empirical inquiry (Dash, 2005; Crotty, 1998). Inclining to this perspective would 
mean any discovery made out of 'scientific' method does not amount to the truth 
of a reality.
In contrast, subjectivism accords primacy to subjective experience as a 
fundamental of all measure and law (Crotty, 1998). This is related to the anti- 
foundationalist ontology discussed earlier. By proceeding on this assumption, 
the research would go about uncovering the truth of the reality presented above 
from the experiences of people working in the agencies that are responsible for 
housing finance administration, estate developers, NHF subscribers, 
bureaucrats etc. The theoretical perspective closely related to subjectivist 
epistemology is the constructivist perspective (or constructivism). According to 
Lund (2011), the social constructivists claim that we cannot know reality apart 
from our interpretation of it. Lund argues that reality is a social construct and 
this opposed to the idea that reality is objective and exists outside an 
individual's interpretation. Supporting this position, Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi 
(2004 p. 49) in an earlier study, state that social constructionism as a 
perspective enables one to interpret problem in its 'real' conditions. This is 
because social problems do not change, only the way they are defined and 
understood changes, with the policy towards the problems changing as a result. 
Constructivism posits that truth and meaning do not exist in some external world, 
but are created by the subject's interaction with the world. Meaning is 
constructed not discovered, so subjects construct their own meaning in different 
ways, even in relation to the same phenomenon.
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Another theoretical perspective closely linked to constructivism is the 
interpretivist perspective (or interpretivism). The constructivist or interpretivist 
believes that to understand the world of meaning one must interpret it. The 
inquirer must elucidate the process of meaning construction and clarify what 
and how meanings are embodied in the language and actions of social actors 
(Schwandt, 1994). Constructivist and interpretivist perspectives contrast with 
positivism and are based upon the ontology of being (Gray, 2009). The 
preceding discussion explains a range of assumptions on which a research 
project may be founded. However, the assumptions merely suggest directions 
in which to look rather than provided description of what to seek. The next 
section explains the methodology and the methods used for the study.
6.3 METHODOLOGY, METHODS AND CONTINGENT NECESSITY
6.3.1 Methodology and Approach
Housing is a complex phenomenon and its provision involves complex 
arrangements with multiple strategies, instruments, actions, components and 
actors. In previous discussions (see page pages 148), it was established that 
the arrangement for housing provision is complex. It has also become evident 
from chapter four that Nigeria's formal housing system is developing amidst 
complex political, economic and social circumstances. These are some of the 
complexities within which the study will investigate variables that influence the 
enabling approach for housing provision. Gibb (2009) argues that to examine 
any housing problem in such a complex context, the study will often involve an 
economic analysis of individuals, the organisational arrangement of housing 
provision and market phenomena.
The complexities in housing are consistent with the arguments of Jessop (2008). 
Jessop argues that, epistemologically, "the real world is infinitely complex" 
(Jessop, 2008 p. 229) and, for this reason, "it cannot be exhausted analytically" 
(ibid). In view of this epistemological reality, it is appropriate, when studying any 
complex phenomenon, "that we select simplifying entry points into that 
complexity and recognise that all knowledge is partial, provisional, and 
incompletable" (ibid). Jessop further argues that for any given complex
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phenomenon, "a method is required that respects contingent necessity and 
complexity" (ibid). 'Contingent necessity' "assumes that everything that happens 
in the real world must happen, that it is, in some sense, 'necessary'. The 
rejection of this assumption would render much scientific inquiry pointless 
(Jessop, 2008 p. 232).
Given the contingency (the complexity of housing), this study employs an 
explanatory methodology. And to empirically examine the variables that 
influence the enabling system of housing provision in Jos, a case study 
approach is adopted. A case study approach is appropriate for investigating 
how theory applies in practice and to explain or explore conditions (Crowe, et al, 
2011 citing Yin, 2009 p. 18). A case study is both a process of learning about a 
case and the product of that learning (Crowe, et al, 2011 citing Stake, 1995 
p.237). These are the motivations for choosing a case study approach. And 
further to these, a case study approach is used to generate an in-depth, multi­
faceted understanding of complex phenomena in their real context (Crowe et al, 
2011 citing Yin, 2009 p. 18; Tellis, 1997). A case study approach provides an 
opportunity for reducing the complex arrangement of housing provision into 
smaller manageable processes or relationships that can be empirically 
examined. With a case study approach, a researcher is able to study the voices 
and perspectives of individual actors or groups of actors and the interaction 
between them (Tellis, 1997).
The case study approach has developed in the direction of eclecticism and 
pragmatism. The essence of the case study approach is triangulation (the 
combination on different levels of techniques, methods, strategies, or theories) 
(Johansson, 2003 citing Denzin, 1978). With the case study approach, the study 
of a complex housing problem could derive ideas, style, or taste from a broad 
and diverse range of sources. The researcher can be pragmatic in dealing with 
things sensibly and realistically in a way that is practical. The combination of 
methods and multiple data sourcing can make a study even richer (Tellis, 1997). 
Finally, the housing system is highly contextually shaped (Gibb, 2009) and case 
study approach enables the researcher to examine phenomena like housing 
provision within their contexts (Baxter and Jack, 2008). Having explained the
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research methodology and approach, the next section explains the methods 
used.
6.3.2 Methods
The combination of qualitative and quantitative methods is well established in 
case studies (Yin, 1994 cited in Tellis, 1997; Johansson, 2003; Crowe et al, 
2011; Baxter and Jack, 2008). Tellis (1997) citing Yin (1994) identifies six 
methods of data collection for case studies. These include interviews, 
documentation, archival records, direct observations, physical artifacts, and 
participant observation. Tellis (1997) adds questionnaire survey. Interviews are 
one of the most important sources of case-study information. Interviews can 
take one of several forms: structured; semi-structured; or unstructured. 
Documents could be letters, memoranda, agendas, study reports, or any items 
that could add to understanding of the case study. Documents are often used to 
corroborate evidence gathered from other sources. Archival records can be 
useful in some studies since they include service records, maps, and charts, 
lists of names, survey data, and even personal records such as diaries. Direct 
observation is also used to obtain information on case studies and it requires 
the investigator to carry out site visits to gather data. The observations can be 
formal or casual activities. Participant observation is a unique mode of 
observation in which the researcher may actually participate in the events being 
studied. Physical artifacts can be any physical evidence that might be gathered 
during a site visit. It might include tools, art works, notebooks, computer outputs, 
and other such physical evidence (Tellis, 1997).
The relevant methods for this research include interviews, questionnaire survey, 
documents, archival records and direct observation. These methods were 
decided in view of the problem being investigated and the research questions 
presented in chapter one. For instance, sub-research question one required the 
examination of globalisation process and neoliberal policy transfer in Nigeria. 
This question was answered by reviewing documents (peer review articles, 
reports, textbooks and grey materials). Sub-research question two, three and 
four are concerned with case studies based on relationships between 
institutional and individual actors. The case studies are also concerned with 
how administrative systems organise and assign roles to be performed by
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individual actors or in partnership with other actors and the outcomes expected. 
Interviews, questionnaire surveys, archival records, documents and direct 
observation were used based on the target data. Further explanation will be 
made below on how these methods were used.
6.4 CASE STUDIES FRAMEWORK AND FIELD STUDY
This section explains the design of the case studies and the field study. In 
chapter five, Nigeria's housing system, based on the enabling concept, was 
explained with the aid of a diagram (see page 148) that represents the complex 
relationships involved. The relationships involve institutional and individual 
actors whose interaction is meant to lead to new housing provision and the 
improvement of slums. These outcomes are expected to create different forms 
of relationship at the local level. The design of case studies follows the lines of 
relationships required to achieve these outcomes. This brings about four 
interrelated institutional arrangements (case studies) that are designed for 
empirical study.
Case Study I
Case study one was concerned with the provision of housing finance through 
the FMBN. The network of relationships leading to this case study is illustrated 
in figure 16. On the one hand, the case study investigates factors affecting the 
FMBN's role in brokering relationships with local (Deposit Money Banks and 
insurance companies) and foreign investors, the federal government and 
workers in Jos in order to supply housing finance. On the other hand, the case 
study scrutinises the opportunities for access to finance for developers who 
desire to build affordable houses that are accessible to households (NHF 
subscribers) in Jos. This case study takes account of how the FMBN and the 
NHF arrangement contribute to the supply of subsidised mortgage housing in 
Jos. The case study examines the data collected from interviews and the 
questionnaire survey. Interviews , were conducted with three officers of the 
FMBN and the data collected was used to examine how the bank fulfils its role 
of mobilising finance from anticipated investors, the success achieved and the 
associated challenges. Furthermore, official reports were collected from the 
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) and the FMBN to examine the contribution of the 
investors in financing housing and their consistency. Developers were
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interviewed to scrutinise opportunities for access to finance from the FMBN and 
the factors influencing the process of loan making. The questionnaire survey 
was focused on sampling the opinion of workers employed in the public sector 
in Jos. The sampling covered workers employed by federal, state and local 
government organisations. The data collected was used to confirm the extent of 
participation of the workers in the NHF scheme, the opportunities for access to 
the houses provided and the workers' views about the arrangement.
Local Private 
Instituional 
Investors
Housing
Foreign finance NHF
Investors mobilisation subscriptions
by the FMBN
Annual 
budgetary 
allocation by 
the Federal 
Government
Figure 16: Anticipated Housing Finance Arrangement through the FMBN
Case Study II
The second case study was concerned with the role of the local authorities in 
the provision of subsidy and support for housing delivery in Jos. The anticipated 
arrangement for subsidy provision is illustrated in figure 17. This case study was 
interested in examining the interaction of the bureaucratic agencies (The 
Ministry for Lands, Survey and Town Planning, the LGC Land Registries and 
the Ministry for Housing and Urban Development) with the developers and the 
land owners for the purpose of providing subsidised mortgages that is 
affordable and accessible to households (NHF subscribers). The case study 
took account of how the government subsidises the cost of housing provision
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through infrastructure provision, facilitating access to land documents and 
dealing with building permits etc. The data collected from interviews conducted 
with bureaucrats and developers was combined with documents to analyse this 
case study.
Governm ent 
subsidy/support (LGC Depts., 
State and Federal 
G overnm ent Agencies in Jos)
Developers (Housing Corps, Customary Land Owners
Private House bu ild ing (Kinship groups and
companies and Coops.) individuals)
Figure 17: Anticipated arrangement for the provision of subsidy and support for housing delivery
Case Study III
The third case study was concerned with the arrangement for new housing 
provision in Jos. The anticipated partnership for this purpose is illustrated in 
figure 18. This case study examines how the interaction of LGC Departments, 
state government agencies and federal government agencies with developers 
influences the anticipated housing-supply outcomes in Jos. This case study was 
interested in examining the strategy created by the local administration for the 
new housing supply in Jos and its effectiveness in ameliorating constraints. It 
takes account of the extent to which administrative and organisational roles 
have been devolved from the federal level to the local level in Jos, the response 
of government agencies and the partnership created with developers to improve 
the supply of housing in Jos. Interviews conducted with bureaucrats and 
developers were combined with government documents as part of the 
explication of this case study.
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Figure 18: Anticipated arrangement for the provision of housing in Jos
Case Study IV
Case study four was concerned with the arrangement for the improvement of 
the slum housing conditions in Jos. The anticipated network for this purpose is 
illustrated in figure 19. It required public institutions to broker partnership of 
households (organised through CBOs, cooperatives and thrift and credit 
associations) affected by slum conditions with NGOs and financiers to carryout 
slum improvement programmes. This case study was interested in examining 
the interaction of financiers (local and international investors), government 
agencies who are responsible for organising the slum improvement programme, 
CBOs and the households affected by the slum conditions. It also takes account 
of the financing mechanism, the strategy created by the local administrative 
system, the extent to which roles are devolved from central government to local 
level in Jos and the participation of the relevant actors and the households 
affected by slum housing conditions. Interviews were conducted with 
bureaucrats, were then combined with the relevant reports produced by the 
international agencies involved in the funding of slum improvement programmes 
in Jos in order to elucidate the case study.
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Figure 19: Anticipated arrangement for the improvement of slums in Jos
6.4.1 Interviews
The interviews were conducted between the months of September and 
November 2011 in Nigeria. A semi-structured interview was used in the 
discussion and this was considered suitable for a number of reasons: firstly, 
because there was only one chance to do the fieldwork; a semi-structured 
interview was appropriate in such circumstances (Cohen & Crabtree, 2006). 
Secondly, it was appropriate because "it provides the means of conducting an 
interview with a fairly open framework which allows focused conversation and 
two-way communication" (Cohen and Crabtree, 2006). Further to this, Flick 
(2009) provides that semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to use a 
guideline and also follow topical trajectories in the conversation that may stray 
from the guide when it seems appropriate (Flick 2009). Therefore, an interview 
guide was prepared according to the specific items intended for discussion with 
the respondents. General questions for discussion with respondents were 
outlined with sub-questions attributed to the general question. The interview 
guide was carried along to every interview. Some of the interviews were 
recorded on a tape recorder where the respondent consented to it. This was
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supplemented by note-taking. In some cases, the respondents declined to have 
their voices recorded and, in such circumstances, only notes were taken.
6.4.2 Sampling for Interview
A non-probability purposive sampling technique was adopted in selecting the 
people to be interviewed. Creswell and Clark (2007) provide that purposive 
sampling may be used where the researcher intends to select participants who 
have experience about the central phenomenon or key concept being explored. 
In this case, people who were considered as industry role-players in the local 
and national housing market were the target. Flick (2009) states that the 
purposive sampling technique may be adopted when the researcher intends to 
group participants according to preselected criteria. The preselected criteria in 
this study were based on the institutions responsible for the provision of finance, 
those concerned with the supply of housing and those concerned with the 
provision of subsidy and support. Another consideration was the relevance of 
the organisation and/or participant to a particular research objective and 
question.
Fifteen interviews were conducted in all. The respondents were selected from 
the institutions that play relevant roles in housing provision. From the FMBN, 
three supervisors were interviewed. At the Federal Ministry for Land, Housing 
and Urban Development in Jos, the Controller (a director in the federal civil 
service) was interviewed. Four representatives of state government 
bureaucratic agencies were interview as follows: one Assistant Director from the 
Ministry of Housing and Urban Development; one Deputy Director from the 
Ministry of Lands, Survey and Town Planning; one Senior Administrative Officer 
from First Capital Savings and Loans (PMI) and one Deputy General Manager 
from the Plateau Investment and Property Development Company (Housing 
Corporation). At the LGCs, a Senior Administrative Officer (Lands) and a Chief 
Town Planning Officer (Lands) were interviewed. The National Executive 
Secretary (a former Managing Director of a private estate Development 
Company) of the Real Estate Developers Association of Nigeria (REDAN) was 
interviewed. Two private developers were also interviewed. Two representatives 
of agencies responsible for the administration of slum improvement in Jos were 
interviewed: a National Programme Officer (WAC II) and a Monitoring and
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Evaluation Manager (Plateau State Community and Social Development 
Agency). A sample of the letter used in requesting permission for interview is 
available in Appendix XV and further information about the interview 
respondents is contained in Appendix XVI. Samples of the interview transcripts 
are provided in appendix XVI-XXII.
6.4.3 Questionnaire Survey
This section provides an explanation of the questionnaire survey and it takes 
account of the sampling technique and questionnaire administration. The 
questionnaire was designed in two parts, both of which centred on the research 
themes. In the first part, closed questions were designed for respondents to tick 
a range of options. In the second part, respondents were allowed to freely 
express their experiences in relation to getting access to affordable housing via 
the NHF arrangement.
Questionnaire method was used because it offers the advantage of collecting a 
large amount of information from a large sample in a short period of time in a 
relatively cost-effective way. In this regard, the questionnaire aimed to examine 
the participation of workers in the subscription housing finance arrangement. It 
also examined the opportunities for accessing FMBN-subsidised mortgage 
housing by subscribers and subscribers' perceptions about the scheme. The 
study population consisted of public sector workers employed by federal, state 
and local government establishments which were situated within the territorial 
boundaries of Jos North and the South LGAs of Plateau State in Nigeria. 'Public 
sector establishment', in this context, refers to Ministries, Departments and 
Agencies (MDAs), excluding military and paramilitary agencies. The reason for 
excluding military and paramilitary agencies is because they have a separate 
housing scheme that operates out of the NHF arrangement.
At the time of the field work, there were 82 federal government establishments, 
54 state government establishments and 18 local government departments in 
the study area. The units of analysis in this research were individuals employed 
by these establishments and not the establishments themselves. Therefore, the 
aggregate of establishments formed the elements from which the sample 
population (individuals) was selected. Appendix XXIII contains the instrument
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(questionnaire) used in data collection during the survey. The list of government 
organisations from which the survey sample was drawn is contained in 
Appendices X X IV -X X V I.
6.4.4 Sampling for Questionnaire Survey
The research employed a multi-stage sampling technique in order to arrive at a 
suitable sample for the study. The choice of this sampling technique was with a 
view to overcoming the difficulty of getting access to staff lists in all public 
establishments in Jos. The difficulty of accessing staff lists arose because some 
of the federal establishments in Jos were branches of national organisations 
and getting lists of workers in the branches required making official requests to 
head-offices, which could take a longer time to give their approval. The same 
applied to some of the state and local government establishments. In addition, 
staff lists in most of the organisations were protected by a privacy provision 
which made them inaccessible within a reasonable period of time and the 
procedure for getting approval would have resulted in a substantial delay to the 
study. To overcome such difficulties, Babbie (2007) and Frey (1981) 
recommend the use of multi-stage sampling technique, it was used in this 
research on this basis.
The multi-stage logic adopted in order to arrive at a sample population is as 
follows. Firstly, lists of organisations that fell under the control of each tier of 
government (federal, state and local) in Jos were compiled into three clusters. 
The second stage involved stratifying organisations in each cluster into strata of 
allied professions and related functions. From each stratum, organisations were 
randomly selected and letters were sent to them requesting permission to 
conduct the survey. From the federal government cluster, seven organisations 
gave approval, nine from the state government cluster and eight Council 
departments from the Jos North and South local government cluster. The 
procedure followed is consistent with the logic recommended by Babbie (2007). 
A list of organisations that participated in the questionnaire survey is available in 
Appendix XXVII and the sampling scheme is in Appendix XXVIII.
The survey covered only organisations where authorities gave permission for 
workers to participate. Questionnaires were sent out to workers through their
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staff officers and also retrieved from them. The survey lasted for three months 
from October 2011 to January 2012. In all, a total of 543 questionnaires were 
administered and 410 were retrieved. Five out of 410 questionnaires retrieved 
were invalid due to incomplete responses. The survey ended up with 405 valid 
questionnaires, which represent a percentage return of 74.58, and this forms 
the basis of the analysis. Details of the analysis of the administered and 
returned questionnaires are available in Appendix XXIX.
The exact population of public sector workers in Jos is not known, but the 
human population in the city of Jos was estimated at 736,016 in 2006 (FGN- 
NPC, 2006). The adequacy of sample size was based on the population of Jos, 
and with inferences from previous studies. Israel (2012) stated that at five- 
percent precision levels, a sample size of 400 is an adequate representation of 
population above 100,000. In an earlier study on determining sample size for 
research activities, Krejcie and Morgan (1970) suggest that a sample size of 
384 is an adequate representation of 1,000,000 population size. Similarly, 
Taylor (2012) says that, for an unknown target population, 300 - 500 
respondents can work as long as the survey is representative. In this case, 
there is a human population (736,016 people in 2006) estimate which serves as 
a clue and, in any case, the population of public sector workers in Jos can only 
be a fraction of the total estimate. If the population of public sector workers is 
assumed to be less than 100,000 or more, or even up to 1,000,000, the sample 
of 405 is an adequate representation. The sampling table used is available in 
Appendix XXX (page).
6.4.5 Documents and Direct Observation
The documents collected for this study included a record of public organisations, 
policy papers, reports and narratives. Some of the documents were official 
government publications, while others were published by international 
organisations. The list of documents is available in Appendix XXXI. Direct 
observation was conducted and pictures were collected. This involved visiting 
sites where houses were being constructed to be sold to NHF subscribers in 
Jos. Another aspect of the observation involved documenting pictures of public 
estates that were provided for workers by government agencies before the 
advent of the enabling system. Also, some pictures of houses provided through
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self-help approaches in Jos were also collected. These data were used to 
illustrate the housing situation visually.
6.5 ANALYSES OF CASE STUDIES
This section explains the procedures adopted to analyse the case studies. The 
data collected were partly qualitative and partly quantitative. The techniques 
used in analysing these data are explained in this section.
6.5.1 Qualitative Data Analysis
The qualitative data collected for this study consist of interview transcripts, 
documents and comments written by people who responded to the 
questionnaire. Each of these data contributes to a specific research question 
and case study. There are no concrete rules for analysing cases studies. 
However, every analysis of a case study should at least consist of some form of 
examining, categorising, tabulating, or otherwise recombining the evidence to 
address the initial proposition of the study (Tellis, 1997 citing Yin, 1994). This 
implies that some level of pragmatism is required in the analysis of case studies. 
In this study, the analysis followed step-by-step activities which were consistent 
with some fairly well established procedures for the analysis of qualitative data 
and case studies.
The first step involved the reading of the data carefully in order to become 
familiarise with their content. Reading through carefully gave an idea as how to 
sort out (classify) the data. The data were classified according to the research 
questions and the case studies. After classifying the data, each case study was 
analysed separately, after which the findings were synthesised. For each case 
study, the data were categorised according to the responses of actors who 
shared similar roles. At this level, themes were identified. This step involved 
identifying patterns and connections within and between categories. This step 
also involved assessing the relative importance of different themes and 
highlighting subtle variations. These activities are consistent with the 
procedures given by Taylor-Powell and Renner (2003).
Tellis (1997) citing Yin (1994) argues that analysis should rely on the theoretical 
proposition that led to the case study. In this analysis consideration was given
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to the theoretical propositions that led to the case studies. The last step was 
interpretation. The interpretation involved using themes and connections to 
explain the findings. This was achieved by developing a list of key points or 
important findings discovered as a result of categorising and sorting the data. 
This was followed by a consideration on the implication of the findings.
6.5.2 Quantitative Data Analysis
The quantitative data for the study are in two forms: some were collected 
through the questionnaire survey, while some were extracted from official 
documents. These data were classified according to their relevance to the 
research questions. For the questionnaire, the analysis was based on the 405 
valid responses. After entering the data into Predictive Analysis Software 
(PASW version 18), the analysis followed a number of stages which were 
consistent with the logic of treating survey data: 1) descriptive analysis was 
conducted with the purpose of exploring the attributes of the study's variables. 
At this stage, the results of the analyses were represented by graphs and 
percentages; 2) the relationship between the variables was determined through 
tests of statistical significance. This analysis was focused on determining the 
variables that influenced the participation of workers in the housing finance 
(NHF scheme) arrangement and the access to subsidised mortgages by 
participants; a bivariate analysis was conducted and the relationships between 
variables were determined through Pearson's Chi-square and Cramer's V 
statistics; the Pearson's Chi-square statistic determines whether two variables 
are independent; if the significance value is small enough (conventionally, 
significance should be less than 0.05) then a statistical relationship is said to 
exist between the variables under consideration; the Cramer's V statistic takes 
values from a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 1; the closer the statistic is to 1, 
the stronger the association between the variables (Field, 2009); 3) having 
identified the variables that had a statistical relationship with the participation of 
workers in the present housing finance arrangement, binary logistic regression 
analysis was conducted to explain and to predict how the employment 
characteristics of workers determine their participation in the NHF scheme; 
multivariate analysis was conducted based on binary logistic regression 
modelling; this model is often used to predict a categorical (usually dichotomous) 
variable from a set of predictor variables (Pallant, 2010; Wuensch, 2011;
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Wuensch and Poteat, 1998; and Park, 2009); finally, the quantitative data 
extracted from the documents were either tabulated or presented graphically 
and then followed with discussion
6.6 ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
In conducting the research, adequate measures were taken to avoid any ethical 
issues while conducting the research. The measures adopted were as follows. 
For interview purposes, approval was sought from appropriate authorities. 
Having obtained approval from the organisation of interest, formal request was 
served to the officers representing the organisations seeking consent to have 
interview discussions which would be recorded on an electronic device. For the 
purpose of survey, a consent clause was included in the introductory section of 
the questionnaire. And those that participated in the survey consented to the 
clause. These measures were taken to ensure that all respondents participate 
voluntarily. The documents and reports used in the writing this thesis were 
obtained from the appropriate authorities directly or retrieved from websites. All 
comments extracted from documents were properly acknowledged. The 
photographs that appear in this thesis were collected directly during the field 
survey and consent was sought by word of mouth where necessary before 
taking the shots. Finally, the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents 
was properly observed during the analysis and the discussion. For the interview 
responses, relevant initials were adopted to represent the actual names of the 
respondents. The responses of participants were used for the purpose of this 
research only. As far as I am aware, no participant was coerced to participate, 
all subjects consented to participation and confidentiality and anonymity has not 
been comprised in any way.
6.7 SUMMARY
This chapter explained the methodology, methods and field study. It started with 
explanation of philosophical persuasions the informed the methodology 
employed for the research. It then went on to explain the methods used for the 
study, the design of the case studies, the field study and data analysis. The 
analysis of the field data is presented in the succeeding chapters.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
FINANCING THE PROVISION OF SUBSIDISED HOUSING IN NIGERIA
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussions covered in chapter five reveals that housing financing in the 
context of the housing policy was proposed on a number of assumptions: firstly, 
that the federal government will remain a key contributor to the financing of 
subsidised housing through a regular budgetary allocation to the FMBN. 
Secondly, that liberalisation process will transfer the ownership of public finance 
institutions from government to private ownership. If this assumption is held, the 
FMBN should then partner with the private financial institutions to finance 
subsidised mortgages. The discussions of the neoliberal reforms implemented 
in Nigeria (see chapter five) indicate that privatisation brought some impressive 
results among the banks, insurance companies and PMIs. This chapter will 
confirm how this trickle down to the supply of finance for the provision of 
subsidised housing in Jos.
Thirdly, the policy designers assumed that if the government enact relevant 
legislation (such as the NHF and the FMBN Acts of 1992 and 1993) directing 
private institutions and workers to invest in financing of low-income housing 
through the FMBN, they would comply. It is on the basis of this assumption that 
the NHF scheme was created, mandating all workers to subscribe by 
contributing a fraction of their monthly income to the FMBN as a precondition for 
access to a mortgage loan. Finally, the policy designers anticipated a 
participatory housing financing arrangement whereby the FMBN would broker a 
network of partnership with relevant actors to mobilise finance and supply 
mortgage housing for the exclusive benefit of the NHF subscribers.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the assumptions of the housing policy 
within the premise of financing housing that is affordable and accessible to NHF 
participants in Jos. The chapter corresponds with research question two as 
stated in chapter one (see page 17) and case study one contained in chapter 
six (see page 158). The role of the FMBN is crucial to the supply of the 
subsidised mortgage housing in the context of the enabling strategy. The field 
data is analysed in two parts. The first part examines the participation of key
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investors (see pages 135 and 159) in the provision of housing finance through 
the FMBN. The second part examines the arrangement for supplying finance to 
developers to build houses for the NHF participants in Jos. The sources and 
nature of data used for this analysis is contained in Table 11.
Table 11 Sources and nature of data used
Data Source Nature of data Abbreviation 
used in analysis
Three representatives of FMBN Interview transcripts M B 1 .M B 2  and 
MB3
Public sector workers in Jos Questionnaires survey Quantitative
analysis
Two private developers and one 
Housing Corporation
Interview transcripts P D 1 .P D 2  and HC
Representative of Real Estate 
Developers Association of Nigeria
Interview transcript RD
7.2 THE MOBILISATION OF HOUSING FINANCE
Drawing from preceding discussions, the FMBN is expected to broker a 
partnership for mobilising finance from Deposit Money Banks, insurance 
companies, workers and foreign investors. The federal government is also 
required to contribute to the fund. The objective role of the FMBN is fulfilled if it 
partners with these investors and they are consistent in contributing to the 
supply of housing finance. This section is focused on analysing how the FMBN 
organises its partnership with relevant investors and the level of their 
participation. The discussion is structured according to the following sub-themes: 
federal government's contribution, Deposit Money Banks and insurance 
companies, foreign investors and workers' contribution.
7.2.1 Federal Government's Participation
It is evident from the discussions covered in chapter five that FMBN is a 
Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE). As a GSE, the federal government 
has a stake in its ownership and apart from this, there are two others ways it 
could support the FMBN. First, in section 3 (d) of NHF Act of 1992, the federal 
government promised to support the bank through statutory allocation from time 
to time. This provision is at the federal government's discretion because the
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FMBN is not empowered in any way to enforce it. The participation of the 
federal government was questioned and sparked the following response:
The federal government is not committed to its promise and its contribution to 
FMBN is inconsistent. The bank received allocation of 142.5 million 
(US$17million) in span of five years and this came in two instalments. This is 
not sufficient when we look at it in relation to the growing demand for housing in 
Nigeria (MB1).
There is inconsistency on the part of the federal government as is evident in the 
response of MB1. The response was rather a lamentation on the financial 
position of FMBN. Another respondent also corroborates MB1:
If the FMBN is compared with similar secondary mortgage institutions in 
developing countries around the world, it will be realised that its current 
capitalisation is inadequate (MB2).
This indeed, confirms that the FMBN was in a difficult financial position. 
Records suggest that the paid up capital of the FMBN has changed over time, 
from US$17million in 2007 to US$33.3 in 2011 (Kolawole, 2011). However, the 
FMBN is in a poor financial state when compared with the housing deficit of 
about 16million units it is expected to finance for Nigerians. Also, the FMBN is in 
a poor state when compared with similar institutions in some selected 
developing countries (see Table 12).
Table 12: Comparing the FMBN to National Housing Finance Institutions in selected Countries
Country Institution Year Paid-up capital 
(US$)
Total liability 
(US$)
Nigeria Federal Mortgage Bank 2007 17,005,877 336,600,000
Malaysia Cagamas Holdings Berhad 2007 40,350,978 8,884,664,348,
Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation Ltd 2007 257,871,861 5,140,623,760.
Mexico Sociedad Hipotecaria 2008 342,235,042 4,760,743,960,
South
Africa
Housing Finance 
Corporation
2008 80,421.00 52,300,671
Source: (Kolawole, 2011).
In 2011, there was speculations that the federal government through the CBN 
approved approximately N200 billion for FMBN. MB2 confirmed this speculation 
and also states that:
W e hope that as the money gets to the bank, we will support more house 
building activities (MB2).
Also speculating about this point, the Managing Director and Chief Executive 
Officer of the FMBN reported in public interview that:
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The bank is planning to raise its capital base to f4100billion (from J45billion), 
followed by yearly capital injection of N250billion from 2012 to 2013. This is 
expected to raise the total capitalisation of the bank to t4350billion by 2013  
(Okoghenun, 2011).
The comments of MB1 and 2 clearly suggest that the federal government has 
been contributing to the bank. However, this contribution is insufficient. For 
instance, MB1 said that injecting the sum of N2.5billion over five years is 
grossly inadequate to provide the necessary boost for mortgage financing in 
Nigeria. The federal government's contribution is also inadequate when 
compared with the capitalisation of mortgage institutions in contemporary 
countries such as Malaysia, Hong Kong, Mexico and South Africa. There is an 
aspiration by authorities of the FMBN to raise its capital base to N350 billion by 
2013. However, the authorities did not explain a strategy for achieving this 
aspiration.
The second way that federal government intends to support the FMBN is 
provided in part II, section 6 (b) of FMBN Act of 1993. The Act empowers the 
bank to issue its own securities, including debentures and bonds under federal 
government guarantees and issue promissory notes and other bills of exchange 
for the purpose of raising funds from financial institutions. Has the FMBN 
achieved this? MB1 comments:
The FMBN has concluded arrangements to float bond in the capital market and 
in addition, some federal government guaranteed bond has been issued (MB1).
The response of MB1 does not suggest any new development. As far back as 
2006, the federal government reported on this arrangement as follows:
The bank (referring to FMBN) has obtained the FGN's guarantee and approval 
of N 100 billion Bond (FGN-Housing Sector Reforms, 2006 p. 8)
The authorities of FMBN have come out to announce to the public through the 
media that the bank is in a position to purchase and warehouse mortgages, and 
to create mortgage-backed securities for subscription by investors in the capital 
market. They also announce that the FMBN has provided mortgaged-backed 
bond of N26 billion to civil servants to re-finance the acquisition of 9525 units of 
houses privatised by federal government-owned in the FCT, Abuja (Okoghenun, 
2011).
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These responses are suggestive of inconsistency on the part of government. 
Here, the federal government appears to show less commitment to its promise 
and the FMBN is in a poor financial position to provide mortgage housing. 
Further, there are ambiguities around the housing finance policy. Nonetheless, 
the authorities of the FMBN are trying to convince the public that the housing 
finance arrangement is working.
7.2.2 Participation of Local Private Investors
As previously discussed in chapter five, the NHF Act of 1992 empowers the 
CBN to serve as a link in the partnership between the FMBN with Deposit 
Money Banks and insurance companies for the purpose of mobilisation housing 
finance. Previous discussion in chapter five confirmed the outcome produced by 
deregulation and recapitalisation on banks and insurance companies. 
Considering the level of capital appreciation experienced by Deposit Money 
Banks from 2006 to 2011 and insurance companies for the same period (see 
pages 128 and 129) which gave rise to a corresponding effect on loans and 
advances disbursed by Deposit Money Banks for the same period (see page 
130), one would think that much was invested in the FMBN in line with the 
statutes. A question was asked on how the FMBN organises the partnership 
with relevant local investors and the level of their participation. Only MB2 
responded to this question:
The policy provision is not practical because the FMBN lacks enforcement 
power and government is not willing to provide support (MB2).
The authorities of the FMBN corroborate this position by announcing to the 
public that: "Deposit Money Banks and insurance companies operating in the 
country have failed to invest in the NHF as statutorily required under the law, 
thus owing the fund trillions of un-remitted monies". The authorities of the FMBN 
appear to put the blame on the CBN. They reported that the CBN which is 
supposed to deduct at source from the banks and remit to FMBN, failed in its 
responsibility in this regard (Kolawole, 2012a).
The comment of MB2 shows that the FMBN lacks the power to enforce the 
policy provision on private finance institutions. The authorities of the FMBN 
corroborates that the power to enforce such law on Deposit Money Banks and 
insurance companies lies with the CBN which has failed in its responsibility. The
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FMBN cannot compel the CBN to enforce such legal provision because the 
bank (FMBN) itself operates under the supervision of the CBN. MB2 further 
commented that they have approached the CBN on the matter. By the design of 
the housing finance policy, the CBN is responsible for collecting investments 
from banks and insurers and paying it to the FMBN. This has not happened 
according to MB2 and the FMBN authorities were planning to take the matter to 
the National Assembly because the housing finance policy was an Act of 
Parliament which must be respected and obeyed. MB2 also confirmed that they 
have informed the police to take the necessary action.
These responses show that the management of the FMBN is almost exhausting 
all possibilities to have Deposit Money Banks and insurance companies invest 
in housing finance as was expected by the NHF Act. The situation is bad with 
either Deposit Money Banks or insurance companies having invested any 
amount of money into the housing fund since its inception (Ogunwusi, 2012). 
Kolawole (2012b) also confirms that most banks were offering mortgage 
products of their own with interest rates clearly outside the six percent stipulated 
by the NHF Act.
The enforcement of the NHF Act on banks and insurance companies is a matter 
of concern to Real Estate Developers Association (REDAN). RD confirmed that 
non-compliance with provisions of the NHF Act in particular will be taken up by 
the REDAN. According to RD, it is a serious matter which violates federal 
government laws and REDAN was going to sensitise the National Assembly on 
the development, and also write to the CBN because this shows clearly that the 
CBN has not been playing its expected role. The issue requires a synergy 
amongst interested parties. This understanding is beginning to surface with the 
involvement of REDAN. Advocacy is equally required. However, RD states that 
advocacy is required on the part of mass media to bring some of these facts 
into the public domain in order to ensure that everybody plays their role in 
financing housing development in the country.
The non-compliance of Deposit Money Banks and insurance companies with 
the NHF Act and CBN's failure to enforce compliance on them takes us back to 
the Marxist critique of housing market liberalisation. Pugh (2007) provides that
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the neo-Marxist sees the state as serving the functional needs of capitalist 
development. The state ensures the continuity of capitalism, in doing so it is 
incapable of prevailing over the conflict between social policy and the interest of 
capitalists. This is evident by government failure or reluctance (Central Bank of 
Nigeria, National Assembly and Police as noted in the comment of MB2 above) 
to enforce the NHF Act on private enterprises (Deposit Money Banks and 
insurance companies).
Lack of political will on the government's side to prevail on the Deposit Money 
Banks and insurers to participate in funding subsidised housing through the 
FMBN is one such conflict speculated upon in previous discussions (see page 
81). On this point, the authorities of the FMBN have reported that:
...since banking deregulation, it has been clearly established that given all the liberties of 
deregulation, banks are not inclined towards any long term lending (Kolawole, 2012a).
The mortgage system is suffering from the reluctance of Deposit Money Banks 
and insurers to invest in housing loans. Authorities of the FMBN maintain that 
once the NHF law is enforced to ensure compliance of the Deposit Money 
Banks and Insurance Companies, the provision of subsidised loans through the 
FMBN will improve. It is reported that the CBN has make attempts to impose 
penalty for non-compliance but most banks would gladly oblige the penalties as 
these are cheaper than the financial cost of complying (Kolawole, 2012a).
The discussions covered in this section revolve around enforcement problem. 
As rightly noted, the making of legislation is necessary but not sufficient for the 
takeoff of the housing finance arrangement. In this case, the NHF and the 
FMBN Acts which requires local financial institutions to invest in mortgage 
housing through the FMBN exists but there is no enforcement mechanism. The 
policy designers assumed that the FMBN should rely on the CBN to have the 
law enforced on the Deposit Money Banks and Insurance Companies but this is 
not happening. On its own, the FMBN is lacking the power to enforce the policy. 
In another sense, the discussions suggest that the local financial institutions do 
not really consider the NHF arrangement as a viable investment. This is why 
they would rather oblige to the penalties for non-compliance than to invest in 
subsidised mortgages. A conflict of this nature was speculated earlier in chapter 
three. It was speculated that a conflict of interest may arise because the FMBN
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is a regulated system and this could drive away private investors whose interest 
is to make profit from any investment. The reluctance of Deposit Money Banks 
and Insurance Companies to partner with the FMBN on this course is a 
confirmation.
7.2.3 Participation of Foreign Investors
The national housing policy (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 22) requires the FMBN to 
partner with foreign investors to mobilise finance for housing provision in Nigeria. 
The logical question here then is: how does FMBN achieve this? This question 
sparked a number of responses: MB1 raised the issue of the global financial 
crisis which has curtailed the availability of foreign credit and investment. MB1 
further confirmed that the FMBN was working towards attracting foreign funding 
and investment from international financial and multi-lateral institutions. 
Flowever, this aspiration will be fulfilled only when the global financial crisis
eases up. On the contrary, MB3 suggested that:
...the bank (FMBN) made attempt to partner with a foreign investor. A 
memorandum of understanding was signed between the FMBN and a foreign 
bank. The bank presented this request to the government that was about to end 
its office tenure and unfortunately the Memorandum of Understanding did not 
see the light of day after a new government assume power (MB3).
The comment of MB3 reveals the effect of state ownership and control on the 
FMBN. From this response, one can observe that a progressive arrangement to 
attract foreign investors was halted due to a change in government. In an ideal 
situation, provisional change in government would not have such an effect. The 
Memorandum of Understanding failed to materialise because the government 
that assumed power failed to give political backing to the bank's decision. This 
confirms the concern (raised in chapter five) regarding the evidence that 
showed that the FMBN was transform into a GSE. Perhaps the federal 
government maintained a substantial ownership of the FMBN so it could 
exercise control over its activities and to be in a position to check for any 
excesses in its operation. This objective negates the idea of allowing 
institutions to operate with some degree of freedom in the market place and has 
resulted in a significant failure in the provision of housing finance.
7.2.4 Participation of Workers in NHF Scheme
Workers (employed in public, private and informal sectors) are required to 
subscribe to NHF scheme based on a 2.5 percent of basic monthly salary
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contribution to FMBN. The law empowers the FMBN to mobilise workers onto
the scheme and also collect their subscriptions. The question that follows is:
How does this arrangement operate in Jos? MB3 is one of the supervisors at
the FMBN office in Jos and observed:
We are experiencing problem with enforcement of the NHF scheme. ...there 
are recalcitrant organisations that are not willing to obey the law. Some 
organisations here in Jos have refused to let their workers contribute to the 
scheme (MB3).
The lack of enforcement capacity of the FMBN has continued to feature in the 
views of respondents. This suggests that the issue of enforcement is a major 
constraint on the FMBN's operations. The problem of enforcement is not just 
peculiar to the FMBN's office in Jos; it is being experienced across the country. 
For instance, in November 2011, the NHF collection reached the sum of 
N81.597billion from 3,657,354 subscribers across Nigeria (Ochayi, 2012). MB3 
considers this as being far below expectations. MB3 attributes the low 
performance of the NHF collection to a lack of cooperation from employers. 
Employers and workers are not complying with the NHF Act and the FMBN 
lacks the political and administrative power to enforce the law.
In addition, MB3 further reported that:
"Another problem that we have actually faced is lack of awareness about the 
NHF scheme. This is arises from a lack of resources to embark on an 
enlightenment campaign by the FMBN in Jos" (MB3).
MB3 also confirmed that the FMBN officers have visited some organisations
that accepted the bank's invitation to create awareness. But the effort is clearly
inadequate as there are many people that have worked a long time but are still
unaware of the NHF scheme and the FMBN's activities. However, there has
been some progress in the creation of awareness among workers in Jos to
participate in the NHF scheme. Some organisations have been visited as
confirmed by MB3:
This year alone, we have held talks with workers at the Film Corporation, the 
Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corporation, the National Commission for 
Museum and Monument, the National Veterinary Research Institute and, the 
Institute of Archaeology and Museum Studies (MB3).
The comments of MB3 show that the bank has made much effort to reach out to 
employers and workers in Jos. However, it is observed that all the organisations 
visited are controlled by federal government. What about state and local
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government employers and employees? MB2 responded to this question as 
follows:
The Plateau State government has resumed its contribution to the NHF scheme.
The state government has directed all organisations under its control to 
cooperate with the FMBN. The State Government owned tertiary institutions 
have not complied with this directive and we are still pursuing them with a hope 
that they would comply. We are yet to reach out to the LGC employers and 
workers (MB3).
From the response of MB3, it appears that federal government agencies have 
received higher priority in the awareness campaign compared to state and local 
government agencies. However, MB3 did not explain why this has been the 
case.
A number of concerns are noted from the perspectives of the FMBN officers: 
Firstly, there is a concern arising from the lack of enforcement power. Secondly, 
there is concern arising from the lack of awareness about NHF scheme and the 
activities of the FMBN among workers and their employers in Jos. Thirdly, the 
FMBN officials are constraint by the lack of sufficient resources to undertake an 
extensive awareness campaign in and around the city of Jos.
7.3 PREDICTING WORKERS PARTICIPATION IN NHF SCHEME
It is necessary to examine employment characteristics to identify factors that 
influence the possibility of workers to participate in the NHF scheme in Jos. This 
section examines the participation of workers in the NHF scheme by analysing 
the data obtained from a questionnaire administered to public sector workers in 
Jos. The analysis is based on 405 valid questionnaires given to a sample of 
workers across federal, state and local government organisations in Jos. The 
sample population consists of 270 male subjects (representing 67.2 percent) 
and 132 females (who represent 32.8 percent). The distribution of subjects 
according to tier of government employed indicates that 35.6 percent (144 
subjects) were employed in federal government organisations; 38.5 percent 
(156 subjects) were employed in state government organisations and 25.9 
percent (105 respondents) were employed in Council departments. From the 
sample population, 51.5 percent (208 subjects) have worked for less or equal to 
14 years; 35.6 percent (144 subjects) have been in public sector job in the 
range of 15 - 28years while 12.9 percent (52 subjects) have worked for 29 years 
or more. The subjects comprise of 17.6 percent (70 subjects) low cadre within
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grade levels 01-06; 60.1 percent (239 subjects) are middle cadre within grade 
levels 0 7 - 1 2  while 22.4 percent (89 subjects) are high cadre. Regarding their 
incomes, 55.0 percent (222 subjects) feel 'good' about their income; 14.9 
percent (60 subjects) said their income was 'neither good nor bad'; 30.2 percent 
(122 subjects) felt their income was 'bad'. These variables summarise the 
attributes of workers being examined.
In order to confirm the level of participation in the NHF scheme, the question 
asked is: do you currently participate in NHF scheme? The response of workers 
to this question is illustrated in figure 20. From the sampled population (figure 
23), 43.3 percent (175 subjects) said they were participating in NHF while 56.7 
percent (230 subjects) said they were not.
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Figure 20 Distribution of respondents by participation in NHF scheme
More than half of the sampled population do not subscribe to the NHF scheme. 
The question that follows searched for reasons why some workers are not 
subscribing to the scheme.
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Figure 21 Distribution of respondents by reasons for not participating in NHF scheme
Out of 230 subjects (figure 21) that responded to the question, 45.6 percent 
(104 respondents) said they were unaware of the existence of NHF scheme; 
17.9 percent (40 subjects) said they did not wish to participate while 35.4 
percent (79 subjects) gave other reasons. This suggests that lack of awareness 
is an important reason for non-participation advanced by workers who do not 
currently participate in the NHF scheme. This confirms the comments of MB3 
above. Next to being unaware are other reasons such as the role of public 
sector employers and the influence of labour union. Other comments that 
appeared in questionnaires were as follows:
My employer refused to let us participate.
My place of work is not captured on the NHF scheme.
The NHF scheme is dead.
The NHF doesn't operate.
The labour union stopped us from participating in the NHF.
We were forced to join the NHF scheme.
(Comments extracted from questionnaire).
These responses appeared in several completed questionnaires, cutting across 
workers employed in federal and state government agencies. The workers 
employed in the LGC departments wrote in several completed questionnaires 
that:
There is no NHF provision for the local government council workers.
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This indicates that workers employed in LGC departments are deprived of the 
opportunity of participating in NHF scheme.
7.3.1 Chi-Square Result of factors influencing the Participation of Workers 
in the NHF Scheme
Beyond the reasons given above, how does a worker's attributes affect their 
participation in the NHF scheme? To scrutinise this question, the attributes of 
public sector workers outlined above (sex, tier of government employed, length 
of employment, grade level and level of satisfaction with income) were 
examined in relation to participation in the NHF scheme. Table 13 shows the 
relationship between each independent variable and participation in the NHF 
scheme (dependent variable). Chi-square analysis was carried out for this 
purpose; Pearson's Chi-square and Cramer's statistics values are reported. As 
earlier explained in chapter six (see page 168), the Pearson's Chi-square 
statistics tests whether two variables are independent. If the significance value 
is above 0.05 (conventionally, the significance should be less than 0.05) then it 
means the variables are independent, implying that they do not have an 
influence on each other. The Cramer's V  statistic takes values from a minimum 
of 0 to a maximum of 1. The closer the statistic is to 1, the stronger the 
association between the variables (Field, 2009).
Table 13 Factors influencing workers participation in the NHF scheme
Dependent
Variable
Independent Variables Relationship between dependent and 
independent variables
Sex of respondent
Pearson's Chi-square 
value 
p=0.013
Cramer's V 
' Statistics 
0.125
0JZ Tier of government employed p=0.000 0.464
c
—  CD Length of employment p=0.013 0.147
.2 § *-> pi Grade Level attained at work p=0.048 0.1248. o •o co place
CD X  
0l Z Level of satisfaction with income p=0.002 0.206
Source: Researcher's owned analysis (2013).
The sex of respondent was found to have statistical significant relationship (p = 
0.013) with NHF participation (Table 13). A Cramer's statistics of 0.125 reveals 
an association between a respondent's sex and participation in NHF scheme. 
Appendix XXXII Table one (a - d) provides further detail on the analysis.
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The tier of government employed by public sector workers in Jos was found to 
influence subscription to the NHF scheme. From the analysis conducted (see 
Table 13), the Pearson Chi-square value obtained is less than impossible (Chi- 
square = 86.816; p = 0.000). For these data, Cramer's statistics is 0.464 out of a 
possible maximum value of 1. This represents the existence of an association 
between the two variables. The association of tier of government employed with 
participation in NHF is seen clearest in appendix XXXII Table two (a - d).
Length of employment was found to have an influence on participation in the 
NHF scheme as is evident from the analysis conducted (see Table 13). The 
Pearson's Chi-square value obtained is far below 0.05 (p = 0.002) which 
suggests that length of employment has a statistical significant association with 
participation in the NHF scheme. A Cramer's statistics of 0.147 confirms the 
existence of an association between the two variables. The association 
between length of employment and participation in the NHF scheme is further 
illustrated on appendix XXXII Table three (a-d).
The position attained in work place (by grade level) was found to have influence 
on participation in the NHF scheme. The Pearson's chi-square value obtained 
from the analysis (see Table 13) is below 0.05 (p = 0.04) which suggests 
existence of a statistical significant relationship. The Cramer's statistics 
represents a low association between the two variables. Further detail on the 
analysis is provided in appendix XXXII Table four (a-d).
Similarly, there is a statistically significant relationship between the level of 
satisfaction with income and participation in the NHF scheme. The analysis (see 
Table 13) revealed a Pearson's Chi-square value of less than 0.05 (p = 0.002). 
A Cramer's statistic of 0.206 suggests the existence of an association between 
the two variables. The analysis is further clarified in appendix XXXV Table five 
(a-d).
7.3.2 Results of Logistic Regression Analysis
This analysis is conducted to validate the above findings. As shown in Table 13, 
it is clear that workers' participation in the NHF scheme is dependent on
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employment characteristics. The findings suggest that a worker's participation in 
the NHF scheme is determine by sex, tier of government employer, length of 
employment, grade level attained at work place and perception of level of 
satisfaction with income. These variables will be further examined to predict 
how they determine workers' participation in the NHF scheme.
In this analysis, the decision variable is a question asked to find out if 
respondents' were currently participating in NHF scheme. This question is a 
dependent variable with a binary outcome of 'No' encoded with 'O' and 'Yes' 
encoded with '1'. This is illustrated in Table 14. The independent (covariates) 
variables are the gender and work characteristics outlined above. For each 
independent variable, a reference group is created to which each other group is 
compared. Sex of respondent has male as the reference category on which 
female respondents are compared; tier of government has respondents 
employed in federal government organisations as the reference category on 
which state and local government employed respondents are compared. Length 
of employment has those who responded to have been employed for 29 years 
or more as the reference category on which those employed for 15-28 years 
and those employed for 14 years or less are compared. For position attained at 
work place, the reference category is low cadre workers (GL 01 - 06). The 
middle (GL 07-12) and high (GL13-17) cadres are compared to the low cadre 
respondents. For level of satisfaction with income, those that felt good about 
their income are the reference category on which those that responded neither 
good nor bad and those who felt bad about their incomes are compared.
Table 14: Dependent Variable Encoding: Currently Participating in NHF Scheme?
Original Value Internal Value
No 0
Yes 1
Source: Author's own analysis
Results and Interpretation
For this analysis, 405 cases were modelled. The case processing summary is 
presented in Table 15; it indicates that the combined missing values from the 
explanatory variables and outcomes are 13 cases which represent 3.2 percent. 
This leaves 392 cases (representing 96.8 percent) which were included in 
analysis. Though sex of respondent was found to a have statistical relationship
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and association with participation in the NHF scheme above, it does not 
contribute to the prediction of whether or not a respondent will participate in the 
scheme. Therefore, the final model obtained eliminates this variable, leaving 
only four predictors in Table 16.
Table 15 Case Processing Summary
Case Processing N Percent
Included in Analysis 39 2 96.8
Missing Cases 13 3 .2
Total 4 0 5 100.0
Source: Author's own analysis
The full model containing all predictors was statistically significant. The chi- 
square value of the model is 136.693 with 7 degree of freedom at step 2a and p 
< .000, indicating that the model was able to distinguish between respondents 
who reported and those who did not report participation in the NHF scheme. 
The data appropriately fit the model as confirmed by a non-significant chi- 
square (p = 0.441) result obtained in Hosmer-Lemeshow test of good fit. The 
model as a whole explained between 29.4 percent (Cox & Snell R2) and 39.5 
percent (Negelkerke R2) of the variance in NHF participation status, and 
correctly classified 72.4 percent of cases. The details of analysis from which 
these results are extracted are contained in appendix XXXIII.
Table 16 shows the logistics regression coefficient, Wald test and odds ratio for 
each of the four predictors. Employing a .05 criterion of statistical significance, 
there are eight significant variables (federal government organisation p = .000, 
local government organisation p = .000, 29 years plus p = .049, Lower Cadre p 
= .002, Middle Cadre p = .010, High Cadre p = .015, Good p = .001, and neither 
p = 020). These are the major factors influencing whether or not a worker 
participate in the NHF scheme.
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Table 16: Result of Logistic Regression Model Predicting Participation in the NHF Scheme from
Work Characteristics
Predictor Variables B W a ld /* P Exp (B)
Tier of
government
employed
Federal Government 
organisation 
State Government 
Organisation
-.475
56.014
3.279
.000
.070 .622
Local Government -4.009 55.517 .000 .018
organisation
Length of 
employment
29 years plus 
<= 14 years -.666
6.024
3.213
.049
.073 .514
1 5 - 2 8  years -.062 .026 .872 .940
Grade Level 
attained
Low Cadre (GL 01-06) 
Middle Cadre (GL 07-12) .858
7.610
6.642
.022
.010 2.358
High Cadre (GL 13 plus) .991 5.907 .015 2.693
Satisfaction with Good 14.903 .001
income Neither -.750 5.435 .020 .472
Bad .651 2.177 .140 1.917
Constant .573 1.207 .272 1.774
Source: Au thors' own analysis
The exponent of the coefficient of state government and local government 
organisations gave odds ratios of 0.622 and 0.018 (see Table 16). This 
indicates that when holding all other variables constant, the odds of participating 
in the NHF scheme for workers employed in state government organisations are 
0.6 times the odds of workers employed in federal government organisations. 
Similarly, the odds of participating in the NHF scheme for workers employed in 
local government organisations are 0.2 times the odds for those employed in 
federal government organisations. This suggests that being employed in state 
and local government organisation is associated with a lower likelihood of 
participating in the NHF scheme among the sampled respondents in Jos.
The exponent of the coefficient of workers that have been employed for 14 
years or less and those that have been on employment for 15 - 28 years gave 
odds ratios of 0.514 and 0.940 (see Table 16). This means that when holding all 
other variables constant the odds of participating in NHF scheme for those that 
have been employed for 14 years and below are 0.5 times the odds of workers
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that have been employed for 29 years and above. Similarly, the odds of 
participating in the NHF scheme for workers that have work for 15-28 years are 
0.9 times the odds of workers that have been employed for 29 years and above. 
This suggests that increased years of employment are associated with a higher 
likelihood of participating in the NHF scheme among the sampled respondents 
in Jos.
The exponent of the coefficient of middle and high cadre workers gave odds 
ratios of 2.358 and 2.693 (see Table 16). This indicates that when holding all 
other variables constant, the odds of participating in the NHF scheme for middle 
cadre workers are 2.4 times the odds of low cadre workers. Similarly, the odds 
of participating in the NHF scheme for high cadre workers are 2.7 times the 
odds of low level cadre workers. This suggests that low cadre workers are 
associated with a lower likelihood of participating in the NHF scheme among the 
sampled respondents in Jos.
The exponent of the coefficient of workers who feel their incomes were neither 
good nor bad and those who reported feeling bad about their incomes gave 
odds ratios of 0.472 and 1.917 (see Table 16). This means that when holding all 
other variables constant, the odds of participating in the NHF scheme for 
workers that feel neither good nor bad about their incomes are about 0.5 times 
the odds of workers who feel good about their income. Similarly, the odds of 
participating in NHF scheme for workers that felt bad about their incomes are 
about 1.9 times the odds of workers that reported feeling good. This suggests 
that feeling good about income is associated with a higher likelihood of 
participating in NHF scheme among the sample population of workers in Jos.
The analysis further confirms that the participation of workers in NHF scheme is 
influence by employment arrangement. The employment arrangement favours 
certain category of workers, while at the same time depriving others.
Overall, the analyses conducted in this section suggest that there are seven key 
variables (see Table 17) that influence the mobilisation of finance by the FMBN. 
Each of the variables has an effect on the anticipated role of the FMBN.
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Table 17: Summary of key variables that influence the mobilisation of finance by the FMBN
Key variables Effects of the variables on the mobilisation of housing finance
Lack of
enforcement
mechanism
The FMBN lacks the authority to enforce the compliance of the federal 
government, local private investors and workers to invest in the subsidised 
housing finance scheme.
The federal authority has failed by not directing the CBN to help enforce a 
partnership of local private investors with the FMBN as stated in the NHF law.
Inconsistency on 
the part of federal 
government 
authorities
The federal government has failed to offer political support for the FMBN to 
enter into partnership with foreign investors.
The monetary support of the federal government to the FMBN through budget 
allocation is irregular.
Uncertainty and 
risk
The financial outcome of partnering with the FMBN is uncertain. This is 
possibly putting away the local private investors from partnering with the 
FMBN.
The regulation of interest rates of mortgage loans provided by the FMBN is a 
possible disincentive for private investors.
Lack of
awareness about 
the NHF Scheme
Many workers in Jos are not aware of the activities of the FMBN, the NHF 
policy and the benefits of participating in the NHF scheme.
Lack of trust and 
confidence on 
government's 
policy
The NHF scheme is ambiguous. For example, some workers reported that 
the scheme did no longer exist. Some said they were forced to participate.
Some workers are unwilling to subscribe to the NHF due to a lack of trust and 
confidence on the NHF policy.
Lack of
cooperation from 
employers and 
the labour union
The lack of cooperation from employers and the Labour Union is affecting the 
ability of the FMBN to mobilise workers into the NHF scheme.
Favouritism The employment arrangements give certain category of workers a high 
chance of subscribing to the NHF scheme over others.
For instance, people that are employed in federal government organisations 
have opportunity over those that are employed in state and local government 
organisations.
In like manner, those in high cadre have opportunity over those in the middle 
and low cadres; those that have worked for 29years and above have 
opportunity over those that have worked for 28 years or less; those who feel 
good about their income have opportunity over those who feel bad; and the 
male workers have higher opportunity over females.
Source: Author's summary of analysis.
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7.3 CREDIT SUPPLY, DEVELOPMENT OF NEW HOUSING AND ACCESS 
OPPORTUNITY FOR THE NHF SUBSCRIBERS IN JOS
The housing finance arrangement was designed based on assumption that the 
FMBN should be able to mobilise finance and to supply credit to developers to 
build houses for the benefit of NHF subscribers. It was on the basis of this 
assumption that the FMBN introduced the Estate Development Loan (EDL) in 
2002. This was confirmed in previous discussion in chapter five. The 
introduction of the EDL created a platform for developers (private estate 
development firms, housing corporations and cooperative societies) affiliated 
with the FMBN to have access to subsidised credit to build houses for 
interested NHF subscribers. As of 2012, 101 small and medium size house­
building companies were in affiliation with the FMBN for the purpose of building 
houses for sell to the NHF subscribers and four of these companies were 
operating in Jos. Similarly, 85 PMIs were in affiliation with the FMBN but only 
one was operating from Jos (FGN-FMBN, 2011). The role of the FMBN is 
fulfilled if it partners the house-building companies and PMIs to finance the 
supply of mortgage housing for the benefit of the NHF subscribers. This section 
examines the extent to which the FMBN fulfils its role in Jos. The discussion is 
structured according to the following two sub-themes: estate development loans 
and access to subsidised credit by NHF subscribers.
7.3.1 Supply of Estate Development Loans
The data available from the FMBN shows that as at end of 2011 the amount of 
NHF loans disbursed through PMIs was N34.036 billion and another N49.182 
billion was disbursed directly to estate developers. This makes a total of 
N83.218 billion NHF loans disbursed by the FMBN (FGB-FMBN, 2011). The 
question that is being scrutinised here is: has the FMBN made any loan 
available to developers for the benefit of NHF subscribers in Jos? MB3 
responded as follows:
...in Jos there are four estate developers who have accessed EDL from the 
FMBN to build houses for the NHF beneficiaries. The first developer came to 
Jos in 2007 to construct Citrus Garden estate which is located around the 
building material market. The Citrus garden (thirty housing units) is already 
completed.
The respondent further confirmed that:
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"Two other developers came to Jos (BNTI and Mamko Investment); loans were 
given to them to provide 120 housing units. The fourth developer (Socus 
Garden) has just mobilised to site, the project (300 housing units) is located at 
Ritzek area" (MB3).
The response of MB3 indicates that the FMBN has made loans available to 
developers to build houses for the benefit of NHF subscribers in Jos. This is a 
good development for new housing provision in Jos. The four developers 
mentioned are all private companies; nothing is mentioned about state or 
federal government housing corporations. The question that follows then is: how 
accessible is the loan facility? MB3 confirmed that the bank usually gives loans 
to developers who are licensed by the REDAN to build houses which are 
designed for different categories of workers (such as one, two and three 
bedroom apartments). The houses constructed should not exceed a ceiling cost 
of N5million per unit and all developers must comply with this regulation. This 
regulation is contained in the national housing policy and the FMBN is required 
to enforce it (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 37).
Being a member of the REDAN is one of the criteria for accessing and EDL 
from the FMBN. MB3 further outlines other requirements: the first step is for 
developers to acquire land and also secure statutory title (C of O) on it. After 
this, they will then apply to the bank seeking a loan to finance the construction 
of a specified number of housing units which would eventually be sold to NHF 
contributors. If the loan is approved and construction begins, the off-takers 
(NHF subscribers) who are interested will be required to make an upfront 
payment of 10 percent (equity contribution) cost to the developer of their 
desired house. This is the first test of affordability. The developer will then build 
the houses to completion. When houses have been allocated to beneficiaries, 
the FMBN will pay the remaining 90 percent costs to the developer while 
beneficiaries repay the loan to the bank. The repayment plan for the beneficiary 
depends on the number of years left in service.
The response of MB3 would suggest that the process of credit supply is 
straightforward with minimal obstacles. Two private developers (PD1 and PD2) 
and one representative of the Housing Corporation (HC) were interviewed in
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Jos. The first question asked was: what are your experiences about the 
arrangement for accessing EDL from FMBN? HC responded:
From the inception of the new housing policy in ' 1991 to date, the Plateau 
Investment and Property Company (PIPC - State Government owned Housing 
Corporation in Jos) has never accessed NHF/FMBN loan. The last time the 
PIPC constructed houses (45 units along Yakubu Gowon way) was in 1997.
The project was directly funded by the State Government. The houses were 
sold to workers and the government is recovering the cost by deducting from 
their salaries (HC).
The comments of HC reveal that the housing corporation in Jos has not been 
involved in the provision of housing. This confirms the effect of governmental 
ownership and control on activities of the housing corporation in Jos. However, 
in the span of two decades (1991-2011) the housing corporation produced only 
45 housing units. HC further responded:
The company (PIPC) is owned by the state government and so it only engages 
in projects that the government feel are viable such as shopping centres" (HC).
The housing corporation in Jos is confined to the management of government 
owned shopping centres in and around Jos city. The comments of HC clearly 
reveal the influence of government on the activities of the PIPC. At present, this 
company is not having any dealings with the FMBN and is not building any 
houses in Jos.
The experiences of private developers regarding the process of disbursing loan 
from the FMBN in Jos are as follows. PD1 said:
There is a check list of requirements which a developer must satisfy... It is a 
stringent one because there are too many conditions. A lot of the requirements 
are paper work but a crucial one is ownership of land for the housing project.
The land must have a statutory title (C of O). When we talk about land, the cost 
of its acquisition and the processing of title come to mind (PD1).
The response of PD2 goes as follows:
...we started operation in 2001 and it took time to be able to meet up with the 
requirements for accessing the NHF loan from the FMBN. After meeting the 
requirement, we faced a lot of problems with the bank's workers (PD2).
PD2 further noted that at the time his company applied for the loan, the FMBN 
workers did not seem to be very well orientated with the bank's operations. PD2 
feels that some workers were lacking experience in mortgage operations. PD2 
noted that it appeared that there were insufficient funds available to loan out to 
developers at the time they put in the application. This was evident in the time it
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took (approximately three years) to get a loan. It was around the same time that 
banks were made to recapitalise and so the FMBN was having a lot of issues to 
deal with (PD2).
The responses of PD1 and 2 both suggest that the arrangement of getting 
access to an EDL from the FMBN is not straightforward as reported by MB3 
above. There are too many requirements to satisfy according to PD1 and issues 
of incompetence and a lack of proper orientation of mortgage operation on the 
part of officers working in the bank is observed by PD1. These issues added up 
to considerable delays in accessing an EDL. These problems were envisaged in 
chapter five because the FMBN remains a public institution and cannot be 
devoid of the bureaucratic controls and restraints that are associated with 
government organisations in Nigeria. Furthermore, the bank does not have 
sufficient financial resources as was confirmed above.
The effect of the federal government's control over the FMBN and bureaucratic 
processes within the bank is further noted in the following responses:
There is need to review the operation of the FMBN. The arrangement is opened 
to manipulations so that those that supposed to benefit are not really the ones 
benefiting. There is need to improve on the level of transparency particularly at 
the FMBN so that loan will be disbursed on first-come, first-served basis (PD1).
PD2 also commented that:
The FMBN is suffering from restraints; the presence of government in this bank 
creates a lot of bottlenecks. There are a lot of bureaucratic bottlenecks in the 
bank which is affecting access to the NHF funds. We were victims of this 
problem because it took us close to three years to access the funds "(PD2).
The responses of PD1, PD2 and even HC would suggest that government has 
too much influence in the arrangement for housing provision in Jos. This 
concern is made with particular reference to the FMBN and Housing 
Corporations. This raised the question as to whether NHF subscribers are 
actually benefiting from houses being funded by the FMBN in Jos. PD1 
responded:
There is huge demand for housing in Jos. People really want to have good 
housing but they are financially constraint. We are trying to take as much off­
takers as possible but we are constrained in many ways (PD1).
PD1 confirmed that there was demand for housing from workers employed in 
both government organisations (federal, state and local government employees)
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and the private sector. PD2 said sales of houses are open to all NHF 
subscribers in Jos, both the public and private sector workers. The company of 
PD2 do not restrict the sale of houses to any category of people. For instance, 
PD2 responded:
"In our completed phase one project, we sold houses to workers employed in 
the teaching hospital, the state government workers, military personnel and 
workers from the Local Government Service Commission" (PD2).
The responses of PD1&2 here are concerned with the access and allocation of 
houses to the NHF subscribers. The responses of PD1&2 clearly suggest that 
the process needs checks to be installed in the process of allocating houses to 
interested NHF subscribers so as to prevent any tendency to favour some 
subscribers over others. Indeed, the response of PD1 clearly necessitates such 
checks:
...there is huge demand for housing in Jos but we prefer to work with people 
who have better capacity to acquire houses produced (PD1).
PD2 said the sale of houses is open to all NHF subscribers but those who 
benefitted from the phase one project completed by PD2's company were 
mostly from the federal government organisation (University Teaching Hospital), 
senior bureaucrats and political appointees (in the Local Government Service 
Commission) and military officers who are not supposed to benefit from this 
arrangement because they don't subscribe to NHF scheme (there is a separate 
post services housing scheme created by federal government for military 
personnel).
The summary of factors that influence the supply of loan from the FMBN and 
the development of new housing in Jos are outlined in figure 22. Firstly, the 
reform programme (such the introduction of an EDL by the FMBN and the 
formation of REDAN) examined in the preceding chapter has brought about the 
partnership of private housing-building companies with the FMBN in Jos.
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The supply of 
FMBN loan and 
development 
of housing in 
Jos
Bureaucratic control is 
restraining the FMBN 
and Housing 
Coorporation.
Figure 22: Factors influencing the supply of credit and development of new housing in Jos
Secondly, the housing corporations owned by the federal and state government 
remain inactive. The reason for this may be found in the failure of government 
to privatise them. Thirdly, the issue of bureaucratic controls and restraints is 
raised in connection to the FMBN and the Housing Corporation in Jos. For the 
FMBN, it creates delay in approving of loan to the developers, it permits 
government officials and workers of the FMBN to exert influence over the bank's 
activities and it leads to manipulations and lack of transparency. With regard to 
the Housing Corporation in Jos, the state government authorities are restraining 
its ability to participate in the provision of housing. Fourthly, developers raise an 
issue of incompetence and the lack of professionalism on the part of the FMBN 
workers. This problem simply creates inefficiency in the performance of the
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FMBN. Lastly, the influence of developers over allocation of houses is likely to 
deprive the NHF subscribers access to housing provided for their benefits in Jos.
7.3.2 Access to the NHF Loan/Housing by Workers in Jos
It is necessary to examine access opportunity to the mortgage houses provided 
by private developers for the benefit of the NHF subscribers in Jos. The 
analysis is conducted based on responses provided in the questionnaire 
administered to the workers in Jos. Based on the present policy, only estate 
developers can access loans to build houses on behalf of NHF participants. So, 
access to a loan automatically means access to houses provided by estate 
developers. From the analysis conducted (figure 23) only 4.0 percent (14 
subjects out of 349) of respondents reported that they had accessed an NHF 
loan from the FMBN or were in the process of accessing a loan at the time of 
the field study. This means that only 4.0 percent of the subjects have accessed 
housing through the NHF arrangement.
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Figure 23: Responses of Workers about Access to NHF Loan from FMBN
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The contribution of the NHF scheme in supplying housing finance is insignificant 
when compared with alternative sources of finance that subjects have reported 
to have used in acquiring houses in Jos. The subjects were asked to identify 
sources of finance they have used or plan to use in acquiring houses. For this 
question, 349 subjects responded out of 405 (see details on appendix XXXV 
Table six). As can be seen from figure 24, only 4.0 percent (14 subjects) have 
accessed/plan to access an NHF loan from the FMBN. The use of personal 
savings is high at 49.9 percent (174 subjects) followed by those who combined 
different sources of finance at 18.3 percent (64 subjects) and those who use 
alternatives sources such as Cooperatives/Thrift (15.5 percent - 54 subjects). 
First, this finding suggests that the NHF scheme has limited significance when 
compared to alternative sources of finance available to the sampled population. 
Second, the finding confirms previous findings that public sector workers were 
unaware of the NHF scheme or that they do not wish to participate in it for 
reasons identified previously.
Housing finance alternatives
Housing finance alternatives
Figure 24 Distribution of respondents by housing finance alternatives
The factors responsible for the inaccessibility to an NHF loan or houses 
financed by the FMBN do not seem to be so connected to work characteristics 
as they are with participation in the NHF scheme. The findings in Table 18 
indicate that gender has a statistical significant relationship with access to NHF 
loan and housing. A chi-square value of p = 0.014 was obtained so there exist a 
relationship between gender and access to NHF loan and housing. This is 
confirmed by Cramer's V statistic value of 0.132. Similarly, tier of government 
employed has a statistical significant relationship (p = 0.043) and an association 
(V  = 0.134) with access to the NHF loan and housing. Length of employment, 
grade level attained at work place and level of satisfaction with income were 
found not to have a statistical significant relationship with access to NHF loan 
and housing. These findings suggest that the factors responsible for 
inaccessibility to NHF loans and housing are less connected to the work 
characteristics of NHF participants.
Table 18 Relationship between Workers Characteristics and Access to NHF Loan and Housing
Dependent Independent Variables Relationship between dependent
Variable and independent variables
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Source: Author's own analysis
7.3.3 Workers' Perceptions on Housing Financing through the NHF Scheme 
Some of the respondents provided additional comments while filling out the 
questionnaires administered to them. The comments are:
The FMBN and the NHF arrangement is good but the policy for release of funds 
to contributors only through estate developers is not fair since it does not allow 
one to build to his/her specification and taste.
This comment is similar to another comment which states:
I would like to decide on the type of house to buy. With the NHF scheme, the 
developers build to their specifications and not to our taste.
These comments raise issues that may discourage some workers from 
subscribing to NHF scheme. The federal government's policy for the release of
Pearson's Chi-square Cramer's V
value Statistics
Sex of respondent p=0.014 0.132
Tier of government employed p=0.043 0.134
Length of employment p=0.741 0.041
Grade Level attained at work place p=0.733 0.043
Level of satisfaction with income p=0.453 0.067
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loans to developers on behalf of subscribers who have applied for a loan is not 
appealing to workers. The two responses above express the workers' desire to 
be involved in deciding the type of houses they would want developers to build 
for them. This is an important issue to deal with so as to encourage people to 
subscribe to the NHF scheme. Other comments suggest that workers do not 
trust the government and its housing finance policy. The comments are:
Mortgage institution ran by government is seen as an avenue of taking and 
sharing the 'national cake'. And even when a worker makes contribution, the 
money is eaten by corrupt officials.
Government is only interested in deducting staff salaries without anything 
coming out of the new housing arrangement.
The NHF has never achieved its aim as no contributor has benefited from the 
scheme.
Government policies have been very unstable and I can't trust the housing 
policy.
The operators of the NHF scheme are not honest at all, after being on waiting 
list for a long period one's turn will never come.
These comments convey a feeling of mistrust about the government's policy on 
NHF and it is a discouraging factor for subscribers. A further comment states:
I feel there should be consideration for those that have got houses before and 
do not wish to get another one. My salary is being deducted even when I am 
not interested in acquiring a house.
This comment suggests that the respondent is unaware of all the benefits of 
subscribing to the NHF scheme. The expression confirms previous findings 
above, that the lack of proper awareness is an important problem facing the 
NHF scheme and the FMBN's role. It was explained in chapter one and five that 
the NHF scheme serves a dual purpose of providing subsidised credit for 
housing and also a social insurance scheme. NHF subscriptions are part of the 
Nigeria Social Insurance Trust Fund (NSITF). At retirement from work, retirees 
would be refunded their contributions along with two percent interest. The 
government needs to take necessary steps to create awareness about the NHF 
scheme and the social benefits that are associated with it. If this was done, it 
will help address the concern expressed in the following comment:
There is a lot of insincerely around NHF operation and the policy that brought 
about its existence.
The findings that came out of the discussion are summarised in figure 25. Firstly, 
the FMBN loan/mortgages are not accessible to the NHF subscribers in Jos.
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Secondly, consequence for not being able to access the FMBN 
loans/mortgages is the prevalence of alternative financing options among the 
workers.Thirdly, the process of disbursing loans to developers for the benefit of 
subscribers is not appealing to the workers in Jos. In regards to this, the 
workers reported that the arrangement does not allow them to decide on the 
type of houses they wish to own. Fourthly, the workers do not trust or have 
confidence on the government's policy; they expressed concern over corruption, 
lack of honesty and the unstable nature of government policies. Finally, the 
factors responsible for inaccessibility to the FMBN loans/mortgages in Jos are 
less connected to the work characteristics as in the case of participating in the 
NHF scheme.
The loans/mortgages 
are inaccessible to 
majority of the NHF 
subscribers
The use of alternative 
housing finance 
option is high among 
the workers sampledAccess to FMBN 
loan/Mortgages 
by the NHF 
subscribers in 
Jos
The workers do not 
trust or have 
confidence on the 
government's policy
Figure 25: Access to Loan/Mortgages by NHF Subscribers in Jos: A Summary of Key Findings
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7.4 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
The sub-question examined in this chapter is an important part of the jigsaw. 
The discussions covered have substantially resolved the puzzle surrounding the 
mobilisation of finance by the FMBN, the supply of credit for the development of 
new housing and the opportunity for access to FMBN loans/mortgages by the 
NHF subscribers in Jos. The findings obtained in Table 17, and figures 24 and 
27 will further be synthesised. The discussions will be presented based on the 
following themes:
1 A Lack of a Policy Enforcement Mechanism
The difficulty of enforcing policy provision is identified as one of the key factors 
affecting the provision of housing finance. This theme featured extensively in 
the responses of MB1, MB2, MB3 and RD. These respondents are in 
agreement with one another; they all expressed concern over challenges 
associated with enforcing policy decisions particularly in connection with the 
anticipated partnership for mobilising investible finance by the FMBN. The 
respondents expressed concern over the lack of enforcement mechanism that 
could enable the FMBN to partner with local institutional investors in the 
provision of housing finance. The expectation that the CBN will serve as a 
connecting link between local investors and the FMBN has failed. The CBN is 
reluctant to play the role that is expected of and the FMBN is not in a position to 
enforce compliance.
Similarly, the FMBN does not have the political power to decide on partnership 
with international investors without the support of politicians at federal 
government level. It was noted earlier that an effort made by the FMBN to 
partner with a foreign investor failed owing to a lack of political support from the 
federal government authorities. At the local level in Jos, the FMBN lacks the 
power to enforce worker participation in the NHF without the support of state 
and local government political leaders. In Jos, some employers have failed to 
allow their employees to participate in the NHF scheme and the FMBN lacks the 
power to enforce compliance. One can observe inconsistency on the part of the 
federal government to fulfil its promise of investing public finance in the FMBN 
through budgetary allocation and again, there is no mechanism to ensure 
compliance.
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It is clear that at the time of the field study the FMBN had only two sources of 
finance (government allocation and NHF subscriptions) which were both 
irregular. This shortage of finance is a challenge because the FMBN is unable 
to broker partnerships with potential investors; therefore, the lack of an 
enforcement mechanism is one critical factor in the failure to organise housing 
finance and the supply of credit in Jos.
2 Political influence
Lack of commitment to housing financing by federal and state government 
authorities is identified as another problem affecting the supply of housing 
finance. This is closely related to the enforcement problem discussed above. 
The federal government in particular has made loud promises about the 
provision of housing finance as was noted in chapter one and three. To the 
contrary, however, the responses of MB1, MB2, MB2, and RD suggested a lack 
of commitment to these promises. The provision of housing finance requires 
long-term and continuous financial commitment on the part of the federal 
government but this has been lacking. As noted previously, the FMBN is 80 
percent owned by the Federal Government but its financial commitment is 
inconsistent, irregular, and not commensurate with the level of its ownership in 
the bank. The federal government annual allocation that is meant to continually 
energise the bank to provide long term funding is irregular and insufficient, and 
where the federal government is expected to support decisions made by the 
FMBN to partner with investors, it has failed to do so.
At the local level in Jos, the state government does not appear to play any role 
in the provision of housing finance. The State Government PMI which is 
supposed to serve as a platform for mobilising NHF subscription from workers 
employed by state and local government agencies in Jos was moribund at the 
time of field study. The failure of state government to recapitalise its PMI in line 
with present regulations for PMIs is a demonstration of lack of its commitment. 
Similarly, the State Government Housing Corporation is not playing the 
anticipated role contained in the present housing policy. As was noted earlier, 
the Housing Corporation only carries out projects that the state government
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consider viable, and housing is never one of those projects (as indicated by HC 
earlier). There are no traces of any cooperative societies that are meant to 
serve as platforms for informal sector workers to participate in the NHF scheme 
and to benefit equally from the present housing finance arrangement. This is a 
failure on the part of local authorities which are expected to help organise 
informal workers into cooperatives that should then collaborate with the FMBN. 
These findings suggest that federal, state and local government authorities 
have demonstrated a lack of commitment in the organisation of housing finance.
3 A Lack of Awareness about Government's Policy
Lack of awareness about public policies and government programmes is 
identified as a problem affecting the provision of housing finance. This theme 
featured in the response presented by the representatives of FMBN who 
expressed concern over the lack of awareness of the NHF scheme and the 
activities of the FMBN. First of all, local investors (Deposit Money Banks and 
insurers) claim to be unaware of any government policy that requires their 
resources to finance low-income housing through the FMBN. In a like manner, a 
lack of awareness about the existence of the NHF scheme and the activities of 
FMBN in Jos is identified as a problem which affects workers participation. A 
representative of the FMBN again confirmed this problem and during the period 
of field study, the FMBN office in Jos was attempting to reach out to create 
awareness among employers and employees. A survey conducted among 
workers employed by public organisations in Jos further confirms this problem. 
The analysis above suggests that the level of awareness about the NHF 
scheme is low among the sample population of workers. The workers also 
express a lack of awareness about the benefits of participating in the NHF 
scheme. Some felt that they are being forced to participate in a scheme which 
does not provide any benefit to them. All these findings suggest that the lack of 
awareness is a critical factor concerning the participation of workers in the NHF 
scheme.
4 Bureaucratic Restraint
This theme featured in the response of developers who expressed 
dissatisfaction with the process of loan disbursement at the FMBN office in Jos.
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It was established earlier that the FMBN operates as part of a government 
bureaucracy and is not free from the bureaucratic issues associated with 
government bureaus. The developers expressed concern about delays that are 
associated with the bureaucratic procedures for approving estate development 
loans. Developers feel that there are too many conditions to satisfy before being 
considered for a loan. They express concern over the incompetence of officers 
working in the bank and also feel that the process of loan disbursement is both 
open to series of manipulation and lacks transparency.
5 Exclusion and Favouritism
The research suggests that a number of excluding elements exist which could 
impede the participation of workers in housing financing through the NHF 
scheme and their access to housing. In the arrangement, participation in the 
NHF scheme is a condition for access to mortgage housing provided with 
subsidised credit from the FMBN. It was confirmed above that the lack of 
awareness about housing finance arrangements is high among public sector 
workers and this is an impeding factor for their participation and access. 
Furthermore, in the process of spreading awareness to workers in Jos, the 
FMBN tends to exclude workers employed in certain organisations. This 
process deprives local and state government employees of relevant information 
so they are less aware of the NHF scheme and its benefits.
The analysis conducted suggests that gender and work characteristics also 
determine whether or not, workers will participate in financing housing through 
the NHF scheme. For the entire sampled population, sex of respondent, tier of 
government employed, length of employment, position attained at work place by 
grade level and the extent of satisfaction with income were found to have a 
statistical significant relationship and association with the participation of 
workers in the NHF scheme. This suggests that these variables influence 
participation in NHF scheme. A further analysis employing logistic regression 
modelling revealed that gender was not an important determinant for 
participation in the NHF scheme but that the rest of the variables were.
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For some workers (whether federal, state or local government employed), the 
role of employers is also a determining factor for their participation in the NHF 
scheme. This was confirmed when some workers reported that they wished to 
participate in NHF scheme but their employers refused them the opportunity to 
do so. This indicates that employers have an important role to play in the 
process of getting their employees to participate in the housing finance 
arrangement. As was noted earlier, housing cooperatives societies are 
completely missing from the organisation of housing finance and credit supply in 
Jos. The non-involvement of cooperatives automatically deprived informal 
sector workers from participating and accessing affordable housing from the 
NHF/FMBN arrangement.
Access to loan/housing provided with NHF loan by participations is influenced 
by multiple variables. Amongst public sector workers, gender and tier of 
government employed are key determinants for access to loan/housing through 
the NHF scheme. These two variables were found to have a statistical 
significant relationship and association with access. Other work characteristics 
(length of employment, position attained at work place by grade level, and 
extent of satisfaction with income) were found not to have such a relationship 
and association with access to loan/housing from NHF scheme. Some 
determinants for access are out of the workers control and allocation 
manipulated by developers. As noted previously in chapter five, the FMBN 
influences the process of disbursing loan to developers on behalf of NHF 
applicants but does not have much influence in the process of allocating the 
houses provided. The findings in this chapter revealed that developers 
demonstrate a tendency to be selective in the process of allocating houses to 
NHF participants.
6 Ambiguity and Mistrust
The ambiguities surrounding the arrangement of financing housing through NHF 
participation and the roles of the FMBN creates mistrust in workers. The 
perceptions of some workers about housing delivery through the NHF scheme 
and the FMBN are putting them off participating. Some workers expressed 
dissatisfaction with the NHF/FMBN arrangement because it does not allow them
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opportunity to decide the type of houses they want to buy. They feel excluded 
from the decision making process.
In summary, affordable housing provision in Jos is affected by an inadequate 
supply of finance by the FMBN. This is because the FMBN itself does not have 
sufficient resources for the robust financing of housing. The findings of this 
chapter reveal some contradictions that exist between the national housing 
finance policy aim of providing affordable housing and the means of achieving it. 
First, the federal government has maintained that financing housing through the 
FMBN is an investment opportunity which local institutional and foreign 
investors could take advantage of (FGN-NHF Act, 1992 - Section 5; FGN-NHP, 
2006, p. 22). If financing housing through the FMBN is considered in terms of 
an investment, the arrangement automatically becomes unattractive to the 
anticipated investors because interest rates are regulated thus it offers a low 
return on investment compared to other ventures. Moreover, the federal 
government itself is inconsistent and reluctant to invest public finance in the 
provision of housing through the FMBN.
Secondly, the regulation of interest rates of loan (mortgages) provided by the 
FMBN is a deliberate effort by the federal government to facilitate access to 
affordable housing by NHF participants. The scheme was introduced partly in 
pursuit of this social objective (FGN-Housing Sector Reforms, 2006 pp. 3-9). If 
the arrangement is considered in terms of a social welfare, then it is capable of 
generating conflict between the business interests of investors and the social 
welfare objective. The findings of this chapter and those of chapter five 
suggests that local investors (Deposit Money Banks and insurers) prefer to 
invest deposits and premiums at open market interest rates that offer a high 
return on investment rather to commit such resources in pursuit of a social 
welfare objective which attract low return on capital.
Finally, as it was previously noted, the respondents (MB1, MB2, MB3 and RD) 
maintained that NHF Act is federal government legislation which must be 
complied with by the anticipated institutional investors and workers. If the NHF 
scheme is considered in terms of legislation which must be adhered to, then the 
lack of an enforcement mechanism stands out as a major barrier to its effective
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implementation. The findings of this chapter show that federal government 
organs which are responsible for enforcing the participation of local investors 
(banks and insurers) lack the will to do so. This may be as a result of the fear of 
undermining the vested interest of shareholders of which perhaps, politicians, 
bureaucrats, technocrats are themselves part of. On the part of workers, a lack 
of awareness about the NHF scheme and work characteristics is depriving 
some from investing in the housing finance arrangement. Access to 
loans/housing is partly determined by gender, tier of government employed and 
allocative role of developers. The perceptions that workers hold about the 
scheme equally influence their participation.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DEVELOPMENT SUBSIDIES FOR HOUSING SUPPLY IN  JOS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
In previous discussions covered in chapter three, it was evident that housing 
production and consumption subsidies are essential for the protection of social 
welfare in housing. From the range of arguments examined, it was clear that 
guaranteeing social welfare in housing is difficult to achieve, particularly when 
housing is provided in an open market environment. In such a context, housing 
often creates a conflict of interest between the government's welfare intentions 
and the attainment of business objectives of private actors. To bridge such 
conflict, production subsidies are often suggested to keep house prices at 
reasonable levels and consumption subsidies advocated to help the low-income 
households to afford the cost of a house.
In the framing of Nigeria's housing policy, the designers acknowledged and 
incorporated a proposal for the provision of housing supply subsidies (see 
pages 142 and 122). This is essential, particularly when considering that 
Nigeria's government wishes to fulfil the social objective of providing affordable 
mortgage housing to low-income households through a partnership with private 
institutions. The provision of a consumption subsidy in the context of the 
enabling strategy for housing provision is undertaken when the FMBN fulfils its 
role of supplying low interest finance for the benefit of NHF subscribers (this 
aspect was covered in chapter seven). The findings in the preceding chapter 
suggest that the provision of consumption subsidy is affected by the reluctance 
of private institutions to partner the FMBN in the provision of subsidised housing 
finance.
This chapter is focused on examining the arrangement for administering the 
provision of land and infrastructure subsidies and other forms of support for 
housing provision. This is where the role of local authorities comes into play. In 
specific terms, the policy statement instructed the local authorities to subsidise
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the cost of land and infrastructure for new housing supply, to streamline and 
speed up the issuance of C of O (a prerequisite for access to credit), to grant 
tax exemption on loans for the provision of new housing that is meant to benefit 
low-income groups. Also, the local authorities are required to facilitate the 
obtaining of development permits by estate developers. It is based on this 
assumption that the policy designers decided to cap the price of houses that the 
FMBN would finance at N5million. To fulfil this role the housing policy statement 
implied that the local states will organise a partnership of actors, involving the 
land owners, developers and government agencies. If this assumption holds, 
the NHF subscribers should have access to affordable mortgage-housing in Jos 
and other locations. The question that requires an answer is: does the local 
state organise the provision of subsidies and support for housing provision in 
Jos? The chapter corresponds with the earlier sub-research question three 
contained in chapter one and case study two contained on page 162. The 
source and nature of data used in the analysis is contained in Table 19.
Table 19 Sources and nature of data used
Data Source Nature of data Abbreviation used in 
analysis
Federal Government officer Interview transcript FG
State Government officers Interview transcripts SG2 and SG3
Local Government Council officers Interview transcripts LGC1 and LGC2
Representative of REDAN Interview transcript RD
Private developers Interview transcript PD1 and PD2
Public sector workers Questionnaire survey Quantitative analysis
8.2 LAND AND INFRASTRUCTURE FOR HOUSING PROVISION IN JOS
8.2.1 Response of Federal Government authorities in Jos 
The three tiers of government (federal, state and local) have a responsibility to 
subsidise the cost of housing production in Jos. From the federal government 
side, there are two agencies that are expected to perform such a role in Jos. 
These agencies are the Federal Ministry for Lands, Housing and Urban 
development and the FHA (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 19 - 22). However, the FHA 
was not operating in Jos at the time of the field study (a possible reason for this
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is explained on page 237). A representative of the federal ministry was asked
about the role of the federal government in subsidising cost of houses in Jos.
The response was:
The federal government facilitates housing development through provision of 
infrastructure. This is achieved under Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(FG).
This respondent was not able to confirm how the federal government is fulfilling 
this objective through MDGs. However, FG confirmed that the office of the 
federal ministry in Jos is in custody of land that was acquired by the federal 
government for a project (presumably housing) which did not take place. FG 
said part of this land had been sold to some federal government employed 
workers in Jos and part of it was still held by government. FG did not provide an 
explanation of the arrangement through which the land was allocated and or 
sold to workers. The federal ministry in Jos appears to have been engaged with 
private developers with a view to let them acquire the remaining part of the land 
held by Government in Jos. This was confirmed by FG:
We have had several meetings with developers who showed interest on 
acquiring the land but the negotiation is not completed (FG).
It is not clear if the federal government is going to sell the land to developers at 
a subsidised cost. Though FG was not specific on when the land in Jos was 
acquired, it appears the federal government contradicts itself by keeping such a 
portion of land idle when the government is expected to provide land for new 
housing projects.
8.2.2 Responses of State Government Officers
Officers of state government agencies made comments regarding their advice 
to the government on subsidising the cost of housing production. SG2 said:
The state government has expressed desire to partner with private developers 
to build houses in Jos. ...the M inistry has advised the government to acquire 
land and provide infrastructure to cut down development cost. ...it seems that 
the government (political leaders) is reluctant about our proposal. Government 
feels that if it incurs any cost to compensate land owners and provide 
infrastructure, the developers will have to refund the cost to the government 
(SG2).
The response of SG2 confirms the desire of state government to partner with 
private estate development companies to provide housing in Jos. The response 
also suggests that state government is unwilling to bear the responsibility of
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financing the cost of subsidies. Should this be the case, then SG2 expressed 
concern:
The partnership arrangement between the government and private developers 
is not very clear as government maintains that its role is to facilitate land 
purchase by bringing together private developers and land owners to ensure 
smooth transaction. The M inistry has advised government to do the right thing 
so that houses will be accessible to low and middle income groups. If 
government fails to take our advice, we may end up with a situation like that of 
Gwarimpa estate at FCT where lots of houses were built and only sold to rich 
people because the target groups could not afford the cost. Similar situation 
occurred at Bauchi and Gombe where houses were left vacant because the 
target groups could not afford the cost (SG2).
The response of SG3 was rather in support of state government's position. In 
SG3's words,
...the understanding we had was that government should identify suitable 
residential sites, assess the values, negotiate with lands owners then 
developers will pay the cost of compensation. This has been completed and 
reports have been sent to developers that were screened for partnership by 
Ministry for Housing and Urban Development. Whenever they provide money, 
we will compensate the land owners. ..." (SG3).
From the response of SG3, the state government is unlikely to bear the cost of 
financing subsidies. If this is the case, the arrangement could result in the 
supply of houses that are unaffordable to low-income households. This was the 
case in cities where the anticipated subsidies were not provided, as indicated by 
SG2. In the opinion of SG2, the state government would finance the cost of 
subsidies only if the houses provided would not benefit workers employed by 
other tiers of government in Jos. In SG2 words,
The state government cannot use its money to acquire land for developers who 
will eventually sell their houses to the federal government workers (SG2).
This response suggests that the state government authorities want the federal 
government to bear the financial cost of the development subsidies that benefits 
its workers in Jos. SG2 did not specifically comment on how the state 
government wishes to conduct its partnership with LGCs employed workers, 
those employed by private organisations and workers in informal sector.
8.2.3 Responses of Local Government Council officers 
The local government officers confirmed that LGCs have been subsidising the 
cost of housing to their workers and people residing (presumably for 
households that acquire houses through a self-build approach) in their LGAs. 
This is confirmed in the following responses:
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The LGC usually acquire land to sell to interested workers and residents around 
the LGA. The last time that Council produced a residential layout was in 2008.
The site was prone to erosion and so the Council produced drainage gutters 
before selling the plots (LGC1).
The response of LGC2 concurs with that of LGC1 above:
...as usual the Council is helping people to have access to affordable housing.
One way is through acquisition of land for sell to interested Council workers and 
the public at subsidised rate. The most recent residential layout produced by 
the Council is situated at Mungel".
LGC2 said:
Three hundred plots were produced at Mungel layout of which 150 were sold to 
the Council workers (at *4150, 000 per plot) who indicated interest and the 
remaining were sold to the public. The Council supported its workers who were 
interested by giving them a loan to acquire the plots. The loan was recovered 
from the workers over a period of four years (LGC2).
LGC2 expands further on Council activities:
In all the layouts that Council has produced and sold, infrastructure and 
services are usually provided. For example, the Council is about to produce a 
new layout in partnership with the land owners (LGC2).
LGC2 confirmed that the initiative of partnering with land owners was adopted in 
view of the difficulty experienced by Council officers in the acquisition of land 
from local natives. To mitigate such difficulties, the Council tries to give land 
owners a sense of involvement in the process of the laying out and disposing of 
residential plots to prospective buyers. In this arrangement, the Council will not 
acquire the land as it did previously but will rather render a service to individuals, 
families or kinship groups who wish to sell their land for a fee. Such a service 
will include carrying out a survey plan, producing plots and marketing it to the 
public. The Council will take responsibility for the provision of infrastructure 
such as road, drainage, electricity and water. LGC2 confirmed that the Council 
plans to collaborate with the Plateau State Community and Social Development 
Agency in the area of infrastructure provision. In previous layouts (citing an 
instance at Mungel), the Council provided a primary school and a health care 
facility for the residents. It plans to do same for the layout that will be produced 
from its partnership with the land owners.
The responses of LCG1 and 2 indicate that Councils are fulfilling their 
anticipated roles to a reasonable degree. However, the consistency of their 
attempts to provide new residential layouts and to sell plots at subsidised cost
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varies between LGC 1 & 2. The shortcoming arises from a lack of connection to 
the FMBN where credit could be accessed by developers to build houses for the 
people. However, the Council workers and other beneficiaries of the plots would 
of course, first subscribe to the NHF so as to benefit from it. This lack of 
connection between Councils, the FMBN and developers means that 
beneficiaries of plots sold by Councils usually adopt a self-build/self-help 
approach. The disadvantages of this approach arise because projects do not 
benefit from economies of scale and often take a long time to finish when 
money is not readily available.
8.2.4 Experiences of Private Developers
There are certain practical issues that surround the subsidy provision 
arrangement. The direction of federal government authorities in Jos was not 
clearly established. The state government authorities hold the view that 
developers should bear the full cost of land acquisition and of the provision of 
infrastructure. In this sense, the role of state government agencies will be 
limited to facilitating the land acquisition process by negotiating with land 
owners on behalf of developers but state government officers were already 
playing this role. The LGCs have made attempts to fulfil their anticipated role of 
subsidising the cost of land and infrastructure but they do not collaborate with 
the FMBN and house building companies.
Private developers were already building houses for the benefit of some NHF 
subscribers in Jos. The experiences of developers confirmed a lot of issues that 
constrain the housing activities in Jos. With regards to land, PD1 responded:
The issue of land is still a major problem in Jos... the land owners prefer to 
keep their land for ages without any improvement on it. The cost of land has 
been an issue, and it naturally inflates the cost of producing houses. ...it is very 
unfortunate that a company affiliated with the FMBN to provide affordable 
housing cannot get land allocation from the government. (PD1).
The response of PD1 is an expression of the uncertainties and ambiguities that 
affect the system of subsidising housing. PD1 laments the inability of 
government authorities in Jos to take advantage of provisions of the LUA to fulfil 
the housing policy statement. It was discussed earlier that the LUA of 1978 
(Part V Section 28) vested the power of compulsory acquisition of land on State 
governor and local government chairpersons. The state and local government
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authorities are expected to use the power vested in them to acquire land and
allocate it to developers at a subsidised cost for mass housing provision. The
response of PD1 shows that this arrangement has offered no benefits to
developers because the state government officers were allocating land to their
associates who may not use it for the purpose of providing, low income housing.
PD1 was able to confirm that this corrupt practice took place. This problem has
persisted despite the government's intention to address it. Furthermore, PD1
said if a developer has to wait for government to provide the land, it will take
decades. In PDTs words,
...for us, we don't wait to get the government's allocation because it’s always 
not coming. We usually look for land that can be purchased at reasonable cost, 
bearing in mind the affordability level of our off-takers (PD1).
PD2 concurs with PD1:
The housing policy says that the government will make land accessible to 
developers but partnering with the government in this regard is not working at 
all. Partnering with the government rather causes delay which could have 
negative implication on the cost of houses that will eventually come out of the 
scheme (PD1).
PD2 further adds that the experience of partnering with the government to
acquire land for a new housing project was not a positive one:
At first, the government officers took some time to negotiate with the land 
owners and claimed to have concluded. Then a day was fixed for the payment 
of compensation to land owners. It was on the day of payment that we got to 
understand there were pending issues. Fresh negotiation had to start but this 
time around developers were involved and it took about a year to acquire the 
land (PD2).
These respondents confirmed that the involvement of government led them to 
pay a higher compensation cost than they would have paid if they had gone to 
negotiate directly with land owners. According to PD1 and 2, this happened to 
almost all developers that partnered with government at that time. These 
respondents confirmed that in future attempts to acquire land for a project; they 
will avoid government involvement in fear of the previous experience repeating 
itself. The two developers reported that they were responsible for the payment 
of compensation to land owners and the attempt of government to mediate in 
land transactions created unnecessary delays in the land acquisition process.
The subsidising of physical and social infrastructure in new residential 
development sites is a primary role of the local state in Jos. The responses of
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LGC1 and 2 above confirmed that LGCs were fulfilling this role reasonably but 
that their activities do not benefit developers due to the absence of partnership 
as noted above. The failure of state government to bear the cost of financing 
infrastructure raises concerns to developers. The question this raises is how 
developers deal with the cost of infrastructure provision. PD1 responded:
It is expected that the government will provide infrastructure to our project sites 
as a way of subsidising the cost of houses for people in Jos but this is still an 
issue... We have heard a lot promises from the state and federal government 
but nothing is forthcoming. The political leaders are always complaining of a 
lack of finance. In short, they don't provide it at all (PD1).
PD1 further adds that the FMBN is helping to tackle the infrastructure issues by 
granting additional loans of up to 70 percent of the total cost of providing 
infrastructure to their project site. This loan will have to be paid off by adding it 
to the cost of the houses produced. PD1 said it inflates the cost of houses 
beyond what is expected but that there is no alternative: clearly, the off-takers 
(NHF subscribers) have to pay higher cost on their houses as well. This would 
not happen if they had received subsidies for development.
PD2 responded:
Providing primary infrastructure remains an issue to us because the 
government is not doing as it says. At our project site, we thought that 
government will help with the cost of infrastructure but nothing happened even 
after we approached them with request. We kept sending reminder to the 
government even up to the time we completed phase one of our project but 
never received any response. Along the line, we decided to use our money to 
provide roads, electricity and water. Part of the cost incurred was transferred to 
the end users so that the cost of three bedroom bungalow went up to 
N5.3million, three bedroom semi-detached house went for t44.8million and two 
bedrooms semi-detached was sold for J44.3million (PD2).
The responses of PD1 and 2 revealed the effects of the lack of government 
subsidies in the development of housing. The two developers reported that they 
incurred additional costs in financing primary infrastructure. The cost of house 
inflated so much that a three bedroom bungalow was sold at N5 .3 million 
(according to PD2). This price is above the ceiling of N5million stipulated by the 
FMBN. In the preceding chapter, MB2 said developers who accessed 
subsidised credit were expected to build houses at a maximum cost of N5million 
per unit. This regulation was introduced by the government to ensure that 
houses provided through the subsidised scheme are affordable to NHF 
subscribers (FGN-Housing Sector Reform, 2006 p. 6; FGN-FMBN, 2011). This
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regulation is only practical if the required subsidies (land and infrastructure) are 
provided. The effective implementation of the regulation has not been achieved 
in Jos. The developers have said they cannot be bound to the terms of subsidy 
and made a case to FMBN, the loan provider, to allow them to sell houses to 
those who can afford them.
The experience of developers in Jos is similar to what occurred in other parts of 
Nigeria. For instance, a developer whose project was located at Akure, Ondo 
State (south west Nigeria) had to revise the price of houses from N3.9 to N4.48 
million per housing unit to cover the addition costs. In this instance, the 
developer incurred an additional cost in financing the provision of infrastructure. 
This was in addition to a price variation that arose due to a two year delay that 
occurred because the FMBN was initially unable to disburse the second tranche 
of the loan for the completion of the company's project. The company also 
witnessed another two year delay in seeking the FMBN's approval to revise the 
price of houses upward to cover the cost overrun (Salami, 2009 p. 18). These 
experiences suggest that the subsidy arrangement has practical difficulties in 
different locations across Nigeria.
8.2.5 Perspective of REDAN
The following respondent conveys the official position of REDAN and also 
shares experiences from their work as a developer in Jos. The comments of 
this respondent are connected to the anticipated role of government in subsidy 
provision and REDAN's perspective about it. RD said:
The housing policy requires state and local governments to design sub-policies 
and programmes simply because they have control over land in their territories 
as provided in LUA of 1978. I feel they don't really understand their role in that 
direction. They seem to understand the arrangement whereby the government 
will provide money for them to buy land and build instead of providing subsidies 
for developers to build. From my experience, the involvement of the 
government is rather discouraging activities of developers (RD).
The responses of RD raise a number of issues. First, it is observed that state 
and local government authorities do not understand the power they have over 
land in their territories and fail to appreciate their new role in the present 
housing arrangement. Second, the comments of RD suggest that history has an 
enduring legacy. This is seen in the position of the state government and local 
government councils towards a policy that enables them to directly build houses 
rather than facilitate a partnership between the private sector and the
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government. Finally, according to RD the involvement of government is rather 
discouraging activities of developers. On this RD clearly said:
"Housing is capable of stimulating the economy and creating demand for its 
product. We need to approach it from this perspective. If the government were 
to subsidise the cost of land and infrastructure for developers, it must be done 
with some care otherwise the housing market will be distorted and killed" (RD).
The comments of RD corroborate the concern raised by PD1 and 2 above 
regarding government attempts to mediate in land transaction which resulted in 
delays and increases the cost of acquiring land.
Elaborating further, RD said:
The city of Jos is being opened up substantially and the state government has 
acquired some parcels of land. If developers can pay for the compensation to 
enable them have the land it would be good. Such arrangement is more 
sustainable than waiting for the government to use its money to acquire land for 
developers. Let people earn the ir subsidy. The concept of subsidy should be 
looked at very carefully otherwise the housing market will never pick up (RD).
In this response, RD is trying to argue that the provision of government subsidy 
will possibly interfere with the local housing market. This is consistent with the 
position of neo-classical economics (which was discussed in chapter five). 
However, the responses of PD1 and 2 indicate that these subsidies are 
essential to ensure that houses are affordable to the target population. Besides, 
there were only a few developers providing housing through the subsidised 
arrangement in Jos and they are not able to supply enough houses to meet 
demand. This shortage of supply of subsidised mortgage housing is likely to 
continue to push prices of formal housing upward. It is possible that, subsidies 
will attract more small scale companies to increase the supply in line with 
demand thereby bringing price down.
8.3 SUPPORT FOR HOUSING ACTIVITIES
The national housing policy outlined a number of ways that federal, state and 
local government authorities are required to support housing activities. 
Specifically, state government and LGCs are required to streamline the 
procedure of issuing statutory land title documents (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 25). The 
poor performance of Plateau State, in registering property and granting 
construction permits has already been confirmed in the World Bank 'Doing 
Business Report' for 2012. This underscores the existence of problems with
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those agencies responsible for these functions. With problems still being 
experienced, a concern is raised regarding how local agencies support housing 
activities in Jos.
8.3.1 Government's side of the story
This section presents governmental responses about the support for housing 
provision in Jos. Speaking on the attempt of state government to improve the 
process of land registration; SG3 said the computerisation of the land registry 
was completed. A land data capturing system known as the Geographic 
Information System (PLAGIS) was designed and a new database is being 
created. At the time of the field study, existing land records were being captured 
on PLAGIS and SG3 feels that this will transform the land registration process 
from a manual to a computerised system. This should speed up land titling 
procedures and also reduce the delays being experienced by developers and 
individuals who need to obtain C of O. SG3 further commented that a new 
master plan for the Greater Jos urban area has been designed and this will take 
effect when the State Legislature passes it into law.
The computerisation of the Land Registry was already in process at one of the 
Councils as confirmed by LGC2. The response of LGC2 indicates that an ICT 
unit was already in place and some officers from land unit had already been 
sent on training courses by the Council. However, this development was not 
confirmed by LGC1. The LGC housing provision support system is rather 
focused on administering the relationship between developers and individuals 
who seek to acquire land from the Natives (kinship groups, families and 
individuals) and traditional rulers (Ward and District Heads and First Class 
Chiefs) whose role is to give clearance for change of ownership to take place 
during land transaction or to advise government to grant statutory rights to 
applicants. This role was confirmed by LGC1 and 2.
A land transaction at the land registry of councils would usually end after a 
change of ownership occurs and the Right of Occupancy (R of O) is issued to 
the land purchaser. If the land purchaser wishes to obtain higher title (C of O) 
which is a requirement for accessing a mortgage loan, the Council will write to 
the chairman of the Land Advisory and Allocation Committee (a first class
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traditional ruler in Jos), requesting the Statutory Right of Occupancy on behalf 
of the purchaser. The Land Advisory and Allocation Committee Chairman will 
then advise the State Government Land Registry to grant C of O to the 
applicant. All these procedures attract fees (as confirmed by LGC1 and 2) and 
the process usually takes seven work days at Council Registry according to 
LGC2. This indicates that delays often occur between the office of Land 
Advisory and Allocation Committee Chairman, the State Government Land 
Registry and the office of State Governor where consent is being sought prior to 
granting C of O.
8.3.2 Experiences of Private Developers
The experiences of private developers reveal dissatisfaction with the 
government's support systems in facilitating access to land and titling processes. 
PD1 said:
The government in Jos is trying but there are issues that need to be dealt with.
W e applied for land title documents at a time when the government was 
planning to computerise the land registry. The Governor decided to place an 
embargo on issuance of C of O for approximately three years. This action alone 
halted housing activities in Jos (PD1).
PD2 concurred with PD1:
Land registration process has improved a little in Jos. It took about 12 months 
for us to obtain land title document after making application. Before submitting 
our application the state government suspended land registration process for 
three years. This created problems to developers who needed to obtain title 
documents at the time. It was a significant delay for investors (PD 1)
The responses of PD1 and 2 confirmed a number of issues. Firstly, the process 
of land registration is associated with delays which could discourage investment 
in housing. Secondly, an abuse of the power vested on state governors by LUA 
1978 is confirmed by the action of state government suspending land 
registration for approximately three years simply because the land registry was 
being computerised. SG2 said this delay was a directive from the Governor's 
office to the State Ministry for Lands, Survey and Town Planning. The Ministry 
had no option other than to comply with the Governor's directive. Such action is 
capable of discouraging housing investment.
9.3.3 Experiences of Individuals
This section presents workers' perceptions on the cost of land acquisition, land 
title registration procedures and the provision of infrastructure. The respondents
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expressed similar concerns to those of developers about each of these 
processes. Figure 26 suggests that the cost of acquiring land by subjects who 
desire their own houses in Jos is a 'very big problem' or 'fairly big problem' 
irrespective of the tier of government employed by the subjects. For this data, 
the Pearson Chi-square is 0.002, indicating a statistical relationship between 
tier of government employed and cost of land acquisition. The Cramer's 
statistics revealed an association of 0.177 between tier of government 
employed and cost of land acquisition (further details on this analysis are 
available in appendix XXXV, Table 1a-c). This finding corroborates developers' 
concern with the government's failure to provide sufficient support for 
prospective home owners to acquire land at a subsidised cost.
Bar Chart
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□  Local Govt
iVery big problem
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Figure 26 Response of public sector workers about cost of land acquisition in Jos
The result in figure 27 suggests that ineffective land registration is perceived a 
'very big problem' by the sampled population. This is confirmed by a statistical 
significant (p=0.004) relationship between tier of government employed and 
land registration process. The two variables are associated with Cramer's 
statistics of 0.169 (see further details on this analysis in appendix XXXV, Table 
2a-c). This finding confirms the issues raised by private developers concerning
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the land registration process. In short, the challenge of land registration affects 
workers irrespective of tier of government employed.
Bar Chart
Tier of Govt Employed
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□  State Govt
□  Local Govt
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Land Registration
Figure 27 Response of public sector workers about land registration in Jos
The failure of state and federal government to provide infrastructure for housing 
in Jos was noted earlier in responses provided by PD1 and 2. The perceptions 
of workers presented in figure 28 corroborate the issues raised by the 
developers. The response rate for 'very big problem' and 'fairly big problem' on 
cost of providing infrastructure to building site is overwhelming. There is no 
statistical significant (p=0.414) relationship between tier of government 
employed by the subjects and cost of providing infrastructure to building site. 
However, the two variables have an association as indicated by Cramer's 
statistics of 0.102. Notwithstanding the lack of statistical relationship between 
the variables, figure 28 reveals that the provision of infrastructure to building 
sites is a problem for the subjects (further detail on this analysis is provided in 
appendix XXXV, Table 3a-c).
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□  State Govt
□  Local Govt
Figure 28 Response of public sector workers about cost of infrastructure provision in Jos
8.4 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
This chapter examines the arrangement for provision of subsidy and support for 
housing activities in Jos. The key factors influencing the provision of subsidies 
and support for housing provision in Jos are presented in figure 29. The factors 
identified will further be synthesised in this section.
1) Political will
The LGC authorities have demonstrated political will in supporting people to 
have access to land at affordable prices. The efforts of Councils to acquire land 
for sale takes away the cumbersome transaction processes which land seekers 
would usually encounter. The Councils have reasonably appreciated the 
difficulties of acquiring land from local natives in Jos. In order to mitigate such 
difficulties, LGC2 confirmed that partnerships have been introduced with land 
owners that wish to sell their land. In this way, the land owners will have a 
sense of partnership with the government rather than seeing the government as 
trying to dispossess them of their property without commensurate compensation. 
Councils do not have sufficient partnerships with corporate developers as would 
be expected; however, their activities appear to have had an effect on 
households that acquire houses through self-build efforts.
Bar Chart
8 0 -
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Figure 29: Factors influencing the provision of subsidies and support for housing provision in Jos
The state government authorities appear to deny the responsibility of subsidy 
provision. With regard to subsidising the cost of land and provision of 
infrastructure in Jos, the expressions of government officers and developers 
revealed that the arrangement has various operational challenges. Whilst LGCs 
tend to provide support directly to people through subsidising the cost of land 
and primary infrastructure provision, the state and federal agencies do not 
understand their role in this process.
2) Transparency and Accountability
The comments of developers revealed a lack of transparency in the process of 
providing support for housing in Jos. The arrangement at state government 
level tends to reflect corrupt practice in the sense that government officials 
prefer to allocate land to their associates who may not use it for the purpose of 
general housing provision. Developers lamented over the arrangement for the 
subsidising costs of land by the state government for its lack of transparency 
and accountability. Lipsky (2010 p. 19) argued that "street level bureaucrats 
conspicuously create capacities to act with discretion" but this study confirms 
the abuse of discretionary power by state government officers. The challenge of 
managing abuse together with accountability and transparency issues in street
level bureaucracy is already established in implementation literatures (Brodkin, 
2008; Hupe and Hill, 2007). The situation in Jos confirms that higher level policy 
implementers can adopt strategies around policy to divert public goods to their 
own purpose (Sabatier, 1988; Wong, 2009).
3) Resistance to change
The reluctance of state and federal government authorities to accept, in clear 
terms, the responsibility for financing housing supply subsidies indicates a 
resistance to change. This was further confirmed by RD who observed the 
action of government agencies to favour the arrangement whereby the 
government will allocate a budget for bureaucratic agencies to directly 
participate in acquiring land and building houses rather than providing 
development subsidy. For this reason, the present subsidy process appears not 
to have legitimacy in state government bureaucratic agencies in Jos.
4) Absence of supportive legislation
The policy proposal that require government authorities to provide capital 
subsidies for housing development is not supported with a national legislation. 
This was confirmed earlier in chapter five. In like manner, no legislation has 
been made by the law makers at the state government level in Jos. Also, the 
LGCs have not supported the decision with a byelaw. The interview responses 
suggest that federal and state government authorities in Jos not willing to 
accept the responsibility of financing the cost of land and infrastructure 
subsidies. This happened because the decision is left at the discretion of 
government authorities, and in this case, they chose not to provide the 
subsidies.
Effect of Government's failure to provide development subsidies in Jos
There are three key issues that arise from the failure of government to finance 
the cost of subsidies for housing in Jos. The issues are outlined in Figure 30 
and subsequently discussed.
223
Cost of houses 
goes up and 
above the 
ceiling price set 
by government
Effect of 
government's 
failure to finance 
the cost of 
development 
subsidies in Jos
Developers 
incur additional 
cost and delays 
in the 
completion of 
housing projects
Figure 30: Effect of government's failure to provide housing development subsidies in Jos
1) Uncertainties and Risk
The responses of local government officers confirm the role of traditional rulers 
in land titling processes. At Council level, Ward and Districts Heads give 
clearance for the change of ownership of land between land sellers and buyers, 
and also give advice to the local government authority to grant R of O to 
applicants. The essence of their involvement is to obtain confirmation on root of 
title to land. This process does not create much delay (as confirmed by LGC2). 
However, developers and individuals who wish to access mortgages will have to 
go beyond Council level to obtain C of O at the State Government Land 
Registry. This process requires the involvement of first class traditional ruler 
whose role it is to advise the government to on approving applications for C of 
O. This process creates delay (as confirmed by LGC2). When this delay is 
added to the period it takes for the Land Registry to seek for Governors consent 
before granting C of O, the process appears considerably unattractive to 
investors. The responses of developers corroborate this finding, with it taking up 
to three years to have their land registered by C of O at the Land Registry in Jos. 
The process of registering land at the State Land Registry in Jos is shrouded in 
bureaucratic arrangements that create further delays. This arrangement needs
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reforms that will shift the power and responsibility to Local Authorities to also be 
able to register land by C of O.
2) Developers incur additional cost and delays
The failure of the government to provide subsidies has implications for 
affordability. As was noted earlier, developers are incurring additional 
development costs which arise from land acquisition and the provision of 
primary infrastructure such as access roads, electricity and water supplies to 
new project sites. These additional costs are often transferred to the end user, 
in this case the NHF subscriber The cost of houses then increases and 
possibly becomes unaffordable to some NHF subscribers.
3) High cost of houses
Further, the ceiling price of N5million imposed by the government for houses 
funded with subsidised finance is unachievable by developers without the 
necessary subsidies being made available by government. This was confirmed 
by PD2 who said the cost of three-bedroom bungalow goes beyond the ceiling 
price of N5million to N5.3million. Finally, individuals who desire to acquire 
houses through a self-help/self-build approach will experience similar 
challenges to that of developers. This was confirmed in the analysis conducted. 
It suggests that the government's failure to provide subsidy and support housing 
activities in Jos has negative consequences for both the formal and informal 
housing system.
In summary, the arrangements for the provision of capital subsidies in Jos are 
affected by a number of variables. First, there is lack of will by state and federal 
government authorities to politically endorse the proposed housing subsidy 
scheme in Jos. As a result, the subsidy arrangement is lacking legitimacy in 
local agencies. Secondly, the opportunity for developers to have access to land 
through the support arrangement created in LGCs is hampered by the absence 
of partnership between developers and Councils. Thirdly, the responses of state 
and federal government officers suggest that the local state is resistant to 
change. Fourthly, the bureaucratic arrangement for land registration is 
associated with delays and finally, the arrangement lacks transparency and
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accountability. These failures have implications for the cost of houses provided 
by developers for sale to NHF subscribers in Jos. As clearly noted, the cost of 
houses goes above the ceiling price set by government because developers 
incur costs which should have been covered by the government.
This chapter is an important component of the jigsaw. The findings obtained 
have further resolved the puzzle in the thesis. It now necessary to examine how 
the enabling strategy (decentralisation, participation and partnerships) benefit 
the arrangement for organising the provision of new housing and improvement 
of slums conditions in Jos. This will be undertaken in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER NINE
ADMINISTRATIVE TECHIQUES FOR HOUSING PROVISION IN JOS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The discussions covered in chapter three confirms that the International 
Development Agencies (the World Bank, the UNDP and the UNHABITAT) have 
advised the Nigerian government to adopt new administrative techniques 
(decentralisation, participation and partnerships), and to embed housing 
provision roles in local administrative systems in order to promote effectiveness, 
efficiency and accountability. These administrative techniques are deployed to 
Nigeria within the purview of the 'enabling approach'. The purpose of this 
chapter is to examine the extent to which the enabling strategies benefit the 
organisation of new housing provision and the improvement of slums in Jos. 
The question raised (in chapter one) concerned how the local state organises 
the 'enabling' provision of new housing and the improvement of slum conditions 
in Jos. This corresponds with case study three and four (contained on page 
160).
The analysis is concerned with the decentralisation of administrative roles 
among government institutions, the participation of institutional actors (public 
and private) and the local partnerships created between them. For the purpose 
of analysis, the field data is discussed in two parts: the first part examines case 
study three, which is concerned with the application of the enabling strategy in 
new housing provision, and the second part examines case study four which is 
concerned with the improvement of slum conditions. The type and nature of 
data used for the analysis is contained on Table 20 (overleaf).
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Table 20 Sources and nature of data used
Data Source Nature of data A bbreviation used 
in analysis
A representative of Federal Government 
agency
Interview transcripts FG
Three representatives of State 
Government agencies
Interview transcripts SG1.SG 2 and SG3
Two representative of LGCs Interview transcripts LGC1 and LGC2
A representative of the REDAN Interview transcript RD
Two private developers Interview transcripts PD1 and PD2
Representative of FMBN Interview transcript MB3
Two representative of programme 
implementation agencies
Interview transcript A1 and A2
Federal government official documents Reports Reference cited
Government official documents Reports Reference cited
International Agencies (the World Bank, 
UN-HABITAT and UNDP)
Reports Reference cited
9.2 ADMINISTRATION OF NEW HOUSING PROVISION
The national housing policy emphasised the decentralisation of roles, 
participation of multiple actors and local level partnerships in the provision of 
new housing. The national housing policy statement expected state and local 
government authorities to design local strategies in line with the overall goals of 
the national housing policy. The local strategies should serve as a framework 
for local level partnership (FGN-NHP, 2006 pp. 19 - 26). The anticipated 
network of relationships created for this purpose was illustrated on page 161. 
The key actors consist of bureaucratic administrative institutions such as the 
Federal Department for Lands, Housing and Urban Development Department in 
Jos, the State Ministry of Housing and Urban Development, the State Ministry of 
Lands, Survey and Town Planning and Development Control Board; Local 
Government Council Departments for Housing, Lands, Planning; private estate 
developers, Housing Corporations, the FMBN and land owners. In the following 
section, the administrative system used in organising relevant actors to provide 
new housing will be examined. For this purpose, the views of bureaucratic
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officers are combined with relevant documents to examine the local 
administrative system used in Jos.
9.2.1 Strategy
The aspiration of the federal government to support state and local government 
authorities to come up with an administrative system for local development is 
reflected in several documents produced by federal government (see Table 21). 
At the state and local government levels, there is no evidence of an existing 
policy statement for housing and land. However, the state government 
authorities have designed relevant strategies for urban development in the form 
of a Master Plan document (2008-25) and a Four-Year Strategic Plan for 
Housing and Urban Development which spanned from 2007 to 2011. Strategies 
of similar forms do not exist in the LGCs and this is likely to negatively affect the 
enabling strategy for housing provision and local-level development.
The Federal Government of Nigeria in partnership with donor agencies notably 
the UNDP, World Bank, UN-HABITAT, UK Department for International 
Development (DFID) and United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID) came up with a methodology for participatory development, which is 
based on economic empowerment and development. Since 2004 a national 
strategy for economic development and delivery of social services was 
designed. This strategy is termed 'National Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategy' (NEEDS). This was supposed to serve as basis for the 
design of State-, Local-, and Community Economic Empowerment and 
Development Strategies (SEEDS, LEEDS, and CEEDS). The strategies of 
SEEDS, LEEDS and CEEDS were proposed as methodologies for promoting 
poverty alleviation and general development at the grassroots level by involving 
key stakeholders such as local government officials, civil society groups, private 
sector participants, community leaders, traditional rulers, women and youths in 
the process of development at the local government level (UNDP, 2006 p. 15). 
The administration of public services such as health facilities, education, 
housing, infrastructure facilities is supposed to be achieved within these 
methodologies (UNDP, 2006 pp. 34-35).
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Table 21: Policy framework for development
Forms of policy Policy statements categorised based on authoring authority
statement
F e d e r a l  G o v e r n m e n t S ta te  G o v e r n m e n t  (J o s ) L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
C o u n c i ls  (J o s  
N o r t h  & S o u th )
Housing National Housing Policy 
(2006), Revised (2012)
None None
Land Land Use Act (1978) None None
Urban
development
Urban Development Policy 
(1992), Revised (2012)
Greater Jos Master Plan (2008- 
25); 4-Year Strategic Plan for 
Housing and Urban Development 
(2007-11)
None
Economic 
development 
and poverty 
eradication
National Economic 
Empowerment and 
Development Strategy 
(NEEDS, 2004-07; 2008-12)
Plateau State Economic 
Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (PLASEEDS, 2005-15)
None
Other strategy 
documents
Vision 2020 Thematic 
Reports: Housing (2009); 
Governance (2009); Urban 
& Rural Development 
(2009); and Water & 
Sanitation (2009)
None None
Source: Author's compilation based on available official documents (2013)
The State Government in Jos in partnership with the UNDP designed a strategy 
in 2005. The strategy is referred to as Plateau State Economic Empowerment 
and Development Strategy (PLASEEDS) and was designed to span from 2005 
to 2015. It contains plans for the implementation of national public policies at 
the state government level. It provides policy targets, action plans and activities 
for different aspects of economic development including new housing provision 
(PLASEEDS, 2005 pp. 71-128; 239-253). The state government policy targets 
include the provision of 20,000 housing units in Jos and other LGAs by 2015. 
This was to be achieved through an annual budgetary provision of five percent 
for the housing sector, formalising informal land, reclaiming land damaged by 
mining, computerising land registries, amending compensation law to reflect 
present day economic values, encouraging the LGCs to develop strategies for 
housing provision and recapitalising and resuscitating State Government owned 
PMI (PLASEEDS, 2005 p 73). These policy targets are possible areas for 
networking. Specifically, the state government strategy emphasised the need 
for partnerships with private developers and financial institutions to provide new 
housing (PLASEEDS, 2005 p. 73). The State Government's PLASEEDS
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provides evidence of a strategy at the state government level, but there is no 
evidence of a similar strategy as regards LEEDS and CEEDS at local 
government and community levels in Jos. This raises the question of how do 
LGCs fit into, the arrangement for new housing provision in Jos?
PLASEEDS lacks the requisite detail for operation. It does not clearly allocate 
roles to be performed by local agencies and the forms of partnerships that 
should result. As was established earlier (see page 122) in housing provision, 
the FMBN is required to partner with real estate developers (private developers 
and housing corporation), PMIs (private and government owned), and NHF 
subscribers for the purpose of financing new housing development (FGN-NHP, 
2006 p. 22; FGN-Housing Sector Reform, 2006 pp. 4 - 6). The FHA is expected 
to provide sites-and-services for new housing projects, construct houses for low 
income groups at Federal Capital Territory and State levels (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 
22). The state government is expected to provide sites-and-services for new 
housing projects, utilise State Housing Corporation to build houses and partner 
with private developers for the same purpose (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 23). The 
LGCs are specifically required to provide residential sites-and-services layouts 
and enter into partnership with the private sector and state and federal 
government agencies to provide new housing at a local level (FGN-NHP, 2006 
p. 24). These policy provisions pin point areas for local level partnerships in 
housing provision; however, the methodology of PLASEEDS did not clearly 
elaborate on how the new housing provision should be implemented. The 
strategy is deficient in terms of operational guidelines for planning, organising 
and coordinating new housing provision in Jos.
Aside from PLASEEDS, in 2008 the Plateau State Government produced a 
short-term Strategic Plan for Urban Development and Housing in Plateau State 
(2008 - 2011). The programme of activities was to cover aspects of designing 
state policy on urban development, housing, and environmental protection. This 
was to be fulfilled through the review of relevant laws on planning, housing, 
public health, and the adoption of state building code. There was no evidence to 
confirm that any of the policy review was completed at the time of field study.
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Other activities that were expected to be covered included the creation of local 
planning authorities at LGCs, the creation of district planning committees, the 
design of a new master plan for the Greater Jos urban environment, preparation 
of master plans for LGA headquarters, and to encourage the creation of PMIs. 
These activities were to be achieved through institutional reforms at both State 
and Local Government levels. There is evidence to indicate that design of a 
master plan document for the Greater Jos urban area was completed 
(Government Plateau State, 2009) but there is no evidence of such plans at 
LGCs. The desire to create local planning authorities at LGCs and district 
planning committees was yet to be realised at the time of the field study. The 
responses of LGC 1 and 2 confirmed that the administrative structure of LGCs 
has not been altered.
Some programmes were created to cover aspects of the design and 
construction of four by-pass roads, the construction of urban markets, the 
establishment of a land bank, preparation of urban renewal and an urban 
upgrading plan, upgrading programmes, land reclamation, the production of 
new residential layouts, the preparation of district plans and the implementation 
of new housing projects. These activities were to be fulfilled through the 
financial and political commitment by the government (Government of Plateau 
State, 2008a p. 35). The evidence available suggests that the government was 
focusing on the expansion of inner city roads and the opening of new ones 
around the city. As of 2008, nine such contracts were awarded (Government of 
Plateau State, 2008 p.43) and eight were awarded between November 2012 
and February 2013 (Alao, 2013; Government of Plateau State, 2012). This 
development has a future potential of providing new residential sites around Jos.
9.2.2 Planning and organising
The state and federal government officers confirmed they were playing the role 
of planning and organising new housing provision in Jos. However, their 
acclaimed roles appear to be similar and these roles include mediating between 
land owners and estate developers to facilitate land acquisition by developers, 
identifying suitable sites for housing projects, and negotiating with land owners 
on behalf of developers. These roles were expressed by SG2 & 3 and FG:
W e have had series of meetings with developers to help them acquire land for
housing projects around the city. W e often give advice to the government on
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how to go about the provision of infrastructure such as roads, drainage, 
electricity and water supply as part of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)
(FG).
SG2 laid similar claims:
The Ministry for Housing and Urban Development has just completed the 
screening of private developers which will partner with government to build 
houses in Jos. ...six were selected and they are now waiting for government to 
provide land for housing project. ...Government has identified five sites and the 
land owners are very much willing to sale (SG2).
SG3 made similar expression:
W e have been mediating between developers and land owners to facilitate 
acquisition. W e have mediated and also settled land ownership disputes 
between two communities and kinship groups on behalf of developers. W e are 
waiting for developers to make money available for us to compensate land 
owners (SG3).
Based on the responses of FG and SG2&3, it would appear that bureaucratic 
agencies are deeply involved with the mediatory role of trying to help 
developers deal with cumbersome land acquisition processes. However, 
developers tend to have a contrary view about the involvement of bureaucratic 
officials in the land acquisition process. PD 1 and 2 both confirmed that the 
involvement of government officials had resulted in an unpleasant experience. 
They also revealed that government officers were unable to carryout conclusive 
negotiations with land owners. As a result, negotiations had to be repeated. The 
process of land acquisition took too long, numerous delays were experienced 
and developers ended up paying higher costs for land compensation than they 
ought to have paid. The expressions of developers revealed that they do not 
wish to repeat such an experience.
The roles of LGCs tend to be directed at the grassroots. One of the local 
government officers commented:
From 1991 to date we have not been directly involved in building 
houses. ...from time to time, the Council usually acquire land and after 
producing the layout it will then sell to workers and the general public at 
subsidised rate. ...the work of estate officers involves negotiating with 
landowners and carrying out valuation for compensation. In addition, we are 
performing our routine duty of investigating land ownership roots (LGC1).
Similarly, LGC2 responded that the Land and Estate Department does its 
routine duty of establishing root of title to land, processing of change of 
ownership and issuing of customary title to land. Further to this, the Council has
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been acquiring land for sale to its workers and the public. LGC2 cited an 
instance:
We produced 300 plots, each measuring 50ft x 100ft. The Council decided to 
allocate 150 plots to its staff and the rest were sold to people residing in the 
local government area (LGC2).
The LGC officers were able to confirm the absence of a housing department 
within the administrative structure of Councils. The officers confirmed the 
existence of an Estate nit, Planning Unit and Lands Department. The housing 
related activities of LGCs are more to do with land administration than the 
provision of housing. Similarly, the state and federal government officers were 
only able to explain their roles in relation to land, as opposed to the overall 
administration of housing provision.
9.2.3 Management of Public Houses
The local government officers confirmed that they were still involved in the 
management of public houses:
The Estate nit is responsible for maintenance of Council estates. The estates 
are still being held by the Council and there is no plan to sell at the moment. 
(LGC1). LGC2 also confirmed this role.
This appears to be contrary to the policy that the government introduced in 
2003, which directed government at all levels to sell public estates. The policy 
expects public institutions to monetise worker's fringe benefits and stop 
providing rental housing for them. FG confirmed that the federal government 
houses in Jos have been sold. What is currently left is land which the federal 
government acquired some years ago but is yet to be developed. At state 
government level SG1 state that the state government sold its houses to sitting 
tenants (except for a small number that were in dilapidated condition). In the 
present era, the management of public estates is no longer a role for State and 
federal government but this still exists at Councils level.
9.2.4 Partnerships and Participation
The responses of bureaucrats suggest an absence of an appropriate 
coordination mechanism for new housing provision at the local level in Jos. 
Different levels of 'loose interactions' between actors are observed. At one level 
it is observed that the FMBN is interacting with private developers and NHF 
subscribers. This was revealed in the responses of MB2, RD, PD1 and 2 in
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chapter seven. At another level, it is observed that bureaucratic agencies are 
trying to plan and organise housing provision with their activities resulting in 
partnerships between developers and land owners. This level of interaction is 
confirmed from the responses of FG, SG2 and 3. A third level of interaction 
involves LGC departments, landowners and individuals seeking land to build 
houses. The first and second partnerships mentioned above are created 
through the interaction of private developers with the FMBN. This partially fulfils 
the aspiration of the national housing policy. The partnership between LGCs 
with landowners and individuals is not connected to the partnership of the 
FMBN with developers, NHF subscribers and those bureaucratic agencies 
(state and federal) that claimed to perform the role of organising and planning. 
This suggests that LGCs are operating separately and outside of the planned 
arrangement for new housing provision (which was illustrated on page 161).
The absence of appropriate coordination is creating negative results on the 
anticipated partnerships and participation of relevant actors. In chapter seven, 
the interaction of the FMBN with private developers and NHF subscribers in Jos 
was confirmed. This partnership partially fulfils the aspiration of the national 
housing policy (FGN-Housing Sector Reform, 2006 pp. 5, 6). However, it falls 
short of the planned partnership in some respects because the FMBN has not 
been able to create this partnership with local institutional and international 
investors. Similarly the UDBN, which is supposed to be involved with local 
agencies in financing the provision of urban infrastructure, was not operating in 
Jos and no mention was made of it by the people interviewed. Also, there is no 
indication that PMIs and Cooperatives were engaged to play their anticipated 
roles. Specifically, the PMIs are expected to act as an interface in the collection 
of subscription from workers and remit these to the FMBN. The arrangement 
also require developers to liaise with PMIs to process loan applications on 
behalf of NHF subscribers and also collect loan repayment on behalf of the 
FMBN (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 39; FGN-Housing Sector Reform, 2006 p. 6). In Jos, 
the system does not operate as directed in the policy as confirmed in the 
response of MB3:
The first step is for developers to acquire a land and also secure title on it. After 
this, they will then apply to the bank seeking for a loan to finance the 
construction of certain number of housing units, which would eventually be sold 
to the NHF subscribers (MB3).
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This response suggests that developers can access loans from the FMBN 
directly without needing a PMI to interface. It should also be mentioned that the 
State Government PMI in Jos was not functional at the time of field study and 
one of the policy targets of state government since 2005 was to recapitalise and 
resuscitate it (Government of Plateau State, 2008a p.35; PLASEEDS, 2005 p. 
75) but this aspiration was yet achieved as confirmed by SG 1:
W e have just been struggling to survive and at the moment we are 
bankrupt. ...the prescribed capital base of PMIs in the country used to be 
N5million. It was reviewed as a result of the financial sector reforms that started 
in 2004. W e submitted a proposal to state government on how to go about 
recapitalising the PMI but never got any response despite series of reminders 
(SG1).
SG1 also confirmed that the PMI is jointly owned by the State Government in 
Jos and government of a neighbouring state (Nassarawa) which was created 
from Plateau State. These authorities were yet to decide on the future of the 
PMI but however, they were not showing sufficient commitment towards 
recapitalising it at the time of this study. Cooperative societies are expected to 
perform a similar role to that of PMIs, but their focus should be on the non­
salaried informal sector who wishes to subscriber to NHF. This was not 
happening in Jos at the time of field study and the information made available to 
the public by authorities of the FMBN suggests that this arrangement was just 
about to commence in 2012. For example, local print media reported that: 
"Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) has introduced a new product 
known as FMBN Informal Sector Cooperative Scheme, in a bid to integrate 
Nigerians operating in the informal sector of the economy into the National 
Housing Fund (NHF) scheme" (Kolawole, 2012a). In another paper, it was 
stated that: "Brighter days may lay around the corner for operatives in the 
informal sector of the economy... the Informal Sector Housing Loan scheme, 
being promoted by the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) launched in 
December 2011. The scheme is designed to integrate the non-salaried informal 
sector into the National Housing Fund (NHF) through cooperative 
societies. ...traders, artisans, and mechanics usually lacking formal education 
with low and irregular incomes but are bound together by membership to 
various associations, unions, trade groups and cooperatives determined by their 
business and trade are granted a mortgage loan..." (Uwaegbulam, 2012).
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The authorities of the FMBN are over exaggerating the performance of the NHF 
scheme through the print media. They are trying to raise hopes by announcing 
that the housing finance policy statement is being supported with action but this 
does not appear to produce corresponding results at a local level. In Jos, both 
State and Federal Government Housing Corporations are missing from the 
anticipated arrangement. This was confirmed earlier when HC said:
"From the inception of the new policy to date, PIPC (State government Housing 
Corporation) has never accessed NHF/FMBN loans... The company is owned 
by the state government and it only engages in projects that government feel 
are viable such as shopping centres"(HC).
The records made available from the FHA suggest that the Federal Government 
Housing Corporation has not contributed to housing provision in Jos. The 
activities of the FHA are not spread across Nigeria and as a result, the city of 
Jos, together with others, has not benefitted from the houses it has supplied so 
far. For instance, the official record of the FHA (see appendix XXXVI on page 
122) indicates that it has partnered with 26 State Governments (including FCT) 
to build 35,609 housing units in all (FGN-Federal Housing Authority, 2010) but 
Plateau State is not on the list of beneficiaries.
The preceding discussions allows for the assessment of the effect of applying 
the enabling strategies of decentralisation, participation and partnership in 
organising for new housing provision. Table 22 summarises the positive and 
negative effects of applying the enabling strategies.
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Table 22: Assessing the effect of applying the enabling strategy on the provision of housing
Enabling
strategy
housing
provision
components
Outcome
P o s it iv e N e g a t iv e
c - o
<0(A
Local strategy 
formulation
The decentralisation of 
administrative roles led to the 
formulation of policy strategy and 
action plan by the state 
government authorities.
Such development did not occur in 
the Local Government Councils.
WL.*->C0)od)a
Planning and 
organising
The officers interviewed were only 
able to comment on their planning 
and organising role with reference 
to land acquisition.
Decentralisation did not lead to any 
identified innovativeness in the 
planning and organising for new 
housing provision.
Provision of 
finance from the 
FMBN
The Federal Government is 
providing financial support to the 
FMBN but this is not on a regular 
basis.
The workers in Jos are 
subscribing to the NHF scheme.
Private local institutions and 
foreign investors are not 
participating.
The participation of the workers in 
Jos is low.
Subsidising the 
cost of land
The Local Government Councils 
are involved in this role but their 
effort is beneficial only to the self- 
build sector.
The State and Federal 
Government authorities are not 
involved with this role.
coroQ.
O
'€
Helping developers 
to acquire land
The Federal, State and Local 
Government authorities are 
involved in this role
The involvement of government 
officers creates delay and inflates 
cost of land acquisition for the 
developers.
a.
Subsidising the 
cost of 
infrastructure
Local Government Councils are 
involved but their effort is 
beneficial only to the self-build 
sector.
The Federal and State 
Government Authorities are not 
involved.
Construction of 
new houses
Private housing-building 
companies are involved
Housing Corporation and 
Cooperatives are not involved
Access to 
mortgage housing
The workers in Jos are 
participating in the NHF scheme
But their participation does not 
guarantee access to mortgage 
housing.
Pa
rtn
er
sh
ip
s
Partnership among 
institutional actors
There are partnerships among 
institutional actors.
But activities of actors are 
uncoordinated due to a lack of an 
appropriate coordination 
mechanism.
The activities of actors are loose 
and not directed at predetermined 
goals.
Source: author's assessment
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9.3 ADMINISTRATION OF SLUM IMPROVEMENT
This section examines how the application of the enabling strategy helps in 
organising for slum improvement in Jos. This examination corresponds with 
case study four contained on page 161 and research four.
9.3.1 Strategy
Slum improvement activities in Jos are supported in the strategies of NEEDS 
and PLASEEDS which has been explained previously. Broadly speaking, the 
national housing policy states that state government should carry out the re­
development and upgrading of existing blighted residential areas either alone or 
in collaboration with federal government or international bodies or the private 
sector. Similarly, LGCs are required to upgrade infrastructure in blighted 
residential areas. In order to achieve this, state and local government 
authorities are required to develop local strategies and plans (FGN-NHP, 2006 
pp. 23, 24). The question that follows then is how do local administrative 
systems organise this slum improvement in Jos? Some strategies and plans for 
slum improvement are contained in PLASEEDS; however, this is not sufficiently 
elaborated upon in terms of specifying how projects will be funded, who will 
contribute to funding, and how roles will be assign to local agencies. In spite of 
this, the plan and strategy of state government expresses an intention to carry 
out appropriate urban renewal programmes (PLASEEDS, 2005 p. 73). The 
strategy adopted by state government is to collaborate with CBOs and NGOs 
(PLASEEDS, 2005 p. 128). As for new housing provision, LEEDS and CEEDS 
strategies simply do not exist for the improvement of slum conditions in Jos. 
However, the situation differs with that of new housing provision as will be 
observed subsequently discussed.
9.3.2 Funding sources and targets
The finance for slum improvement on the basis of community and social 
development programme in Jos comes partly from international investors and 
partly from Federal, State and Local Government authorities in Nigeria. The 
international investors involved are the World Bank and the N-HABITAT. 
These investors are providing finance for specific projects and periods on a loan 
basis to the federal government which takes the loan on behalf of the state and 
local governments that fulfil some prescribed conditions. This development is
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quite recent in Jos, with the N-HABITAT commencing in 2006 (as confirmed 
by A1) and the World Bank starting only in 2008 (World Bank, 2008 p. 1; 2012 p. 
1,3).
The N-HABITAT's partnership with Nigerian authorities is organised under a 
programme known as Water for African Cities (WACII) (This was confirmed by 
A1). This partnership is supported in the ited Nations Development 
Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for achieving MDGs (particularly MDG No. 7, 
Target 11, to improve the lives of at least 100 million slum dwellers by the year 
2020; and Target 10 which calls for a 50 percent reduction of the number of 
people without sustainable access to safe drinking water) through national, 
state, local and community strategies (United Nations Systems in Nigeria, 2010; 
2008 pp. 6-9 &14; UN-HABITAT, 2008a pp. 6-11).
The funding for the improvement of water supply and sanitation conditions 
under the Water for African Cities II (WAC II) in Jos comes through a loan 
facilitated by the N-Habitat from the African Development Bank for the 
government of Nigeria. This financial support is made possible by the interest of 
UN-Habitat and African Development Bank to promote pro-poor water supply 
and sanitation projects, and to facilitate loan/grant for services that benefits the 
urban poor (UN-HABITAT, 2009 p. 7). The funding is intended to improve basic 
water supply and sanitation services for the underprivileged communities; to 
develop a Water Demand Management (WDM) strategy for the city of Jos; to 
develop a strategy for the empowerment of the community to manage and 
operate water and sanitation facilities provided to their communities; and to 
promote hygiene education in selected schools and communities in Jos. These 
projects were implemented by government organisations in Jos at a total project 
cost of US$1,911,828. The loan element from the N-habitat is US$1,057,674 
(55%). The balance of S$854154 (45%) is a counterpart fund provided by the 
implementing partners (see Table 23). The loan is for the benefit of the 
government in Jos and is guaranteed by the Federal Government of Nigeria. 
The conditions set by the N-Habitat for the loan will be examined in 
succeeding discussions. In regards to community projects, the benefiting 
communities in Jos were not required to contribute to the project cost but are 
expected to take responsibility for operation and maintenance of facilities
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provided to their communities. In addition to the above mentioned projects a 
micro-credit scheme for female headed households in Jos was designed as part 
of WAC II. This was implemented by an NGO and the funding was provided by 
a local micro finance institution on loan basis to the households who are 
guaranteed by the NGO.
Table 23: Funding Arrangement for WAC II Projects in Jos
Contributors Amount
UN-Habitat - US$1,057,674
Local
implementing
partners
Federal Government (30% of US$854,154) 
State Government (60% of US$854,154) 
LGCs in Jos Metropolis (10% of US$854,154)
US$854,154
Total Project Cost US$1,911,828
Local private 
institution
To provide micro credit for female-headed households 
who lack toilet facilities to provide such
Value not stated
Beneficiary
community
To take responsibility for operation and maintenance of 
community facilities
Source: Field study conducted in Jos (2012); UN-Habitat (2009)
The strategic direction for the WAC II programme is on facilitating access to 
environmentally sound water and sanitation services to the un-served 
populations of the target cities. The city of Jos is one of those locations where 
the WACII programme is being implemented. The Programme aims to provide 
support to water supply and sanitation utilities, Local Governments and CSOs to 
help improve service provision for the urban poor. The funding provided by UN- 
HABITAT comes via a Memorandum of Understanding with the African 
Development Bank. This financial support is "provided for the incorporation of 
pro-poor components in larger water supply and sanitation projects funded by 
the Bank, and the pre-investment capacity enhancement of utility service 
providers to facilitate rapid and effective loan/grant processing and utilisation for 
expanded access to services that benefits the urban poor" (UN-HABITAT, 2009 
p. 7).
The funding for Community and Social Development Projects (CSDP) in Jos 
comes partly from the World Bank and partly from Federal, State and Local 
Government authorities in Nigeria and the benefiting communities. The World 
Bank provided an initial loan of US$300million in 2009 for the implementation of
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three major components of the CSDP (see Table 24) across Nigeria. The first 
component of the CSDP is the coordination and project support, which the 
Federal Project Support Unit (FPSU) in the Federal Ministry of Finance was 
responsible for its implementation at a cost of US$10million. The second 
component was the building of capacity for LGAs and State Government 
Ministries. This component was handled by the FPSU in collaboration with 
participating state and local government authorities at a cost of US$20million. 
The third component was concerned with community-driven investment and the 
implementation was done by agencies created by the participating state 
governments in collaboration with participating LGCs and project beneficiary 
communities. This is where the funding for community-driven investment comes 
from and a sum of US$170million was allocated.
Table 24: Major Components of CSDP and Cost Allocation
Project Description of Cost Implementation
Component Component ($m)
F e d e r a l  le v e l S t a t e  le v e l L o c a l  le v e l
One Federal level- 
coordination and 
project support
US$10 The Federal Project 
Support Unit of the 
Federal Ministry of 
Finance
- -
Two LGA/sectoral ministry 
capacity building
US$20 FPSU of the Federal 
Ministry of Finance
An Agency 
created by the 
state
government
Three Community-Driven
Investment
US$170 An Agency 
created by the 
state
government
LGCs and 
Communities
Source: World Bank (2008; 2012a&c)
One of the conditions set by the World Bank is that the total cost of any 
community project selected for implementation should not be more than 
US$100,000 equivalent (See Table 25). For this reason, the beneficiary 
community, with the support of facilities (project officers and LGC officers) 
should be involved in proposing the project. The benefiting communities are 
required to contribute 10 percent of the total project cost and any shortfall to the 
total project cost is paid up by the implementation agency (confirmed by A2). 
The World Bank is the only private investor for CSDP projects in Jos and its 
involvement in community-driven investment is done on conditions which will be 
examined shortly.
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Table 25: Funding Arrangement for Community-Driven Investment in Jos
Contributors Commitment Amount
The W orld Bank Contributes to the cost of a project 
proposed by a community and approved 
by the implementation agency in Jos
Naira equivalent of US$100,000
Federal Government Guarantees the state and local 
government for the World Bank loan and 
also recover the loan for the World Bank
State Government To create an autonomous implementation 
agency and set up a project account in its 
name.
To make an initial contribution of 
at least 100 million Naira (about 
$833,000) to the agency's 
account.
Local Government To create a Local Governments Review 
Committee (LGRC) and fund its activities
Unstated amount
Beneficiary Community To contribute to the cost of a project 
approved for their community and take 
responsibility for operation and 
maintenance of facility
Contribute 10% of the total cost 
of a project
Source: Field Survey in Jos (2012); World Bank (2008, 2012a&b)
The World Bank states that the rationale for its Country Partnership Strategy 
(CPS) with Nigeria is a direct response to the national strategy of NEEDS as 
well as other developmental progress. The World Bank also states that it 
recognises that Nigeria faces considerable human development challenges as 
shown by very poor human development indicators and high regional disparities. 
Therefore, the World Bank CPS in agreement with the NEEDS aims to 
empower people through poverty reduction, increased access to basic social 
services and the promotion of a sustainable environment (World Bank, 2008 
p.3). In line with these objectives, the World Bank clearly specified how local 
states should use the finance provided in administering Community and Social 
Development Projects: general public administration sector (30 percent), 
general water, sanitation and flood protection sector (10 percent), roads and 
highways (20 percent), primary education (20 percent) and other social services 
(30 percent) (World Bank, 2008 p. 1).
9.3.3 Conditions for participation of investors
The two international investors (the World Bank and UN-HABITAT) operate with 
similar principles. As stated above, the money provided by the international 
investors is on a loan basis to the federal government for use by state and local 
government authorities that fulfil a number of prescribed conditions. The first
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condition for state government is that it must set-up an autonomous managing 
agency through local legislation, which is free from the existing bureaucracy but 
integrated into the governance system. Competent workers should be recruited 
into the agency and the process of recruitment should be agreed upon with 
funding partners. This condition is applicable for both UN-HABITAT and the 
World Bank loans. These principles were confirmed by A1 and A2.
In addition, the World Bank requires any LGC that wishes to participate to 
provide a local government level institutional structure called the Local 
Governance Review Committee (LGRC) along with designated desk officers in 
key state sectoral ministries and development agencies. The process of 
creating an LGRC requires a supporting bye-law. The World Bank funded 
CDSP will not operate in any Local Government that do not establish and fund 
the activities of the LGRC (World Bank, 2008 pp. 6, 7). At the time of field study, 
only Jos South LGC had fulfilled the World Bank conditions and was benefitting 
from its funded CDSP as confirmed by LGC 1 and A1.
Secondly, the participating state and local government were made to sign an 
undertaking with the federal government, agreeing to contribute counterpart 
funding and to repay the loan invested by the World Bank and UN-HABITAT. 
This was confirmed by A1 and A2. Thirdly, the process of loan recovery 
applicable is at-source deduction from statutory allocation accrued to 
participating state and local government by the federal government and 
remitting directly to investors. Fourthly, the investors require state government 
to adopt a community-driven approach in the execution of projects and also to 
decentralise decision-making responsibility and control.
Lastly, the state government is required to partner those LGCs and 
communities where projects are being provided. These actors must be involved 
in review, supervision and monitoring of project proposals emerging from 
communities expected to benefit from the arrangement. A1 and A2 confirm that 
these conditions were all satisfied by State Government in Jos before the UN- 
HABITAT and World Bank began to release funds. At the time of field study, the
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two LGCs (Jos North and Jos South) had satisfied all the prescribed conditions 
to benefit from the 	N-HABITAT funded projects (LGC1 and 2 confirmed it).
9.3.4 Project components and implementation activities 
The 	N-HABITAT WAC II programme for Jos city consists of four projects. 
Three of these projects are implemented by partners from state and local 
government organisations in Jos and one by NGOs. These projects include: 
"water supply and sanitation services for the underprivileged communities, 
Water Demand Management (WDM) strategy development, and the 
development of a strategy for the empowerment of the community to manage 
and operate the facilities provided" (UN-HABITAT, 2009b p. 20).
The activities supported under these projects are micro in nature, and include: 
"water network expansion, provision of public latrines and mobilisation of 
communities for better waste management and disposal, capacity building at 
utility level and strengthening of existing community management structures, 
support for implementation of in-house reform by Plateau State Water Board 
and development of a WDM strategy for the board, carrying out water, 
sanitation and hygiene education in schools, undertaking of advocacy and 
public awareness campaign and development of an Urban Catchment 
management strategy for the Plateau State Water Board" (UN-HABITAT, 2009b
p. 20).
In addition to the projects and associated activities listed above, the WAC II 
programme for Jos city also has a micro-credit scheme for female headed 
households. This project aims to assist women from informal settlements where 
houses lack pit latrines and are inhabited by low-income earners to access 
sanitation microcredit in order to provide such a latrine. The project consists of 
awareness creation to get communities to understand the concept and to also 
prepare them for creation of solidarity groups and the mobilisation of the 
required artisans. To elaborate, training is provided for selected artisans on how 
to construct affordable latrines and women who wish to participate are 
organised into solidarity groups and trained in entrepreneurship, savings and 
loan operations (all these were confirmed by A1). During the field study, the 
project was being experimented in three informal communities in the Jos 
metropolis; two in Jos North LGA (Jenta and Tudun Wada) and one in Jos
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South LGA (Rankeng Gyel). The selected communities all satisfied criteria of 
inadequate toilet facilities and the presence of low-income female headed 
households who were willing to participate in the project (A1)
The World Bank provides funding for community development plans based on 
specific selection criteria, including community participation in plan formulation, 
micro-project identification and preparation. So far in Jos, the activities carried 
out by the managing agency (Plateau State Community and Social 
Development Agency - PLCSDA) include:
Information campaigns on community development plans, agency goals and 
funding procedures: providing support for community identification of needs and 
priorities and preparation of community development plans (World Bank, 2012).
Further to this, A2 confirms that the agency, acting in collaboration with LGAs:
Appraises, approves and finances community development projects and 
monitors and evaluates the implementation of community development plans 
(A2).
The funding from the World Bank only supports micro projects such as 
rehabilitation, extension or construction of primary school, health centres, rural 
electrification, provision of water points and reservoirs. Other micro-project that 
may be contained in eligible community development plan to be funded include 
rehabilitation or construction of feeder road, small bridges, culverts, drifts and 
stock routes, boreholes, planting of windbreaks, lowering of soil erosion and 
environmental degradation, community sanitation, water catchment systems, 
drainage systems and local management of solid waste among others (World 
Bank, 2008,2012).
9.3.5 Coordination and Organisation
The World Bank and UN-HABITAT assisted programmes in Jos, share similar 
coordination and organisational characteristics at both national and local level. 
For each programme, there are three components. The first component is 
federal level coordination and programme support. In the case of CSDP, this 
component is being supervised by the Federal Ministry of Finance, while direct 
responsibility for the implementation rests with the Federal Project Support Unit 
(FPSU). The FPSU is responsible for:
Provision of technical support to the State agencies, in the areas of: 
procurement, financial management, gender, environment, and local
246
government capacity issues. It also provides an overall result-based monitoring 
and evaluation framework for the CSDP project (World Bank, 2008b p. 4).
In the case of the WAC II programme, a similar component exists at the Federal 
Ministry of Water Resources and the Federal Ministry of Health (A1 confirms 
this). Furthermore, the Federal Ministry of Water Resources provides technical 
support to State Government Water Agency to improve the supply of clean and 
safe water for domestic use while the Federal Ministry of Health, in collaboration 
with local education agencies promote water sanitation and hygiene among 
school pupils and their families (UN-HABITAT, 2008b).
The second component consists of local level capacity and partnership building. 
In Jos, this component is implemented by the Plateau State Community and 
Social Development Agency (PLCSDA) for the World Bank partnership and the 
Project Office of WAC II, Jos city programme for the UN-HABITAT partnership. 
For this component, the two agencies were involved in establishing and 
strengthening the partnership between LGAs and communities (A1 and A2 
confirms this). Specifically, the World Bank documented that funds were made 
available for PLCSDA to carryout capacity building, skills training, as well as 
provide essential facilities for specific local government officials, such as 
community development workers. This was to facilitate their activities with 
community groups and management of local government subprojects (World 
Bank, 2008b p. 4).
The third component is community-driven investment. In Jos, this component is 
managed by the PLCSDA and WAC II project office. Here, the two Agencies 
embarked on information campaigns through advocacy, awareness-raising and 
information exchange. The two Agencies were also involved in the identification 
of micro projects in collaboration with communities (A1 and 2 confirm this). A1 
also adds that the micro projects being experimented in two settlements of Jos 
South LGA by UN-HABITAT, were identified after the WAC II project office 
carried out a vulnerability assessment of settlements in Jos. Six were found to 
be vulnerable with two of these identified as the most vulnerable (Gwarandok 
and Longwah). The two settlements were situated on rocky terrain and lacked 
water supply for domestic use thus poor sanitation conditions were being
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experienced. In addition, the two settlements were committed to tackling water 
shortage and sanitation problems through community efforts.
In the case of the CSDP funded by the World Bank, the PLCSDA specifically 
documented that they provide support for vulnerable communities to identify 
projects based on needs and priorities, which are then included in Community 
Development Plans (CDPs) (This was confirmed by A2). In the case of WAC II, 
the response of A1 indicates that they were involved with pushing forward pro­
poor policies to local communities in Jos and trying to draw the community 
members to actively participate in the planning, provision and management of 
water and sanitation. In this component, the WAC II tried to forge partnerships 
and development of innovative financial mechanisms for the mobilisation of 
local funds. Urban catchment management, Water Demand Management, 
water education in schools and communities, expansion of water network, and 
provision of toilets in schools and communities are part of this component.
9.3.6 Partnership and Participation
There are a number of partnerships involving the WAC II Project Office or the 
PLCSDA with other institutional actors for the purpose of improving slum 
conditions and community development in Jos. As regards funding, it was 
confirmed earlier (by A1) that UN-HABITAT provides 57 percent of WAC II 
programme's funding. This is loan finance which will be jointly repaid by federal, 
state and local government. The balance of 43 percent is counterpart funding 
provided by the federal government (who contributes 60 percent of it), the state 
government and LGC (30 percent and 10 percent respectively). During the field 
study, federal and state governments had redeemed their counterpart funding in 
full while LGCs were still paying off their own part. The benefiting communities 
are responsible for the operating and running costs of the facilities provided. For 
CSDP, the World Bank provides 90 percent funding for any micro project while 
the benefitting community itself contributes 10 percent and take responsibility 
for operation and maintenance of the facilities provided. The World Bank loan 
will be jointly paid off by federal and the relevant state and local government (A2 
confirms this). This is one area where partnerships have developed and the 
actors are actively participating as planned.
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The micro-credit and revolving fund scheme for the provision and improvement 
of sanitation facilities by female-headed households is a collaborative 
programme between the WAC II Project Office in Jos, one micro finance 
institution and two CSOs known as the Country Women Association of Nigeria 
(COWAN) and Centre for Gender and Rural Development (CEGERD). These 
NGOs serve as platforms for the mobilisation of women to participate in the 
programme. The finance is being provided on a loan basis to the women by the 
micro finance institution and COWAN serves as guarantor for the women. The 
process of implementation also involved the social marketing of the concept of 
sanitation microcredit through the media. For this purpose, a partnership was 
forged between the WAC II Project Office, the two CSOs involved and Plateau 
Radio and Television Corporation (PRTVC), which is a tripartite media houses 
made up of, FM, AM and TV arms. The PRTVC has been involved in various 
awareness campaigns about the activities of WAC II and the World Bank CSDP 
being facilitated by PLCSDA (All these were confirmed by A1 and A2). Other 
partners involved with WAC II on this project include WaterAid Nigeria, Ministry 
of education, and Plateau State Sanitation and Environmental Protection 
Agency (A1; UN-HABIAT, 2008b p.10).
The extension of water programme by WACII involves laying new pipes, 
providing water kiosks, installing stand up pipes in schools and providing toilets, 
and water tanks in communities. This project is handled by the Plateau State 
Water Board. In addition, the WAC II Project Office has engaged the services of 
the National Water Resources Institute in Kaduna to carry out integrated water 
catchment management in Jos. The Plateau State Ministry of Justice is involved 
to enforce any operational legislation while the Ministry for Women Affairs in Jos 
assists the mobilisation of women to participate in sanitation projects. Finally, 
the Jos Metropolitan Development Board is engaged to help acquire land on 
which toilets are constructed (A1 confirms this).
A2 confirms that the PLCSDA coordinate the activities of its partners to raise 
the quality of life in communities through the implementation of micro projects 
as listed above. To achieve its aims, the agency usually partners communities 
and relevant agencies for the purpose to implement projects. The agency has 
partnered with: the Plateau State Water Board and the Ministry for Water
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Resources to supply water in some communities; the Power Holding Company 
to execute an electrification project; the Plateau Environmental and Sanitation 
Agency to provide sanitation facilities; the Plateau State Ministry of Health to 
provide health centres; and the Ministry of Education to provide schools. 
According to A2, the PLCSDA specifically work towards empowering 
disadvantaged communities to plan, part-finance, implement, and maintain 
sustainable and socially inclusive multi-sectoral micro-projects. The agency 
always involves local government authorities that demonstrate the willingness to 
set up a Local Government Review Committee backed by an edict or bye-law, 
and whose activities are funded by the Council. However, the Council must be 
willing to allow communities to take decisions, maintain, control and have 
authority over financial resources for the project.
This section confirms the existence of different forms of partnership for the 
purpose of improving slumps/informal settlements. The participation of multiple 
public and private institutional actors suggests that slum improvement and 
community and social development programmes are being addressed from a 
pluralist perspective. The implementation of micro projects benefits from the 
delegation of responsibility and because the programmes are being coordinated 
by agencies situated in Jos, this confirms the devolution of roles from federal 
government to local level. These roles are further deconcentrated from the 
implementation agencies to other public and private agencies and CSOs. This 
approach is capable of promoting efficiency, effectiveness and accountability in 
service delivery (Cohen and Peterson, 1997).
9.3.7 Assessing the Level and Degree of Community Participation
The preceding discussions provide the basis for assessing the level of 
participation of communities in the implementation of slum improvement 
projects in Jos (see details in Table 26). The data examined suggests that at 
the stage of identifying a project to implement in a community, the people were 
consulted and equally given the opportunity to get involved. However, the 
degree of intensity of the consultation and their involvement in the process is 
assessed to be high in the process of selecting a CSDP and medium in the 
identification of WAC II projects. In regard to financing, the communities were 
involved in a collaborative funding. But the degree of intensity of participation is
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adjudged to be high in the funding of CSDP and medium in the funding of WAC  
II projects. In the planning stage, the views of the communities were sought for, 
through consultation and information dissemination. This is assessed to be low 
in the programme for the implementation of CSDP and high for the WAC II 
programme. As regard to the involvement of communities and households in 
the actual implementation of projects, the degree of intensity is assessed to be 
medium for CSDP and high for WAC II projects. All these findings suggest that 
the programmes for the improvement of slum conditions allows for the 
participation of local communities in Jos.
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Table 26: Assessing the Level and Degree of Community Participation in World Bank and UN*
HABITAT funded programmes in Jos
Stages in 
project
implementation
World Bank's (CSDP) funded projects UN-Habitat's (WAC II) funded projects
Identification
Funding
Level o f participation
Consultation and involvement 
communities were consulted 
and involved in deciding a 
project based on the ir needs 
and priorities
Involvement and collaboration 
communities are asked to 
contribute 10% of the total 
project cost and are expected 
to take responsibility of future 
(operation and maintenance) 
costs.
Degree
of
intensity
High
Level o f participation
High Involvement and 
collaboration -  communities 
do not contribu te to the 
project cost but are expected 
to take responsibility for 
operation and maintenance.
Degree of 
intensity
Consultation and in volvement M ed i u m 
-implementation agency 
undertook vulnerability 
assessment and selected 
communities to benefit from 
projects. Communities were 
consulted but not really 
involved in the process.
Medium
Planning Consultation and information
dissemination -  Communities 
are consulted and engaged in 
discussions by the 
implementation agency. There 
is no much information 
campaign through the local 
media to provide the public with 
information on how to 
participate and benefit from the 
CSDP programme.
Implementation Involvement - The
implementation agency 
engaged communities whose 
CSDP projects were selected 
for decisions. The communities 
were allowed to maintain 
control and have reasonable 
level of authority over financial 
resources during the 
implementation of project.
Low Consultation and information High
dissemination - the public is 
provided with information 
through the local media to 
assist them in understanding 
how to participate and benefit 
from the WAC II programme. 
Communities are consulted 
through the NGOs for 
discussions.
Medium Involvement -  Female High
headed households were 
organised by two NGOs to 
access loan to finance the 
provision of Ventilated 
Improved Pit (VIP) toilet 
system in the ir houses.
Interested male and female 
members of three 
communities were trained on 
how to design and build a 
VIP toilet and were 
subsequently hired by the 
households to provide such 
facilities.
Source: Author's' assessment base on available data (interviews and documents)
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Table 27: Summary of findings
Variables 
influencing the 
application of the 
enabling strategy
New housing provision Slum improvement
Political
endorsement
The funding of new housing, the supply The programme for improvement of slum 
of development subsidies, provision of conditions is politically endorsed by the 
incentives for private house-building federal, state and local government 
companies and allowing housing authorities, 
corporations to participate in Jos did not
receive sufficient support from the federal The local states supported with local 
and state government authorities. legislation and bylaw.
Strategy and 
methodology for 
project
implementation
Local strategy and action plan is Local strategy and action plan do not 
formulated by the state government. exist in LGCs.
Similar development did not occur in 
LGCs.
The methodology for implementation of The methods of PLASEEDS appear to be 
project on the basis of PLASEEDS does appropriate for the implementation of 
not address the complexities of new micro project for the improvement of slum 
housing provision. conditions.
Funding
mechanism
The federal government is involved with The World Bank and UN-Habitat are 
workers in the provision of finance involved in the provision of finance along 
through the FMBN. with the federal, state and local
government authorities. Communities are 
equally participating.
The private investors and state and local The indigenous institutions such as the 
government authorities are not involved. FMBN, UDBN and private finance
institutions are not involved.
Bureaucratic
restraints
The activities of the FMBN, Housing Bureaucratic restraints are mitigated 
Corporations and PMIs are affected by through the creation of autonomous 
bureaucratic restraints. agencies.
However, the existing local bureaucratic 
system is likely to become redundant by 
this development.
Organisation and 
Coordination of 
project
implementation
The activities of actors are uncoordinated There is appropriate organisation and 
due to a lack of an appropriate coordination mechanism, which involves 
coordination mechanism. federal, state and local government
agencies.
The activities of actors are loose and not Activities of actors are directed at 
directed at predetermine goals. predetermine goals.
Awareness of 
public policies
There is limited information campaign to Massive information campaign is 
make people aware of government's undertaken to make people aware of the 
programme for new housing and how programmes and the benefit of 
they can benefit from it. participating in it.
Participation of
government
institutions
Relevant institutions such as Housing All government agencies that are 
Corporations, the UDBN and PMIs are required to fulfil specific roles are directed 
not participating to participate.
Participation of 
private sector 
institutions
Private house-building companies are Relevant private institutions are engaged 
involved in the construction of new by governmental authorities, where 
houses. But private finance institutions necessary, 
are not involved in the provision of 
finance through the FMBN.
Partnerships 
between 
government and 
the private 
institutions
The anticipated partnerships for the A well organised and coordinated 
provision of finance, the supply of partnership between government and 
subsidies and construction of new private institutions exist for the purpose of 
housing have not been created. Also, financing and execution of projects, 
government agencies belonging to the 
three tiers of government are operating 
independent of each other.
Source: Author's assessment (2013).
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9.4 ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY
The purpose of this chapter is to examine how the application of the enabling 
strategy helps in organising for the provision of new housing and improvement 
of slum conditions in Jos. The data discussed leads to a number of findings 
which are summarised in Table 27 above and subsequently discussed.
1 Planning Strategy
The idea of addressing housing delivery through the methodology of National-, 
State-, Local-, and Community Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategies (NEEDS, SEEDS, LEEDS and CEEDS) does not appear to support 
the arrangement for new housing provision. The evidences examined suggest 
that NEEDS and SEEDS exist but LEEDS and CEEDS do not exist completely 
in Jos. What this means is that people's efforts in housing provision using 
informal approaches are not integrated into the formal arrangement. This is a 
fundamental failure in the government's efforts of holistically tackling the 
housing problems in Jos.
The methodology of SEEDS is wide in scope, touching on economic, social, 
and physical development but it is simply not detailed enough to guide housing 
provision in a practical manner. The document does not clearly spell out the 
roles of local agencies and the nature of the partnerships that are expected in 
the implementation of new housing projects. However, the methodology of 
NEEDS and SEEDS appear to serve as an appropriate framework for the 
improvement of slum conditions and community and social development in Jos. 
The involvement of international agencies (investors) that proposed the 
methodology has helped to influence its application in the process of executing 
community and social development projects in Jos. This is not the case with 
new housing provision because international agencies are not involved and 
bureaucrats do not seem to properly comprehend how the methodology could 
effectively be used for this purpose.
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The arrangement for the provision of new housing in Jos is affected by poor 
planning. The role of bureaucrats in planning for new housing provision are not 
really concerned with designing action plans for housing provision or office 
based work. The bureaucrats appear to be more concerned with practical roles 
such as mediating between developers and land owners, identifying suitable 
sites for developers to acquire, carrying out land valuation for compensation, 
settling land disputes between kinship groups to pave way for developers to 
acquire land and giving advice and recommendations to political leaders on 
urban infrastructure provision. These roles featured extensively in the 
expressions of federal, state and local government officers interviewed. 
Interestingly, both senior bureaucrats (an Assistant Director and a Director) and 
middle level bureaucrats (such as Senior Administrative Officers) confirmed 
being involved in such roles. However, the mediatory role of bureaucrats does 
not appear to facilitate the process of housing provision. The developers 
confirmed that the involvement of bureaucrats in the process of land acquisition 
is a factor responsible for causing delay in the acquisition of land. Developers 
also confirmed that involvement of government officers was responsible for the 
increased compensation cost paid to dispossessed land owners.
2 Financing Mechanism
The data examined above indicates that the funding of micro projects to 
improve slum conditions is achieved through partnerships between government 
authorities in Nigeria, international investors (the World Bank and UN-HABITAT), 
and communities in Jos. This funding arrangement appears to work well except 
that local institutional investors are completely left out. Apart from the 
involvement of a micro finance institution which provided credit facilities to 
disadvantaged women to provide toilet facilities as a means of improving their 
sanitation conditions, other local private institutional investors were not involved. 
Similarly, the two development finance institutions (UDBN and FMBN), which by 
design of national policy, are expected to perform financing roles are not 
involved in the arrangement.
The non-involvement of local institutional investors puts the financial 
arrangement at risk of not being sustained in the event that international
investors withdraw. It is certain that the government's partnership with the World 
Bank and UN-HABITAT will have to end at some point. The partnership with 
these investors is subject to the politician's desire to accumulate foreign debt 
and if this desire ceases, the investors will have to withdraw. This funding 
arrangement, as it currently stands, appears to lack an enduring capacity 
compared to the arrangement for new housing provision provided through the 
FMBN which has vested a local interest because of participation of workers 
along with the government.
Government authorities at federal, state and local levels have shown sufficient 
support in the funding arrangement for the improvement of slum conditions. 
First, the federal government showed support by reaching an understanding 
with international investors and secondly, in the aspect of counterpart funding. 
This kind of support is lacking from the housing finance arrangement that is 
being administered by the FMBN. A typical demonstration of this lack of support 
was identified in chapter seven, where the federal government failed to give 
approval for the FMBN to reach an understanding with foreign investors. It is 
noted above that State and local government authorities in Jos are consistent in 
paying their counterpart funds. This is not the case with the housing finance 
scheme administered by the FMBN, where based on housing policy framing, 
only the federal government is allowed to invest public resources in mortgage 
financing and even then, the federal authority has not been consistent in its 
provision of support to the FMBN. Both federal government and local authorities 
in Jos are seen to support the partnership with World Bank and UN-HABITAT in 
the fulfilling of requirements on which the participation of the investors was 
conditioned.
International investors were able to participate because of their capacity to 
bargain with the government from a position of strength. For instance, the World 
Bank and UN-HABITAT decided on how and what the loan given to Nigerian 
government should be allocated. A typical example is where the World Bank 
specified the percentage allocation for each implementation component from 
federal to local level in Jos. In this way, the investors are able to monitor 
financial flow and build security around their investment. Local institutional 
investors do not appear to have the capacity to bargain and take such
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measures to safeguard their own investment. In the preceding chapters, it was 
noted that the government tried to specify the interest rates on which local 
private investors (insurers and banks) are expected to take from investing their 
resource at FMBN. This is a discouraging factor for the participation of local 
investors.
To further safeguard their investment, the international investors made the 
federal government take full responsibility for loan recovery from state and local 
governments who benefit from the loan facility through micro projects provided 
to communities situated in their territory. Technically, the loan is given to the 
federal government on prescribed terms and conditions. The federal 
government in turn gave loans to state and local government on terms and 
conditions which were set in agreement with the international investors.
The monitoring and evaluation mechanism put in place as a pre-condition for 
the participation of investors serves as a check against any lack of transparency 
in the application of finance. The monitoring and evaluation team comprises of 
the FPSU which represents federal government, the implementation agencies 
(PLCSDA and WAC II Project Office) that represent the interest of investors and 
state government, the LGRC that represents participating LGCs, and various 
CSOs that represent communities. In addition, the investors carry out mid-term 
review to appraise the implementation status and the results achieved. These 
measures may not be necessary for investors that wish to invest in financing 
housing through the FMBN. In their case, the government needs to improve 
property rights by carrying out land reforms and introducing legislation including 
mortgage foreclosure and securitisation laws. This legislation was found to be 
sorely missing at the time of field study.
3 Organisation and Coordination
The absence of a coordinating mechanism is affecting the administration of new 
housing provision in Jos. The data examined in this chapter suggest that the 
federal, state and local government bureaucratic institutions are involved in one 
way or another but none of these institutions holds a dominant position over the 
others so to organise and coordinate their roles. From the responses of 
government officers, diverse forms of interaction between institutional actors
were confirmed. The federal and state government bureaucratic agencies are
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interacting with developers and land owners. The developers are interacting 
with the FMBN and NHF subscribers. The LGCs are interacting with land 
owners and people who need land to build houses. There is no indication that 
these levels of interaction are connected and directed at common objectives. 
This provides clear evidence of the absence of any coordinating mechanism.
The poor organisation and coordination being experienced in new housing 
provision is however, avoided in the arrangement for the improvement of slums 
in Jos. The World Bank and UN-HABITAT funded programmes in Jos have a 
federal level coordination and monitoring arrangement. This role is being 
performed by the FPSU in the Federal Ministry of Finance for the World Bank 
partnership and Federal Ministry of Water Resources for the 
N-HABITAT. By 
provisions of national housing policy, the Federal Ministry of Lands, Housing 
and Urban Development is expected to perform a similar role in the aspect of 
new housing provision but there is no evidence of its interaction with 
corresponding agencies at State (Ministry of Housing and Urban Development 
and Ministry of Land, Survey and Town Planning) and Local Government level 
in Jos.
In Jos, the management agencies for improving slum conditions carried out 
LGA/Sectoral Ministries capacity and partnership building. The two agencies 
(PLCSDA and WAC II Project Office) were interacting with federal level 
coordination agencies at the same time as organising local agencies and 
directing their efforts at relevant community and social development projects. 
This nature of interaction does not exist in the case of new housing provision. 
The PLCSDA and WAC II Project Office have engaged a state government 
media agency in Jos to perform information spreading campaigns, create 
awareness, and the public about ongoing community and social development 
programmes and how people can participate. There are also CSOs that are 
involved in these campaigns. This component is missing in regards to financing 
of housing through the NHF scheme and mortgage arrangement being 
administered by FMBN. For these schemes, the lack of public awareness is a 
critical failure factor as was confirmed in the preceding chapter.
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In Jos, the management agencies for the slum improvement programme 
mobilises communities and gives them support to identify needs and priorities 
that can be addressed with CDPs. They collaborate with LGAs to appraise, 
approve, and finance CDPs and also monitor and evaluate their implementation. 
Also at the local level, Community Project Management Committees (CPMCs) 
exist that work with LGA workers and officials to implement, monitor and report 
on their micro projects performance. The roles of these committees have 
improved the chances of completing the micro-projects to be then used by 
community members to improve their wellbeing. Such support is lacking for new 
housing provision, partly due to a lack of budgetary allocation for such 
organisation and coordination. In the case of slum improvement, the federal and 
local level coordination agencies are allocated various sums of money for 
coordination and organising.
4 Mitigating bureaucratic restraints
Previous discussion in chapter four confirmed that delivering housing through 
bureaucratic agencies is associated with failure. In this chapter, it has been 
observed that international investors conditioned their participation in the 
funding of slum improvement scheme by the creation of autonomous agencies 
which are free from government bureaucracy. This resulted in the creation of 
the two agencies identified earlier. In this way, bureaucratic restraints are 
significantly mitigated from the administration of slum improvement. This is not 
the case with the administration of new housing development where 
bureaucracies are substantially involved from the provision of finance, to land 
acquisition and urban infrastructure provision. The restraint created by such 
involvement of bureaucracies was identified in chapter seven and eight, where 
developers expressed concern about the delays resulting from loan 
disbursement process at FMBN in Jos. Similarly, the expression of developers 
in this chapter also confirms the problem of delay in land acquisition which 
arises from involvement of bureaucrats. These issues suggest that bureaucratic 
restraints have persisted and remain an important source of failure in housing 
provision.
The autonomy of implementation agencies allows the opportunity to employ 
competent workers and to further improve their professionalism through
relevant training. This is a major element of success in the implementation of 
micro projects by the PLSCDA and WAC II Project Office. The creation of 
autonomous implementation agencies was a condition set by investors because 
they recognised that the existing civil service systems and structure required 
essential reforms and a large dose of capacity strengthening before they could 
effectively and efficiently deliver the desired results. While it is possible to avoid 
bureaucratic restraints by creating autonomous agencies to administer the slum 
improvement programme, the delivery of new housing cannot be completely 
taken away from the existing bureaucratic set up. Therefore, essential reforms 
are necessary for agencies concerned with financing and delivery of housing. In 
this case, reform of the FMBN, Federal and State Housing Corporation, Land 
Registries should be given priority
5 Political Influence
The influence of national and local political leaders is affecting new housing 
provision and the improvement of slum settlements in both positive and 
negative ways. The discussions presented in this chapter indicate that national 
and local leaders exhibit differential levels of commitment in the provision of 
finance. In regards to funding, perhaps, the long term funding circles required to 
continually provide new housing is discouraging the commitment of political 
leaders. The politicians have shown commitment in the case of micro projects 
for the improvement of slum conditions because they anticipate that a local 
system will emerge to take ownership and future responsibility of both funding 
and administering the process after the foreign investors withdraw.
The arrangement for slum improvement has managed to limit negative political 
influence. This is possible because the implementation agencies are 
autonomous and experience limited political interference from national and local 
politicians and bureaucrats. By involving the LGCs, State Government line 
Ministries and Federal Government agencies, roles are devolved from the 
central to the local and are further deconcentrated across multiple organisations. 
In these circumstances, politicians and bureaucrats are less able to interfere 
with the whole process.
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These advantages are missing from the arrangements for new housing 
provision which is currently being carried out by bureaucracies which cannot 
operate without considerable interference from national and local politicians and 
bureaucrats. Attempts have been made to move roles from centre to local level 
agencies such as in the case of the FMBN and the Federal Ministry of Housing 
and Urban Development (which have offices in Jos). Even with this 
development, the time it takes for the FMBN to process estate development 
loan is too long and unreasonable for developers. In order to partner with 
investors, the FMBN requires the support of national politicians. The same goes 
for mobilising subscriptions from workers where the support of both national and 
local politicians is required. Unfortunately, the supply of finance through the 
FMBN was found to be negatively affected by the inadequate support of 
national and local politicians.
In summary, inadequate funding, poor organisation and coordination, 
bureaucratic constraints and the absence of political support are the key 
variables affecting the provision of new housing in Jos. In addition to these 
factors, the strategy employed appears not to accommodate the complexities, 
components and processes required for new housing provision. The strategy for 
slum improvement receives sufficient support in the funding and administration 
of micro projects. The problems of poor organisation, coordination, and 
bureaucratic restrains are mitigated. In addition, the funding and implementation 
of slum improvement schemes receives sufficient support from national and 
local politicians. This support contributes significantly to the success of the 
arrangement.
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CHAPTER TEN
CONCLUSION
10.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter concludes the study. It reflects on the theoretical footing of the 
enabling approach for housing and then draws conclusions based on the 
study's findings. This is followed by an outline of the contribution the study 
makes to knowledge.
10.2 FINDINGS AND CONLUSIONS
The study set out to explore some aspects of housing policy and practice in 
Nigeria. Specifically, the study examines the variables influencing the 'enabling' 
approach for housing provision in Jos. Four research questions (see page 17 in 
chapter one) were pursued in order to examine the underlying characteristic of 
the enabling approach in the context of housing provision.
The first research question was concerned with examining how the globalisation 
of liberalism has impacted on the economic and socio-political development of 
Nigeria. This question was scrutinised through the review of literature in 
chapters two, four and five, and the findings obtained are chapter specific. The 
findings suggest that the notion of enabling as popularised by International 
Development Agencies (the IMF and the World Bank) and the UN agencies (the 
UNDP and UN-HABITAT) evolved overtime in differing forms. During the 1980s 
and 1990s, the notion of enabling took the form of helping countries affected by 
debt crises to return to stability. Since then, the IMF and the World Bank have 
been at the forefront, prescribing an array of policies. The first policy proposal 
was prescribed under the SAPs by the IMF and pushed forward as a solution to 
the debt crisis in the developing countries.
In theory, the SAPs were meant to help countries affected by the debt crisis to 
recover. Behind the SAPs however, was an agenda that changed the path of 
development in the developing countries. As is evident in chapters two (page 
26), four (pages 93-95) and five (pages 122-125), the implementation of the 
SAPs in Nigeria and other developing countries led to a radical transformation
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to liberalism and the adoption of neoliberal ideology. For Nigeria and most other 
developing countries, the neoliberal ideology was conditionally imposed by the 
IMF with the intention of placing markets over state in the quickest way possible. 
In Nigeria, the intention of the IMF was demonstrated by an on-ground 
supervision of a programme of rapid liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation.
The transfer of neoliberal policy under the SAPs came with conditions that 
eroded the sovereignty of Nigeria and its ability to critically examine a foreign 
policy proposal before adopting it. Consequently, the SAPs conditionality further 
destabilised the economy of Nigeria. For instance, the conditionality that 
required the Nigerian authorities to devaluate the domestic currency as the 
basis for receiving a loan from the IMF succeeded in creating an endless 
depreciation of the Nigerian naira against international benchmark currencies 
(such as the S Dollar and British Pounds Sterling).
Another condition demanded that the government achieved a deficit through the 
cutting of public expenditure. This was found to undermine social services 
arrangements in Nigeria. Interfering with the public social service system has 
exacerbated poverty and hardship. This in turn ushered in a history of civil 
protest (such as prolonged strikes by workers and street demonstrations) and 
violent reactions: religious conflicts, ethnic clashes, militancy and the Boko 
Flaram (the jihadist ‘Western Education is Evil’ movement). The discussion 
covered in chapter two (see pages 36 - 38) allows us to conclude that the 
violence, riots and civil protest currently occurring in Nigeria cannot be divorced 
from the failure of neoliberalism. In addition, the demand placed on the 
Nigerian authorities to pursue privatisation by any, and the quickest, means 
possible has caused the benefits of reform to be lost to corruption. For instance, 
the evidences examined in chapter two (pages 41 and 42) suggest that the 
institutional framework during the first round (1988 - 1993) of Nigeria's 
privatisation programme was deficient and yet much of the divesture, involving 
about 110 public enterprises, was undertaken within this arrangement.
In spite of these irregularities, Nigeria's privatisation programme led to the 
growth of private finance institutions. However, this growth came at a time when 
financial regulations were poor or even non-existent. As is evident in chapter
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five (page 123), all manner of financial irregularities (money laundering, 
advance fee fraud, the making of non-performing loans and the failure of 
financial institutions) were connected to Nigeria's privatisation programme and 
the absence of an appropriate institutional and regulatory framework. The 
chapter therefore concludes that Nigeria's privatisation reform programme 
nurtured the growth of financial corruption.
Following the deregulation programme in Nigeria, the anticipation of a formal 
housing financing system was affected by the rise and demise of commercial 
banks and PMIs. Additionally, the financial institutions suffered from a hostile 
business environment, defective capital structures, a lack of professional 
capacity, and poor patronage by the public due to a lack of confidence in the 
financial system.
The privatisation of public housing stock was introduced in a course of 
neoliberal reforms starting in 2003. In Jos, government authorities responded to 
this policy in different ways. The federal government showed a high degree of 
compliance by selling its housing stock in Jos; the state government partially 
complied by selling part of its stock; Councils kept their stock. This form of 
privatisation has not fulfilled the government's aspiration to increase the supply 
of formal housing as it does not contribute to the commissioning of new homes. 
In like manner, Nigeria's trade liberalisation exposed the small and medium 
scale companies (such the steel and textile industry) to harmful competition 
which led to their demise. As a consequence, job losses reached record 
numbers and unemployment increased. These evidences were confirmed in the 
discussions covered in chapter two (pages 46-48).
The manner at which conditionality was imposed made the neoliberal reforms 
politically unsustainable in Nigeria. Politically, there was instability in 
governance as a result of military coups and changes in administrations that 
held opposing ideological stances about neoliberalism. Therefore, many of the 
policy proposals were not given priority by successive military administrations 
until after the return to civil rule in 1999. Nigeria's liberalisation was timetabled 
to start as far back as 1982, but the actual restructuring of public enterprises
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only commenced in 1988. By 1993, it was suspended as a result of change in 
government and it only resumed again after a return to democratic rule in 1999. 
It is a possible to attribute much of the failure of the neoliberal reforms and 
housing provision introduced through the enabling approach to this time lag and 
irregularity.
In summary, the transfer of neoliberal ideology and the conditionality attached 
by the IMF were critical in shaping public policy and the path of development. 
The SAPs in Nigeria were a radical transformation in political and economic 
ideology than an economic recovery programme; they were felt to be an 
undermining of the economic and political sovereignty of the nation; a further 
disorganisation of an infant economy that was already ravaged by debt crisis; 
and a process of the elimination of government enterprises and the disabling of 
the social system, which had included attempts to provide public housing by 
governmental agencies.
The second research question was concerned with the effect of neoliberal 
reforms on the supply of subsidised housing. This question is partly examined 
through the review of neoliberal reforms in chapter five and, partly through the 
analysis of empirical data in chapter seven.
In regard to the implementation of neoliberal reforms, the study reached the 
conclusion that the process was tardy, irregular and inconsistent. Consequently, 
a considerable time lag occurred. And because the government's house 
building agencies were already eliminated by deregulation, this left a decades- 
long gap (1986-2004) in the attempt to supply formal housing in urban centres. 
The aspiration of providing subsidised formal housing through the FMBN was 
affected by this time lag. In Jos, it took about 15 years (1991-2006) for the first 
partnership between a private developer and the FMBN to emerge for the 
purpose of supplying subsidised housing to the NHF subscribers in Jos.
One key assumption of Nigeria's housing policy that originated from the 
neoliberal thinking is that financial liberalisation would lead to the growth of the 
private financial system, and that government would apply appropriate 
legislation to compel the private institutions to finance subsidised mortgages 
through the FMBN. This assumption was empirically examined in chapter seven
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and a conclusion reached: the neoliberal reforms produced impressive results in 
the financial system (see pages 127-130) but these did not lead to the 
anticipated partnership between the FMBN and the private investors (see page 
2000). It is speculated that the reluctance of private institutions to partner the 
FMBN is because the mortgage arrangement administered by the FMBN is a 
regulated one. Further research should empirically confirm this conjecture.
Another assumption in Nigeria's housing policy is the anticipation that workers 
will subscribe to the NHF scheme by putting 2.5 percent of their monthly income 
into the FMBN as a condition of accessing credit. This assumption was 
empirically examined in chapter seven and the low participation of workers in 
the NHF scheme in Jos is identified as a key cause for concern. The findings in 
chapter seven (see pages 188 and 199) suggest that the issue of low 
participation results from a lack of awareness regarding public policy, a feeling 
of mistrust in public policy, the lack of an appropriate institutional framework for 
the mobilisation of subscriptions, employment circumstances, gender attributes, 
the influence of the Labour Union and the absence of political support from the 
local state authorities and employers. Again, the analysis in chapter seven 
allows the conclusion to be drawn that subscribing to the NHF scheme is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for access to a mortgage. This is 
because the role of house-builders was found to be a key determinant for 
allocating the small quantity of mortgage houses supplied in Jos.
The third research question was concerned with examining the factors 
influencing the arrangement for organising the provision of subsidies and 
support for new housing supply in Jos. This question is examined empirically in 
chapter eight. The Nigerian housing policy assumes that the devolution of roles 
from central to local state would allow the local authorities to subsidise the cost 
of development subsidies (access to land, land titling arrangements and 
infrastructure for new development sites). In anticipation of these subsidies, the 
housing policy designers decided to cap the cost of subsidised housing units for 
the low- and middle-come households at N5million.
Contrarily, the study found (see pages 221-225) the subsidy proposal in Jos to 
be affected by the absence of local legislation and political will; the inability of 
local authorities to act in partnership in regard to the provision of subsidy, a
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complex arrangement which causes delay and increases the cost of land 
acquisition by house-builders; and the existence of an ownership and control 
tussle over land between government and kinship groups or between one 
kinship group and another. Moreover, the overbearing influence of the state 
government authorities over those LGCs in regard to land allocation and the 
granting of title documents are found to undermine the idea of decentralisation, 
and the anticipated role of LGCs in Jos. For these reasons, the unit cost of a 
three-bedroom bungalow built by private developers for the benefit of NHF 
subscribers in Jos has risen above the ceiling price of N5million to N5.3million. 
Further, the failure of the subsidy system is exposing private house-builders to 
risk and uncertainties and it is concluded that this is limiting the activities of 
small and medium sized house building companies in Jos.
The fourth research question asked whether the local state organised this 
'enabling' provision of new housing and improvement of slum conditions in Jos. 
This question essentially seeks to examine how the administrative technique 
transferred to Nigeria (by the World Bank, the UNDP and UN-HABIT) within the 
purview of enabling helps to organise the provision of new housing and the 
improvement of slum conditions. This research question was empirically 
examined in chapter nine.
One assumption on which the devolution of administrative roles from central to 
local was based was that it would help in the formulation of local strategy for 
housing and urban development. The findings of the empirical study (see pages 
238 and 253) conducted in Jos suggest that the decentralisation of 
administrative roles is necessary for enabling the activities of local authorities. 
However, this appears to be insufficient for the formulation of local strategies for 
housing provision in Jos. For instance, the Federal Government authorities in 
Nigeria have worked with the UNDP to design a national strategy of NEEDS in 
anticipation that State Government (SEEDS) and Local Government (LEEDS) 
versions would be formulated. The SEEDS version exists in Jos but LEEDS is 
still absent. Even the existence of SEEDS does not provide a practical 
organisation framework for the coordination of relevant actors and for directing 
their efforts towards predetermined objectives. Based on this finding, it is 
concluded that federalism affects the implementation of housing programmes in
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Nigeria. Where the Federal Government seems to push for uniformity so that 
proposed national strategies will account for housing activities in Jos, the 
autonomy of federalism pushes activity divergence. It is also concluded that the 
decentralisation of roles is neither a sufficient condition for the participation of 
multiple actors in the provision of housing nor a sufficient condition for local- 
level partnerships among institutional actors in Jos.
The methodology for the implementation of projects on the basis of NEEDS and 
SEEDS does not address the complexities of new housing provision in Jos. 
However, it does appear to be appropriate for the implementation of slum 
improvement projects. There is a possible explanation for this. In Jos, the slum 
improvement programme is carried out by means of the implementation of 
micro infrastructure projects. This is not the case with new housing provision 
where projects are massive in character and require a considerable amount of 
money to acquire land, provide services (road, water, electricity etc.), purchase 
building materials, pay for development permits and professional services, hire 
plant and equipment and also service the interest on loans.
The findings obtained from studying the arrangement for the improvement of 
slums in Jos allow for a number of conclusions: firstly, it has been concluded 
that the methodology of SEEDS is amenable to the arrangement for the 
improvement of slum conditions because the international agencies (the World 
Bank and UN-HABITAT) who designed the programme are involved. Secondly, 
the programme designers included clauses in the partnership agreement which 
protect their investment from risk and uncertainties. Thirdly, participation and 
partnership of multiple actors is promoted through the use of SEEDs in regard 
to slum improvement projects. This is not the case with new housing provision 
where such partnership is absent in Jos. Lastly, the authorities in Nigeria were 
mandated to provide political support for the programme as a condition for 
obtaining a loan. This political commitment was critical to the success of the 
implementation of slum improvement schemes in Jos.
Another key factor required for the successful decentralisation of administrative 
roles is the need to improve the local bureaucratic system in terms of efficiency,
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effectiveness, transparency and accountability (see pages 64-66, 82 and 83). In 
practice, however, the opposite happened in Jos. The existing bureaucratic 
system in Jos has been bypassed in favour of autonomous agencies that were 
created to manage N-Habitat (WAC II) and World Bank (CSDP) assisted 
project activities. The creation of autonomous agencies duplicates the work of 
existing, well established government agencies. This is likely to result in 
administrative redundancy in some agencies (this conclusion is deserving of 
further research). Instead of building capacity for the existing local bureaucratic 
system, this study found that workers were drawn away from it to work in the 
newly created autonomous agencies. Increased wages appear to be the 
incentive in this regard. If such incentives were given to workers employed in 
the existing public agencies, they too could deliver the desired results. These 
findings have once again called into question the idea of transferring policy 
(administrative techniques) from the international development agencies to 
Nigeria.
Finally, while effective in the early stages, the arrangement for the improvement 
of slum areas appears to lack both enduring capacity and continuity. One factor 
that may threaten its sustainability is the current funding arrangements. The 
funding arrangements are not sustainable because they rely substantially on 
foreign debt instruments (from World Bank, the African Development Bank and 
UN-Habitat) to the exclusion of indigenous public (UDBN and FMBN) and 
private (money deposit banks, insurers, and pension fund custodians) 
institutional investors.
In summary, this study demonstrates the inconsistency between the theory of 
neoliberalism, and the practical application of it in Nigeria. Firstly, the 
conditionality of the IMF's SAPs, in theory, was meant to help Nigeria return to 
economic stability after the debt crisis of 1980s. In practice, however, the 
opposite was the case; the course of national development in Nigeria changed 
drastically, and the attempts to provide public housing and basic social services 
were interfered with. Secondly, the neoliberal reforms in Nigeria were 
undertaken on the assumption that economic liberalisation, deregulation and 
privatisation would enhance the role of private sector, encouraging growth and 
development. It was in line with this thinking that Nigeria designed its current
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housing system. The policy designers assumed that neoliberal reforms would 
lead to growth and stability in the financial system and that the government 
would introduce and enforce appropriate legislation to compel private finance 
institutions to contribute in the financing of subsidised mortgage housing. On 
the contrary, the neoliberal reforms brought fewer results to the national 
economy and the subsidised housing scheme. Lastly, the practice of 
decentralising public services provision (including housing provision and slum 
improvement) to newly created autonomous agencies as popularised by the 
World Bank, the  and the HABITAT, was seen to create redundancy of 
human resources in the existing local bureaucratic system in Jos.
10.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE
This study contributes to the debate about the notion of enabling. Its originality 
and contribution lies in the approach which examines the contexts within which 
the notion of enabling can be understood and how it affects attempts to provide 
formal housing in Nigeria. The analysis takes the form of a three-step process 
that follows the sequence of policy implementation. Firstly, the notion of 
enabling was examined in respect to the debt crisis that occurred during the 
1980s and the measures taken (SAPs) by the IMF to aid the country's recovery. 
For Nigeria and most other developing countries, the conditionality imposed by 
the IMF further crippled the economy thereby interfering with the social services 
system. This study concurs with previous studies in confirming that the 
implementation of SAPs in countries affected by debt crisis rather than bringing 
about recovery effectively ushered in liberalism.
Secondly, the notion of enabling was scrutinised in respect to the rise of 
neoliberalism and the reforms implemented in Nigeria as a consequence. The 
neoliberal policy reforms prescribed by the IMF and the World Bank did not 
deliver their promise - economic growth and national development. For the 
Nigerian housing sub-sector, the neoliberal reform programme left fewer results 
than the reforms promised.
Thirdly, the notion of enabling is examined in relation to the transfer of 
administrative techniques from the World Bank, the  and the N- 
HABITAT, to Nigeria. The assumptions of this policy transfer were empirically 
examined in respect to the provision of new housing and the improvement of
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slum conditions in Jos. The study reveals that the strategy emanating from the 
transferred technique was unsuitable for addressing the complexities affecting 
the provision of new housing. It was, however, suitable for the administration of 
slum improvement projects. But this had the negative consequence of limiting 
the participation of the existing bureaucratic system in Jos and domestic 
financial institutions.
Another novel aspect of this research lies in the approach adopted to 
investigate the overall effect of Nigeria's socioeconomic and political 
development process on housing policy outcomes in Jos. This research method 
allowed the complexities surrounding housing provision in Nigeria to be 
uncovered and the variables influencing housing provision in Jos to be identified. 
Again, a distinction was drawn between variables: those that result from 
enduring legacies of the national development processes and those that 
originate in the local setting of Jos. Finally, the effect of the interaction of 
housing policy decisions within a local institutional setting was explained.
Overall therefore, this study demonstrates that the drawing up and 
implementation of public policy based on foreign ideas that are coercively 
imposed can lead to unsustainable policy strategy. This was confirmed in 
respect to housing policy and practice in Jos.
10.4 LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH
This study acknowledged the epistemological realities about housing which 
makes it complex and difficult to completely uncover empirically. In drawing a 
conclusion, the researcher "recognised that all knowledge is partial, provisional 
and incompletable" (Jessops, 2008 p. 229). The limitation of this study arose 
from a non-exhaustive uncovering of complex realities around housing; hence, 
there is recommendation for further study.
Firstly, the findings obtained and the conclusions reached from examining the 
transfer of policy (from the International Development Agencies to Nigeria) with 
conditions that interfered with Nigeria's social, political and economic 
development processes were based only on the analysis of secondary data. In 
view of this limitation, it is recommended that future study should validate the
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findings and conclusions of this thesis by conducting an empirical research in 
Nigeria.
Secondly, the information collected and examined suggest that liberalisation led 
to growth and stability in Nigeria's financial system but that private finance 
institutions that were expected to partner the government institution (the FMBN) 
have exhibited reluctance. This conclusion is solely based on the analysis of 
interviews conducted with officers from the FMBN and an examination of 
documents. Time and financial constraint did not permit the study to interview 
officers from deposit money banks and insurance companies. As a result, it is 
speculated that the private finance institutions were reluctant because the 
FMBN supplies credit at a regulated rate of interest and is a bureaucratic organ 
of government which cannot operate without political interference. Further study 
could validate this speculation.
Thirdly, the International Development Agencies (the World Bank, the UNDP 
and the UNHABITAT) have transferred a technique for administering public 
services, which led to the formulation of the methodology of NEEDS in Nigeria. 
This strategy was expected to produce a State Government strategy of SEEDS  
and a Local Government strategy of LEEDS. The data available suggest that 
NEEDS and SEEDS exist in Jos but that LEEDS does not. However, this 
conclusion was arrived at by the examination of documents only. Given 
adequate time and financial resources, a more rigorous approach could be used 
to investigate why the strategy of LEEDS was not available in Jos. If these 
strategies do in fact exist, further study could investigate its effect on the 
administration of housing provision in LGCs. In addition, the approach adopted 
(on the basis of NEEDS and SEEDS) in slum improvement allows the 
organisation and coordination to be performed by autonomous agencies which 
are situated in Jos. In this way, the federal government has devolved an 
administrative role to local level agencies. Because the agencies are 
autonomous from the state and local government bureaucratic set-up, the 
administrative role is deconcentrated from local bureaucracies. However, 
moving this responsibility from existing bureaucratic system to newly created 
agencies tends to create redundancy of human resources. Further study could 
investigate this conjecture.
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Finally, a conclusion reached in preceding discussions that there were unequal 
opportunities for subscribing to the NHF scheme among public sector workers 
in Jos. The data leading to this conclusion is limited to a randomly generated 
sample of workers employed by federal, state and local government 
organisations within the geographical boundaries of Jos South and North (jointly 
referred to as Jos city in this study) LGAs in Plateau State, Nigeria. The 
methods adopted by this study could be used to replicate the study in other 
Nigerian cities to corroborate the findings.
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APPENDICE
APPENDIX- I:Map of Nigeria Showing Location of Jos and Map of Plateau State 
Showing Research Site (Jos North and South LGAs)
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Appendix II: Exchange rates of Nigerian to Naira U.S. Dollar and inflation 
trends for some selected years
Year Exchange of Naira to US Dollar Inflation rate
1971 - 15.6
1972 - 3.2
1973 0.66 5.4
1974 - -
1975 - 34.4
1980 - 9.97
1981 - 20.5
1982 0.67 5.6
1986 2.02 5 .39
1987 4.02 10.18
1988 4.54 56 .04
1989 7.39 50.04
1990 8.04 7.50
1991 9.91 12.70
1992 17.30 44.81
1993 22.05 57.17
1994 21.9 57.03
1995 81.0 72.81
1996 81.3 29.29
1997 81.6 10.67
1998 83.6 7.86
1999 92.7 6.62
2000 102.1 6.94
2001 111.9 18.87
2002 121.0 12.87
2003 129.4 14.03
2004 133.5 15.01
2005 132.1 17.85
2006 128.7 8.24
2007 125.8 5 .38
2008 118.6 11.60
2009 150.40 12.50
2010 156.00 13.72
2011 165.00 10.20
2012 164.00 -
Sources: Central Bank of Nigeria (2012b); Imimole and Enoma (2011 p. 12); Metz (1992); IMF (2012). 
Onwioduokit (1999 p.3)
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Appendix III: Do's and Don'ts of the enabling approach to shelter
Variables________
Role of government
Institutional
arrangements
Participation
Partnerships 
Legal frameworks
Regulatory
frameworks
Human resources
Housing finance
rban planning and 
provision of land
Provision of 
infrastructure and 
services
Shelter production 
improvement
Building materials 
and construction 
technologies 
Labour
Do________________________
Shift from the role of providers to 
enabler
Decentralise
Do ensure the full and equal 
participation of all the actors in 
the shelter process 
Do form and strengthen 
partnerships with all the actors in 
the shelter process 
Create enabling legal 
frameworks that recognise and 
protect the rights to adequate 
and affordable housing 
Create appropriate regulatory 
frameworks and conduct regular 
regulatory audits 
Prioritise human resource 
development in the shelter sector 
Encourage and support 
alternative housing finance 
Promote efficient and accessible 
land markets, and alternative 
tenure forms 
Promote partnerships in 
infrastructure and services 
development, operation and 
maintenance 
Facilitate and support the 
initiatives of all the actors in the 
shelter process and, in particular, 
women
Promote the use of local readily 
available building materials and 
construction technologies 
Support the use and capacity 
building of local labour
Don't_____________________
Withdraw completely from the 
shelter process or abrogate 
responsibility 
Centralise authority and 
responsibility
Don't exclude or marginalise 
and key stakeholder groups
Exclude any actor in the shelter 
process
Condone restrictive, unjust and 
discriminatory legislation
Impose inappropriate regulatory 
that can't be enforced
Discriminate in training and
capacity building
Impose restrictive collateral
arrangements
Carry out forced evictions
without due process and without
provide adequate alternatives
Provide unaffordable
infrastructure services
Demolish slum housing unless it 
is absolutely necessary
Impose inappropriate building 
materials specifications and 
construction standards 
Prevent the employment of local 
labour and contractors though 
restrictive conditions
Source: UN-HABITAT, 2004
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APPENDIX- IV: Federal and State Low-cost Housing in Jos
ss/ts/ssii
Plate 1-Federal Low Estate in Jos, Nigeria
Note: These houses were constructed in Jos during The fourth National 
Development Plan (1981-1985). The Federal Government provided funding 
while State Government provided land with infrastructure for the project. The 
houses were sold to Federal Government workers and the general public on 
owner-occupier arrangement. Some of the houses suffered poor maintenance 
and were abandoned by the occupants. There is vast underdeveloped land 
within the estate now being advertised for sale.
Plates 2: State Low cost Housing Estates in Jos
Notes: These houses were constructed in Jos during The fourth National 
Development Plan (1981-1985). The houses were jointly funded by Federal and 
State government. The houses have been sold to State Government workers 
and the general public through owner occupier arrangement. The new owners 
are now remodelled their houses in one way or the other such as construction 
offence around the building.
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APPENDIX - V: Houses Provided For Workers Employed by Some
Federal Government Organisations in Jos
snsmn
Plates 1: University of Jos Staff Quarter
Note: These houses were constructed by University of Jos between 1970s and 
80s under employee housing scheme. Some niversity staffs are presently 
residing in the houses. The niversity proposed to sale the houses but was met 
with serious resistance by workers’ unions of the versity.
Plates 2: Nigerian Mining Corporation Staff Quarters in Jos
Notes: The houses were constructed by the defunct Mining Corporation in 70s 
and & 80s for workers to rent. Although the organisation that constructed these 
houses is longer exist, but they are still being occupied by its erstwhile staff. 
Some of the workers are now pensioners while few were transferred to the 
Federal Ministry of Steel and Mines in Jos. Government once attempted to sale 
the houses by auction to the public but sitting tenants resisted as they are 
interested in buying them from government
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APPENDIX- VI: 
Workers in Jos
Houses Provided By Plateau State Government for its
Notes: These houses were constructed by Plateau State Government way back 
in the 70s & early 80s for workers to rent. They were sold to workers and the 
general public after government implemented a policy of monetizing fringe 
benefits.
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APPENDIX -VII: Typical Local Government Council Housing
Notes: These houses were constructed by Local Government Councils in Jos 
between 70s & 80s for rent to its workers only. The houses are still being owned 
by the Council but are in very bad state of repair. Council is yet to decide on 
whether to sale or retain them.
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Appendix-VIII: Crude Petroleum Production, Selected years: 1967 - 89
Table 15. Crude Petroleum Production, Selected Years,
1967-89 
(in millions of barrels per day)
Year Quantity Year Quantity
19 6 7 ............... 1979 .................
1969 ............... ................... 564 1981 .................
1971 ............... 1983 .................
1973 ............... 1985 .................
1975 ............... 1987 .................
1977 ............... 1989 ................. .................  1,662
Source: Metz (1992 p. 335)
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Appendix-IX: Major Exports and Imports
Table 13, Major Exports, 1934-88 
(in millions of naira) 1
Commodity 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 s
Cocoa beans ............ .
Cocoa products............................
Palm kernels and products ..........
Petroleum .......................... .
Rubber.......... ............................
Other * .................... ..................
182
57
6
11,224
4
248
371 1,498 
54 62 
8 30 
8,368 28,209 
29 61 
91 501
2,627
86
103
29,293
290
739
TOTAL ...................................... 11,721 8,921 30,361 33,138
Source: Metz (1992 p. 333)
Table 12. Major Imports, 1985-88 
(in millions of naira) *
Commodity 1985 1986 1987 1988
Food and live animals .................. ..
Beverages and tobacco ..................
Animal and vegetable fats and oils .
Crude materials (inedible)............ ..
Mineral fuels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chemicals ...................... ..............
Manufactured goods .....................
Machinery and transportation
equipment ..................................
Other ...........................................
. 1,200 
9 
71
. 350 
61 
. 1,108 
. 1,612
. 2,414 
. 238
802
14
125
194
42
1,039
1,237
2,278
253
1,874
31
66
800
77
3,017
4,485
6,828
684
1,948
86
83
667
255
4,838
5,650
10,282
1,091
TOTAL ....................................... . 7,063 5,984 17,862 24,900
Source: Metz (1992 p. 333)
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APPENDIX- X: Objectives and Strategies of Government 'Enabled'
Housing Policy
The objectives of 1991 national housing policy are as follows:
1) Develop and sustain the political will of Government for the provision of housing for all
Nigerians.
2) Provide adequate incentives and an enabling environment for greater private sector 
(formal and informal) participation in the provision of housing.
3) Strengthen all existing public institutions involved in housing provision at all levels.
4) Encourage and promote active participation of other tiers of Government in 
housing delivery.
5) Create the necessary and appropriate institutional framework for housing delivery.
6) Strengthen the institutional framework to facilitate effective housing delivery.
7) Develop and promote measures that will mobilize long term sustainable and cheap
funding for the housing sector.
8) Government shall by patronage, develop and promote the use of certified locally 
produced building materials as a means of reducing construction cost.
9) Ensure the use of relevant and fully registered Nigerian professionals to provide
appropriate designs and management in housing delivery.
10) Develop and promote the use of appropriate technology in housing construction and
material production.
11) Make land for housing development easily accessible and affordable.
12) Develop and promote a national housing market.
13) Enact laws and make regulations to prevent and control fire incidents in Nigeria.
These objectives were to be achieved within broad strategies which are outlined as follows:
a) Strengthen and sustain the Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development to 
harmonise and monitor housing delivery in Nigeria
b) Structure and adequately capitalize the following institutions to effectively 
perform their statutory roles: FMBN, Federal Housing Authority (FHA), Federal
Mortgage Finance Limited (FMF) and Urban Development Bank Ltd.
c) To review as when necessary, the provision of the following Acts to make them more
effective and enforceable: Mortgage Institutions Act, FMBN Act, Trustee Investment Act, 
Insurance Act, NHF Act, Employee Housing Scheme (Special Provision) Act, Federal 
Government Staff Housing Board Act; Urban Development Bank Ltd Act and Land Use Act 
(LUA).
d) Promote and encourage partnership between research institutions and private 
organizations.
e) Encourage the establishment of Cooperatives or Housing Associations to 
enable the rural dwellers have access to funds.
f) Provide fiscal incentives (tax waivers, duty waivers etc) serviced land and 
expeditious planning approval process to encourage private sector participation in
housing delivery.
g) Encourage the establishment of, and sustain Land Registers in all tiers of 
Government in the country.
h) Promote sites and services schemes for housing nationwide.
i) Provide statistical data for effective process of housing delivery in Nigeria.
j) Seek international, bilateral and multilateral assistance for promoting housing and urban
development.
For the purpose of realising the goal of the housing policy, the following new structures and 
enabling Decrees were promulgated which have been ratified by Acts of Parliament. Employees 
Housing Scheme Act, Federal Housing Authority Act, Mortgage Institution Act, National Housing 
Fund Act, Urban Development Bank of Nigeria Act, Urban and Regional Planning Act, Nigerian 
Social Insurance Trust Fund Act, Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria Act, National Construction 
Policy and National Urban Development Policy. The main strategy of the National Housing 
Policy was the establishment of the National Housing Fund (NHF) scheme to mobilise funds 
from workers, which could be disbursed as loans via Primary Mortgage Institutions (PMIs) with 
the Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (FMBN) playing the role of apex/supervisory body. The 
Fund was to be mandatorily subscribed by all workers as prescribed in NHF Act (Federal 
Republic of Nigeria 2006).
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The Federal Ministry of Housing and Urban Development was to carry out some functions as 
follows: set up the National Housing Trust Fund (NHTF) and source for it; assist in mobilisation 
of contributors and enforce collection of funds into the NHTF; supervise FMBN in the collection 
and disbursement of NHTF; enforce the provisions of the NHTF with particular reference to 
penalties; develop Data Bank for housing needs in the country among others. The FHA which is 
under federal government was to provide sites and services for all income groups with special 
emphasis on the low income group. It was to also provide low-income and rural housing in all 
States of the Federation and FCT from funds provided by the Federal Government and other 
sources. To execute such programmes as may be approved by Government.
The State Governments were to carry out the following functions: formulate its own housing 
policy and programmes within the overall framework; to establish the appropriate agencies and 
utilise State Housing Corporations to execute, develop and manage housing programmes on 
commercial basis; to establish State Committee of the National Housing Facilitation Council as 
provided for in the Employees Housing Scheme (Special Provision) Act for the purpose of 
implementing the provision of the Act; to strengthen the existing Planning Authorities and 
establish same in all Local Government Areas where there are non and collaborate with Federal 
Government in such areas; promote and facilitate the development of Site and Services 
Scheme; promote the formation of co-operatives, or housing associations, thrift and credit 
societies, PMIs and Building Societies.
The Local Governments were to carry out the following functions: implement rural housing 
programmes; provide residential Site and Services layouts; assist in the formation of housing 
cooperatives, housing associations, thrift and credit associations, PMIs and Building societies.
The Housing Policy sought to achieve a Public Private Partnership (PPP). The private sector 
was to function in relation to the policy in the following respects: private sector employers were 
expected to comply with the provision of Employees Housing Scheme (Special Provisions) and 
NHF Acts; to establish PMIs or building societies, thrift and credit associations etc; to cooperate 
either with Federal, State, Local Government or any agency of Government in provision of 
houses, and economic growth; participate in the development of estates, and houses for sale or 
for rent, or share ownership.
Government was to encourage private sector participation by granting capital allowances on 
residential buildings and provide tax exemptions on mortgage loans; exempt investment by 
Estate Developers on low-income houses for sale from tax for the first five years; exempt 
investment by employers developing staff housing from tax during the construction period; 
ensure that rent control measures are never introduced as they mitigate against housing 
delivery; streamline the procedure and speed up the issuance of certificate of occupancy; to 
encourage non-profit making organisation by facilitating easy access to land provide matching 
grants to building hostels and accommodation for unemployed young school leavers, students, 
the university undergraduates, the aged, the infirm, the motherless and widow and to encourage 
the effective enforcement of the provisions of the Employees Housing Scheme (EHS) Act of 
1979 (Federal Republic of Nigeria 2006).
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APPENDIX - XI: Summary of Legislative Reforms and Outcomes
Year Legislative Reforms Outcomes
1988 Privatisation and
Commercialisation
Decree
This Act led to the creation of the Technical Committee on Privatisation and 
Commercialisation (TCPC) which was given the mandate to privatise and 
commercialise public enterprises (Nwoye, 2007)
1989 The Primary Mortgage 
Institutions Act
This set the ground for the creation of PMIs government and the private 
sectors (FGN-NHP, 2006 p. 10; MBAN, 2009).
1991 Banks and other 
Financial Institutions 
Act
A legal framework for regulating the activities of banks and financial 
institutions was created without an enforcement agency.
1992
The National Housing 
Fund Act
This act introduced the National Housing Fund (NHF).
The FMBN Act 82 The FMBN that existed prior to introduction of the NHF in 1992 was 
empowered to administer the scheme.
1993
The UDBN Act 88 The UDBN was incorporated as a Public Liability Company (PLC) to finance 
the provision urban infrastructure.
The Nigerian Social 
Insurance Trust Fund 
Act 73
This Act created the Nigerian Social Insurance Trust Fund (N SITF) for the 
purpose of providing of Social Security to all Nigerians.
1994 The Failed Banks and 
Financial Malpractices 
in Banks Act
Banks were beginning to fail as result of non-performing loans and financial 
malpractices were prevalent. The Act was enacted to help failed banks 
recover debts and to checkmate financial malpractices.
1995
The Advance Fee 
Fraud and other 
Fraud Related 
Offences Act
Fraudulent activities were increasing in Nigeria and this act was enacted to 
control advance fee fraud and other fraud related offences.
The Money 
Laundering Act
Money laundry was now a common crime among corrupt government officials 
and this Act was enacted to control this.
1999
The Public Enterprise 
(Privatisation and 
Commercialisation) 
Act
This legislation led to the creation of the Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE> 
to take responsibility of implementing Nigeria's policy on privatisation and 
commercialisation (FGN- Privatisation Programme, 2006).
The National 
Insurance 
Commission 
(NAICOM) was 
created
The Insurance Act of 2003 empowered the (NAICOM) (which was setup in 
1999) to address problems facing insurance companies in Nigeria (FGN- 
NAICOM, 2011).
2000 The Corrupt Practices 
and Other Related 
Offences Act
The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission 
(ICPC) was created and vested with the responsibility of investigating and 
prosecuting corrupt related offences.
2003 The Insurance Act 37 
Volume 90
This Act was made to provide regulations for insurance companies, which 
before then was lacking in Nigeria (World Bank, 2009, p. 89).
The Pension Reform 
Act
A contributory pension scheme involving workers and employers was 
introduced.
Money Laundering 
(Prohibition) Act
A legal framework for the control of money laundry was created.
2004 The Economic and Financial Crimes Act
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) was created and 
the Act harmonised statutes that existed prior to this time but were ineffective 
due to a lack of an enforcement agency. (FGN-Economic and Financial 
Crimes Act/Commission, 2004).
2007 The Public 
Procurement Act
The Bureau of Public Procurement (BPP) and the National Council on Public 
Procurement (NCPP) were created.
The Pension Reform 
Amendment Act
This Act was amended to exempt members of the Armed Forces and 
members of the Intelligence and Secret Services from a contributory pension 
in line with international conventions (FGN-Pension Reform Amendment Act, 
2011).
2011 Personal Income Tax 
Amendment Act
Personal Income Tax Law was amended to regards deductions from gross 
income in relation to NHF contributions as non-taxable. The income tax table 
that existed prior to the Amendment Act was substituted with a new table 
(see Appendix XXX). (FRN-Personal Income Amendment Act, 2011). The law 
was gazetted on 24 June, 2011 without a commencement date (BDO 
Professional Services, Nigeria, 2012 p. 2).
Source: author’s compilation (2013)
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APPENDIX-XII: Summary of Policy Proposal and Institutional reforms
Year Policy proposals 
and Reforms
Remark
1988 the Technical 
Committee on 
Privatisation and 
Commercialisation 
(TCPC)
Between 1988 and 1993, the TCPC Committee was involved with the 
privatisation of 110 public enterprises, of which about 70 were fully divested 
(Drum, 1993)
1991 The National 
Housing Policy 
was launch
A neoliberalism system for subsidising low-income housing was introduced. The 
idea of enabling was introduced.
2002
Liquidation of 
Federal
Government's PM I
The federal government withdrew from primary mortgage operation and 
liquidated the PMI (the FMFL) which it had set-up in 1993. However, state 
government owned PMIs were not privatised including that in Jos (Mabogunje, 
2011). The withdrawal of federal government led to the emergence of privately 
owned PMIs. As of 2011, there were 101 registered PMIs on CBN's record and 
over 80 were privately owned.
Reforms at the 
FMBN
A new Board was constituted; retrenchment of incompetent staff and the 
employment of professionals (Mabogunje, 2011 p. 579); and an arrangement 
was put in place for private developers to access estate development loans from 
the FMBN to build houses for the benefit of NHF subscribers (Mabogunje, 2011 
p.584).
2003 New Guidelines 
for PMIs
The CBN introduced new guideline for PMIs from August 2003 (FGN-CBN, 
2003). The regulation of PMIs was moved to the CBN from the FMBN.
Monetisation
policy
This policy directed government agencies to sell off public residential houses.
2004 The
recapitalisation 
and stabilisation of 
financial
institutions started
The capital base of all licensed financial institutions was reviewed upward 
(Soludo, 2004 and 2006). This programme led to the merger and acquisition of 
financial institutions (CBN, 2012).
2005 Privatisation
programme
By 2005, 6 cement companies, 5 bricks and clay making companies, 3 steel 
rolling mills and 2 stone quarries were privatised (FGN-Privatisation programme, 
2006).
By 2005, 5 public Deposit Money Banks were privatised (FGN-Privatisation 
programme, 2006).
By 2005, the Federal Government had divested in three public owned insurance 
companies through management buy-out and core sales.
By 2005, FMBN was turned into a GSE (FGN-Housing Sector Reform, 2006). 
The UDBN was also privatised with over 50 percent shareholding divested to 
core investors (Yari, 2010 p. 20).
2006 The Nigeria 
Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
(NDIC) Decree 
No. 22 of 1988 
was amended
The amendment of this law became necessary to ensure that deposits collected 
by financial institutions are ensured to prevent the wide-spread distress and 
failure of financial institutions witnessed in the past, which had resulted in the 
loss of hard-earned savings by depositors.
2007
Procurement
guidelines
Guidelines for procuring consultancy services, goods and works were circulated 
(FGN-Bureau of Public Procurement, 2007b&c).
Some banks 
undertook self­
induced 
consolidation
Some banks went on to enhance their capital base through a combination of 
rights issue and public offers in pursuit of their domestic and regional expansion 
programmes via a second self-induced wave of consolidation.
2011
Public
procurement
A Public Procurement Manual was prepared, drawing from the relevant sections 
of the principal Act and circulated to MDAs (FGN-Bureau for Public 
Procurement, 2011 f).
Housing supply 
agencies
By December 2011 there were 102 developers in affiliation with the FMBN for 
the purpose of building low-income housing for NHF participants. They are 
comprised of Housing Corporations and private developers. The introduction of 
EDL and the activities of REDAN brought in more corporate developers which 
could improve the housing supply in Nigeria. (FGN-FMBN, 2011).
Source: author’s compilation (2013)
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APPENDIX- XIII: Repayment Plan for the National Housing Fund (NHF)
Loan
LOAN AT SIX (6) 
PERCENT INTEREST 
RATE
5yrs 10yrs 15yrs 20yrs 25yrs 30yrs
Loan amount (in 
Nigerian Naira 
currency)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
Monthly
loan
repayment
(N)
50,000.00 966.64 555.10 421.93 358.22 322.15 299.78
100,000.00 1,933.28 1,110.21 843.86 716.43 644.30 599.55
250,000.00 4,833.20 2,775.51 2,109.64 1,791.08 1,610.75 1,498.88
500,000.00 9,666.40 5,551.03 4,219.28 3,582.16 3,221.51 2,997.75
750,000.00 14,499.60 8,326.54 6328.93 5,372.23 4,832.26 4,496.63
1,000,000.00 19,332.80 11,102.05 8,436.57 7,164.31 6,443.01 5,995.51
1,250,000.00 24,166.00 13,877.56 10,548.21 8,955.39 8,053.77 7,494.38
1,500,000.00 28,999.20 16,653.08 12,657.85 10,746.47 9,664.52 8,993.26
1,750,000.00 33,832.40 19,428.59 14,767.49 12,537.54 11,275.27 10,492.13
2,000,000.00 38,665.60 22,204.10 16,877.14 14,328.62 12,886.03 11,991.01
2,250,000.00 43,498.80 24,979.61 18,986.78 16,119.70 14,496.78 13,489.89
2,500,000.00 48,332.00 27,755 .13 21,096.42 17,910.78 16,107,54 13,988.76
2,750,000.00 53,165.20 30,530.64 23,206.06 19,701.85 17,718.29 16,487.64
3,000,000.00 57,998.40 33,306.15 25,315 .70 21,492.93 19,329.04 17,986.52
3,250,000.00 62,831.60 36,081.66 27,425 .35 23,284.01 20,939.80 19,485 .39
3.500,000.00 67,664.81 38,857.18 29,534.99 25,075.01 22,550.55 20,984.27
3,750,000.00 72,498.01 41,632.69 31,644.63 26,866.16 24,161.30 22,483.14
4,000,000.00 77,331.21 44,408.20 33,754.27 28,657.24 25 ,772.06 23,982.02
4,250,000.00 82,164.41 47,183.71 35,863.92 30,448.32 27,382.81 25 ,480.90
4,500,000.00 86,997.61 49,959.23 37,973.56 32,239.40 28,993.56 26,979.77
4,750,000.00 91,830.81 52,734.74 40,083.20 34,030.48 30,604.32 28,478.65
5,000,000.00 96,664.01 55,510.25 42,192.84 35,821.55 32,215 .07 29,977.53
Source: Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (2008)
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APPENDIX- XV: Project Description /  Request for Interview Permission
. Sheffield
Hallam University
Faculty of Development & Society Graduate School 
Unit 9 Howard Street, S1 1WB Sheffield, England, United Kingdom 
Email contact: mdmaren@vahoo.com ; maren.m.daniel@ student.shu.ac.uk
5th August 2011.
To:
Dear Sir/Madam
Project Description / Request for Interview Permission
My name is Maren Mallo Daniel, a PhD student at Sheffield Hallam University, 
Sheffield, England, UK. My thesis is about housing policy implementation and 
access to adequate and affordable housing in Jos. I am currently undertaking 
field research to obtain data for the study. It is with this view that I hereby 
request for permission to carryout interview with any senior officer from your 
organisation.
The interview is planned to last for about 30 minutes. The data collected from 
the interview will be used for my dissertation and articles that may result from it. 
Depending on your wishes, I intend to record the interview on a tape from which 
it will be transcribed for analysis. Your responses will be completely deleted 
from the recording device at the end of the analyses. As a respondent from your 
organisation, your name will appear in my dissertation's acknowledgement page. 
If you are interested in hearing from me with the results of the study, I will be 
happy to receive your contact information on the day of interview. If you have 
any questions pertaining to the research, you can contact me on the above 
address.
I will be grateful if my request is granted.
Yours sincerely,
Maren Mallo Daniel 
Research Student
Agreed & accepted by
Signature....
Title..............
Organisation
Date
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APPENDIX- XVI: Interviews conducted
Organisations Representation Number of 
Interviews
Federal Mortgage Bank of 
Nigeria
3 Supervisors 3
Federal Government Controller, Federal Mi. of Lands, Housing and Urban 
Development, Jos
1
State Government Ministry of Housing and Urban Development (Assistant 
Director); Ministry for Land, Survey and Town Planning 
(Deputy Director); First Capital Savings and Loans 
(Officer II); Plateau Investment and Property Company 
PIPC (State government Housing Corporation) (Deputy 
General Manager - Properties)
4
Local Government Councils Jos North LGC (Senior Executive Officer - Lands) 
Jos South LGC (Chief Town Planning Officer
2
Real Estate Developers 
Association of Nigeria 
(REDAN), Abuja
National Executive Secretary/Former MD J Hausen Ltd. 1
Private developers MD/CEO -Socus Concepts Ltd 
Ag MD - Mamko Investments Ltd
2
Non-Governmental
Organisations
UN-Habitat Water for African City II, Jos City Programme 
(National Programme Officer)
Plateau State Community and Social Development 
Agency, Jos (Monitoring and Evaluation Manager
2
Total 15
Source: Researcher's fieldwork, August - October, 2011.
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APPENDIX- XVII: Transcript of interview conducted with representative of
Real Estate Developers Association of Nigeria
RESPONDENT - RD
M - My research is emanating from the backdrop of 1991 national housing policy. From my
understanding, it was 1991 housing policy that brought about mortgage finance mechanism through the 
Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria. In the last 20yrs, reforms have taken place in order to improve on 
mortgage mechanisms. As a developer and Executive Secretary of REDAN, what would you say are the 
changes that have occurred in the operation of FMBN in terms of making finance available for housing 
delivery?
RD - First of all, government recognised the fact that for individuals to build their own houses, getting 
access to land title, carrying out the construction, etc was a challenge. Because of that, Board of the 
Federal Mortgage Bank then introduced what is today known as Estate Development Loan. At about the 
same time, an association of real estate developers was formed which became the Real Estate 
Developers Association of Nigeria (REDAN). Members of REDAN were allowed to source for EDL from 
FMBN to provide housing for contributors of the National Housing Fund (NHF). The idea was to benefit 
from economics of scale, to overcome the challenge of getting access to land and titles by individuals, and 
provision infrastructure.
M - As recorded in some studies, before the housing reforms that started in 2002, accessing loan
facility by developers was challenge. The impression I got from the FMBN shows that there is significant 
improvement as a result of the reforms. What do you feel about this?
RD - Well, prior to the introduction of the EDL, I don’t know if you refer to individual prospective home
owners as developers because there was no window for accessing loan by estate developers.
M - OK, so what was happening before EDL and what has changed after its introduction?
RD - Prior to introduction of EDL, any body wanting to build will have to do it using their own 
structured device because there were no any structured mechanism either for buyers to access the funds 
from the mortgage bank for the purchase of houses from private developers. All that was happening then 
was that a few states that had housing corporations were building and not too many of them link up 
effectively with the federal mortgage bank.
M -O k
RD - It was so because the federal mortgage bank of Nigeria as was then having been created as the
federal mortgage finance out of the erstwhile federal mortgage bank. There was supposed to be a 
distinction between the Primary Mortgage Institutions and the Federal Mortgage Bank which was suppose 
to act as a secondary mortgage institution. The ideas was that the PM I would make loan available to home 
owners and would obtain refinancing from the FMBN to enhance their liquidity position so that they would 
continue to do there business.
M Ok
RD Linder that scheme the contributors (i.e prospective home owners) were supposed to contribute 
10%. And the PMIs were supposed to also, in the process of creating the mortgage put in 20% and then 
the FMBN would contribute 70%. Unfortunately, not only were the PMIs unable to originate mortgages 
themselves (as in advancing the funds, perfecting the mortgages, and then passing them unto the FMBN). 
The reasons for this are quiet simple. One, the PMIs seems to lack the capacity to provide the 20%.
M -O K
RD - Two, the capital base of PMIs at the onset was just 5million naira and subsequently it was raised
to 10Omillion naira. And by the time they put up their offices and other things, there wasn’t anything much 
left for doing real business. In addition, they found themselves in competition with the commercial banks 
and the kind of money they were getting did not afford them opportunity to lend loan. Assuming that a PMI 
has funds available for a portfolio, say 50million naira to lend out 20% of mortgage, it would mean that the 
best one would do is to create mortgages of about 500million naira. Of course a PMI had to have the 
money to create those mortgages in the first place without any definite assurance that FMBN will purchase 
the mortgages. For this reason, the general attitude at that time was that of reluctance and so many of 
them, because there were a lot of activities in the financial markets. A lot of financial houses were set up, 
unity banks were established, people’s bank was set up etc, and the market then went haywire, with
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people running pillar to pole. I think they were more or less round tripping rather than creating mortgages 
or addressing the core business.
M -O k
RD - Worthy of note is the fact that most of the people that set up these PMIs had to tap from the pool
of bankers which were limited even in terms of professional capacity. For instance, officers were picked 
from the commercial banks to head the PMIs. In some case officers were drawn from the FMBN which was 
the only mortgage institution available. Most of these officers were people that have risen to the rank of 
managers and that have not really acquired any core mortgage experiences and were expected to deliver 
miraculous results.
M -O k
RD - So in no time, we had close to 200 PMIs, and just as the financial market crashed, they also
went insolvent. At the moment, we have about 100 PMIs and some of them are still not solvent because 
about 30 were listed for revocation of their licences. Of course they have been resisting, because their 
insolvency emanates from the financial sector reforms that raised capital base of PMIs from 10Omillion 
naira to 5billion naira. The market is still very infantile and not effective as we think it should be. The fact 
that FMBN is a federal government owned institution, it is not free from the problems that government 
establishment have in this country -  nepotism, inefficiency, etc. make it very difficult. I don’t think they
have been looking into the bottom line in terms of e ff ic ie n c y  in  th e ir  o w n  u s e  o f  fu n d s .
The immediate money coming NHF is what they have had to use to run their operations, meet overheads, 
and also create mortgages. By and large, I feel there is not much that has happened. They have not been 
able to deliver finance for adequate housing provision, am sure you most have had access to the record of 
their operations. In ten years, barely 30,000 houses have come out of the scheme and many of them have 
not translated into mortgages.
M -Ok
RD - The effect of that is the expectation of the technical committee that produced the document 
which we though was a policy and now discovered that it was not more than a draft which never got 
approved. That fact was established recently with the inauguration of the committee set up by the Minister 
to review 1991 housing policy and not 2006 as we thought it would be.
The PMIs as expected have not been able to go into the money market to tap into secondary sources by 
way of mortgage securitization in order to boost their own liquidity. This has not been possible. Not only is 
the FMBN now expected to lend 90% of money on a mortgage, it has no other source of replenishing the 
limited funds that are available to it. In essence FMBN is not far from a limped dog. Amongst what we are 
looking at now is linking up with the World Bank, Shelter Afrique and perhaps, we think it’s high time that 
there’s a private sector complement to the FMBN.
M - Are banks and insurance companies investing in FMBN as required by statutes?
RD - the general attitude of banks to housing finance in the country is lamentable; their non-
compliance with the provisions of the NHF Act in particular will be taken up by our association. It is a 
serious matter, which bothers on violation of the constitution. What we intend to do is to set up a 
committee of experts to critically look into this and advise us appropriately. W e will take steps to sensitize 
the National Assembly on the development, and also write to the CBN because this shows clearly that the 
apex bank has not been playing its expected role as a regulator of the banks. After thoroughly examining 
the issue, we may even go to court to ensure that they take up their responsibilities under the NHF Act,” he 
stated. A lot of advocacy is also required on the part of the mass media to bring out some of these facts 
into the public domain in order to ensure that very body plays its role in financing housing development in 
the country.
The banks and insurance companies are claiming to be unaware of the law that requires them to invest 
some proportions of their advances and premiums at the Federal Mortgage Bank. Since banking 
deregulation, in terms of sectoral allocation of credit portfolios, it has been clearly established that given all 
the liberties of deregulation, banks are not inclined towards any long term lending. Housing loans share 
this attribute. Unfortunately, there is no' strict enforcement of these rules. Where CBN make attempts at 
some enforcement, you discover most banks would gladly oblige the penalties as these are cheaper than 
the financial cost of complying. The regulations may be there but implementation and effectiveness is 
another thing. That’s the bane of Nigerian banking system for now."
M - What do you think about privatising the FMBN?
319
RD - Privatisation in itself is not bad but our implementation is usually faulty. Don’t forget that many of
the banks that have folded over time are federal government owned banks that were privatised. There is
still government presence in some of the privatised banks and some are still surviving on sentiments but 
they are not really doing well. So I don’t know much about privatisation as such but what we are looking at 
is creating a fresh institution.
M - At what particular time was REDAN established and what role is it playing within the 
arrangement housing delivery?
RD - REDAN was established in 2002.
M - Ok, for what purpose was it established?
RD - The entrepreneurship disposition to invest or pool together large funds and go into development 
in a pragmatic manner has been lacking, just like we lacked capacity in the mortgage sector. REDAN was 
established to deal with capacity issues. Nearly two thousand people registered with REDAN in the last ten 
years but sooner than they registered, they realised that it’s a big work and they dropped off. There is a 
new crop of professionals overseeing the affairs of REDAN and I’m one of them. When we took over, we 
reviewed our member’ capacity and discovered that many members were just would be developers in 
terms of capital, there was lack of organisational capability. With these problems, developers that have 
had to submit proposal for funding from Shelter Afrique couldn’t scale through because of the way their 
businesses are set up (in terms of corporate governance) did not really auger well to attract funds. W e also 
discovered that many developers lacked the prescribed capital base to access loan from FMBN. A 
developer is expected to have with Corporate Affairs Commission, 25% of the amount he is seeking for as 
loan from FMBN. Most of developers were just one or two-man businesses.
M -O k
RD - To get into real estate development, developers need to pay the necessary professional fees to
do the needful -  surveys, do the opening up, put in infrastructure etc before development commence. Of 
course many developers don’t even have the marketing skills. Then there is also the challenge of lack in 
purchasing capacity due to in-access to mortgage finance. Like in most other things, buyers have to pay 
cash and carry. The bottom line is that there is a major capacity issue. EDAN is still battling with 
organisational capacity issues and is not yet firm on its feet to get much involve in policy advocacy such as 
development and application of alternative materials in construction of housing. REDAN is still trying to get 
its members strengthened so as to achieve a vibrant association that would be able to advocate and 
influence public policies in the housing sector. W e’re looking out for support in that regard.
M - From your experience of housing provision in Jos, how is government (Federal, State and Local)
responding to policy objectives in order to facilitate housing delivery?
RD - The housing policy provides that, State and Local governments were supposed to develop their 
housing policies simply because they have control over land in their territories as provided in the Land Use 
Act. I feel they don’t really understand their role in that direction. They seem to understand the policy 
whereby government will provide money for them to buy land and build instead of providing land and 
infrastructure on site for developers to come and build. Well, that is their disposition and from my 
experience, the involvement of government is rather discouraging activities of developers. Subsidising 
development cost through site and services scheme is good but if it is not carefully applied, it would distort 
and kill the market itself. Housing is capable of stimulating the economy and also creating demand for its 
products. W e need to approach it from that perspective.
M - 1 see subsidy as a way of supporting those that are likely to be priced out of the market. And if
land and infrastructure is made available by government, it would help sustain developers that lacked 
capacity as earlier discussed. Don’t you feel such is appropriate?
RD - It is appropriate to ease the procedure of getting access to land but those that have capacity to 
pay for it should do so. I feel a lot of people don’t like to pay the cost of their utilities and it is a problem. 
Yes, the issue of providing primary infrastructure on site is very important but let’s appreciate the fact that 
we’re living in a country where what we refer to as primary infrastructure is not even available. Power 
holding is not generating sufficient power, water board is not providing sufficient water, master plan is out 
of date and new one is not implemented etc. These are challenges that we need to appreciate. the 
moment, the city of Jos is being opened up substantially and government has acquired some parcels of 
land. If developers can pay up the compensation to enable them have the land for development, it would 
be good. Such arrangement will more sustainable than what obtains in the policy. Let people earn their 
subsidy. The concept of subsidy should be looked at very carefully otherwise the housing market won’t 
pick up.
M - Thank you for your time sir.
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APPENDIX- XVIII: Transcript of Interview conducted with representative of
Federal Mortgage of Bank of Nigeria
RESPONDENT - MB3
M - My research comes from the backdrop of 1991 housing policy and reforms that have taken 
place. In this discussion, I would like to know the extent to which Federal Mortgage Bank fulfils its role of 
mobilising finance and disbursing credit for housing in Jos.
MB3 - Ok. The 1991 housing policy brought about the new structure of this Bank but subsequent 
reforms have repositioned our operations. I would refer you to a document which contains most of the 
restructuring and developments that took place in FMBN from its inception to date. I believe the document 
will be more helpful to you as I may not be able to remember all that took places in the bank and besides 
we have just little time for this discussion. Actually the reforms in particular boosted house building 
activities in Nigeria at large and specifically in some states. If you go round the country now, estate 
development activities are actually going on in most of the states. That is why in Plateau state and in Jos 
in particular, at least for now, there are four estate developers that are constructing houses and one of 
them has completed a thirty unit estate which has been taken by beneficiaries. First, we had Citrus 
Garden estate located around building material market. It was followed by BNTI and Mamco Investment; 
there estates are located behind federal low-cost. There are still on going activities like Socus Garden is 
the new developer that has come in and now building houses around Rize. They are building three 
hundred units at the moment and hope to increase the number as approval is given.
M - How does the policy reform affect mobilisation of finance and supply of credit?
MB3 - It is yielding a desired result to some extent; it is a good policy if implemented to the latter. The 
major problem we’re encountering is that of finance. The 2.5 percent worker’s subscription is still not 
adequate to fund estate development activities. Recent research shows that housing deficit in Nigeria is 
estimate at about 1 6 - 1 7  million units. It then means that government has to make concerted efforts by 
pooling in more financial resources and also creating avenue for the bank to be funded. This will enable 
the bank to have more money to give out as loan to loan seekers. At some point in time the bank was 
sourcing money offshore. The FMBN once signed a memorandum of understanding with a foreign bank, 
which was supposed to be approved by Federal Government so that money would be made available to 
the bank for its activities. Unfortunately, the memorandum of understanding could not see the light of the 
day with the coming of present government -  inconsistency and continuity problem.
M - What are the challenges affecting the role of Federal Mortgage Bank?
MB3 - W e’re experiencing a problem with enforcement of NHF law. The NHF scheme was set up by 
an Act, which need to be enforce at all levels of government, unfortunately there are recalcitrant 
organisations (not willing to obey the law). Some organisations have refused to let their workers contribute 
to the NHF scheme even though it is mandatory. The bank lacks the power to enforce the law on all 
workers and employers. Lack of enforcement is a major constraint to our operations.
M -O k
MB3 - One other problem we have actually faced is that of awareness about NHF and FMBN. People 
are not informed (enlightened) about what the bank could offer. This is largely due to the bank’s lack of 
resources to embark on enlightenment campaign. W e have made effort to visit some organisations that 
invited us to explain activities of the bank to their workers. The effort is not enough as there are many 
people that have worked for quite a long time but still unaware of the NHF and FMBN scheme.
M - Whose responsibility is it, to create awareness on the NHF and FMBN scheme -  the bank or 
government?
MB3 - The bank and federal ministry of Housing and Urban Development both have responsibility to 
create awareness on the scheme. And because the scheme was created by a law, each public 
organisation also has a responsibility to inform its workers and also comply. Because it is a mandatory 
scheme, the moment a worker join public service, deductions from salary to NHF commences. Workers 
need to ask where these monies are taken to and their employers too have responsibility to explain to the 
workers. The workers need to know how they could benefit from the scheme and how to go about it.
M - Can you walk me through the process of issuing loan to estate developer?
MB3 - There are three windows through which loan could be accessed. W e have the NHF loan, estate 
development loan and Cooperative development loan. The bank has identified estate developers that are
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duly licensed (registered with Real Estate Development Association -  REDAN) to build houses for sale to 
NHF contributors -  influence of bank on selection of developers. The first step is for developers to acquire 
land and also secure title on it. After this, they will then apply to the bank seeking for a loan to fund the 
construction of certain number of housing units which would eventually be sold to NHF contributors. If loan 
is approved and construction begins, the beneficiary (off-taker) will be required to make upfront payment of 
10% (equity contribution) cost of the house -  first test of affordability. The developer will then build the 
houses to finish and make allocation to beneficiary -  influences of developers on allocation of estates.
After the houses have been completed, the bank will pay off 90% cost to the developer while the
beneficiary repay the bank on instalment arrangement to last for 25yrs. The repayment plan also depends 
on the number of years left in service for the beneficiary.
M -O k
MB3 -Beneficiaries have the responsibility of making arrangement with Primary Mortgage Institution or 
Mortgage Loan Originator. In most cases, developers will decide to beneficiary the PMI or MLO that 
package the mortgage loan for them -  influences of developers on decision making.
M -At what point do developer gets off the process?
MB3 -The developer gets off the process after completing construction houses, providing infrastructure 
(access road, drainage and water) which should not exceed two years. At this stage, the developer’s role 
terminates and the bank equally pays them off. The repayment arrangement is handled by the bank, 
PMI/MLO and beneficiaries of the houses.
M -How far has the bank gone in mobilising Plateau State workers into NHF?
MB3 -W e have made tremendous efforts to enlightened workers about the scheme. This year alone, 
we have held talks with Film Corporation, Nigerian Security and Civil Defence, National Commission for 
Museum and Monument, National Veterinary Research Institute, Institute of Archaeology and Museum 
Studies -  These are all federal government establishments.
M - What about the state and local government workers?
MB3 - At the state level, we will be having talk with Water Board in the coming week. Plateau State 
government has resumed its contributions to the scheme and it’s also mobilising workers to participate. 
W e’re still pursuing the local governments -  the need for political will to support NHF scheme. The tertiary 
institutions in Plateau State are not contributing but we’re still pursuing them and hope they will comply. 
Getting more workers into the scheme will provide more money for houses building. From 1992 when the 
scheme began, we have collected about 2.4billion Nigerian currency.
M - What about accessibility, are the houses reaching the target groups (middle and low income 
groups) as stated in the Bank’s policy documents?
MB3 -Yes, that is the reason why NHF based arrangement is provided where house prices is regulated 
to meet target group. Houses that are built in all states with the exception of Lagos, Abuja and Port- 
Harcourt are not sold at the price above 5 million Nigerian currencies. With this arrangement, middle and 
low income earners will be able to benefit. In all the estates, houses are design for different category of 
workers and affordability (i.e 1, 2 & 3 bedroom apartments). All developers accessing NHF funds are given 
a ceiling amount at which cost of houses should not exceed. They are expected to build houses at the 
maximum cost of 5million per unit.
M -Are we likely to experience any more progress in the near future?
MB2 -W e hope so. Recently, the federal government through the Central Bank of Nigeria had 
approved about N200billion Nigerian currency. W e hope that as the money gets to the bank, we will 
support more house building activities. Apart from FMBN, there are other agencies within the housing 
ministry that are also building houses such as Federal Housing Authority, though its activities are more 
concentrated at the federal capital.
M - Where does FHA get its finances?
MB3 - FHA gets its finances directly from the Ministry.
M -Thank you very much for your time.
322
APPENDIX- XIX: Transcripts of interview conducted with representatives
of State Government Agencies in Jos
TRANSCRIPT ONE 
RESPONDENT: SG1
M - The purpose of this interview is to understand the role that your agency plays in the present
arrangement for housing provision. How is this agency supporting housing activities in line with 1991 policy 
decision and reforms that have occurred subsequently?
SG1 -The policy has reduced our activities to becoming a supervisory and regulatory organisation. 
We're no longer building houses for workers to rent like before. As an Assistant Director, I must confess to 
you that I have never seen a copy of the policy. What I know of it is that government was meant to create 
enabling environment for the private sector or partner with private sector to provide affordable houses for 
workers and the general public to buy. In our own case, we have already, in line with the national housing 
policy and reforms, the ministry recommended to the state government in a report, to provide land with 
primary infrastructure (access road, water, electricity) for the project. The ministry has screened 47 private 
developers for Public-Private Partnership arrangement. Out of the 47, six were selected and now one has 
been dropped. The successful developers are now waiting for government to provide land to enable them 
mobilize to site. In fact, some of them are even willing to acquire the land for the project by themselves.
M -O k
SG1 - Government has identified five sites for the housing project, one at Mista Ali, others at Rizek,
Gofwan, Dong and Mararaban Jama’a areas respectively.
M -How is government supporting developers with subsidies?
SG1 -There are ongoing efforts, the process of land acquisition is still in progress. The ministry 
recommended to government to provide land with primary infrastructure as a way of subsidizing cost of 
production. But it seems government is unwilling to provide land and infrastructure for free. Government is 
of the view that developers should refund whatever cost it incur in acquiring land and making infrastructure 
available. It appears government is no longer willing to provide site with infrastructure. The thinking of 
government now is to facilitate the process of land acquisition while developers bear whatever cost.
For me, the cardinal point about low income housing is affordability. If the houses are unaffordable to the 
end user, then the aim of this arrangement would be defeated. What my colleague is saying is a very 
crucial point. The arrangement now is not very clear to us as government feels its role is to facilitate land 
purchase by bringing together private developers and the land owners to ensure smooth transaction. 
These are very critical issues which remain very unclear to us till this moment.
M -O k
SG1 - My personal view is that housing sector should operate as a service oriented sector than profit
making venture. But it seems all the developers are just out for profit making. Developers are not thinking 
of any cost saving measures apart from profit making. The target group for this housing project is workers 
(middle and low income earners). The workers are not well remunerated, this is an issue already. W e have 
experienced industrial disputes over and again due to low wages. This is a critical factor to consider in the 
provision of low income housing. If government fails to provide supply subsidy as we recommended, 
workers would not be able to acquire the houses.
M -O k
SG1 - This arrangement may not benefit the target groups so long as government is not making 
adequate commitment. W e have advised government that even if it’s not going to acquire the land for 
developers, it should provide primary infrastructure. And if government refuses completely, we may end 
up with a situation like that of Gwarimpa estate at the federal capital territory where lots of houses have 
been constructed but remained vacant because workers could not afford the cost.
This is my candid view, except the cost of land and infrastructure is taken care off by government, we’ll 
definitely experience the situation of federal capital territory. The same situation occurred at Bauchi and 
Gombe states respectively. In these states, houses were constructed but remained unaffordable to the 
people. The houses remain vacant till today. Apart from providing supply subsidy, we also recommended 
that state government should serve as guarantor for all workers that will eventually take the houses.
M - Is government involving the ministry officials in the facilitation process of land acquisition?
SG1 - Yes.
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M -What is the respond of the land owners?
SG1 - The land owners are very much willing to sale. But some are not willing to be displaced; they 
wish to be made part of the new community. Their agents are always coming to follow up on the 
transaction.
M - What is the status of houses that were built by government long time ago?
SG1 - Government at all levels have withdrawn from direct provision and maintenance of public
estates. Houses owned by federal government have been sold to the occupants on owner-occupier 
arrangement. At the state level, some have been sold while many are still held by government. However, 
those held are in state of disrepair. Government usually deduct rent for the houses from worker’s salaries 
but don’t remit such to the ministry for maintenance.
M - What plan does government have for the houses still being held?
SG1 - What happened in the last administration is, government disposed off those houses that were
still in good shape. The houses being held by government at the moment are in dilapidated condition but 
government is unwilling to sell it out.
M - What is the present situation of Plateau state Primary Mortgage Institution?
SG1 - The PMI is not functioning at the moment. W e understood that government was unable to 
recapitalize in line with the financial reforms. You will recall that the last ten years experience reforms in 
the financial sector. The reform affected the operation of PMIs across the country as they were expected 
to recapitalize to enable them have a share capital of NIOOmillion each against N5million as it used to be. 
Government did not respond and so long as it is not recapitalized the Central Bank will not let it carry on 
with retail mortgage activities. . And government is not desirous to commit such sum of money to bring it 
back to life.
M - You mention earlier that government is planning to engage developers to build houses through 
NHF arrangement. How would the new arrangement work without a functional PMI to interface the 
transaction?
SG1 -Government plan to use an outside PMI to interface transaction between workers, developers 
and Federal Mortgage Bank. As far as we’re aware, the new arrangement is still at rudimentary stage in 
Plateau but efforts are being made to achieve some progress. There are two options to work with; first, 
government can connect its workers with an out PMIs as earlier mentioned. Another option is to 
resuscitate its own PMIs; I mean First Capital Savings and Loan. It doesn't take much, except that there is 
no political will on the part of government.
M - What would you say are the main restructuring that took place in this Ministry after 1991 housing 
policy and subsequent reforms? -
SG1 - Some restructuring took place over time. Before 1991, it used to Ministry for Works and Housing. 
Then, the ministry was directly involved in building houses for workers to rent. I cannot remember the 
exact date now. Later on, the Ministry became a Ministry for Housing and Environment. At this time we 
were no longer building houses. W e were only maintaining existing stock through routine maintenances 
and also involved in environmental related activities. As you can see now, it is now referred to as Ministry 
of Housing and Urban Development. The Ministry has undergone restructuring. Its role now is to develop 
housing programmes, monitor and supervise implementation.
M -Thank you for your time.
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APPENDIX- XX: Transcripts of interview conducted with representatives
of Local Government Councils in Jos
TRANSCRIPT ONE 
RESPONDENT - LGC1
My research is about national housing policy implementation and adequate housing provision in Jos. How 
have things changed in Council’s activities with regard to housing provision Jos?
R - Council stopped building houses with the coming into existence of 1991 housing policy. From 
1991 to date, we have not had any housing project. However, from time to time, Council usually acquire 
land and after producing the layout it will then be sold to workers and the general public at a subsidised 
rate. The last time that Council acquire land was in 2008. The significant change is that Council no longer 
build houses for workers. The reforms that followed aren’t making much impact in Council’s operation.
M - What restructuring took place in the Council as result of the policy and reforms?
R - Nothing much has happened with regards to restructuring. The structure of the Local
Government Council remains the same like it was before the policy. Except for the role that specific 
departments use to place like case of Works department where I am. When Council was building houses 
for workers, the works through the estate units use to acquire land for that purpose. The work of estate 
officers then involved negotiating with landowners and carrying out valuation for compensation etc. Such 
role no longer exists. The Estate Unit now handles maintenances of estates owned by the council. W e also 
carryon with the routine of registering land title for prospective developers
M - You made mention of the Council acquiring plots to sale to its workers and the general public. Is
that a kind of subsidy for housing provision in Jos?
R - Yes. Council is supposed to be doing that continuously but unfortunately; it's not doing much of 
that. Council is not doing much in that regard. Like the last layout, the works department submitted a 
proposal for infrastructure provision but there was no response from the Council chair. The only thing that 
Council did was to control erosion along a flood drain by constructing a culvert. People had no option than 
to start building houses while they struggle to extend primary infrastructure to their houses. It has not been 
easy at all.
M - What is the position of estates that Council provided for workers to rent before 1991 ?
R - The estates are still being owned by LG Council and there is no plan at the moment to sale 
them. W e have a number of such estates scattered around the city. However, they are in a dilapidated 
condition because Council don’t maintain them at all. But despite the dilapidated condition, they are still be 
occupied by the workers.
M In what ways did housing reforms carried out by previous government affected management of
Council owned estates?
R - In my opinion, the reforms only affected the management of Council housing in a negative way. 
I said this because the estates have not received any attention in terms of routine maintenance in the last 
ten years. The very few that Council have had to maintained are those ones which senior officers were 
occupying or wanted to occupy. Government stopped maintaining those estates and we thought that they 
would be transferred to workers to pay in instalments. Unfortunately, we are yet to hear any news in regard 
to that and it’s also too bad that they are not being maintained.
Council did not just stopped maintaining the estates, but it also stopped collecting rent on them. For 
whatever reason, Council is no longer responsible for allocating tenants; workers usually occupy the 
houses on a local arrangement within themselves. The responsibility of maintaining the estates is on those 
occupying it. Council has record of what is on ground and nothing else.
M - Is Council having any collaboration with any agency to make housing affordable for workers?
R - Not really. There is no any collaboration except for residential layout produce by Council for the
benefit of workers and general public as earlier discussed.
M - Thank you for your time and good bye.
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APPENDIX- XXI: Transcript of interview conducted with representative of
Non-Governmental Organisation in Jos
RESPONDENT: A1
M - My research is about housing policy implementation and access to adequate housing in Jos. I
understand that this agency is coordination activities for water supply and improvement of slums/informal 
settlements. How is the agency carrying out its activities in Jos?
R -UN-Habit WAC II came up as a fall out of WAC I which started in 1999. The idea behind WACI 
emerged when UN-habit created water, sanitation and infrastructure department with funding from the 
water and sanitation trust fund.
NG01-The idea was to identify cities, focusing on urban core informal settlements in Africa who have 
severe water and sanitation problems. Urban core informal settlements are chosen because of increasing 
rural-urban drift (urbanisation) which is causing huge population of economically weak urban residents to 
reside in informal settlements that lack basic infrastructure such as water. As a result of this, WAC I was 
decided upon by UN-habit to be piloted in seven African cities excluding Nigeria at that time.
M -Ok
NG01 -At the end of WAC I, a review was done and WACII was decided to be carried out. The review is 
usually done by the highest water management body in Africa i.e the African Ministerial Council. It was 
during the review that Nigeria indicated interest through the Ministry of Water Resources to participate in 
WAC II. WAC II is a pilot scheme in Nigeria and was schedule to start in 2006 to end by 2008.
Through certain criteria developed by the Federal Ministry of Water Resources, the city of Jos was 
selected for the pilot scheme. The UN-habit carried out vulnerability assessment of settlements in Jos and 
six were found to be very vulnerable. Out of the six two were selected again as the most vulnerable i.e 
Gwarandok and Longwah respectively. These two communities are informal settlements on rocky terrains. 
They are inadequate in getting supply of domestic water as a result of which poor sanitation condition is 
experienced. In addition, the two settlements were committed to tacking water shortage and sanitation 
problems through community efforts.
M -Ok
NG01 -As I speak to you now, WAC II is being implemented in the two communities mentioned with the
intention of replicating it in other cities.
M -In what way is government contributing to WAC II
NG01 -WAC II is collaboration between UN-habit and Federal Government of Nigeria. It is the federal 
government that decided to pilot this scheme in Jos. UN-Habit contributed 57% funding of WAC II, the 
remaining percentage is coming from Federal, State and local government that is benefiting from the pilot 
scheme. Plateau State government is contributing 60%, federal government is contributing 30% while Jos 
south local government contribute 10%. So far, federal and state governments have redeemed 100% of 
their counterpart funding. W e are now pursuing Jos south local government to redeem its own part.
M -Ok.
NG 01-lt would interest you to know that the programme was design to run for just two years starting from
2006 through 2008 but it’s still going on due to some challenges we’re encountering. W e are not happy
that it has lasted too long and the longer it last, the more problems we would encounter.
The scheme has six thematic areas and each of it is being implemented by government agencies or non­
governmental agencies. All the implementation agencies signed a cooperation agreement with UN-Habit. 
The cooperation agreement provides guidelines of operations and implementation of the scheme. The six 
thematic areas as follows:
Pro-poor water governance and investment. This involves bringing together the community, 
informal water vendors, civil societies and stakeholders concern with water provision to see how 
best to management water provision. The follow up investment involve providing infrastructure 
such as laying pipes, providing water kiosk, installing stand up pipes in schools and provision of 
toilets. In the two communities, we have provided two water tanks with capacity of 125,000 litres. 
Pro-poor water governance and investment is being handled by Plateau State W ater Board.
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Water Sanitation which is being handled by Plateau Environmental and Sanitation Agency. W e 
have a focal person that coordinates activities in that agency. This involves provision of mobile 
toilets and improving sanitation conditions in schools and communities.
Value based water sanitation and hygiene education. This is being handled by the State Ministry 
of Education, Department of Planning, Research and Statistics. The department is reviewing 
curriculum of primary and secondary schools to ensure that sanitation and hygiene is 
incorporated.
Integrated Water Catchment’s Management. This involves management of water reservoirs 
around the city. It also handles water demand management aspects. This thematic area is 
handled by National Water Resource Institute in Kaduna.
Advocacy and awareness. Though there was no direct cooperation agreement between UN-habit 
and Plateau Radio Television Corporation, however, it is handling the awareness aspect because 
Water board has subcontracted out to them.
M -Ok
NG01 -In terms of decision making, there is a steering committee overseeing the programmes across 
the country. In each state, the committee is chaired by commissioner for water resources in the benefiting 
state. In our case, the commissioner of water resources is the chairperson of the steering committee in 
Plateau State. The steering committee members are drawn from federal ministry of water resource (there 
is a focal person for the scheme), national water resource institute, which is in charge of capacity building 
for both benefiting community and other implementing partners (particularly water board).
M -O k
NG01 -Others members are drawn from Plateau State Ministry of Justice (for enforcement of legislature), 
and the ministry for women affairs. There is also the Jos Metropolitan Development Board, who is helping 
with acquisition of land on which toilet are constructed. Other members of the steering committee are 
drawn from benefiting communities and local government.
M -What role does the benefiting community play in the whole arrangement?
NG01 - The benefiting community is usually involved right from programme identification and design, 
validation workshop, implementation and even monitoring. As a deliberate effort to ensuring that projects 
are sustained, UN-habitat incorporates some capacity building for members of benefiting communities. 
And it is for same purpose that benefiting community members are incorporated into the steering 
community. At every stage of the programme, benefiting communities are well represented. In addition, an 
agreement has been reached between government and benefiting community, to accept responsibility of 
managing whatever project and facilities provided including payment of any associated bills.
M What challenges is WAC II facing?
NG01 -The major challenges WAC II faced or is facing are as follows:
-The ethno-religious conflicts in Jos did not permit donor agencies to come for mid-term evaluation of the 
scheme.
-There is intermittent replacement of chief executive of the Plateau State ministry for water resources. This 
has affected progress of the project as new executive need to understand and also appreciate the scheme 
for any action to take place.
-The city of Jos is on a rocky terrain and so it’s always difficult and expensive to lay water pipes and to 
also construct whatever facilities that is required for the project.
-The issue of capacity is also a challenge. Workers need to be equipped to understand the dynamics of 
urban water supply in order to achieve any success. W e have been carrying out a lot of training for 
workers across implementing agencies and we hope to overcome this challenge.
W e’re always trying to convert our challenges into opportunities. Formerly, the capacity of water 
treatment plants in Jos was inadequate but through this scheme, it is being expanded to meet growing 
demand for water.
M -Thank you for your time.
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APPENDIX- XXII: Transcripts of interview conducted with Private
Developers in Jos
TRANSCRIPT ONE 
RESPONDENT: PD1
M - My research comes from the backdrop of 1991 housing policy decision which introduced
the housing finance arrangement that is being administered by Federal Mortgage Bank. I understand that 
your company has accessed finance for housing provision in Jos. What are your experiences with the 
arrangement for access to finance at the Federal Mortgage Bank?
PD1 -Let’s first appreciate the fact that we’re in a developing country and so things are not as they are
in developed countries. Before the 1991 housing policy, the involvement of private estate developers in 
mass housing production did not exist. There were no any arrangements for accessing affordable credit for 
house building; it was only government that was involved in housing provision through budgetary 
allocations. The 1991 housing policy in particular brought about the operation of National Housing Fund, 
and it is one good thing that ever happened in this country.
M -O k
PD1 -The NHF brought in the backbone of mortgage operation in Nigeria. NHF was a move at the right
direction. Through NHF, we now have a pool of financial resources that can be accessed for the purpose 
of providing affordable housing. If NHF was not there, subsequent reforms wouldn’t have taken place and 
people will still be at the mercy of commercial banks that charge high interest rates on loan. As a 
developer, we don’t access estate loan from commercial bank, otherwise we end up debts.
M - What does it take for a private developer to access NHF loan from the Federal Mortgage Bank
of Nigeria?
PD1 - There is a check list of requirements which a developer must satisfy in order to access NHF loan.
It is a very stringent one because there are about 30 to 40 conditions that a developer has to satisfy in 
order to access housing loan from the FMBN. A lot of the requirements to satisfy are paper work related 
but a crucial one is ownership of land for the housing project. The land must have a valid title, preferably 
certificate of occupancy. And when we talk about land, the issue of cost of its acquisition comes to mind.
M -O k
PD1 - The issue of land is still a major problem in Jos and elsewhere in Nigeria where we’ve had to
undertake housing project despite housing policy and reforms. The policy and reforms have not address 
land issues. Customary owners of land still hold firm to their properties. They prefer to keep their land in 
their ownership for hundreds of years even without any improvement taking place on it. There is so much 
for government to do in terms of policies or reforms to address land issues and to give access to land for 
mass housing provision. The Land Use Act which says that all land in the country belong to government 
has not achieved its purpose. The cost of land has been an issue, and it naturally adds or inflates the cost 
of producing housing.
M -O k
PD1 - Once a developer is able to acquire land and obtain a good title, we can then say he is in
business. What follows is to produce building plans, seek approval, produce bill of quantities, and make 
valuation reports to submit to FMBN for a loan. The developer has to be a registered member of Real 
Estate Developers Association of Nigeria (REDAN). In addition to this, a developer should have carried 
out feasibility study and also have some off -  takers handy who will acquire the houses built. The feasibility 
study should show how much the house will cost if produced and the target population.
M -What does it take to acquire land and also obtain title on it in Jos?
PD1 - The experiences in land acquisition processes differ from one city to the other but generally it
seems to remain cumbersome across the country. At the federal capital territory, the experiences we had 
are quite different from what we have experienced in Jos. In both cities, it’s not an issue of how fast you 
can acquire a land but it’s an issue of how much money a developer has. Once you have money at hand, 
you can get land anywhere.
M -O K
PD1 - It’s very unfortunate that a reputable company that is affiliated to FMBN to provide affordable
housing cannot still get land allocation from government. The system is such that government officers
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allocate land only to their friends who may not use it to the benefit of low income groups. No matter how 
good a company’s proposed project is, it’s still very difficult to get land allocation. A developer can wait for 
10yrs, 20yrs, or even forever. And if a developer has gotten a well sensitized market with off-takers readily 
available, he may lose it while waiting for government’s allocation. For us as private developers, we don’t 
often wait to get government allocation because it’s always not forthcoming. W e often look for a land that 
can be purchased at a reasonable cost, bearing in mind the affordability levels of our off-takers; otherwise 
we would be out of business or fail to achieve our objective. The ideal thing would have been to acquire 
the land at a statutory fees but this is still not the case.
M -What are your experiences with land titling processes in Jos, any improvement?
PD1 -The reforms were meant to improve land titling process but the reverse is the case. The reforms
have rather created more bureaucratic bottlenecks to obtaining land titles. In a place like Jos, the 
government has tried but there are still considerable issues to deal with. For instance, the computerisation 
process of land titling processes led to placing of embargo in issuance of titles. This has been a problem.
W e have had to suffer in some instances because of struggles between two different tiers of government 
over jurisdiction to issue certificate of occupancy. From my experiences, there are still a lot of issues to 
deal with as land titling process still take a long time. The processes have not changed in any significant 
ways.
M - What are your experiences in getting interested off-takers?
PD1 - There is huge demand for housing and so getting off-takers is not a big issues. People really
want to have access to good housing but they are financially constraint. Despite the financial constraint, 
there are huge off-takers to access in the market. People’s confidence is rising because the arrangement 
is more workable compared to early years of our housing policy and operation of NHF. I can confidently 
say that we have demand that we cannot even meet. W e’re struggling to see that we take as much off­
takers as possible. However, we are equally constraint in many respects and government need-to do more 
in terms of policy and reforms. The recent restructuring in FMBN is a move at the right direction but there 
is need for improvement in the whole structure of housing provision. There is need to review the operation 
of some agencies involved in the arrangement so as to eliminate the obstacles we often encounter. The 
arrangement is open to a lot of manipulations so that those that supposed to benefit are not really the ones 
benefiting. There is need to improve the level of transparency particularly at FMBN so that loan will be 
disbursed base on first come, first serve basis.
M - Are you able to get off-takers from the three tiers of government and as well as the private
sector?
PD1 -Yes, we do get demand from all tiers of government and the private sector. But we often prefer
to work with people who have better capacity to acquire the houses produced.
M - In what ways is government facilitating the process of house building through provision of
physical and social infrastructure to project sites?
PD1 - It is expected that government would provide infrastructure to our project sites as a way of 
subsidising cost of housing to workers but this is still an issue even in this present era. W e have had a lot 
of promises from government in that regards but nothing is forthcoming. The politicians are always 
complaining of lack of funds to provide infrastructure on our project sites, in fact they don’t provide it at all. 
And if we will have to wait for when government will have money to provide infrastructure in our project 
sites, then we may not achieve projects at stipulated period. In the most recent reviews carried out in 
FMBN, the bank is helping to tackle the issue of infrastructure by granting additional loan of up to 70% of 
the total cost of providing infrastructure on project site. Though it’s a loan which will have to be off-set by 
building it into the cost of houses produced, we can say it’s the developer that provide infrastructure. The 
implication is that cost of housing escalates to become unaffordable to some interested off-takers. If we 
had subsidies for infrastructure, the reverse would be the case as prices of houses process will be lower.
There are instances where off-takers will accept to bear the cost of providing infrastructure to projects site 
at the on-set. In that case, developer will not need to take FMBN loan for that purpose.
M - What would you say are the main challenges of providing affordable housing in the present
dispensation?
PD1 - W e have discussed a lot of them but in summary, they include cost of land and getting access to 
land itself. It’s a crazy experience to get a title to a iand and this is an issue that needs attention. These are 
the two main challenges.
M - Thanks for your time.
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APPENDIX- XXIII: Questionnaire used for Survey in Jos
Sheffield 
I H a l l a m  University
SHARPENS YOUR THINKING
Faculty of Development & Society Graduate School 
Unit 9 Howard Street, S1 1WB Sheffield, England, United Kingdom 
Email contact: mdmaren@vahoo.com ; maren.m.daniel@student.shu.ac.uk
18/07/2011
Dear Respondent,
My name is Maren Mallo Daniel, a student at the above named institution, carrying out 
fieldwork to collect data for PhD research. The study is about housing policy 
implementation and access to adequate housing, with a focus on financial mechanisms. 
The aim is to appraise housing policy outcome, focusing on access opportunities for public 
sector workers in Jos. I would be grateful if you make time to respond to the questionnaire. 
The instructions for completing the questionnaire are as follows:
1) Please read the instructions for answering each question carefully.
2) Ignore the numbers beside or below each option - they are for analysis purpose
only.
3) Check that you have answered the entire questions that apply to you.
4) If for any reason you're unable to take part please return the blank questionnaire.
5) Completed questionnaire will be collected at the place they were administered.
All the information you give will be kept completely confidential and your anonymity is 
highly guaranteed. Information collected will be used for this study only and you're entitled 
. to the finding of the research, if you wish to have it.
Thanks for your cooperation.
QUESTIONNAIRE
PART 1
Section A: In this section, I would like to obtain information about respondents and their 
employment.
1) What is your sex? Tick one option only V
a) Male [ ]1
b) Female [ ]2
2) In which tier of Government are you employed?
Tick one option only V
a) Federal Government [ ]1
b) State Government [ ]2
c) Local Government [ ]3
3) What are your aggregate years of employment in the public sector?
Tick one option only V
a) Less than 7yrs [ ]1
b) 8 -1 4 y rs  [ ]2
c) 15 - 21yrs [ ]3
d) 22 - 28yrs [ ]4
e) 29 - 35yrs [ ]5
f) Above 35yrs [ ]6
4) Choose the Grade Level category in which your current position stands 
Tick one option only V
a) GL 0 1 - 0 6  [ ]1
b) GL 07 - 1 2/CONUASS 0 1 - 0 4  [ ]2
c) GL 13 - 17/CONUASS 05 - 07 [ ]3
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5) How do you feel about your salary income in relation to meeting personal and/or 
family need?
Tick one option only V
a) Very good
b) Fairly good
c) Neither good nor bad
d) Fairly bad
e) Very bad
Section B: In this section, I would like to know about respondents' status in relation to 
home ownership and housing finance arrangement.
6) What is your status in relation to home ownership (either building by yourself, 
purchasing by mortgage, outright purchase etc)?
Tick one option only V
a) Already acquired a house [ ]1
b) In process for the first time [ j2
c) Still making plans [ ]3
d) No plans at the moment [ j
7) What housing finance arrangement did you employ (or plan to use) to acquire a 
house?
Tick one option only V
specify.
a) Personal savings
b) Loan from commercial bank
c) Loan from Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria
d) Loan from Employer
e) Loan from Cooperative or Thrift Association
f) Assistance/gift from family or friends
g) Combination of two or more of the above
h) Others, Please
8) Are you currently participating in National Housing Fund (NHF) saving scheme
(NHF is a federal government arrangement for housing finance through Federal Mortgage
Bank of Nigeria)?
a) Yes [ ]1
b) No [ ]2
9) If yes to question 8, how do you feel about the arrangement?
Tick one option only V
a) Very good [ ]1
b) Fairly good [ ]2
c) Neither good nor bad [ ]3
d) Fairly bad [ ]4
e) Very bad [ j5
10) If no to question 8, what is your reason for not participating?
Tick one option only V
a) Not aware of its existence [ ]1
b) Don't wish to participate [ j2
c) Other reasons [ j3 Please specify...................
Section C: In this section, I would like to know how you consider any of the following as 
critical problem in acquiring a house.
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12) Beside each statement in the table below, please indicate the extent to which any
of them is (was) a problem to you in getting access to finance and housing
Against each item, tick below one option only V
Items Very big 
problem
fairly
big
problem
Fairly 
not a 
problem
■ Not a 
problem at 
all
Undecid
ed
1 2 3 4 5
Cost of land
Getting title to land (Certificate of 
Occupancy)
Access to long term loan
Satisfying loan requirements
Affordability of loan (interest, repayment 
mode etc)
Insufficient income
Access to housing loan from employer
Access to alternative sources of credit 
( e.g Cooperatives, Thrift & Credit 
Associations etc)
Cost of providing infrastructure to 
building site (e.g. water, electricity, 
access road, drainage etc).
PART 2
In this section, I would like to have your personal views on issues within home acquisition 
processes. In your perception, what do you consider as important issues to accessing 
housing in your local environment that should receive public policy priority and action?
Thanks for your cooperation and participation. 
Sincerely Yours,
Maren Mallo Daniel 
Research Student
332
APPENDIX- XXIV: Federal Government Organisations in Jos as at 2011-02-
13
S/NO CATEGORY
A -  TEACHING & RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS
1 National Veterinary Research Institute (NVRI), Vom, Jos South
2 National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos South
3 Federal College of Land Resources Technology, Vom, Jos South
4 Federal College of Forestry, Jos North
5 Federal Government College, Jos North
6 University of Jos, Jos North
7 Jos University Teaching Hospital (JUTH), Lamingo Village, Jos East
8 Federal College of Medical Laboratory Technology, Vom, Jos South
9 Federal College of Animal Health and Husbandry, Vom, Jos South
10 Federal College of Nursing and Midwifery, Jos North,
11 Federal School of Medical Laboratory Science, Jos North
12 NTA Television College, Ray Field, Jos South
13 National Open University, Jos Study Centre, Jos South
14 National Institute for Museum and Archaeological Studies, Jos North
B - MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION
1 Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation (Fed Sect Complex)
2 Nigerian Television Authority (NTA), Jos
3 National Film and Video Censor Board (British -  American Junction), Jos
4 Nigerian Broadcasting Commission, Jos
5 News Agency of Nigeria, Jos
6 National Film Institute, Jos
C -  FINANCE, INSURANCE AND REVENUE INSTITUTIONS
1 Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS), Jos
2 Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria (Jos Zonal Office)
3 Federal Ministry of Finance (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
4 National Revenue Mobilisation and Fiscal Commission (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
5 National Agricultural and Rural Development Bank (NARDP), Jos
6 Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), Jos
7 NICON Insurance Corporation (Sec Link) Jos
8 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation (NDIC), Jos
9 Federal Audit Department (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
10 Federal Pay Office (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
D -  EDUCATION, EXAMINATIONS AND ACHIEVES
1 Federal Department of Statistics (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
2 Federal Ministry of Education (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
3 National Achieves, Jos
4 Museum of Monuments and Artefacts
5 National Library of Nigeria, Jos
6 National Examination Council (NECO), Jos
7 West African Examination Council, Jos
8 Joint Admission and Matriculation Board (JAMB)
E -  JUDICIARY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
1 Code of Conduct Bureau, Jos
2 Federal High Court, Jos
3 Court of Appeal, Jos
4 Industrial and Arbitration Court, Jos
5 National Agency for Food, Drug Administration and Control (NAFDAC), Jos
6 Standard Organisation of Nigeria (SON), Ray field Junction, Jos South
7 National Environmental Standards and Regulation Enforcement Commission (NESREA), Jos
8 Federal Ministry of Justice (Sect Complex), Jos
F -  COMMERCE, INDUSTRY, TRAINING & DEVELOPMENT
1 Federal Ministry of Commerce (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
2 Federal Ministry of Industries (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
3 Federal Ministry of Mines and Steel Development (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
4 Federal Ministry of Establishment -  Zonal office (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
5 Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
6 Nigerian Mining Corporation (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
7 Industrial Training Fund (ITF -  Headguarters), Miango Low cost, Jos
8 Industrial Training Fund (Area office), Kufang, Jos
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9 Industrial Training Fund (Centre for Excellence), Jos South
10 National Metallurgical Development Centre, Zaria road, Jos
11 Federal Ministry of Sports and Social Development (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
12 National Directorate for Employment, Jos
13 National Youth Service Corps (NYSC), Jos
14 Power Holding Company of Nigeria (PHCN)
15 Nigerian Postal Service (NIPOST)
G -  W ORKS, TRANSPORTATION, HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
1 Federal Ministry of Works (Fed Sec Complex), Jos
2 Federal Ministry of Housing & Urban Development (Fed Sec Complex), Jos
3 Nigerian Railway Corporation (NRC), Jos
4 Federal Ministry of Aviation (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
H -  AGRICULTURE AND ENVIRONMENT
1 Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Pest Control (Fed Sec Complex), Jos
2 Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Land Resources (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
3 Federal Ministry of Environment, Erosion, Flood & Coastal Zone
4 Federal Ministry of Water Resources (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
5 National Centre for Remote Censing
I -  HEALTH
1 Federal Ministry of Health (Fed Sect Complex)
2 National Health Insurance Scheme, Jos
3 Federal Staff Clinic (Fed Sect Complex), Jos
J -  SPECIAL COMMISSIONS, AGENCIES & OTHERS
1 National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA), Jos
2 Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Jos
3 National Population Commission (NPC), Jos
4 National Civil Registration (NCR), Jos
5 Public Complain Commission (PCC), Jos
6 Civil Registration, Jos
7 Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC)
8 National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), Zaria road, Jos
9 Department for Petroleum Resources (DPR), Jos.
H - (EXCLUDED ORGANISATION)
Nigerian Police, Federal Road Safety Corps (FRSC), Nigerian Army (NA) and Nigerian Air Force 
(NAF), State Security Service (SSS), Nigeria Custom Services (NCS), Nigerian Immigration 
Services (NIS), National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA)
Sources Embassy of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Global Scope Inc (2004) 
www.niqerianembassvusa.org/parastatals.shtml: DAWUDU, Segun T (2006). Nigerian Government. 
Herndon, VA, USA http://www.dawodu.com/niaerian4.htm
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APPENDIX- XXV: State Government Establishments in Jos as at 2011-02-15
S/NO CATEGORY
A -ED U C A TIO N
1 Ministry of Education (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Plateau State Polytechnic, Jos South
3 College of Health Technology Zawan, Jos
4 Plateau State Scholarship Board (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
5 Education Resource Centre, Jos North
6 Secondary School (Jos North and South)
7 Primary Education Board, Jos North
8 Plateau State Library Board
B - MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION
1 Ministry of Information and Communication (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Plateau Radio and Television Corporation
3 Plateau Publishing Company (Standard Building), Jos North
C -  FINANCE
1 Ministry of Finance (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Office of Plateau State Accountant General
3 Board of Internal Revenue
4 State Audit Department
E -  JUDICIARY
1 Ministry of Justice
2 State High Court, Jos
3 State Court of Appeal, Jos North
4 Sharia Court of Appeal, Jos North
F -  COMMERCE & INDUSTRY
1 Ministry of Commerce & Industry (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Plateau Industrial Development Authority
3 Relevant Technology Board
G -  WORKS &TRANSPORTATION
1 Ministry of Works and Transport (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Plateau Express Service, Jos
3 Vehicle Inspection office, Jos South
H -  AGRICULTURE AND WATER RESOURCES
1 Ministry of Water Resources and Rural Development (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
3 Water Board
4 Directorate of Food, Road and Infrastructure (DFRI)
1 -  HEALTH
1 Ministry of Health (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Plateau Specialist Hospital, Jos North
3 Hospital Management Board
4 Plateau State Aid Control Agency (PLACA)
J -  LAND, HOUSING AND ENVIRONMENT
1 Ministry of Housing and Environment (JD Gomwalk Sect Complex)
2 Ministry of Land, Survey and Town Planning, Jos North
3 Jos Metropolitan Development Board (JMDB) Jos North and South
4 Plateau Environmental Protection Agency
K- SPECIAL DUTIES, COMMISSIONS AND OTHERS
1 Ministry for Women Affairs and Social Development
2 Ministry for Youths and Sports
3 Ministry for Science and Technology
4 Ministry for Urban Development
5 Local Government Audit Department
6 State Civil Service Commission
7 Local Government Service Commission
8 Legislative Unit (Plateau State House of Assembly)
9 Ministry for Tourism and Culture
10 Ministry for Mineral Development
11 Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs
12 Christian and Muslim Pilgrim Welfare Board
13 Plateau State Electoral Commission (PLASU)
14 Fire Service -  Jos North and South
Sources PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT (2008). Plateau State Today. A Quarterly Publication of the Ministry of 
Information & Communications, Jos, 1 (2), 1 -  76; PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT (2010). People and Land and
Government. State Ministry of Information and Communication, Jos. Nigeria; PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT (2007). 
Government and Business. Last accessed 15/2/2011 at: http://www.plateaustateqov.org/qov bus/qovernment.html
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APPENDIX- XXVI: Local Government Council Departments Jos North and
South LGAs as at 2011-02-15
S/NO Jos North Local Government Council
1 Agriculture & Natural Resources Department
2 Education Authority Department & primary schools
3 Finance & Supply Department
4 ■ Information & Communication Department
5 Lands, Survey & Town Planning
6 Personnel Management Department
7 Primary Health Care Department & clinics
8 Social Services Department
9 Works Department
Jos South Local Government Council
1 Agriculture & Natural Resources Department
2 Education Authority Department & primary schools
3 Finance & Supply Department
4 Information & Communication Department
5 Lands, Survey & Town Planning
6 Personnel Management Department
7 Primary Health Care Department & clinics
8 Social Services Department
9 Works Department
PLATEAU STATE GOVERNMENT (2008). Plateau State Today. A Quarterly Publication of the Ministry of Information & 
Communications, Jos, 1 (2), 1 -7 6 ;
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APPENDIX- XXVII: List of Organisations that Participated in Questionnaire
Survey
CATEGORY A - FEDERAL GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
S/No Organisation Questionnaire
administered
Questionnaire
Retrieved
1 National Commission for Museums and Monuments, Jos 31 29
2 University of Jos 60 54
3 Federal Ministry of Works, Jos 17 17
4 Federal College of Land Resources Technology - Kuru. 20 12
5 National Veterinary Research Institute Vom, 50 24
6 Federal College of Forestry, Jos 10 08
7 National Film Institute, Jos. 10 00
Total 198 144
CATEGORY B - STATE GOVERNMENT ORGANISATIONS
S/No Organisation Questionnaire
administered
Questionnaire
Retrieved
1 Plateau State Water Board, Jos 20 16
2 Cabinet Office, JD Gomwalk Secretariat 27 26
3 Local Government Service Commission 06 03
4 Ministry of Local Government and Chieftaincy Affairs. 20 11
5 Plateau State Library Board, Jos. 36 19
6 Plateau State Polytechnic, Jos Campus 41 21
7 Tourism Corporation, Jos. 15 15
8 Government College, Jos. 15 13
9 Plateau State Polytechnic, B/Ladi Campus 45 37
Total 225 161
CATEGORY C - LOCAL GOVERNMENT COUNCIL DEPARTMENTS
S/No Organisation Questionnaire
administered
Questionnaire
Retrieved
1 Personnel Department, Jos South LGC 20 20
2 Works Department, Jos South LGC 20 12
3 Finance Department, Jos South LGC 20 18
4 Primary Health Care Department 20 20
5 Education Authority Department, Jos North LGC 10 10
6 Social Welfare Department, Jos North LGC 10 10
7 Works Department, Jos Noth LGC 10 10
8 Primary Health Care Department 10 05
Total 120 105
Source: Authors' Field Survey, 2011
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APPENDIX- XXVIII: Multi Stage Sampling Scheme
Stage 1: Compilation 
of functional 
government 
Organizations in Jos as 
at May 2011
Stage 2: Classification 
of organisations into 3 
clusters base on 
governments' control
Stage 3:
Each of the three 
cluster is further 
stratified into allied 
professions and 
related functions. 
Request for 
permission to 
conduct survey was 
sent to Organisations 
at this stage
Stage 4:
Questionnaire 
survey was 
conducted in 
Organisations that 
gave approval
154 Government Establishments
r  N (  \
82 under Federal 54 under State 18 Local Govt
Government Government Council
control control Departmentsv V  J
I
14 Teaching & Research 
Institutions
8 Educational 
Organisations
6 Media & Communication 
Organisations
3 Media & Com. 
Organisations
2 Education 
Departments
10 Finance, Insurance & 
Rev Organisations
4 Finance 
Organisations
2 Agricultural 
Departments
8 Education, Exams & 
Archives Organisations
4 Judiciary 
Organisations
2 Finance 
Departments
8 Judiciary & Law 
Enforcement Oraanisations
3 Com & Industry 
Organisations
2 Land 
Departments
15 Commerce, Training & 
Dev. Organisations
3 Works & Transport 
Organisations
2 Personnel 
Departments
4 Works, Housing & Urban 
Dev. Organisations
4 Health 
Organisations
2 Health 
Departments
5 Agriculture & Environment 
Organisations 4 Housing & Environ.
3 Health Organisations
Agric & Water Res. 
Organisations
2 Works 
Departments
2 Information 
Departments
Survey was conducted in:
7 Federal Government Organisations,
9 State Government Organisations,
8 Local Government Council Departments
2 Social Service 
Departments
9 Special Commissions
14 Special 
Commission
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APPENDIX- XXIX: Questionnaire Administration and return analysis
Category Questionnaire Percentage
ReturnAdministered Returned
Federal Government 
Organisations
198 144 72.70
State Government 
Organisations
225 161 71.55
Local Government Council 
Departments
120 105 87.55
Total 543 410
Less Invalid 005
Total Valid 405
Source: Researcher's fieldwork, October 2011 - January, 2011.
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APPNEDIX- XXX: Table for determining sample size
Sample Size for ±3%, ±5%, ±7%, and ±10% Precision Levels where
Confidence Level is 95% and P=.5.
Size of Population Sample Size (n) for Precision e) of:±3% ±5% ±7% ±10%
500 a 222 145 83
600 a 240 152 86
700 a 255 158 88
800 a 267 163 89
900 a 277 166 90
1,000 a 286 169 91
2,000 714 333 185 95
3,000 811 353 191 97
4,000 870 364 194 98
5,000 909 370 196 98
6,000 938 375 197 98
7,000 959 378 198 99
8,000 976 381 199 99
9,000 989 383 200 99
10,000 1,000 385 200 99
15,000 1,034 390 201 99
20,000 1,053 392 204 100
25,000 1,064 394 204 100
50,000 1,087 397 204 100
100,000 1,099 398 204 100
>100,000 1,111 400 204 100
a = Assumption of normal population is poor (Yamane, 1
should be sampled.
967). The entire population
Source: Israel, 2012: Available at http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/od006 (Last accessed
01/08/2012
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APPENDIX- XXXI: Documents and reports used
Source Description
Cowry Research Desk Nigerian Banking Report - Following the Progress of 
Nigerian Banks in the last 10 years. Lagos, Nigeria.
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
National Housing Policy 1991; National Housing Policy 
2006
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
2006 Population and Housing Census: Housing 
Characteristics and Amenities Tables - Priority Tables 
(LGA) Volume II
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
Millennium Development Goals - MDG (Nigeria) Report 
2010.
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
Economic Report 2011. Central Bank of Nigeria
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
The Obasanjo Reforms - Housing Sector 2006. 
Production, Publication and Documentation Department, 
Federal Ministry of Information and National Orientation, 
Abuja, Nigeria.
Federal Government of 
Nigeria
Report of the Vision 20:20 - National Technical Working 
Group on Housing, 2009.Federal Government of Nigeria
FINMARK TRUST Overview of the Housing Finance Sector in Nigeria - 
Access to Housing Finance in Africa. Report 
Commissioned by FINMARK TR UST 2010
Government of Plateau State Plateau State Economic Empowerment and Development 
Strategy (PLASEEDS), 2005
Mabogunje, A. L. A Measure of Grace. The Autobiography of Akinlawon 
Ladipo Mabogunje 2011 (Housing and Urban 
Development Parts I & II p. 565 - 620; Land Reform p. 621 
- 652).
Mortgage Banking Association 
of Nigeria
Advocacy Brief, 2009; Memorandum Submitted by the 
Mortgage Banking Association of Nigeria (MBAN) to the 
Senate Ad-hoc Committee on Constitution Review for 
Amendment of the Land Use Act, October 14, 2009.
The World Bank Making Finance Work for Nigeria, 2009
The World Bank Access to Finance in Nigeria: Microfinance, Branchless 
Banking, and SME Finance, 2009.
The World Bank Private Sector Participation, Structural Adjustment and 
Nigeria's New National Housing Policy: Lesson from 
foreign experience , TW URD W P #5 1993
UN-HABITAT National Trends in Housing Production Practices. Volume 
4, Nigeria
UN-Habitat Country Programme Document 2008 - 2009 Nigeria.
UN-Habitat Housing in Nigeria: Experimental Reimbursable Seeding 
Operation -  ERSO Expert Meeting, Stockholm 2008.
UN-Habitat Getting W ater and Sanitation to Poor Urban Communities. 
Water for African Cities WAC II, Jos, city programme 2007
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APPENDIX- XXXII: Detail of questionnaire analysis
Table 1 (a) Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Sex * Currently Participate 
in NHF
401 99.0% 4 1.0% 405 100.0%
Tabel 1 (b) Sex * Currently Participate in NHF Crosstabulation ♦
Currently Participate in NHF
Yes No Total
Sex Male Count 127 142 269
Expected Count 115.4 153.6 269.0
% within Sex 47.2% 52.8% 100.0%
% within Currently Participate in 
NHF
73.8% 62.0% 67.1%
% of Total 31.7% 35.4% 67.1%
Female Count 45 87 132
Expected Count 56.6 75.4 132.0
% within Sex 34.1% 65.9% 100.0%
% within Currently Participate in 
NHF
26.2% 38.0% 32.9%
% of Total 11.2% 21.7% 32.9%
Total Count 172 229 401
Expected Count 172.0 229.0 401.0
% within Sex 42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
% within Currently Participate in 
NHF
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 42.9% 57.1% 100.0%
Table 1(c) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided)
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 6.224a 1 .013
Continuity Correction 5.699 1 .017
Likelihood Ratio 6.306 1 .012
Fisher's Exact Test .014 .008
Linear-by-Linear 
Association 
N of Valid Cases
6.208
401
1 .013
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 56.62.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Table 1(d) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .125 .013
Cramer's V .125 .013
N of Valid Cases 401
342
Table 2 (a) Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Tier of Govt Employed * 
Currently Participate in NHF
404 99.8% 1 .2% 405 100.0%
Table 2 (b) Tier of Govt Employed * Currently Participate in NHF Crosstabulation
Currently Participate in 
NHF
TotalYes No
Tier of Govt Employed Federal Govt Count 88 56 144
Expected Count 62.4 81.6 144.0
%  within Tier of Govt 61.1% 38.9% 100.0%
Employed
% within Currently 50.3% . 24.5% 35.6%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 21.8% 13.9% 35.6%
State Govt Count 82 74 156
Expected Count 67.6 88.4 156.0
% within Tier of Govt 52.6% 47.4% 100.0%
Employed
% within Currently 46.9% 32.3% 38.6%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 20.3% 18.3% 38.6%
Local Govt Count 5 99 104
Expected Count 45.0 59.0 104.0
% within Tier of Govt 4.8% 95.2% 100.0%
Employed
% within Currently 2.9% 43.2% 25 .7%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 1.2% 24.5% 25 .7%
Total Count 175 229 404
Expected Count 175.0 229.0 404.0
% within Tier of Govt 43.3% 56.7% 100.0%
Employed
% within Currently 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 43.3% 56.7% 100.0%
Table 2 (c) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 86.816a 2 .000
Likelihood Ratio 104.411 2 .000
Linear-by-Linear 71.801 1 .000
Association
N of Valid Cases 404
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 45.05.
________________ Table 2 (d) Symmetric Measures________
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .464 .000
Cramer's V .464 .000
N of Valid Cases 404
Table 3 (a) Case Processing Summary
343
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
How Long Employed * 
Currently Participate in NHF
403 99.5% 2 .5% 405 100.0%
Table 3 (b) How Long Employed * Currently Participate in NHF Crosstabulation
Currently Participate in 
NHF
Yes No Total
How Long Employed <=14yrs Count 75 132 207
Expected Count 89.4 117.6 207.0
% within How Long 
Employed
36.2% 63.8% 100.0%
% within Currently 
Participate in NHF
43.1% 57.6% 51.4%
% of Total 18.6% 32.8% 51.4%
15-28yrs Count 71 73 144
Expected Count 62.2 81.8 144.0
% within How Long 49.3% 50.7% 100.0%
Employed
% within Currently 
Participate in NHF
40.8% 31.9% 35.7%
% of Total 17.6% 18.1% 35.7%
29yrs and above Count 28 24 52
Expected Count 22.5 29.5 52.0
% within How Long 
Employed
53.8% 46.2% 100.0%
% within Currently 
Participate in NHF
16.1% 10.5% 12.9%
% of Total 6.9% 6.0% 12.9%
Total Count 174 229 403
Expected Count 174.0 229.0 403.0
% within How Long 
Employed
43.2% 56.8% 100.0%
% within Currently 
Participate in NHF
100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 43.2% 56.8% 100.0%
Table 3 c) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 8.687a 2 .013
Likelihood Ratio 8.706 2 .013
Linear-by-Linear 8.094 1 .004
Association
N of Valid Cases 403
expected count is 22.45.
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Table 3 (d) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .147 .013
Cramer's V .147 .013
N of Valid Cases 403
Table 4 (a) Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Grade Level * Currently 
Participate in NHF
397 98.0% 8 2.0% 405 100.0%
Table 4 (b) Grade Level *  Currently Participate in NHF Crosstabulation
Currently Participate in NHF
Yes No Total
Grade Level GL 01-06 Count 21 48 69
Expected Count 30.1 38.9 69.0
% within Grade Level 30.4% 69.6% 100.0%
% within Currently 12.1% 21.4% 17.4%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 5.3% 12.1% 17.4%
GL 07-12/CON 01-04 Count 109 130 239
Expected Count 104.1 134.9 239.0
% within Grade Level 45.6% 54.4% 100.0%
% within Currently 63.0% 58.0% 60.2%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 27.5% 32.7% 60.2%
GL 13-17/CON 05-07 Count 43 46 89
Expected Count 38.8 50.2 89.0
% within Grade Level 48.3% 51.7% 100.0%
% within Currently 24.9% 20.5% 22.4%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 10.8% 11.6% 22.4%
Total Count 173 224 397
Expected Count 173.0 224.0 397.0
% within Grade Level 43.6% 56.4% 100.0%
% within Currently 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 43.6% 56.4% 100.0%
Table 4 (c) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 6.060a 2 .048
Likelihood Ratio 6.232 2 .044
Linear-by-Linear 4.560 1 .033
Association
N of Valid Cases 397
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Table 4 (d) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .124 .048
Cramer's V .124 .048
N of Valid Cases 397
Table 5 (a) Case Processing Summary
Cases
Valid Missing Total
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Satisfaction with Income * 
Currently Participate in NHF
403 99.5% 2 .5% 405 100.0%
Table 5 (b) Satisfaction with Income * Currently Participate in NHF Crosstabulation
Currently Participate in 
NHF
TotalYes No
Satisfaction with Very Good Count 5 12 17
Income % within Satisfaction 29.4% 70.6% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 2.9% 5.2% 4.2%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 1.2% 3.0% 4.2%
Fairly Good Count 91 114 205
% within Satisfaction 44.4% 55.6% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 52.3% 49.8% 50.9%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 22.6% 28.3% 50.9%
Neither good nor Count 37 22 59
bad % within Satisfaction 62.7% 37.3% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 21.3% 9.6% 14.6%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 9.2% 5.5% 14.6%
Fairly bad Count 14 39 53
% within Satisfaction 26.4% 73.6% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 8.0% 17.0% 13.2%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 3.5% 9.7% 13.2%
Very bad Count 27 42 69
% within Satisfaction 39.1% 60.9% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 15.5% 18.3% 17.1%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 6.7% 10.4% 17.1%
Total Count 174 229 403
% within Satisfaction 43.2% 56.8% 100.0%
with Income
% within Currently 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Participate in NHF
% of Total 43.2% 56.8% 100.0%
346
Table 5 (c) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 17.1433 4 .002
Likelihood Ratio 17.443 4 .002
Linear-by-Linear 1.027 1 .311
Association
N of Valid Cases 403
a. 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 7.34.
Table 5 (d) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .206 .002
Cramer's V .206 .002
N of Valid Cases 403
Table 6 Housing finance alternatives
Frequency Percent Valid Percent Cumulative
Percent
Personal Savings 174 43.0 49.9 49.9
Comm. Bank Loan 26 6.4 7.4 57.3
FMBN Loan 14 3.5 4.0 61.3
Emp. Home Loan 7 1.7 2.0. 63.3
Valid Coops Loan/Thrift 54 13.3 15.5 78.8
Assistance/Gifts 5 1.2 1.4 80.2
Comb.Sources 64 15.8 18.3 98.6
Others 5 1.2 1.4 100.0
Total 349 86.2 100.0
Missing System 56 13.8
Total 405 100.0
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Table 7 (a) Cost of Land * Tier of Govt Employed Crosstabulation
Tier of Govt Employed
Total
Federal
Govt
State
Govt
Local
Govt
Cost of Very big problem1 J Count 45 72 62 179Land % within Cost of Land 25.1% 40.2% 34.6% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 32.4% 46.5% 61.4% 45.3%
Employed
% of Total 11.4% 18.2% 15.7% 45.3%
Fairly big Count 53 54 24 131
problem % within Cost of Land 40.5% 41.2% 18.3% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 38.1% 34.8% 23.8% 33.2%
Employed
% of Total 13.4% 13.7% 6.1% 33.2%
Fairly not a Count 29 19 8 56
problem % within Cost of Land 51.8% 33.9% 14.3% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 20.9% 12.3% 7.9% 14.2%
Employed
% of Total 7.3% 4.8% 2.0% 14.2%
Not a problem at Count 12 9 6 27
all % within Cost of Land 44.4% 33.3% 22.2% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 8.6% 5.8% 5.9% 6.8%
Employed
% of Total 3.0% 2.3% 1.5% 6.8%
Undecided Count 0 1 1 2
% within Cost of Land .0% 50.0% 50.0% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt .0% .6% 1.0% .5%
Employed
% of Total .0% .3% .3% .5%
Total Count 139 155 101 395
% within Cost of Land 35.2% 39.2% 25.6% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Employed
% of Total 35.2% 39.2% 25.6% 100.0%
Table 7 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 24.613a 8 .002
Likelihood Ratio 25.411 8 .001
Linear-by-Linear 13.374 1 .000
Association
N of Valid Cases 395
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is .51.
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Table 7 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .250 .002
Cramer’s V .177 .002
N of Valid Cases 395
Table 8 (a) Land Registration * Tier of Govt Employed Crosstabulation
Tier of Govt Employed
Total
Federal
Govt
State
Govt
Local
Govt
Land Very big problem Count 90 67 45 202
Registration % within Land 44.6% 33.2% 22.3% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt 65.2% 44.4% 45.0% 51.9%
Employed
% of Total 23.1% 17.2% 11.6% 51.9%
Fairly big problem Count 24 51 36 111
% within Land 21.6% 45.9% 32.4% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt 17.4% 33.8% 36.0% 28.5%
Employed
% of Total 6.2% 13.1% 9.3% 28.5%
Fairly not a Count 13 22 15 50
problem %  within Land 26.0% 44.0% 30.0% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt 9.4% 14.6% 15.0% 12.9%
Employed
% of Total 3.3% 5.7% 3.9% 12.9%
Not a problem at Count 10 8 4 22
% within Land 45.5% 36.4% 18.2% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt 7.2% 5.3% 4.0% 5.7%
Employed
% of Total 2.6% 2.1% 1.0% 5.7%
Undecided Count 1 3 0 4
% within Land 25.0% 75.0% .0% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt .7% 2.0% .0% 1.0%
Employed
% of Total .3% .8% .0% 1.0%
Total Count 138 151 100 389
% within Land 35.5% 38.8% 25.7% 100.0%
Registration
% within Tier of Govt 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Employed
% of Total 35.5% 38.8% 25 .7% 100.0%
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Table 8 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 22.297a 8 .004
Likelihood Ratio 23.677 8 .003
Linear-by-Linear 2.406 1 .121
Association
N of Valid Cases 389
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.03.
Table 8 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .239 .004
Cramer's V .169 .004
N of Valid Cases 389
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Table 9 (a) Cost of Infrastructure to Bldg site * Tier of Govt Employed Crosstabulation
Tier of Govt Employed
Federal State Local
Govt Govt Govt Total
Cost of Very big problem Count 74 66 57 197
Infrastructure to 
Bldg site
% within Cost of Infr to 
Bldg site
37.6% 33.5% 28.9% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 52.5% 43.4% 56.4% 50.0%
Employed
% of Total 18.8% 16.8% 14.5% 50.0%
Fairly big problem Count 41 46 26 113
% within Cost of Infr to 36.3% 40.7% 23.0% 100.0%
Bldg site
% within Tier of Govt 29.1% 30.3% 25 .7% 28.7%
Employed
% of Total 10.4% 11.7% 6.6% 28.7%
Fairly not a Count 14 24 9 47
problem % within Cost of Infr to 
Bldg site
29.8% 51.1% 19.1% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
9.9% 15.8% 8.9% 11.9%
% of Total 3.6% 6.1% 2.3% 11.9%
Not a problem at Count 10 12 5 27
all % within Cost of Infr to 
Bldg site
37.0% 44.4% 18.5% 100.0%
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
7.1% 7.9% 5.0% 6.9%
% of Total 2.5% 3.0% 1.3% 6.9%
Undecided Count 2 4 4 10
% within Cost of Infr to 20.0% 40.0% 40.0% 100.0%
Bldg site
% within Tier of Govt 1.4% 2.6% 4.0% 2.5%
Employed
% of Total .5% 1.0% 1.0% 2.5%
Total Count 141 152 101 394
% within Cost of Infr to 35.8% 38.6% 25 .6% 100.0%
Bldg site
% within Tier of Govt 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Employed
% of Total 35.8% 38.6% 25.6% 100.0%
Table 9 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df
Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 8.206a 8 .414
Likelihood Ratio 8.228 8 .412
Linear-by-Linear .006 1 .936
Association
N of Valid Cases 394
a. 3 cells (20.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.56.
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Table 9 (c ) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi .144 .414
Cramer's V .102 .414
N of Valid Cases 394
Table 10 (a) Sex * Accessed/Plan to access FMBN Loan Crosstabulation
Accessed/Plan to access FMBN 
Loan
Total
Yes No
Count 13 226 239
% within Sex 5.4% 94.6% 100.0%
Male % within Accessed/Plan to 
access FMBN Loan 100.0% 67.9% 69.1%
Sex % of Total 3.8% 65.3% 69.1%Count 0 107 107
% within Sex 0.0% 100.0% 100.0%
Female % within Accessed/Plan to 
access FMBN Loan 0.0% 32.1% 30.9%
% of Total 
Count
0.0%
13
30.9%
333
30.9%
346
% within Sex 3.8% 96.2% 100.0%
Total %  within Accessed/Plan to 
access FMBN Loan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 3.8% 96.2% 100.0%
Table 10 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Exact Sig. (2- 
sided)
Exact Sig. (1- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 6.047a 1 .014
Continuity Correction13 4.637 1 .031
Likelihood Ratio 9.845 1 .002
Fisher's Exact Test .012 .007
Linear-by-Linear
Association 6.030 1 .014
N of Valid Cases 346
a. 1 cells (25 .0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 4.02.
b. Computed only for a 2x2 table
Table 10 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal PhiCramer's V
.132
.132
.014
.014
N of Valid Cases 346
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis.
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Table 11 (a) Tier of Govt Employed * Accessed/Plan to access FMBN Loan Crosstabulation
Accessed/Plan to access 
FMBN Loan
Total
Yes No
Count 9 122 131
Federal Govt
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
6.9%
64.3%
93.1%
36.4%
100.0%
37.5%
% of Total 2.6% 35.0% 37.5%
Count 5 130 135
Tier of
Government
Employed
State Govt
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
3.7%
35.7%
96.3%
38.8%
100.0%
38.7%
% of Total 1.4% 37.2% 38.7%
Count 0 83 83
Local Govt
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
0.0%
0.0%
100.0%
24.8%
100.0%
23.8%
% of Total 
Count
0.0%
14
23.8%
335
23.8%
349
Total
% within Tier of Govt 
Employed
%  within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
4.0%
100.0%
96.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
% of Total 4.0% 96.0% 100.0%
Table 11 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 6.282a 2 .043
Likelihood Ratio 9.138 2 .010
Linear-by-Linear
Association 6.249 1 .012
N of Valid Cases 349
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 3.33.
Table 11 ( c ) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal PhiCramer's V
.134
.134
.043
.043
N of Valid Cases 349
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis.
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Table 12 (a) How Long Employed * Accessed/Plan to access FMBN Loan Crosstabulation
Accessed/Plan to access Total
FMBN Loan
Yes No
Count 7 167 174
<=14yrs
% within How Long 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
4.0%
50.0%
96.0%
50.0%
100.0%
50.0%
% of Total 2.0% 48.0% 50.0%
Count 6 121 127
How Long Employed 15-28yrs
% within How Long 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
4.7%
42.9%
95.3%
36.2%
100.0%
36.5%
% of Total 1.7% 34.8% 36.5%
Count 1 46 47
29yrs and above
% within How Long 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
2.1%
7.1%
97.9%
13.8%
100.0%
13.5%
% of Total 0.3% 13.2% 13.5%
Count 14 334 348
Total
% within How Long 
Employed
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan
4.0%
100.0%
96.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
% of Total 4.0% 96.0% 100.0%
Table 12 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 
Likelihood Ratio
.599a
.679
2
2
.741
.712
Linear-by-Linear
Association .117 1 .732
N of Valid Cases 348
a. 1 cells (16.7%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 1.89.
Table 13 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal PhiCramer's V
.041
.041
.741
.741
N of Valid Cases 348
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis.
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Table 14 (a) Grade Level * Accessed/Plan to access FMBN Loan Crosstabulation
Accessed/Plan to access Total
FMBN Loan
Yes No
Count 3 54 57
% within Grade Level 5.3% 94.7% 100.0%
GL 01-06 % within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 21.4% 16.4% 16.6%
% of Total 0.9% 15.7% 16.6%
Count 7 199 206
%  within Grade Level 3.4% 96.6% 100.0%
Grade Level GL 07-12/CON 01-04 % within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 50.0% 60.5% 60.1%
% of Total 2.0% 58.0% 60.1%
Count 4 76 80
% within Grade Level 5.0% 95.0% 100.0%
GL 13-17/CON 05-07 % within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 28.6% 23.1% 23.3%
% of Total 1.2% 22.2% 23.3%
Count 14 329 343
% within Grade Level 4.1% 95.9% 100.0%
Total % within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 4.1% 95.9% 100.0%
Table 14 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 
Likelihood Ratio
.6218 
.608
2
2
.733
.738
Linear-by-Linear
Association .001 1 .979
N of Valid Cases 343
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.33.
Table 14 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
PhiNominal by Nominal _ . . .Cramers V
N of Valid Cases
.043
.043
343
.733
.733
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis.
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Table 15 (a) Level of Satisfaction with Income * Accessed/Plan to access FMBN Loan Crosstabulation
Accessed/Plan to access Total
FMBN Loan
Yes No
Count 9 190 199
Good
% within Level of 
Satisfaction with Income 4.5% 95.5% 100.0%
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 64.3% 56.9% 57.2%
% of Total 2.6% 54.6% 57.2%
Count 3 48 51
Level of Satisfaction with Neither
% within Level of 
Satisfaction with Income 5.9% 94.1% 100.0%
Income % within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 21.4% 14.4% 14.7%
% of Total 0.9% 13.8% 14.7%
Count 2 96 98
Bad
% within Level of 
Satisfaction with Income 2.0% 98.0% 100.0%
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 14.3% 28.7% 28.2%
% of Total 0.6% 27.6% 28.2%
Count 14 334 348
Total
% within Level of 
Satisfaction with Income 4.0% 96.0% 100.0%
% within Accessed/Plan 
to access FMBN Loan 100.0% 100.0% 100.0%
% of Total 4.0% 96.0% 100.0%
Table 15 (b) Chi-Square Tests
Value df Asymp. Sig. (2- 
sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 1.583a 2 .453
Likelihood Ratio 1.736 2 .420
Linear-by-Linear
Association .832 1 .362
N of Valid Cases 348
a. 2 cells (33.3%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum 
expected count is 2.05.
Table 15 (c) Symmetric Measures
Value Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal PhiCramer's V
.067
.067
.453
.453
N of Valid Cases 348
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null 
hypothesis.
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APPENDIX-XXXIII: Explanation of Binary Regression Analysis
This section explained the procedure followed in carrying out logistics regression analysis. Further details 
on results presented in chapter eight are also contained in this section.
In logistic regression analysis, a model can be estimated from different stepwise methods (SPSS Inc., 
2007 p. 2). For this analysis the model was estimated from backward (Likelihood Ration - LR) stepwise 
method. This method is recommended when there is small number of variables that can all be managed in 
the model. This was the case for this analysis. Through backward LR stepwise command, SPSS will begin 
with the model that would be selected by the backward elimination method. From there, the algorithm 
alternates between forward entry on the terms left out of the model and backward elimination on the 
stepwise terms in the model. This continues until no terms meet the entry or removal criteria (SPSS Inc., 
2007).
For this analysis, 405 cases were modelled. The case processing summary is presented on table 1. It 
indicates that the combined missing values from the outcomes and explanatory variables reduced from 
405 to 392. Therefore, there is data on all variables from 392 respondents. Table 2 defines the binary 
outcome. It is a question asked to find out whether or not workers participate in NHF scheme. The focus is 
on the category encoded '1 which is 'yes'.
Table 1 Case Processing Summary
Unweighted Cases8 N Percent
Included in Analysis 392 96.8
Selected Cases Missing Cases 13 3.2
Total 405 100.0
Unselected Cases 0 .0
Total 405 100.0
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases.
Table 2: Dependent Variable Encoding
Original Value Internal Value
No 0
Yes 1
Table 3 shows how the dummy variables have been created. Level of satisfaction has two dummy 
variables, tier of government employed has two, length of employed and grade level attained at work place, 
each has to dummy variables and sex of respondent has one.
From classification table 4 and case processing on table 1, given the base rates of the two decision 
options (168/392 = 43% of workers responded 'yes' to participation in NHF scheme, and 57% responded 
'no'), and no other information, the percentage of correctly classified cases is 57.1 percent
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Table 3: Categorical Variables Codings
Frequency Parameter coding
(1) (2)
Good 217 1.000 .000Level of Satisfaction with 
Income Neither good nor bad 56 .000 1.000Bad 119 .000 .000
Federal Govt 138 .000 .000
Tier of Govt Employed State Govt 150 1.000 .000
Local Govt 104 .000 1.000
<=14yrs 199 1.000 .000
How Long Employed 15-28yrs 141 .000 1.000
29yrs and above 52 .000 .000
GL 01-06 68 1.000 .000
Grade Level GL 07-12/CON 01-04 235 .000 1.000
GL 13-17/CON 05-07 89 .000 .000
Male 264 1.000Sex Female 128 .000
Table 4: Classification Tablea,t)
Observed Predicted
Participation in NHF Scheme Percentage
CorrectNo Yes
Participation in NHF No 224 0 100.0
Step 0 Scheme Yes 168 0 .0
Overall Percentage 57.1
a. Constant is included in the model.
b. The cut value is .500
Table 5; Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B)
Step 0 Constant -.288 .102 7.945 1 .005 .750
The Omnibus Test of Model Coefficients is contained in table 6. This test gives overall indication of how 
well the model performs with none of the predictors entered into the model (Pallant, 2010 p. 175). The chi- 
square value of the model is 136.693 with 7 degree of freedom at step 2a and p< .000.
Table 6: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
Chi-square df Siq.
Step 136.864 9 .000
Step 1 Block 136.864 9 .000
Model 136.864 9 .000
Step -.172 1 .679
Step 2a Block 136.693 8 .000
Model 136.693 7 .000
a. A negative Chi-squares value indicates that the Chi-squares value has 
decreased from the previous step.
The Hosmer-Lemeshow test tells us the overall fit of a model to the observed data. A model is term good if 
Hosmer-Lemeshow test value is not significant (Pallant, 2010 p 176). In this case a chi-square statistic is 
computed comparing the observed frequencies with those expected under the linear model and a non 
significant chi-square of p=0.441 is obtained in table 7, indicating that the data appropriately fit the model.
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Table 7: Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Step Chi-square df Sig.
1 5.451 8 .708
2 5.398 8 .714
The model summary is presented on table 8 and the -2Log Likelihood statistics obtained is 398.707. This 
statistic measures how poorly the model predicts the decisions; the smaller the statistic the better the 
model (Wuensch, 2011). A -2Log Likelihood of 398.707 is good (Wuensch, 2011 p 4). The Cox & Snell R 2 
and Naaelkerke R 2 runs from minimum of 0 to maximum of 1 (Pallant, 2010, p. 176). In this case Cox & 
Snell R  (0.294) and Negelkerke R 2 (0.395) are both less than 1. This means that the model fits the data 
and suitably predicts participations in NHF scheme.
Table 8: Model Summary
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Nagelkerke R Square
Square
1 398.536a .295 .396
2 398.707* .294 .395
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than .001.
Classification table 9 provides and indication of how well the model is able to predict the correct category 
(Participating in NHF scheme? - yes/ no) that has been accurately identified by the model (the true 
positives) (Pallant, 2010 p. 176). In this case the model correctly classify 72.4 percent of cases overall. 
This is an improvement over the 57.1 percent obtained in table 4.
Table 9: Classification Table9
Observed Predicted
Participation in NHF Scheme Percentage
CorrectNo Yes
Participation in NHF No 153 71 68.3
Step 1 Scheme Yes 36 132 78.6
Overall Percentage 72.7
Participation in NHF No 150 74 67.0
Step 2 Scheme Yes 34 134 79.8
Overall Percentage 72.4
a. The cut value is .500
The variables in the equation (table 10) gives information about the contribution or important of each of 
predictor variables.
Table 11 gives information about the contribution or importance of each predictor variables.
On the column labelled Sig., values less than .05 denote variables that contribute significantly to the 
predictive ability of the model. In this case, there are eight significant variables (Federal government 
organisation p = .000, Local government organisation p = .000, 29 years plus p  = .049, Lower Cadre p  
= .002, Middle Cadre p = .010, High Cadre p = .015, Good p = .001, and neither p = 020). These are the 
major factors influencing whether or not a worker participate in NHF scheme.
359
The final model is interpreted from Step 2a of table 9.
Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 95% C.I.for 
EXP(B)
Lower Upper
Step Sex(1) -.113 .273 .172 1 .678 .893 .523 1.524
1a TofGovtEmp 54.936 .000
TofGovtEmp(l) -.469 .263 3.194 1 .074 .625 .374 1.046
TofGovtEmp(2) -3.988 .541 54.404 1 .000 .019 .006 .054
YrsEmp2 6.070 .048
YrsEmp2(1) -.673 .372 3.273 1 .070 .510 .246 1.058
YrsEmp2(2) -.068 .385 .031 1 .859 .934 .440 1.985
GLCat 7.360 .025
GLCat(1) .848 .333 6.461 1 .011 2.334 1.214 4.487
GLCat(2) .975 .409 5.679 1 .017 2.652 1.189 5.914
SatSalncome2 14.806 .001
SatSalncome2(
1)
-.757 .323 5.505 1 .019 .469 .249 .883
SatSalncome2(
2)
.636 .443 2.063 1 .151 1.889 .793 4.500
Constant .623 .536 1.351 1 .245 1.864
Stepoa TofGovtEmp 56.014 .0002 TofGovtEmp(l) -.475 .262 3.279 1 .070 .622 .372 1.040
TofGovtEmp(2) -4.009 .538 55.517 1 .000 .018 .006 .052
YrsEmp2 6.024 .049
YrsEmp2(1) -.666 .372 3.213 1 .073 .514 .248 1.064
YrsEmp2(2) -.062 .385 .026 1 .872 .940 .442 1.997
GLCat 7.610 .022
GLCat(1) .858 .333 6.642 1 .010 2.358 1.228 4.526
GLCat(2) .991 .408 5.907 1 .015 2.693 1.211 5.988
SatSalncome2 14.903 .001
SatSalncome2(
1)
-.750 .322 5.435 1 .020 .472 .251 .887
SatSalncome2(
2)
.651 .441 2.177 1 .140 1.917 .808 4.552
Constant .573 . .522 1.207 1 .272 1.774
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Sex, TofGovtEmp, YrsEmp2, GLCat, SatSalncome2.
Table 10: Model if Term Removed
Variable Model Log 
Likelihood
Change in -2 
Log Likelihood
df Sig. of the 
Change
Sex -199.354 .172 1 .679
TofGovtEmp -251.946 105.356 2 .000
Step 1 YrsEmp2 -202.336 6.136 2 .047
GLCat -203.084 7.633 2 .022
LSatwInc -207.470 16.404 2 .000
TofGovtEmp -254.061 109.415 2 .000
Step 2 YrsEmp2 -202.398 6.089 2 .048GLCat -203.304 7.900 2 .019
LSatwInc -207.625 16.542 2 .000
Table 11: Variables not in the Equation
Score df Sig.
SteD 2a Variables Sex(1)
Overall Statistics
.172 1 .678
.172 1 .678
a. Variable(s) removed on step 2: Sex.
Model criticism
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The range of probability for subjects to participate in NHF scheme is between 0.10 and 0.99 for predicted 
probability (table 12). The largest Cooks Distance value is 0.29, which signifies that there are no cases 
with high influence. The normal residual values are between -5 .44 and 2.16 which signify that there are 
extreme negative or positive value cases of concern. From the scatter plot on figure 1, it will be observed 
that there are six extreme cases which imply that the model is poorly fitted with reference to the cases.
Table 12: Statistics
Predicted
probability
Analog of Cook's 
influence statistics
Normalized residual
N 396 396 396
Mean .5719251 .0239327 -.0010809
Std. Deviation .26987657 .03802528 .97076165
Minimum .10405 .00002 -5.44847
Maximum .99225 .29531 2.16535
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